An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization

by

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Author's Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Abstract

Over the years, scholars in the field of terrorism research have suggested that there is a disconnect between the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC) that is preventing information-sharing that might help to advance knowledge in the field. It has been suggested that closer relations between these two communities might address some of the problems that each community faces. While the AC may experience some difficulty gathering primary data in the field of terrorism, the IC may be lacking sufficient resources to thoroughly analyze all of the data that they hold. Therefore, it is thought that combining skills and knowledge might benefit both communities while also improving research on terrorism and potentially preventing intelligence failures. Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) theory also tells us that advancing knowledge in a field requires both research (explicit knowledge) and the experience of practitioners (tacit knowledge) that informs if and how research may be applied to practice. As a basic measure of the researcher - practitioner relationship, KMb studies have examined the use of academic research by practitioners in different fields. These studies have identified common factors that affect the researcher - practitioner relationship and lead to some level of disconnect between these communities in most fields of study. When it comes to information-sharing with intelligence organizations, there are additional factors that uniquely impair the development of co-operation between the AC and the IC. While much has been speculated about a disconnect between the AC and the IC, and the factors involved, the research literature lacks empirical data capturing the perspective of members of the IC. To address this deficiency, this study uses the methods and findings of KMb research to gather input directly from current and former members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

(CSIS) about their use of academic material (AM) on terrorism and the potential for future collaboration with the AC. Through questionnaires, interviews, and a focus group, forty-two intelligence professionals revealed that their use of AM is limited, because of a general sense that the research is largely not relevant to their work. Determining the relevance of AM to IC work involved factors in the organization and the AM itself, as identified by KMb studies. However, respondents also identified misperceptions and a lack of trust that add to the disconnect between the AC and the IC. The majority of respondents supported the idea of closer AC - IC relations but there was considerable skepticism about whether it was possible given each community's concerns about the other. While this study examines a number of information-sharing strategies that could be implemented to improve the relationship between the AC and the IC, and makes recommendations for future action, in the end members of the IC suggested that efforts could start at the level of individual relationships, rather than waiting for larger organizational change in the IC.

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Starting a PhD at a mature age, and after a full career, is not the norm - particularly, if you want to study an area such as terrorism and radicalization. When I began looking for a PhD program and a supervisor, the response was definitely underwhelming - until I found Dr. Lorne Dawson and the University of Waterloo. I am very grateful to Dr. Dawson for taking a chance on me and giving so generously of his time and experience to shepherd me through this process.

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The support of these people - and my wonderful sons - has allowed me to fulfil a lifelong goal. Thank you all.

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my parents. My father and mother came to Canada as refugees in the spring of 1957. They fled Hungary in late 1956 with nothing but the clothes on their backs and their degrees. My father was a civil engineer and my mother was an artist. They were in a refugee camp in Italy when the Canadian immigration officers offered them a future in Canada - mainly because of my father's profession. My parents came to Canada on a boat with other refugees and with my older sister who had been born in the refugee camp. There was little social support from the government in those days but with my father's degree and determination, and my mother's hard work and unwavering support, they built a good life in Canada and instilled in us the value of an education. Which has served me well.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon but, following the events of September 11, 2001 (or 9/11) and other major terrorist attacks around the world, the field of terrorism studies has grown exponentially. Much of this research is conducted in the hope that it will be useful to our intelligence organizations and governments as they make decisions about how to fight terrorism or prevent the radicalization of our youth.

If we look at academic research as a product, it is crucial to know if that product is getting to one of its targeted consumers and if it is making a meaningful contribution to their efforts to prevent and counter terrorism. To that end, it would make sense that there should be some communication and information sharing between the intelligence community (IC) and the academic community (AC) to develop the best possible research on terrorism. Ultimately, this could benefit all parties and possibly translate into more effective counter-terrorism policies and strategies that serve to protect the public.

However, many scholars believe that a lack of effective communication and co-operation between the IC and the AC may be hindering both counter-terrorism efforts and terrorism research. Alex Schmid (2011a:76), an internationally recognized scholar of terrorism, produced a list of questions that he thought needed to be addressed in order to move terrorism research forward and one of his top questions was "Is there a disconnect between academic research on

terrorism and the counter-terrorist intelligence community's knowledge (and knowledge requirements) regarding terrorism?".

Schmid (2014a) noted that "the academic community and the intelligence community often appear to live in different worlds" (Schmid 2014a:10). Likewise, Marc Sageman, another leading scholar of terrorism and a past employee of the CIA, points to a "gap between academia and the intelligence community" (Sageman 2014:565). This gap, or disconnect, means that academics are studying terrorism and radicalization without access to the practical knowledge and the large datasets that the IC possesses. At the same time, the intelligence community may not be taking adequate advantage of the research that the academic community is developing nor do they always have the analytical skills to assess their own data (Sageman, 2014). Scholars contend that these two communities should be seeking to communicate more to take advantage of their complementary skills and resources, and any 'disconnect' may be hindering advances in terrorism research and affecting its usefulness (Sageman, 2014; Schmid 2014a; Horgan, 2014).

These concerns were raised more than a decade ago and the subject of much speculation, yet there has been little formal research about the relationship between academia and the IC and in particular the IC's use of academic research (Schuurman, 2019). This study seeks to address that gap in our understanding of the AC - IC relationship by examining what former and current members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) think about the IC's use of academic research in their work and what that says about their relationship with the AC. This

research begins to address a neglected area of study by setting a base line for seeking to improve the mobilization of academic knowledge in the intelligence community.

Background - Terrorism Research and Sharing Knowledge

Scholars of terrorism have maintained that there are two main problems in researching terrorism that are hindering advancement of knowledge in the field. These two problems are said to be a lack of primary data in terrorism research (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2009; Ranstorp, 2009; Dawson, 2019a; Schuurman, 2020) and a perceived 'disconnect' between the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC). The two problems are related since it is suggested that the IC possesses an abundance of primary data, but is unwilling to share it, in part because they lack a sufficient understanding of the merits of the analysis the AC could bring to bear on the data (Schmid, 2014a; Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Sageman 2014; Schmid 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018).

Summing things up rather forcefully, Sageman (2014:576) asserted that "we have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing". This situation was contributing, he asserted, to "stagnation" in the field of terrorism research, and the solution was "to make non-sensitive data available to academia and to structure more effective discourse between the academic and intelligence communities in order to benefit from the complementary strengths in these two communities" (Sageman 2014:565). While other leading scholars disagreed with Sageman's claims about stagnation (McCauley and Moskolenko, 2014; Schanzer, 2014; Schmid,

2014b; Stern, 2014; Taylor, 2014), many supported the call for closer relations between the AC and the IC to improve research and knowledge in the area (Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a).

This study, as indicated, is focused on the second problem, improving the AC-IC relationship, by providing more empirical insight into one important aspect of that problem: the extent to which the IC utilizes academic research, and the factors conditioning that use (or non-use). To set the stage for this analysis, however, some attention must be given to how Sageman and others have characterized the overall issue.

The fundamental problem of a lack of primary data, that is first-hand information, on terrorism has been a topic of discussion for many years (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001; Horgan, 2004; Silke, 2009, Sageman, 2014; Dawson, 2019a; Schuurman, 2020). It was first highlighted in 1988 when Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) published their review of journal articles about terrorism from the 1960's to the 1980's. They found that the large majority of articles on terrorism did not provide any new data but mostly re-used old material (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Subsequent studies further established that, for many years, only about 20% of articles published on terrorism included primary data or other new material that could provide a basis for new knowledge or theories (Silke 2001, 2004).

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, when the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were attacked, the lack of primary data was largely attributed to the small cohort of scholars

engaged in the field of study. In the years before 9/11, there were few researchers dedicated to the study of terrorism, as it was not a mainstream field of study and funding was scarce (Merari, 1991; Reid, 1997; Ranstorp, 2009; Schmid, 2011b). Further, it was difficult to conduct field research into terrorism, given the type of events, actors, and communities that are involved (Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001; Horgan, 2004; Breen-Smyth, 2009). Therefore, this small cohort of scholars tended to rely on each other's work and the primary data that existed was often re-used by different researchers (Reid, 1997; Ranstorp, 2009).

As Dolnik (2011:5) noted, this heavy reliance on secondary sources meant that the field was becoming a "highly unreliable closed and circular research system, functioning in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop". Likewise, Ranstorp (2009:17) noted that the "Pre-9/11 literature has been criticized for its over-reliance on recycled secondary sources and for academics ensconced in ivory towers, instead of field research and talking to actual terrorists". To stay abreast of changes in society and terrorist groups, the acquisition of new primary data was essential (Neumann, 2009; Crenshaw, 2011; Rapoport, 2012).

Then, with 9/11, everything changed. The attack drew everyone's attention to the issue of terrorism and resulted in a dramatic increase in government funding and increased public awareness and concern. Terrorism research was no longer on the periphery but a burgeoning field of study with research centres being established, new journals being created, and more researchers attracted to the field. More scholars and researchers from diverse backgrounds began to conduct research and publish on terrorism. Advances in technology also introduced

other ways for researchers to obtain primary data, including the ability to obtain first-hand information from terrorists or terrorist groups through their online presence (Weimann, 2006; Klausen, 2015) or even through virtual interviews (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017).

All of this led to an increase in studies that included primary data and firsthand information (such as Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Horgan, 2009; Speckhard, 2009; Speckhard, 2012; Dolnik, 2013; Horgan, 2014). In a 2017 review of the most-cited articles related to terrorism, Silke and Schmidt-Petersen (2017) concluded that important work was being done, and the field had developed a solid body of knowledge. Further, another extensive review of terrorism material by Bart Schuurman (2020) revealed that over half (about 53.8%) of published articles now included some amount of primary data with a corresponding decrease in reliance on secondary sources. Therefore, the problem of a lack of primary data and firsthand information in terrorism research was gradually being addressed.

The lack of communication and co-operation between intelligence agencies and academia, however, is a problem still waiting to be addressed. The events of 9/11 are often cited as a major intelligence failure in that different agencies held relevant information, but it was not analyzed and shared in time. As a result, various government departments and agencies, in the United States and beyond, recognized the need for better information-sharing between government agencies and outside experts. It was also suggested that intelligence agencies need to adapt their techniques and update their analytical skills by making use of academia and outside experts (Crosston, 2013; Maras, 2017; Vogel and Tyler, 2019). Scholars agreed and

suggested that this lack of information-sharing could be putting everyone at a disadvantage in terms of furthering our understanding of terrorism and improving our responses to it (Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018). Intelligence agencies, though, are reluctant to share information and knowledge with academia and others outside of the intelligence community (Lahneman, 2004; Sageman, 2014; Maras, 2017). Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether any inroads have been made towards the IC using more academic research in their analyses.

Framed in these terms, it appears that at least part of the problem is one of knowledge mobilization. Studies in **Knowledge Mobilization** (KMb) focus on the connection between researchers and practitioners and how research is used in policy and practice. KMb research recognizes that knowledge is socially-constructed and information (explicit knowledge) on its own is not knowledge (Weiss, 1979; Lahneman, 2004; Nutley, Morton, Jung and Boaz, 2010). It needs to be combined with 'tacit knowledge' or the knowledge that comes from experience that tells us if or how research may be applied to practice (Lahneman, 2004; Nutley et al, 2010; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Therefore, KMb theory holds that it is important to combine research and experience in order to advance knowledge in a field and lead to better policies and practices (Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head 2015; Vogel and Dennis, 2018.). By combining the knowledge of researchers and the experience of practitioners, this also provides critical feedback or evaluation that adds credibility to the work of both communities and can enhance their social capital (Weiss, 1979; Stone, 2002).

KMb studies have examined the researcher- practitioner relationship in different fields, particularly the fields of health, education, and government, in order to identify common factors that may affect the use of research by practitioners. These factors include the availability and accessibility of academic material (AM), the relevance of the AM to the practitioner, and factors within an organization's culture and structure (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015). An additional factor is time because most practitioners face greater time pressures than researchers and this may affect their ability to use research in their work or to participate in KMb strategies (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Lavis, 2006). In looking at these different factors, KMb research also found that there is a culture gap or a disconnect between researchers and practitioners in most fields (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002).

To improve knowledge mobilization and reduce this gap, KMb researchers have developed a suite of strategies to promote information-sharing between researchers and practitioners. They have found that simply making research available is not enough and more is needed to encourage practitioners to use this material in their work. Building relationships between researchers and practitioners improves information-sharing but the most effective strategies involve direct collaboration, such as working on projects together. Overall, the most effective KMb strategies are those that involve the flow of information in both directions, between researchers and practitioners, through personal relationships (Lahneman, 2004; Lavis, 2006: Phipps, 2011; Campbell, Pollock, Briscoe, Carr-Harris and Tuters, 2017).

Information-sharing with the IC, however, involves additional and unique obstacles. Since the IC is built around the business of collecting information and then protecting it, the IC is traditionally reluctant to share information as the overriding concern is the risk of disclosing too much sensitive information. For this reason, information is classified to limit access and there is a 'culture of secrecy' built around this information. The classification of information, and the added 'Need to Know' policy, create in-groups and out-groups, both within an intelligence organization and with outsiders, based on one's level of access to information (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). In this environment, knowledge may also be seen as a form of power as there is a certain prestige to knowing things that others do not know (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). This means that information also may be withheld to be used when it is most advantageous, either to the organization or the individual (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017).

Information-sharing within the IC is limited therefore not only by one's level of access but also by the desire to exercise the power that comes with having the information. However, there are also risks to withholding too much information and these could include intelligence failures that lead to catastrophic events such as 9/11 (Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017; Britten, 2018) and damaging trust relationships with partner agencies (Lahneman, 2004; Tuinier, Zaalberg and Rietjens, 2023). In Canada, the Conference Board of Canada (Vroegop, 2017) conducted a survey of those who deal with Canada's domestic intelligence agencies and found that there was a general unwillingness in the Canadian IC to share information. Overall, the IC is seen as taking information but providing little in return (Riley-Smith, 2020).

This culture of secrecy and a lack of transparency also lead many in the public to be suspicious of IC activities, especially when the IC is generally only in the news when something bad has happened. At those times, the same classification of information that protects information can also make it difficult for the IC to defend itself. This also contributes to a disconnect as it adds to the ethical concerns about working with the IC and how that might affect an academic's reputation (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison, Bont and Silke, 2023). Additionally, members of the AC may be concerned about their academic freedom and whether the IC will try to influence their research (Lefebvre 2021; Schmid 2014a). Meanwhile, the IC's concerns of working with the AC may revolve around security issues or the risk of being criticized for their work, though there may also be some reluctance to share the power provided by having classified information (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Horgan, 2014; Maras, 2017).

On the whole, the two communities work in very different environments which adds to the suspicions and misperceptions that each has of the other and contributes to an AC - IC disconnect (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel & Dennis, 2018). While both communities have concerns about working with the other, scholars suggest that they should overcome these feelings because there may be significant benefits in working together. The AC may gain valuable feedback about the content and quality of AM while also gaining access to some data and tacit knowledge (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Gendron, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021). At the same time, the IC may gain analytical and training resources, new knowledge, and new perspectives on issues (Schmid,

2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Dover and Goodman, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Improving relations between the AC and IC may also create the trust and confidence needed to build channels of communication that may help to improve the IC's reputation in the public sphere (Vogel & Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021). Overall, both communities stand to enhance their credibility and social capital by combining their knowledge, skills, and resources (Weiss, 1979; Lin, 1999; Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021).

The question then becomes how to improve knowledge-sharing between these two communities in light of the different obstacles, including their attitudes towards each other. Is it even possible? Scholars have suggested a number of strategies for information-sharing, which include increased networking opportunities, the IC commissioning work from the AC, and more movement of personnel between the two communities (Merari, 1991; Shohet, 1997; and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2003; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Vogel and Tyler, 2019; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021).

In Canada, there is little published material about information-sharing between the AC and the IC. CSIS developed an Academic Outreach Unit in 2008 in order to promote relations with the AC in Canada. This has mostly involved inviting guest speakers to CSIS headquarters and hosting conferences, panel discussions, and such. A report was published on their website in 2010, outlining the purpose and activities of this unit (Doyon, 2010), but there has been no public review since then.

Thus far, the literature about information-sharing between the AC and the IC comes from academic researchers with limited input from the IC. Before efforts can be made to improve information-sharing, it is important to understand the IC position as well. Gathering feedback about the use of academic material (AM) by the IC should provide some insight into the nature and limitations of the AC - IC relationship in Canada. Therefore, the focus of this study is exclusively on one aspect of the overall problem: how members of the intelligence community in Canada see the situation, in terms of the mobilization of academic research in the IC. With further resources and time, this study should be complemented with further research focused on securing the views of members of the academic community as well.

Background - Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Since this study focuses on the IC perspective as represented by former and current members of CSIS, it is important to understand something of the origins of CSIS and its intelligence culture, particularly as it relates to past relationships with academia and the use of academic research in the performance of duties. This history of intelligence collection and analysis in Canada provides a foundation for understanding this study's approach and findings.

Until 1984, security intelligence in Canada was handled by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with its origins dating back to when Sir John A. MacDonald assigned the Dominion Police Force and the North West Mounted Police to, among their other duties, "provide information and intelligence on threats to Canada's security" (Rosen, 2000). As society

evolved, the RCMP's role in intelligence gathering also increased, mostly focussed on domestic radical groups, until the 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko revealed the extent of Soviet espionage efforts in the West and Canada began to understand that it was also a target for foreign espionage and influence. This led to heightened concerns about the security of government institutions and the screening of civil servants (Rosen, 2000), as well as increased efforts to "identify and suppress communism" in Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC),2005:5).

In 1966, after some security lapses involving civil servants, the Royal Commission on Security, also known as the MacKenzie Commission, was established to review the security procedures in government as handled by the RCMP. In their 1969 report, in addition to recommendations about institutional security and procedures for screening civil servants, they also recommended that the police and intelligence functions be separated and that a civilian intelligence agency be created (SIRC, 2005). The MacKenzie Commission noted that the intelligence functions of the RCMP "were incompatible with the role of ordinary police: and the Special Branch was found to lack sufficient sophistication and powers of analysis, drawing as it did only on members of the force, to fully discharge the security intelligence role" (Rosen, 2000:3). The commission recognized that police work and intelligence work are two different beasts that require different methods and mindsets.

The government and the RCMP resisted the idea of a separate intelligence agency, but a compromise was reached wherein the RCMP would sever the police and intelligence functions

by creating a separate branch within the RCMP under a civilian director (Rosen, 2000; SIRC, 2005). The security branch was established in 1970 and John Starnes, a career diplomat, was appointed as its director. This compromise also included a pledge by the RCMP to bring in more civilian members in order to expand the intelligence branch's analytical abilities and expertise (Rosen, 2000).

However, this security branch had no real framework or legal mandate and there was no specialized training provided to those RCMP officers who were transferred into this branch. Additionally, the government had a long-standing policy of 'non-interference' when it came to RCMP investigations (Rosen, 2000). Without any real framework or specialized training, combined with a lack of oversight, the intelligence activities of the RCMP went largely unchecked leaving their powers open for abuse (SIRC, 2005). Further, the RCMP did not make good on the pledge to hire more civilians and "by the end of the decade, there was not a single civilian in an officer-equivalent position in planning or operations of the Security Service" (Rosen, 2000:4).

This meant that the branch was still staffed with police officers who had not been taught how to adapt to intelligence work and who continued to operate in a tight-knit police environment. Without any new perspectives or expertise that civilians might have added, and without the involvement of the criminal justice system as in police work, Security Service employees were largely left to their own devices. "Service employees had the best of both worlds - police powers and a large degree of autonomy from the police command structure" (Rosen, 2000:4).

John Starnes, their civilian director, later admitted that he was not prepared for the "different culture of the RCMP and the mistrust that had grown between the government and the force" (SIRC, 2005:6).

Focus on the RCMP's security branch increased in the fall of 1970, when actions by the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), a radical Quebec separatist group, led to the October Crisis. The FLQ had been involved in a number of bombings in Quebec since 1963 but, in October 1970, their actions escalated to the kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Canada, and then Pierre Laporte, the Deputy Premier of the province of Quebec. By the end of this crisis, which saw Prime MInister Pierre Elliot Trudeau invoke the War Measures Act, Cross was released but Laporte was found strangled in the trunk of a car.

As a result of the October Crisis, the government asked that the RCMP be more pro-active in their intelligence investigations so that the government could have better advance information about such threats to security. In response, the RCMP "embarked on an extensive campaign of intelligence-gathering, infiltration, harassment and disruption directed at virtually all stripes of national sentiment in Quebec" (Rosen, 2000:4). In the process, they committed illegal or unauthorized acts, not just in Quebec but across the country, that included opening mail, unlawful entries, accessing confidential government information, unauthorized surveillance (electronic and physical), and the destruction of files or property (McDonald Commission, 1981).

When some of these activities came to light, a commission of inquiry was established to investigate the incidents and determine the extent of government involvement and knowledge. In 1977, the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, also known as the McDonald Commission, was established and, over the next few years, it investigated numerous incidents involving the RCMP in the course of their intelligence operations. A few of the more notable cases, that were extensively reported in the media, involved the following. In May 1972, it was reported that members of the FLQ would be meeting with Black Panthers members from the United States at a barn south of Montreal. Reportedly in an effort to prevent this meeting, and after a judge would not authorize electronic surveillance, the barn was burned down (though there is some internal dispute about whether it was intentional or accidental). In October 1972, members of the RCMP and two local police forces entered the premises of l'Agence de Presse Libre du Quebec (APLQ) and two other organizations during which they removed files, examined them, then destroyed them. In January 1973, RCMP members surreptitiously entered a computer firm to remove, copy, then return files relating to the Parti Quebecois membership (McDonald, 1981).

The McDonald Commission also found that, on occasion, different levels of management at the RCMP compounded the problems by attempting to cover up some of this behaviour or denying RCMP involvement (McDonald, 1981). Overall, it revealed that there had been "a police-sponsored campaign of dirty tricks consisting of break-ins, arson and theft targeted at left-leaning press and political parties (including one that was poised to form a government)" (SIRC, 2005). In their 1981 final report, the McDonald Commission provided numerous

recommendations, one of which was, as MacKenzie had also recommended, that the police and intelligence functions be separated and that a civilian intelligence agency be created, separate from the RCMP, in an effort to move away from what many referred to as 'a police mentality'. Therefore, in 1984, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was created by an Act of Parliament.

In order to set up the new intelligence service, the Security Service Directorate in the RCMP was disbanded and many of its staff transitioned to the new Service. The core of the new Service then was made up of the same individuals who had been conducting intelligence activities in the RMCP, until the first class of civilian intelligence officers was hired in 1985. Whereas the minimum educational requirement for the RCMP, even to this day, is a high school diploma, the new CSIS required all intelligence officer recruits to at least have an undergraduate degree. I was a member of that first class, and I stayed with CSIS until 2015.

The Sir William Stephenson Academy at Camp Borden was opened in the fall of 1985. The instructors were all ex-Mounties, some of whom had university degrees, and they admitted that they had little idea of how to adapt police training to intelligence training. They were essentially developing the curriculum as they went along. As a result, most of the training was related to field work and understanding our intelligence work within the larger context of international intelligence. Analytical training was limited to basic forms of social network analysis and the only time we needed to use any academic material was in preparing an essay towards the end of our training. At that time, the library at the training academy amounted to

a few shelves of books, magazines, and encyclopaedias. I managed, however, to find a few books and articles by Martha Crenshaw, Paul Wilkinson, Brian Jenkins and a few others, so that I was able to write a paper on terrorism. As Air India flight 182, en route from Montreal to London and then New Delhi, had just been downed in the summer of 1985, terrorism was top of mind in Canadian intelligence circles.

When our training was complete, we were sent to the field with the thought that we should learn about gathering intelligence from the ground up. In the end, only the first few classes were sent directly to the field and subsequent classes began their careers as analysts in headquarters. In the field, we were working with ex-Mounties who, at least initially, could not understand how a university degree was going to help us do our jobs. The philosophy of the time was that you had to learn by doing. Knowledge of a topic was passed down from more senior investigators or from reading intelligence reports, including those from our allies. The library in my region was, at the time, very small and contained mostly encyclopaedias, directories, magazines, and copies of the 'Political Handbook of the World' (Sage Publications). While limited, and hardly used, I found these books to be helpful in providing some context about a country, an issue, or a culture.

The fact is that the Service came from a police background and, in the beginning, there was little awareness or use of any academic material (AM) in our work. It was simply not a part of the organizational culture. If anyone wanted to do research or extra reading for an investigation, you usually had to do it on your own time and you usually had to go to the library

to find the material (there was no internet then). Because I had a Master's degree, I was sometimes assigned to a research project so, at those times, I could do research during work hours. If a person had any relationship with academics, it was usually on an individual basis and self-initiated. This situation did not change for many years. Then the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were attacked on September 11, 2001, and everything changed.

CSIS had been conducting terrorism investigations for many years, but it often had to beg for appropriate funding. Intelligence work is meant to be proactive and preventative, but budgets are hard to justify when you cannot show what has been prevented. Increased budgets were therefore usually knee-jerk reactions to events, such as the increase in intelligence funding in Canada that followed the death of 268 Canadians in the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182. Then, after 9/11, the world became focussed on terrorism and funding flowed. Research into terrorism grew and more books and articles and journals were printed. However, in our offices, there was still little use of this academic research.

Over time, CSIS had been expanding its library resources and developing a research unit. We would occasionally get emails to tell us that the library now had certain books or journals, and sometimes we received abstracts of articles or books in our inbox. The library was gradually being staffed by individuals with backgrounds in library sciences or research who could respond to requests for information on specific topics. In 2008, the Academic Outreach unit was established to bring in lecturers and organize conferences. The goal of these efforts was to

professionalize the Service and provide intelligence officers with more information relevant to their work.

These advances were all interesting and met organizational objectives, but they did not really affect our day-to-day work. When researchers were brought in to provide lectures, some intelligence officers could be heard to comment "That was really interesting but what are we supposed to do with this information?". Oftentimes we thought that the information was too theoretical or abstract and many could not see how the information could be applied to our field work or reporting. Further, as the Service grew, so did the demands on our time such that, even if the material was there, we generally did not have the time to read it, interpret it, and apply theory to practice. In any case, such efforts would still have to be self-initiated and likely conducted on your own time. Overall, unless you worked specifically in a research or analysis unit, or were tasked to conduct a research project, it was highly unlikely that you would read or use any academic material.

After leaving the Service in 2015, it was interesting to read articles about the perceived disconnect between the AC and the IC because this was something that I had also considered during my career with CSIS. In relation to Sageman's (2014) remarks about the IC's problem of data analysis, I recalled writing lengthy field reports, with a lot of detail, carefully fact checked, and wondering how much of it would ever be used. It was clear to me that we did not yet have the capability to use or analyze all of our data. This was also clear in some of the taskings that I received wherein I could see that the person in headquarters had missed, or failed to

understand, some of the important points in a report. CSIS was still quite small at the time and there simply were not enough people, with the right skills, experience, or time, to analyze it all.

Meanwhile, if there was something that I wanted to research further, I often could not find any relevant material. Sometimes research articles would be disseminated internally but they usually related more to law enforcement or policy issues - not information that was useful to me in my daily work. When I did find some relevant material, in-house or at the library, it was often very theoretical, and I did not have the time to interpret it and use it. In searching for relevant material, I also recognized that academic researchers did not have the benefit of the type of information that was available to me. It occurred to me that some of our unused information might be useful to academic researchers. What if we could give them some of our less-sensitive data so that it would not go to waste and so that the AM would be more relevant to us in the IC?

Further, after watching academics being interviewed by the media, I noted occasions where our interpretations of events were somewhat different. Clearly, we were assessing things from different vantage points. While there will always be a gap between the AC and IC, because there will always be information that cannot be shared or where a distance must be maintained, perhaps the gap could be reduced a bit by sharing information and insights. Little did I know then that researchers in the AC were thinking about the same things. One would think that, all things considered, it would be beneficial to combine our efforts.

Given my career in CSIS, I am in the unique position of having access to a subject pool of intelligence professionals so that I can address these issues and add some IC perspective to the discussion. But, as indicated, with limited time and resources, this study provides only the IC perspective as represented by current and former CSIS personnel. However, among this study's recommendations for future research is to conduct a similar study in the academic community, and with other Canadian intelligence organizations, in order to provide a more complete picture.

Research Aims

This study seeks to explore the relationship of the intelligence and research communities in Canada by examining the mobilization of academic knowledge on terrorism by members of the IC, during their training and regular duties. In this study, information and insight are being sought exclusively from the perspective of members of the IC.

Formulated as a research question, this study asks, "Is academic research utilized by the intelligence community in Canada and what does the state of such usage tell us about the nature of the relationship between the intelligence and academic research communities?"
To answer this research question, this study examines three more specific sub-questions.

- Does the intelligence community in Canada make use of academic research, to what extent and how?
- What factors influence the use or non-use of academic research in the Canadian intelligence community?
- What actions might be taken to improve the mobilization of academic research in the intelligence community in Canada?

This study examines the factors that may be relevant to the IC's use of AM, including what may be problematic, in their view, about academic research on terrorism. In this study, the research in question, identified as academic material (AM), includes articles, books, textbooks, reports and lectures by scholars in the field. Articles would be those from peer-reviewed journals. Reports refer to publications from think tanks and research centres. Lectures would include both online and in-person offerings by scholars.

The study also sought input from IC personnel about the prospects for future information-sharing between the AC and the IC, as well as recommendations for future research into terrorism. In its entirety, this study aims to provide a snapshot of where we currently stand on knowledge mobilization in the IC, and what this suggests about how relations between the AC and the IC could be improved.

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 2 presents the literature relating to the topic of an AC - IC disconnect as framed by members of the AC. The literature discusses the challenges that the AC faces in gathering primary data as well as the challenges that the IC is thought to have in their analysis of intelligence data. Scholars relate these two problems to the lack of communication and knowledge-sharing between these two communities. They suggest that both the AC and the IC could reap benefits from improved information-sharing and that, ultimately, this would benefit the body of knowledge on terrorism.

Chapter 3 introduces the theory of **Knowledge Mobilization (KMb)** and how it contributes to understanding the researcher - practitioner relationship. KMb theory holds that, when researchers and practitioners share knowledge, the combination of research (explicit knowledge) and experience (tacit knowledge) can help to advance knowledge in a field and provide better research for use in policy and practice, among other benefits. KMb studies have examined the extent to which academic research is utilized by practitioners, and why, in different fields of study, and how this provides some measure of the researcher - practitioner relationship. This chapter identifies and explains the common factors that have been found to affect the use of AM by practitioners and lead to some level of disconnect in most fields. To improve information-sharing between these two groups, KMb research has also developed a suite of strategies that promote communication and the development of relationships. This study uses these findings on KMb as a basis for examining the researcher - practitioner relationship as it applies to the AC and the IC.

Beyond the common factors that KMb research has identified, **Knowledge Mobilization in the IC** includes additional obstacles to information-sharing that are unique to the IC. Chapter 4 identifies and breaks down the different obstacles and elements that affect information-sharing in the IC.

As noted in the literature, the problems that the AC and IC each face, as well as the benefits that might come from working more closely together (Chapter 2), are presented from the

perspective of the AC with little input from the IC. Similarly, the state of information-sharing in the IC (Chapter 4) also requires more input and perspective from members of the IC. Therefore, this study focuses exclusively on gathering IC input in order to provide a more balanced understanding of these topics. To do that, this study explores the uptake of academic research by members of the IC in the course of their work, and the factors affecting the mobilization of that knowledge, to provide some measure of the relationship between researchers and practitioners in the field of terrorism.

Chapter 5 sets out the methodology of this study with close attention to the specific requirements involved in dealing with intelligence professionals as the subject pool. A mixed methods design was chosen to allow for the collection of quantitative data while also gathering qualitative data to help interpret those results. A questionnaire was designed, guided by the literature on KMb, to provide empirical data on the different topics. The questionnaire included both closed and open-ended questions, as well as ample opportunity to add opinions and comments. Beyond the questionnaire, participants could volunteer for a semi-structured interview and / or a focus group that would offer more insights on the different topics, including the AC - IC disconnect. The survey questions formed the basis for the subject interviews while the focus group discussion centred around the main themes that emerged from the questionnaires and interviews. All of the study materials can be found in appendices A through F. Because this study uses human participants, it was also reviewed and received Ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201, 2020).

At the time that this research was being planned, there was no indication or warning that we would soon enter a pandemic with Covid-19. The conditions were not ideal for data collection, and some slight alterations were required to meet pandemic requirements and ethics standards. While I had hoped to conduct in-person interviews and focus groups, this was no longer possible, and the process shifted to virtual interviews and a virtual focus group. Using a virtual format did not appear to negatively affect the input from the interviews or the focus group however the pandemic did affect the distribution and collection of questionnaires within CSIS, limiting the participation of current intelligence personnel. The problems that were encountered during data collection, particularly as it relates to the sample of current members, are discussed in detail in this methodology chapter.

Regrettably, some key questions also were belatedly excluded from the questionnaire by the CSIS management. These questions are identified as the results are presented in Chapter 6. The exclusion of these questions reminds us that individuals may interpret questions differently and these particular questions may have caused CSIS management to have some concerns about the possible disclosure of sensitive information or how the responses might reflect on the organization or its management. These questions are further examined and discussed in Chapter 9.

Chapter 6 presents the results from the questionnaires and interviews. Part I of this chapter provides some key demographic information about the two samples, former and current

members of CSIS, and their experience in the area of counter-terrorism. This data illustrates the diversity of experience and roles within the sample, including different areas of data collection and data analysis. The empirical data is presented in Parts II and III along with selected quotes to provide some insight into the data. Part II looks at the results in terms of how much AM is used by the IC and the factors that are involved in that situation. Part III gathers the respondents' views about how to increase the use of AM by the IC, and which strategies might be useful. The questions that were removed by CSIS are also identified throughout the chapter, with a fuller discussion in Chapter 9. The results for all of the questions are provided though they are grouped according to different themes. Full data and comments may be found in Appendix J.

Chapter 7 adds the Focus Group input (FG) to the discussion. In the FG discussion, it was also possible to go beyond the survey results and directly address the topic of AC - IC relations and how that may affect information-sharing. The different KMb strategies were discussed with consideration given to the perceived risks and benefits to each of the AC and IC communities. In the end, the FG suggested that they would be interested to hear what members of the AC would say to these same questions. While this study is focussed only on the IC perspective, conducting a similar study with the AC is one of the recommendations for future research presented in Chapter 9.

The discussion in Chapter 8 combines the input and comments that were gathered from the different methods in this study and compares them to the existing literature and views of

scholars. This chapter begins with a discussion of the key findings from the surveys, interviews, and FG that establish the current use of AM by the IC and the factors involved in that situation. This is followed by an examination of how the use of AM by the IC could be improved while considering the additional obstacles that are involved when dealing with intelligence organizations. Comments and questions also brought up the topic of potential benefits, and which community might benefit more from increased information-sharing. From the comments that have been provided throughout this study, some observations can be made about the AC - IC relationship from the IC perspective.

In Chapter 9, this study concludes with an overview of the analysis and limitations, as well as some recommendations for future research and action. This chapter begins with a review of the study and reflections on the research design and process, particularly the involvement of CSIS in this study. This is followed by a summary of the key findings including what we can deduce about the AC - IC relationship in Canada from the comments provided. The limitations of this study are discussed as well as the issue of the questions that CSIS removed from the questionnaire. Despite its limitations, this study provides valuable feedback about how AM on terrorism is received by the IC in Canada, as represented by CSIS, and a better understanding of the IC perspective. In so doing, it also provides some evidence and validation for some of the previous literature that has reflected on the AC - IC relationship. Finally, this study provides some direction for the way forward as it outlines a host of recommendations for improving the use of AM by the IC as well as some recommendations for future research on the AC-IC relationship and on terrorism.

CHAPTER 2: TERRORISM RESEARCH AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Terrorism is a complex and constantly evolving issue that affects public safety and national security. It is therefore essential that we do everything that we can to understand it, manage it, and deal with it. Much of the research into terrorism and radicalization is undertaken in the hope that it will be useful to our intelligence organizations and governments when they are making decisions relative to their counter terrorism efforts. However, scholars of terrorism have maintained that there is a disconnect between the AC and the IC that could be hindering research into terrorism (Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018). Scholars contend that both communities have knowledge and skills that, when combined, might help to advance knowledge about terrorism (Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2014; Schmid 2014a; Dover, 2020). However, it is also noted that intelligence agencies still tend to be reluctant to share information and knowledge with academia and others outside of the intelligence community (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Sageman, 2014; Maras, 2017), even though they may be lacking the level of contextual knowledge and analytical skills to maximize the value of the information they have.

While the topic of the AC - IC relationship has been debated in the literature for some time, there has thus far been little formal research in the area and very limited input from the IC. As the literature reflects only how the AC has approached this topic, this study is focussed on providing data and insight from the IC perspective. This is done through an examination of knowledge mobilization within the IC and, in particular, the extent to which academic research

is utilized within the IC and the different factors that might be involved in that situation. This chapter will set the stage for this study by reviewing the literature surrounding how scholars view each community's needs and the benefit that they think can be derived by both communities from closer relations and improved information-sharing. More specifically, I first examine why access to the kinds of primary data collected by the IC could be valuable to the AC in its quest to develop a fuller and more accurate grasp of terrorism. Second, I review the literature surrounding the challenges that the IC is thought to face in analyzing its data. These two problems explain why scholars conclude that there may be considerable benefit to both communities if they could form a closer relationship that would provide for better knowledge mobilization.

Problems of Data Collection in the Academic Community

According to scholars, one of the main problems for academic researchers is collecting primary data on terrorism. Primary data and firsthand information are crucial to building a foundation of knowledge about terrorism so that we can test various theories and expose gaps and errors in our understanding as we move forward (Merari, 1991; Crenshaw, 2000; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Schmid, 2014a). Primary data is also important in keeping the knowledge base current because, over time, terrorism changes as the changes in society may give rise to new grievances or may eliminate old ones. Because the conditions for terrorism are always in flux, research needs to adapt and stay up-to-date so that our governments have the best information available as they make decisions about how to face new challenges related to terrorism.

For this, we need both quantitative and qualitative data on terrorism from original sources. Quantitative data can tell us what is happening in terrorism such as the incidence of certain types of terrorist events or the prevalence of risk factors that may contribute to individual radicalization (such as Desmarais, Simons-Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling, and Hoggan, 2017; Misiak, Samochowiec, Bhui, Schouler-Ocak, Demunter, Kuey, Raballo, Gorwood, Frydecka, and Dom, 2019; Gill, Clemmow, Hetzel, Rottweiler, Salman, Van Der Vegt, Marchment, Schumann, Zolghadriha, Schulten, Taylor, and Corner, 2021). In that respect, creating large datasets can help to show what research has found, provide direction for where research could go, and possibly highlight areas that have been neglected. Meanwhile, first-hand information and personal accounts can give us some insight into the terrorist mindset and the factors that affect a group's behaviour (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Speckhard, 2012; Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017; Speckhard and Ellenberg, 2020; de Koning, 2021; Nilsson, 2022) while it can also help to make sense of what the quantitative data is showing us.

To that end, gathering primary data on terrorism could include collecting information from subjects through interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, and participant observation; as well as examining their written material such as biographies, diaries, letters, or manifestos, some of which may be openly available. Advances in internet technology have not only made it easier to collect some open-source primary data but they have also provided new avenues to collect that data. Researchers can now obtain information from terrorists through their posts, blogs, chat rooms, and social media (Denning, 2010; Prucha, 2016; Freilich, Chermak, Arietti, and

Turner, 2024). Since terrorist organizations increasingly utilize the internet to run 'franchise operations' (Sageman, 2008) or autonomous cells (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Weimann, 2006), as well as for recruiting and training (Weimann, 2006; Neumann, 2009; Denning, 2010; Klausen, 2015; Prucha, 2016), the internet provides a vast amount of information from original sources.

However, many scholars consider it impossible to combat terrorism or radicalization without 'talking to terrorists' and obtaining their first-hand accounts (Horgan, 2004; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Noricks, 2009; Post and Berko, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2014; Nilsson, 2018; Dawson, 2019a). Such accounts help us to examine and understand radicalization and involvement in terrorist organizations from the insider perspective, as opposed to imposing our outsider perspectives on the data (Post and Berko, 2009; Dawson, 2019a; Pilkington, 2022).

> This means that we must acquire more data about and from terrorists, and learn to be more sophisticated in the way we interpret that data, and hence confident in the insights gleaned. (Dawson, 2019a:169)

Gathering firsthand accounts in any field can be time-consuming and expensive but, when working with terrorists, it can also be unpredictable and potentially dangerous (Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2013; Nilsson, 2018; Morrison et al., 2023). Therefore, it is understandable that academic researchers might be reluctant or ill-equipped to venture into the field to gather firsthand data from or about terrorists (Merari, 1991; Horgan, 2004; Dolnik, 2011; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison et al., 2023).

But it is important to consider that not only does field research provide new and original data to the field, it also benefits the body of knowledge through the experiences of the researcher. Only by dealing directly with terrorists can a researcher gain a deeper understanding of the milieu and its inhabitants (Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018). That experience and knowledge will help a researcher to interpret their data and focus future research (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018; Dawson, 2019a) which, in turn, will greatly improve discussion and debates surrounding terrorism.

However, the considerations surrounding field research in terrorism can be daunting. The first thing that comes to mind when discussing field research in terrorism is likely the potential **physical risks** to the researcher, either while conducting the research or threats that may arise after the research is published. While internet technology now makes it possible to conduct virtual interviews, most first-hand accounts will come from field research. If the researcher intends to conduct face-to-face interviews with terrorists, particularly if it also involves entering a conflict zone, the risks are very real (Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2013; Morrison et al, 2023). While some of these dangers may be managed by being well-prepared (Horgan, 2004; Silke, 2004; Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2013; Nilsson, 2018), most researchers in the academic community are not trained or willing to take such risks (Horgan, 2004; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison et al, 2023) so the number of academic researchers who will conduct field research into terrorism is considerably reduced right from the start.

Fortunately, with the advances in the internet, some interviews or discussions can now be held online, from the safety of the researcher's office, while still providing valuable data (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017). However, there is another oft-neglected consideration and that is the potential **psychological risk** and trauma to the researcher from being exposed to, or seeing visuals of, terrorist violence or other disturbing material (Morrison et al., 2023).

Besides these, the academic researcher also has to consider possible **risks to their reputation** or career. Depending on the nature and focus of their research, some researchers may find themselves being accused of supporting terrorism or sympathizing with a certain terrorist group (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Horgan, 2012; Morrison et al, 2023). As terrorism is a highly emotive issue, it is difficult for people to remain objective and sometimes stigma is attached to research into terrorism (Silke, 2004; WIktorowicz, 2005; Horgan, 2012; Dawson, 2019b). Researchers may also draw the attention of government agencies or authorities who may question them about their motivations and their research (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison, Silke and McGowan, 2021). All of this has the potential to upset relationships in academia and affect future career opportunities, particularly if government authorities become involved.

Assuming that a researcher decides to proceed with the field research, the next major impediment is the need to satisfy the requirements of the **ethics review process**, particularly as terrorism field research is usually considered high-risk (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2012; Morrison et al, 2021). While the ethics review process can be a hurdle in any field of research, it is even

more difficult in terrorism research where issues of access, confidentiality, and informed consent are not always clear-cut (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Speckhard, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Nilsson, 2018; Morrison et al, 2021), making it even more difficult to satisfy ethics board requirements. Given that ethics board members may have never conducted such field research, particularly in an area such as terrorism, it may be difficult for board members to understand and accurately assess the issues involved in such research (Dolnik, 2011; Morrison et al, 2021).

The first question to address for ethics boards is who the researcher will be talking to and how they will gain access to the desired **subject pool** (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Dolnik, 2013). Given that terrorists operate in secrecy and are suspicious of outsiders, access is difficult and a researcher cannot usually choose who they talk to (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2013; Nilsson, 2018). Ethics review boards tend to assume that, as in most normal research situations, the researcher holds the power position and controls who they will talk to and how the research will be conducted (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Dolnik, 2011). However, in doing field research with terrorists, the power dynamics are reversed and the interviewer is often at the mercy of the subject and the surroundings (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Dolnik, 2013; Nilsson, 2018).

In terms of the subject pool, it is often a matter of taking what you can get and a researcher is likely to end up with a convenience or opportunistic sample, or snowball sampling (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018). Because terrorist groups operate with some level of secrecy, a researcher usually has to use contacts or go

through guides or 'gatekeepers' to gain access (Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2012; Nilsson, 2018; De Pelecijn, Deconoeb, Hardyns, 2021). These guides or gatekeepers provide an entrance to the group and represent the first-level of approval as they are essentially vouching for the researcher (Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Hwang, 2023). Once approved, the researcher may not have a choice of who they interview and may have to accept whoever is offered or provided for the interview, and some interviews may be spontaneous (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2011).

Once the issue of the sample has been addressed, a key requirement for the ethics review process is that of **Informed Consent**. The goal of this is to ensure that no harm comes to the subject from their participation in the research. Therefore, prior to their participation, ethics review boards require that the researcher explain to the subject what their involvement in the research entails, what the risks are to them, ensure that their participation is voluntary, and then obtain their consent to all of it, preferably in writing. However, a terrorism field researcher is unlikely to be able to get a signed consent form (Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018; Morrison et la, 2021). Besides the fact that it may ruin the rapport between the interviewer and subject (Nilsson, 2018), most terrorist group members will not sign anything and, even if they did, it would likely not be in their real name (Prucha, 2016). The researcher may not even know their subject's real name in the first place as some terrorists use a 'nom de guerre' (Prucha, 2016). For these reasons, many terrorism researchers prefer oral consent after providing the required information (Speckhard, 2009; Hwang, 2023). Speckhard (2009) noted that she intentionally does not ask for real names, asks the subject to choose a fictional name,

and accepts verbal consent. Such anonymity is often demanded or required as both interviewers and subjects have to consider their own safety - from other terrorists or from authorities (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018; Hwang, 2023).

It is also possible that, if the subject is fully informed about the purpose of the study and their involvement in it, they might not want to continue. In such cases, if the information that could be derived from the interview is very important, the researcher may face the ethical dilemma of deciding how much to tell the subject (Dolnik, 2011). Some people might debate whether we should even care if any harm comes to a terrorist. One would think that this is a perfect example of where 'the greater good' may trump individual safety, particularly if that individual is a terrorist. However, that is not what an ethics committee wants to hear.

The next problem may relate to satisfying ethics review boards about the structure, location, and content of **interviews**. Interviews rarely go as planned as researchers have to adapt to each individual subject and situation (Horgan, 2004; Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018). These interviews may be held in a variety of places and the time and location are often determined by the subject (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018).

> Others (interviews) were conducted in a less organized fashion at any available opportunity; on buses, on the move (literally while walking around demonstrations and events), in cars, and before and after events when activists milled around. (Wiktorowicz, 2005:31)

Ethics review boards are also concerned with the **confidentiality** of a subject's identity and information, which also includes the issue of how interviews will be recorded and stored. Speckhard (2009) notes that sometimes audio or video recording the interview is not allowed

or is not desired as it could negatively affect the rapport and inhibit the subject. If video or audio recording the interview is not possible, it will be important for the researcher to keep careful notes which may also be difficult under some circumstances (Horgan, 2004; Nilsson, 2018; de Pelecijn et al., 2021). While a researcher is supposed to ensure the confidentiality of interview records, this cannot always be guaranteed, despite best intentions, and may present another ethical dilemma for the researcher (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison et al, 2021).

There may also be instances where confidentiality of the subject may have to take a back seat to the larger interests. If their information provides details of potential harm to civilians, a researcher is compelled to advise relevant authorities of the threat to life (Speckhard, 2009; Morrison et al, 2021). If research is being conducted in a conflict zone, it is possible that a researcher's notes or recordings might be seized or the researcher be forced to provide information to ensure their own safety (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Morrison et al, 2021; Hwang, 2023). Finally, if a researcher is receiving funding from a government or other organization, some aspects or use of the research may end up being out of their control (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Morrison et al, 2021). Ultimately, in some cases, a researcher may be faced with the question of whose interests it serves to maintain confidentiality.

If ethics approval is required and has been obtained, the next set of hurdles involves actually **conducting the interview**. Clearly, when gatekeepers are involved, there may be some bias involved, from the gatekeeper or the group, about who the researcher is allowed to speak to (Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Horgan, 2012; Nilsson, 2018). Besides providing introductions to the

terrorist group members, the guides or gatekeepers may also be valuable in helping the researcher to prepare for the interview by providing background information about the individuals or about what is expected, as well as identifying any cultural factors (Nilsson, 2018; Hwang, 2023). For this reason, the researcher also has to develop some sort of relationship and trust with their guide (Hwang, 2023).

When a researcher sits down with a subject, they first have to establish some rapport and trust so that the subject will respond more openly and be less likely to leave out information (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018; de Pelecijn, 2021; Hwang, 2023). In some cases, this may require time and multiple meetings (Speckhard, 2009; Hwang, 2023) or, as Nilsson (2018) noted, drinking a lot of tea. Hwang (2023) notes that, if rapport-building requires multiple contacts, this may involve just 'touching base' on occasion, which can also be done via the internet or phone calls though face-to-face meetings, even if just for coffee and small talk, are best. Sometimes the subject will ask questions in order to assess the interviewer and build trust which will present the researcher with the challenge of providing very careful responses (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018). Therefore, building trust may require some 'give and take' in the conversation, sharing information and answering questions, so that the subject will feel more at ease (Post and Berko, 2009; Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018). Wiktorowicz (2005) noted that he would sometimes put subjects at ease by just "letting conversations naturally evolve" (Wiktorowicz, 2005:31). These approaches build trust that is important not only in gaining the subject's co-operation but it also helps to ensure the interviewer's safety, even as it makes it harder to maintain objectivity (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018).

> Under these circumstances, the ideal of having minimal contact with the subjects of the interview study may have to be replaced with a messier approach that often borders on ethnographic research. (Nilsson, 2018:12)

If the guide or an interpreter is required to translate in the interview, this introduces yet another variable that can affect the way an interview goes and the information that it yields (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson, 2018). The subject has to accept not only the interviewer but also the translator (Speckhard, 2009). Further, one can never be sure that the interpreter is providing an accurate translation or that they can handle the information that may be discussed. Speckhard (2009) notes that, if an interview is particularly emotional or sensitive, and the translator is not prepared for that, it can have a traumatic effect on the translator or lead them to pull out of the interview. Given all of these factors, no two interviews will be the same and the researcher must adapt to each one. This means that interviews may not go as planned in the ethics approval.

During such interviews, there is always the issue of a subject's honesty or motivation and their memory of events. After all, terrorists are unlikely to agree to an interview unless they are hoping that it will benefit them in some way (Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2012; Khalil, 2019). As with any subject interview, the subject may have an agenda or certain ideas about what they want to communicate in the interview (Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Horgan, 2012; Khalil, 2019; Morrison et al, 2021). Horgan (2012) also notes that all terrorist accounts are somewhat biased and may also change as the individual becomes more or less involved. Some subjects may not want to implicate themselves in certain criminal or terrorist activity (Speckhard, 2009; Nilsson,

2018); while others may want to talk about it. Post and Berko (2009) note that, in some cases, it seems almost therapeutic for the individual to express themselves without feeling judged.

While a researcher wants a subject to speak freely, some concerns have been raised about taking these personal accounts at face value and whether researchers should attempt to verify some of the information (Dawson, 2019b; Khalil, 2019). Besides the fact that it is usually difficult to verify such interview information, and would probably be limited to verifying factual data, it is important to recognize that it is not only the content of the information that is valuable but what it tells us about that particular subject (Post and Berko, 2009; Dawson, 2019b; Pilkington, 2022). After all, these face-to-face interviews are conducted in order to gain insight and understanding of the individual's world and their own perspective. Experienced interviewers understand that they are unlikely to get complete truth and that the interview is as much about assessing the subject and understanding the environment as it is about the information.

Finally, throughout the field research and interviews, the interviewer has to constantly assess their own situation, not just about their safety but also about their objectivity. Otherwise, there may be concerns that they are too involved or too sympathetic to the group and that perhaps their analysis of the data may be biased (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Speckhard, 2009; Dolnik, 2011; Nilsson, 2018).

All in all, these issues illustrate how a field researcher must adapt at almost every step of the research process which makes it very difficult to satisfy the precise requirements of the ethics review board and then, if approved, to actually conduct the research following the process as it was planned and approved. Without sufficient funding and time, let alone access to subjects, field research may be out of reach for many scholars even though it can yield the kind of rich detail and insight that other types of research cannot.

While academic researchers face a number of obstacles in collecting data, particularly in the field, government and intelligence agencies do this on a regular basis and hold vast amounts of information because they have the authority, access, and training to do it. They collect firsthand information from terrorists and may hold data about incidents and terrorist acts that are not known to the public. Through their field work, intelligence personnel also acquire tacit knowledge about terrorists and their community. Therefore, the IC has both the kind of detailed data and tacit knowledge that could significantly improve the ability of researchers to understand different aspects of terrorism, such as why people join terrorist organizations and the group dynamics that keep them involved in terrorist activity. A deeper understanding of these issues might lead to improved theories that could directly affect programs such as those that focus on deradicalization or disengagement from terrorist groups.

However, to date, there has been little use of government data in terrorism research (e.g. Ljucic, Versteegt, Weerman, Thijs, van Proojien, el Bouk, and van de Weijer, 2020; Rudie, Weerman, Eris, van Prooijen, 2020; Modani, Hernan, Rostami, Askanius, Sarnecki, and Edling,

2021; Gill, Corner, McKee, Hitchen and Betley, 2022; Thijs, Rodermond, and Kleemans, 2023; Freilich et al., 2024). Schmid (2011b) noted that "theory is hampered by inability to use closed-source data" (Schmid, 2011b:468) from intelligence organizations.

Problems of Data Analysis in the Intelligence Community

While academic researchers face a number of obstacles in conducting field research, it is suggested that intelligence agencies may have problems of analyzing all of their data and putting it into proper context (Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018). The point of gathering intelligence in the field of terrorism is to use what is known to predict the future behaviour of those who might wish us harm and thereby prevent bad things from happening. This means that, not only does the IC need to collect a lot of information, the information also needs to be carefully analyzed, and then used or distributed properly in order to make the entire effort worthwhile and productive.

> In order to be useful, intelligence requires effective collection, processing, and analysing of information. (Maras, 2017:189)

While the collection of information is important, it is the analysis of that information that most affects its subsequent use. The development of good programs or policies depends both on high quality intelligence and high-quality analysis (Lahneman, 2004), and this analysis has to keep up with changing times, resources, and methods (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lefebvre, 2004; Juneau and Carvin, 2022). "Even the best data leads to bad intelligence if the analysis is faulty" (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000:99). Therefore, analyzing data and putting it into proper context is crucial to its value in intelligence operations and government decision-making.

While intelligence organizations focus heavily on the quantity of information collected, their ability to effectively process and analyze the information is sometimes called into question (Lahneman, 2004; Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018). Britten (2018) notes that intelligence failures are usually the result of a failure to analyze information properly or to disseminate it to the right people. Events such as 9/11 and Pearl Harbor are often put forward as examples of intelligence failures (Lefebvre, 2004; Maras, 2017).

> A cursory review of significant terrorist incidents indicates that even though information was often held by the right agencies at the right time, world-altering events still occurred. (Britten, 2018:12)

Therefore, it is valid to question whether the vast amounts of data collected by the IC are being analyzed and used to full advantage. Marc Sageman is a forensic psychiatrist and sociologist who previously worked for the CIA for seven years and has since researched and published extensively about terrorism and radicalization. From his experience with the CIA, Sageman (2014) contends that the IC does not have sufficient personnel with the right skills to analyze all of their information and that means that a significant amount of information might be going to waste. Sageman (2014) noted that, when he was working with the CIA, it was rare for analysts to have time to read academic articles related to their work and they received limited in-house analytical training. In a hurry, or without proper training, analysts can make mistakes or miss things and any errors can be magnified as they travel along the path to the decision-makers. Other researchers agree that perhaps the IC does not have the time or manpower to properly analyze all of their data in a timely manner (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Schmid, 2014a).

As I noted in my introduction, this is something that I also questioned during my career with CSIS.

> There is simply no point in collecting data to sit idle, untouched, and unanalyzed forever. Analysis, therefore, is central to the mission of any intelligence community. (Lefebvre, 2004:235)

Therefore, while the AC faces problems in collecting primary data, some researchers believe that the IC may have a problem of data analysis, both of which might be addressed if the two communities worked more closely together

As terrorism evolves, and technology advances, everything moves at a faster pace and the analysis of data has become more complex and difficult (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Juneau and Carvin, 2022). Yet, the IC appears to be preoccupied with the quantity of information collected rather than the quality of the finished product (Maras, 2017; Britten, 2018) as they continue to put a lot of resources into training their intelligence officers without providing equivalent training to their analysts (Maras, 2017; Britten, 2018; Juneau and Carvin, 2022). "The often-overlooked element of analytical success is the underlying skill of the analysts themselves" (Britten, 2018:12).

Sageman (2014) concurred and stated that the ability to analyze intelligence data properly requires both education and experience yet young agents in the CIA received sparse in-house **analytical training**. Intelligence organizations seemed to assume that most of their young analysts have received some methodological training prior to being hired but few actually have the proper background to analyze intelligence data (Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018; Gendron,

2020). Britten (2018) noted that most intelligence organizations do not have comprehensive training programs for the analysis of intelligence data. Generally, analysts only receive training on internal processes related to gathering information or using software, rather than the actual work of analyzing the details in the information (Britten, 2018). In the United States, significant efforts have been made to improve training for intelligence analysts, such as the CIA's Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis that was expanded post 9/11 to better prepare individuals for a career in the intelligence field. However, there is nothing similar in Canada and every organization largely relies on its own in-house training programs (Juneau and Carvin, 2022). As Juneau and Carvin (2022:59) state:

> The Canadian intelligence community does not have an analyst training infrastructure remotely comparable to what exists in the US.

Proper analytical training is very important in analyzing data on terrorism because not only is there a tremendous volume of information coming in, terrorism is constantly evolving and changing as different groups come into play and technology advances. It is very time-consuming and difficult to comb through both open and closed-source information to pick out the relevant information, combine it, analyze it, and put it into proper context (Lahneman, 2004; Lefebvre, 2004; Gendron, 2020), particularly when there are time pressures to report this information quickly (Merari, 1991; Lefebvre, 2004; Sageman, 2014). In such a stressful environment, analysts may miss important details or may fail to assess things properly, particularly if they have less training or experience. Intelligence analysts need to be skilled in critical thinking and logic but, in today's world, they also need to have the technical skills to access all sorts of information and databases (Lefebvre, 2004; Britten, 2018; Juneau and Carvin, 2022).

Finally, since we are dealing with human beings, it is important for an analyst to also have a good understanding of human behaviour, particularly in their focus area, so that they can reasonably assess the motives and actions of the different players (Lefebvre, 2004; Britten, 2018). This could involve drawing on the expertise of scholars or accessing the relevant empirical research and insights that can be found in other fields of study such as psychology, sociology, criminology, and anthropology, to name a few. Therefore, analytical training should include all of these components to provide analysts with the right tools to assess both the information and the individuals involved, and these skills should be maintained or updated regularly.

Some of these same points were raised in the MacKenzie Commission report of 1969 and resulted in their recommendation to hire civilian analysts to add new perspectives and expand RCMP analytical capabilities. However, this recommendation was largely ignored and little was done to advance intelligence analysis in the RCMP Security Service, which was inherited by CSIS.

> When CSIS was created, the analytical resources inherited from the RCMP Security Service were negligible. The Service was essentially a collection agency in which analysis was confined to operations, i.e., planning and assessing operational activities. There was very little strategic analysis. Efforts after the 1968 royal commission to make the Service "more civilian in nature" and to improve the analytical capability largely failed. (Hensler, 1999:127-128)

Beyond training and skill, the **structure of the organization** may also affect the analysis of data as it determines the extent of the division of labour between the collectors and the analysts (Vaughn, 1998; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). For example, in the early days of CSIS, there were few designated analyst positions so intelligence officers who collected the

information often did their own analysis in the regional offices or in conjunction with their counterparts in headquarters. In this case, there was little or no division of labour between the collection and analysis of the data.

However, as the Service grew, it was sometimes the case that the intelligence officers in headquarters, who were doing the analysis, had little or no field experience so there might be some gaps in understanding or communication from this division of labour. Later, when more specialized analyst positions were created, often staffed by individuals with no field experience at all, and housed apart from the investigators, there was an even greater divide between the collectors and the analysts that was only crossed when the individuals involved made a concerted effort to communicate with each other. Eventually, CSIS recognized this problem and attempted to resolve it by restructuring units to locate the analysts with the intelligence officers. Alistair Hensler, who retired as CSIS Deputy Director of Operations in 1995, wrote:

> There was constant conflict between the collectors (operational branches) and the analysts, the former often denying the latter access to pertinent intelligence. This situation carried over into CSIS. The collectors and analysts were located in separate directorates. Analysts had to rely on personal relationships forged with the collectors to gain access to intelligence or on a few operational managers who realized that analysis represented the future of CSIS. A significant improvement occurred only after a reorganization which co-located the collectors and analysts in the same directorate under one senior manager. (Hensler, 1999:128)

As Diane Vaughn (1998) noted, the segregation of duties or 'structural secrecy', directly affects the quality of work in an organization because it means that individuals working in one unit may not know what another unit is doing even though their work might be connected in some way. The larger an organization, the more division of labour there tends to be and the less likely that

any employee will have a complete picture of what is going on in the organization (Vaughn, 1998, 1999; Fox and Harding, 2005; Grey, 2014).

Even when executive summaries or briefs are disseminated throughout an organization, in an attempt to keep everyone informed, those documents have already omitted or condensed information (Vaughn, 1998). In this, Vaughn (1998) refers to the concept of 'bounded rationality', introduced by political scientist Herbert Simon, where individuals make rational decisions based on the knowledge that they have in any given moment. Simon (1956) argued that no one has all of the information and no one can make the 'perfect' decision because they are limited by their own cognitive abilities as well as by conditions in their environment. Therefore, people make 'good enough' decisions - decisions that will serve their purpose or fit their criterion - which Simon refers to as 'satisficing' (Simon, 1956). When one adds the classification of information and structural boundaries that exist in intelligence organizations, it increases the likelihood that employees may be working with incomplete information. Therefore, the siloing of information within the IC may result in sub-optimal levels of even 'satisficing'.

Vogel and Dennis (2018) also noted the problems of division of labour in organizations when they studied the training of civilian intelligence analysts who were involved in analyzing weapons programs for the United States. As participant observers in meetings of various groups of intelligence analysts, Vogel and Dennis (2018) learned that the division of labour between data collectors and analysts was considered to be a significant problem by many

analysts. It was acknowledged that the collectors are usually not subject matter experts and the analysts are not involved in the data collection. This disconnect meant that the collectors and the analysts did not always understand each other's positions and could have different or biased interpretations of the same material (Lefebvre, 2004; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Therefore, errors in analysis can occur if analysts do not have field experience and misinterpret information, or do not understand which details might be important. Errors may also occur if the data collectors are not providing all of the necessary information for proper analysis.

In short, no one can know or understand everything at the best of times but if an organization is set up to impede communication and the sharing of knowledge, then employees are further handicapped in their decision-making. Therefore, Vaughn (1999) states that, in organizations with divisions of labour, "information and knowledge will always be incomplete" and "the potential for things to go wrong increases when tasks or information cross internal boundaries" (Vaughn, 1999:277). Clearly, when information fails to reach the right people within an organization due to the structure of the organization, and individuals do not have all of the relevant information for their work, mistakes are more likely to happen. In the case of intelligence organizations, those 'mistakes' may lead to intelligence failures that could have devastating consequences.

For this reason, intelligence analysts need to have the best available information from all sources - including outside sources such as academic research. While it is clear that the organizational structure of an intelligence organization affects how information is shared within

the organization, how does it affect knowledge mobilization with outsiders such as academia? Are these same elements of an organization's structure hindering AC - IC information-sharing or the uptake of academic research that might be useful to the IC?

Finally, the **organizational culture** or the social environment, can also affect how an intelligence analyst will interpret and process information (Vaughn, 1998; Lefebvre, 2004; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). Further to Simon's (1956) observations about the influences of one's environment, research literature shows that employee choices are heavily influenced by the social environment of an organization, such as management views, organizational bias, peer pressure, and social learning (Vaughn, 1999; Lefebvre, 2004; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). Members of an organization tend to share beliefs and values, and come to have a common view of how things work in their field (Vaughn, 1999; Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Maras, 2017). If there are certain assumptions held within an intelligence organization or a routine way of doing things, employees will default to these when faced with time pressure or scarce resources (Lefebvre, 2004; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). In this way, 'cultural knowledge' may help individuals reduce the complexity of decision-making (Vaughn, 1999; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017) because it helps them pick the course of action that best fits with the organization's interests or processes. Handel (2003) noted that

> Most of the time, people do not bother really making decisions at all; they simply follow existing routines, draw on a stock of preestablished options, or follow the role expectations embedded in their positions. (Handel, 2003:181)

Vaughn (1999) refers to this as 'situated action' when the social context affects how an actor interprets information and makes decisions about their actions. Both the organization and the

individual learn from their past experiences and use this frame of reference to adjust decisions going forward (Vaughn, 1999; Bruch and Feinberg, 2017). In some cases, this type of decision-making might help with the workload, and thereby move the work of the organization forward, but this type of conforming to organizational culture may also lead to mistakes and deviant behaviour (Vaughn, 1999; Punch, 2000). Ironically, the organization may be both the cause of the mistakes and the victim of them (Punch, 2000). Further, such ingrained behaviour will make it more difficult for an organization to change their culture as they adjust to changes in society and their larger work environment (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Maras, 2017).

It follows then that, limited by time and under pressure to produce reports, stressed intelligence analysts will work with the information available to them and interpret it in ways that tend to fit with precedents, existing frameworks, or institutional biases (Merari, 1991; Britten, 2018; Lefebvre, 2021). Further, analysts tend to look for support from internal research documents, as opposed to outside research, because research that an organization holds usually matches their interests and conforms to the organization's worldview (Ouimet, Landry, Ziam and Bedard, 2009; Sageman, 2014).

Even if an analyst locates outside research on their topic of interest, the analyst may choose to ignore it if it does not fit with their own or their organization's preconceptions or purposes (Lefebvre, 2004, Sageman, 2014). In this regard, analysts in the IC have sometimes been accused of 'groupthink' or a 'herd mentality' that makes it difficult for individual employees to provide a creative or contrary point of view (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Crosston, 2013;

Sageman, 2014). As these influences affect analyst decisions, and as the information flows through the process, any errors or flaws in analysis are further embedded (Vaughn, 1998; Sageman, 2014). Because counter terrorism strategies are based on the proper analysis of information, it follows that failures in intelligence may be failures in analysis (Britten, 2018).

In the Canadian context, Juneau and Carvin (2022) note that analysts are now better trained and equipped to analyze intelligence data, though they still face time pressures and deal with some divisions of labour that may affect their work. Further, the focus of Canadian intelligence organizations still tends to be on investigations and data collection, as opposed to the analysis of that data, even though it is the analytical product that is more important in policy-making.

At any rate, this is what academic researchers think might be happening in these two communities. The literature discusses the problems that the AC faces in gathering primary data especially as it relates to conducting the kind of field research that provides the most insight into the terrorist mindset. Meanwhile, the IC collects data that is not publicly available and, through their investigations, they gain the tacit knowledge that comes from direct contact with members of a terrorist organization or their larger community. It is thought that sharing some of their closed-source data or tacit knowledge could significantly aid the AC in analyzing and interpreting data, providing for deeper insight, better theories, and directions for future research. At the same time, scholars suggest that the IC has a problem of data analysis due to different factors within the organization that, combined with the pressures of intelligence work, may mean that the IC is not able to fully analyze its data and use it to its full potential. These

factors involve not only the training of intelligence analysts but how the organization is set up to facilitate or hinder the work of data analysts. The literature suggests that this is where AC skills in research, training, and data analysis may play a role in improving the ability of the IC to maximize the data that they collect.

This is how outsiders see the situation for each community and how a 'disconnect' between the AC and the IC may be hindering the work of each. From this position, it is argued that the solution lies with finding ways to better connect the AC and the IC.

The Case for Working Together

The events of 9/11 are often put forward as an example of a major failure of intelligence analysis due to a lack of knowledge mobilization within the IC and with outside organizations (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). While different U.S. agencies are reported to have held relevant information about the planned strikes, the information was not properly analyzed and shared. After 9/11, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the United States issued directives encouraging the use of outside expertise in researching terrorism. It was suggested that using outside experts would help intelligence analysts gain new knowledge and insights as well as counter 'groupthink' from organizational influences (Crosston, 2013; Vogel and Tyler, 2019). The U.S. National Research Council (2011) and other researchers have also noted that, as national security concerns have changed over time, the intelligence community must adapt and update their analytical skills and techniques or consider

making use of outside expertise in the analysis of their data and training of their personnel (Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018).

Along these lines, many have noted that the IC cannot possibly keep up with all of the potential threats of terrorism (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Crosston, 2013; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Ilardi, Smith and Zammit, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021) so there could be significant benefits in working more closely together. Scholars have suggested that the AC could help by adding their skills and knowledge to fill in any gaps in IC knowledge and provide fresh perspectives on issues (Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). The AC can also challenge or validate IC knowledge on different topics (Dover and Goodman, 2020). This would help to counter any 'groupthink' so that the IC does not fall back on out-dated assumptions or organizational biases that could result in either over-reacting or under-reacting to events (Crosston, 2013; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Britten, 2018; Dover, 2020).

> Policy and science must come closer together, not only to lessen the threat of terrorism, but also to minimize misguided responses to it. (Schmid, 2014a:7*)*

Schmid (2014a) adds that governments spend a lot of money on counter-terrorism programs that are rarely evaluated. Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) also questioned whether and how counter-terrorism strategies are evaluated. Therefore, it has been suggested that the AC could help by conducting assessments of some programs (Schmid, 2014a; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Freilich et al, 2024) or analyzing other unused data and providing recommendations and insights (Schmid, 2014a; Vogel & Dennis, 2018; Dover and Goodman, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021). If the analysis involved older data, it may not be as sensitive and may not require a security

clearance (Schmid, 2014a; Lefebvre, 2021). In such cases, the results might even be published so that it can benefit other agencies or researchers and add to the body of knowledge (Lefebvre, 2021). Further, using the AC to evaluate programs might end up saving the government money, particularly if it results in ineffective programs being discontinued (Schmid, 2014a).

Another area where the AC could be useful is foresight analysis and identifying future threats or trends that might be helpful when developing intelligence requirements (Crosston, 2013; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021). Researchers could also provide analysis of open-source information on selected issues, thereby freeing up IC researchers to focus on the analysis of classified information or other urgent matters (Lahneman, 2003; Lefebvre, 2021). Because academics specialize in their areas, they would likely be able to provide thorough open-source analysis more quickly than the IC analyst who may have to cover a number of different areas while working under time pressures (Shohet, 1997; Lefebvre, 2021). Going one step further, the AC could host conferences or workshops to gather open information on specific topics that are of interest to the IC or where research is needed (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Lefebvre, 2021).

In terms of training, the AC could be helpful in training intelligence analysts (Sageman, 2014; Britten, 2018; Gendron, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021) or provide courses specifically tailored to the interests or needs of the IC (Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Since these would not involve classified information or require a security clearance, they could be conducted in any location. Vogel and Dennis (2018) note that it would also be important to have workshops to teach the AC

about the value of combining tacit knowledge with research and how this may help in advancing knowledge in the field.

Scholars note that the real value in any collaboration between the AC and IC is the independence of academic research (Raphael, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a). Academia is the most independent source of research such that their analysis and recommendations would be free of the organizational bias or political influences that may affect internal government analysis, think tanks, or other research groups (Raphael, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a). This can be particularly helpful in cases where a member of the intelligence community may have to testify in court, or before a hearing, and relevant academic research can provide credible and independent support for IC decision-making (Weiss, 1979; Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Ilardi et al, 2021). As Ilardi et al. (2021:5) conclude:

> Academia's ability to provide external and independent assessment of a range of counter terrorism tools, establish empirically sound understanding around how individuals may become radicalised to violence, and even evaluate internal processes, can provide the evidence base upon which defensibility of decision-making is so important.

Developing closer relationships would also provide opportunities to build trust and confidence in each other, as well as a better understanding of the kind of constraints that each community faces which might increase respect for each other's work (Vogel & Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Any tacit knowledge or understanding that academics acquire through such co-operation could be very helpful in their future teaching or in how they interpret research going forward (Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021). When feedback is provided between the AC and IC, it can also serve as a form of quality control, almost like peer reviews, that could enhance the quality of everyone's work (Dover,

2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021) and add to the credibility and social capital of each community (Weiss, 1979; Dover, 2020).

With increased trust in the AC, the IC may also be more open to providing some data that would allow for more evidence-based research in the field (Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Gendron, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). However, Merari (1991) questioned whether IC data would be useful for scientific research since the IC collects information for different purposes than the AC and may not have the kind of data that would help academics study certain topics (Merari, 1991; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Further, IC data collection methods are unlikely to be disclosed and may not satisfy the standards for scientific evidence (Merari, 1991; Horgan, 2012; Grossman and Davis, 2021).

On the topic of the need to work with outside expertise, Schuurman and Eijkman (2013:8) stated that

> [g]overnments are increasingly aware of this and are making greater efforts to provide researchers with access to data on terrorism. Counter-terrorism practitioners are also becoming more sensitive to the fact that academic research can be a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism.

To that end, some governments have begun providing more closed-source data towards answering some of the pressing questions in the field of terrorism. For example, by releasing data from a number of different government databanks, information can be combined to develop life stories for individuals who have been involved in violent extremism. The Dutch government has provided anonymized data from national registers, probation files, the Prosecutors office, and Statistics Netherland to further research into radicalization and foreign

fighters (Ljucic et al, 2020; Rudie et al., 2020; Thijs, Rodermond, Kleemans, van de Weijer, 2024). In Sweden, anonymized data has been provided from government registers, police, and the security service in order to study violent extremism among women in that country (Mondani, Rostami, Askanius, Sarnecki, and Edling, 2021).

In the United Kingdom, the Counter Terrorism Policing North West commissioned a study that examined 49 cases of lone-actors who had committed or planned to commit terrorism-related offences in the U.K. between 1995 and 2015 (Gill et al., 2022). The study included data from police files, intelligence reports, and the courts. While the authors devised the coding guidelines and analyzed the coded information, the actual coding of information was completed by intelligence analysts who were employed with the U.K. police so that researchers did not require clearances and sensitive information was not exposed to anyone outside of the police service. These kinds of studies can add valuable data to terrorism research. Further, they illustrate how government agencies and academia can work together to produce new research while also making more use of intelligence data (Freilich et al, 2024). So, why isn't this happening more?

Finally, improving relations between the AC and IC can benefit both communities through the establishment of communication channels for when questions or concerns arise (Lefebvre, 2021). Since the AC is often a target of foreign intelligence, having established points of contact within the IC would make it easier to report concerns while the IC could develop and provide security awareness programs for the AC (Lefebvre, 2021). With closer relationships

and better understanding, academics might also support the IC by explaining some issues in the public sphere, correcting public misconceptions, and improving public awareness of security threats (Shohet, 1997; Lefebvre, 2021).

Thus far, however, this literature only reflects how the AC has approached this issue of the AC - IC relationship and the benefits that they foresee. Do members of the IC see the relationship the same way? Do they see the same potential benefits? If their views differ from those of the AC, we need to know to what extent and why. If the IC does not see sufficient benefit in improving relations with the AC, they will be less inclined to want, or make the effort, to do that. Therefore, this study focuses on gathering data from the IC about their views on the utility of academic research in their work and, by extension, the utility of improving relations with the AC.

In order to do this, we turn to the study of Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) which focuses on information-sharing between researchers and practitioners. At its most basic level, the researcher - practitioner relationship can be examined in terms of how much academic research is utilized by practitioners. While KMb literature suggests many of the same benefits of information-sharing as discussed by terrorism scholars, their studies have identified some common hurdles that contribute to some level of disconnect in any researcher - practitioner relationship. Therefore, this study uses the findings of KMb research to examine the uptake of academic research by the IC and gather their input on potential information-sharing with the

AC. This provides a good starting point for assessing the AC - IC relationship and where it may go in the future.

Chapter Summary

The literature sets out that scholars identify one of the main problems in terrorism research as a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is hindering information-sharing that could advance research on terrorism. Scholars suggest that the AC has a problem of data collection because gathering primary data in the field of terrorism can be difficult and, particularly if it involves field research, potentially dangerous. Meanwhile, it is suggested that the IC may have a problem of data analysis as intelligence organizations continue to allocate the bulk of their time, money, and training to data collection efforts while placing less emphasis on the analysis of that information, even though it is the analysis of data that is crucial to its use in decision-making or creating policy. Data analysis is also important when we consider that intelligence failures in recent history, such as 9/11, are reported to be the result of a failure to properly analyze and share information.

As a result, scholars and governments have repeatedly recommended that intelligence organizations should improve information-sharing and increase their use of outside expertise to help analyze intelligence data. In terms of the AC - IC relationship, it is suggested that there may be significant benefits to both communities, and to terrorism research in general, if efforts were made to improve information-sharing. It is thought that the AC could benefit from the insight and experiences of IC members and possibly gain access to some closed-source data.

Meanwhile, the IC may be able to take advantage of AC analytical skills and research knowledge while also gaining fresh perspectives that might help to avoid IC 'groupthink' and better inform counter-terrorism efforts. Further, by improving their relationship and building trust, both communities may also stand to improve their social capital and influence with government and the public.

However, the literature represents the views of members of the AC with little input from the IC. In order to assess the current relationship and any potential for improved relations between the AC and IC, it is important to add the IC perspective to the discussion and determine if the IC feels the same way. What are their views on information-sharing with the AC and do they see the same potential benefits? In the following chapter, we review the theory and practices of Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) research that will provide the basis for this study's approach to exploring and understanding knowledge mobilization within the IC and how that relates to the AC - IC relationship.

CHAPTER 3: KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION

In the previous chapter, we discussed what the literature identifies as problems faced by the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC) when it comes to research in the field of terrorism. Scholars suggest that the AC has a problem of data collection in that it is difficult for them to conduct qualitative research on terrorism and this may be hindering the advancement of knowledge in the field. Meanwhile, the case was made that the IC may have a problem of data analysis in that they collect an abundance of data but may not have the time or resources to analyze it all or properly.

Some scholars suggest that one possible solution to these problems would be for the AC and the IC to work more closely together and share their information and knowledge. It is suggested that perhaps the AC could assist the IC by analyzing some of their data while the AC could gain some important information and insights from the experiences of the IC, as well as possibly acquiring some significant data for their research. In general, a strengthening of the levels of co-operation and collaboration between the AC and the IC is seen as an effective way of increasing knowledge mobilization in the field. But what is the view of members of the IC? Do they concur with this largely academic assessment of the situation? Or are there differences and are the differences significant? As indicated, this study aims to advance our understanding of the situation by filling in some missing data - by gaining some empirical insight into whether the members of the IC in Canada think there is a problem and how so.

In this regard, this study is examining, as part of the larger knowledge mobilization issue, the extent to which academic knowledge is mobilized within the IC and the factors and limits that affect that use. If there is limited exposure to, taste for, or trust in academic research, it is unlikely that the IC would support greater co-operation and knowledge sharing with the AC. In the absence of sufficient primary data regarding the views of the IC, it cannot be assumed that they see things the same way as the scholars do. To help inform and guide the study of this aspect of the disconnect problem, it is logical to turn to knowledge mobilization literature as it focuses on knowledge sharing between researchers and practitioners in different fields. KMb studies have also identified the obstacles commonly standing in the way of achieving more knowledge mobilization in such relationships in general. This chapter provides an overview of the theory and practice of Knowledge Mobilization and its application to the researcher - practitioner relationship.

Knowledge Mobilization

The benefits of information-sharing between researchers and practitioners, in various fields and disciplines, is the subject of studies in Knowledge Mobilization (KMb). Over the years, there has been growing international interest for evidence-based decision-making in developing policy and improving practices in different fields (Maynard, 2006; Sudsawad, 2007; Nutley et al., 2010; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015; Nutley, Boaz, Davies and Fraser, 2019)

Some of the earliest studies in KMb were conducted in the field of health care and addressed their desire for an evidence-based approach (EBP) to medical practices (Lavis, 2006; Sudsawad,

2007). This was often referred to as the "research to policy and practice cycle" (Qi and Levin, 2011:5). Since then, most of the research on KMb has been conducted in the fields of health care, education, and public policy (Stone, 2002; Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017; Farley-Ripple and MacGregor, 2024).

KMb studies grew out of the recognition that knowledge is socially-constructed and therefore information, or *explicit knowledge*, is just one form of evidence and, on its own, is not knowledge (Weiss, 1979; Lahneman, 2004; Nutley et al, 2010). Translating information into knowledge involves placing it into a particular context that makes the information meaningful and useful (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). For example, in government and business, information becomes knowledge when it is analyzed and filtered to the point that it can lead to “actionable strategies and policies” (Lahneman, 2004:614).

This requires adding another type of knowledge - that which is learned from experience or *tacit knowledge* (Lahneman, 2004; Nutley et al, 2010; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Tacit knowledge is the human component of practical experience or "the unarticulated expertise and experience resident in individual workers" (Lahneman, 2004:615) that tells us if research can be applied to practice and the best ways to do that (Lahneman, 2004; Head, 2015; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). But tacit knowledge is something that is not easy to write down or codify (Lahneman, 2004) so sharing it requires other approaches.

Therefore, combining research information (explicit knowledge) and practical experience (tacit knowledge) is believed to produce the best evidence that, when used, will lead to better policies and practices (Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head 2015; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). At the very least, it can provide information and knowledge that can help to reduce the risk in decision-making for policymakers and practitioners (Weiss, 1979; Hemsley-Brown, 2004). For this reason, it is important to acquire a better understanding of the hypothesized disconnect between the AC and the IC.

In defining Knowledge Mobilization, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) website states, for example, that

> Knowledge mobilization is an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of activities relating to the production and use of research results, including knowledge synthesis, dissemination, transfer, exchange, and co-creation or co-production by researchers and knowledge users. The process involves combining findings from research, the knowledge of the researchers, and the experience of stakeholders in a way that will benefit everyone by being used in the creation of policy and programs. (www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca)

It is important to note that different disciplines may use different terms for the practice of information-sharing between researchers and practitioners. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) prefers to use the term Knowledge Translation (KT) and defines it as "a dynamic and iterative process that includes synthesis, dissemination, exchange and ethically-sound application of knowledge" between researchers and knowledge-users in order to improve health care in Canada (cihr-irsc.gc.ca). KT has also been defined as "an interactive process underpinned by effective exchanges between researchers who create new knowledge and those who use it" (Sudsawad, 2007:2). Other terms that have been used in the literature

are knowledge brokering, knowledge exchange, and knowledge transfer. In Australia, knowledge sharing between academia and external users has also been referred to as "engaged scholarship" (Qi and Levin, 2011). While some researchers have attempted to differentiate between the different terms, they are all essentially referring to the sharing of information and knowledge to result in more evidence-based decision-making (Sudsawad, 2007; Qi and Levin, 2011).

KMb literature further suggests that information-sharing can play a part in any or all stages of the process of moving research to action - from determining where research is needed, to how the research is designed, how the results are interpreted, and how those findings can be applied to practice (Sudsawad, 2007; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017; Farley-Ripple and MacGregor, 2024). Overall, Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) "embraces all steps between the generation of research knowledge and its full use in the real world" (Qi and Levin, 2011:6) as it attempts to close the gap between knowledge and practice (Lavis, 2006).

Besides improving overall knowledge in an area, another benefit that may be derived from promoting knowledge relationships is the enhanced *Social Capital* that it can provide to all parties (Weiss, 1979; Stone, 2002). Bourdieu (1986) describes social capital as

> [T]he aggregate of actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition – in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital (Bourdieu, 1986: 248-249).

The value of a network, and the influence it provides, depends not just on its size, but also the amount of capital, of all kinds, that each member of the group possesses. When a community or network links with another network, this amplifies the amount of resources (skills, influence, knowledge, money, etc.) available to each network as they gain access to the resources embedded in the other network (Lin, 1999). In terms of how knowledge is created and used, linkages between different types of networks or communities can also provide an infusion of new ideas and approaches to a topic that may benefit all parties (Burt, 2004; Valente, 2005; Giest, 2019).

Further, linkage between two communities also helps to build trust among its members (Weiss, 1979; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Giest, 2019) and can provide 'critical validation' of ideas as members of both communities scrutinize each other's information, almost like peer reviews (Schuller and Theisens, 2010; Dover, 2020).

> This function of critical validation is especially important in the face of the tidal waves of information and misinformation that slosh around the electronic world. The validation is not only a matter of truth determination, but also of selection, utility, and application. A community of knowledge draws on its members' collective experience and intelligence to decide which of the huge range of possible choices of knowledge is likely to be the most favorable. It reduces the cost of information, both in searching and verification, and raises the level of reliability. These are valuable both financially and psychologically. (Schuller & Theisens, 2010:103)

The combination of explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge provides intellectual capital that enhances credibility and stature (Lahneman, 2004). Weiss (1979) previously noted that it can improve the prestige and credibility of an agency when they are aligned with a reputable university or distinguished academics.

Therefore, there is general agreement that using research as a basis for decision-making can provide benefits that may include reducing some risk in decision-making, leading to better performance and outcomes, as well as possibly increasing the social capital of the communities involved. However, building and maintaining relationships requires effort (Burt, 2004; Head, 2015). Burt (2004) notes that how much time and energy we expend on a relationship depends on the kind and amount of support or benefit that we derive from it. It involves weighing the costs or risks against the potential benefits. In other words, it has to be worth the effort.

Factors in Knowledge Mobilization

Before the 1990's, the research community tended to assume that the mere availability of research would lead to its use by policymakers, who would consider the research in conjunction with their own experience, and that it would improve the quality of government decision-making (Weiss, 1979; Oh, 1997; Lavis, 2006). However, many in the field of KMb believe that this was an optimistic, somewhat naive view and that research has and is under-utilized by governments and their agencies (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Maynard, 2006).

When discussing research utilization, most people might think of the instrumental use of research, which is when the information can be seen to play a direct role in some decision-making on a topic or issue (Weiss, 1979; Landry, Amara, and Lamari, 2001; Lavis, 2006, Sudsawad, 2007). However, it is important to recognize that there are other ways that research can be used that may not result in direct action. The conceptual use of research is when it promotes awareness or adds knowledge that can bring about new ideas or approaches to a

topic (Weiss, 1979; Landry et al., 2001; Lavis, Ross, McLeod, Gildiner, 2003; Sudsawad, 2007). Research may also be used symbolically as a political or tactical tool, when it is used to justify actions that have already been taken or to justify inaction by saying that one is waiting for the research (Weiss, 1979; Landry et al., 2001; Lavis et al., 2003; Sudsawad, 2007).

Given that there are different ways that research may be used, and many factors that may affect that use, it is difficult to measure the impact that research may be making on outcomes or performance (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Lavis et al., 2003; Head, 2015). However, KMb studies have identified a number of factors that may affect the 'uptake' or use of research by policymakers and practitioners. These factors, which may vary between policy areas, include the accessibility of research; the relevance of research; organizational culture; and organizational structure (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015).

> The use of information is a complex phenomenon involving environmental, organizational, and attitudinal components as well as the specific characteristics of information (e.g., sources, content, or quantity of information received by decision makers). (Oh, 1997:6)

In looking at these factors, Oh (1997) noted that there appeared to be two different perspectives in the early literature. Some KMb researchers subscribed to the "two communities" metaphor which considers the differences between the research and practitioner communities that affects the availability of research and its relevance to the user's work (Caplan, 1979; Oh, 1997). Meanwhile, others appear to support the "organizational interests perspective" which places greater importance on the factors within an organization, such as its structure, priorities, rules and politics, that may be biased against the use of external research

that does not support the goals or policies of the organization (Oh, 1997; Rich & Oh, 2000; Ouimet et al, 2009).

Regardless of perspective, Stone (2002) noted that there is a common view in KMb research "that researchers and policy-makers live in different worlds" (Stone, 2002:288), not understanding or appreciating each other's work environment and constraints. Each group feels that the other does not listen to or understand them so that there is a 'cultural gap' between them (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002).

The first step in addressing this gap between researchers and practitioners was to look more closely at the different factors that have been found to affect KMb. Closer examination of these factors reveals where the hurdles are and how they may be addressed in order to reduce the gap and facilitate knowledge mobilization.

a) Availability / accessibility of research

Studies have identified the accessibility of research to potential end-users as one of the factors in the use of research by policymakers or practitioners. The physical accessibility of research refers to its availability to potential users or if users are even aware that the research exists (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009). It is noted that a lot of research is published in academic journals that may not be easily accessible to users or that they are unaware of (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009). The physical accessibility of research material may also be related to the organizational structure and

whether the resources exist to access research from within the organization (Ouimet et al, 2009; Head, 2015). Therefore, even when research material is published or disseminated, it might not be reaching the right audience (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Head, 2015). However, as technology and the internet have become more sophisticated, this should reduce issues of physical access in that users can more easily locate materials or find other ways to obtain information (Rich & Oh, 2000; Qi and Levin, 2011).

Accessibility also refers to the intellectual accessibility of research or 'cognitive access' (Ouimet et al, 2009) to research. Researchers and external users (or end-users) often use different terms and language in the course of their work (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Campbell et al, 2017) which means that some academic articles may be "unintelligible"' to some users (Oh, 1997). Therefore, even if research material is found and read, users may not understand the significance or applicability of the research and may choose to ignore it in favour of research that they can easily access and understand, such as in-house information or open media (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009). In this regard, it would help if researchers could "re-package" material or provide summaries that are clearly written in language that users understand (Rich & Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Campbell et al, 2017). Meanwhile, the organizations could use "inside editors" (Stone, 2002) to sort through and pull relevant information, or even to summarize some of it for their employees (Ouimet et al, 2009).

b) Relevance of Research

Even if research is available and understandable, its perceived relevance is another factor in its potential use. Clearly, research may not be seen to be relevant if it does not address end-user needs (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011). However, end-user needs also involve a variety of complex factors. To begin with, researchers and users (practitioners, policymakers) have different goals in that researchers seek knowledge while users need practical and timely solutions (Oh, 1997; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Head, 2015). For example, studies of KMb in education found that one of the main criticisms of academic research was its failure to address the practical problems that schools and educational systems face (Qi and Levin, 2011).

Sometimes the relevance of research depends on the quality of its content and analysis. This may be affected by a lack of relevant data (Stone,2002) or if the user considers the analysis to be faulty (Stone, 2002; Maynard, 2006). Lavis (2006) notes that research evidence may also be competing with similar evidence from other sources besides academia. In addition, Stone (2002) notes that most researchers are not familiar with the policy process in government so they may have little understanding of what kind of research or analysis policymakers can actually use (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002).

In addition, the political interests and priorities of an organization, as well as internal politics and relationships, may play a role in determining whether certain research is considered relevant by users (Oh, 1997; Landry et al, 2001; Stone, 2002; Ouimet et al, 2009; Head, 2015). Research is more likely to be ignored if the findings do not support an organization's interests

or that of its leadership (Rich and Oh, 2000; Landry et al, 2001; Ouimet et al, 2009). These may also be affected by other governing bodies or special interest groups that may exert some influence over an organization's decision-making (Stone, 2002; Head, 2015). Considering organizational or management interests, users may limit their search for material to that which is provided by trusted or in-house sources (Rich & Oh, 2000; Landry et al, 2001; Ouimet et al., 2009).

Another factor commonly cited in the relevance of research is its timeliness (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006). Whether research is produced at the right time, to address a current issue, will also affect its usefulness. Not only do researchers and users tend to work on different time schedules, the need to obtain ethics approval for academic research may cause further delays (Lavis, 2006; Campbell et al, 2017). In addition, external factors, such as a change in government or sudden world events, may also affect priorities and the timeliness of research (Lavis, 2006). Therefore, while researchers may want to build relationships in an effort to see their research utilized, users or policymakers who face changing priorities and time pressures may not see much benefit in pursuing that (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Lavis, 2006).

c) Organizational Culture

As discussed in the previous chapter, the culture of an organization is the internal environment or social context where shared values and beliefs influence the operations within an organization (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Kunda, 2003; Vaughn, 2007; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). This culture is created or developed over time because it is presumed to help

accomplish the organization's goals or aid in its efficient operation (Kunda, 2003; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017).

> The culture means not only the implicit and explicit rules that guide and shape their own behaviour and experience of work; it is also the vehicle through which they consciously try to influence the behaviour and experience of others. (Kunda, 2003:354)

Studies in KMb have shown that an organization's leadership is a key factor in whether the organizational culture values research (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015). Senior managers may come from different backgrounds so they bring different views, expectations, and experiences into their leadership role (Hemsley- Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Head, 2015). Managers who believe that experience trumps research may ignore or discount research (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004). On the other hand, leaders or managers who have used research in the past or who come from academic backgrounds may be more likely to build or support a culture that values learning (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Head, 2015).

Some authors have also observed that there tends to be an anti-intellectual stance within government organizations and a general mistrust of external sources of information, that leads to research being discounted (Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Head, 2015). In such cases, a researcher's reputation and their commitment to the field of study may be factors in whether an organization will trust and use their research (Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Maynard, 2006).

Within this environment, employees absorb these different attitudes and develop certain habits and routines that make it easier to make decisions (Ouimet et al, 2009; Bruch & Feinberg, 2017; Maras, 2017). This was discussed earlier in relation to how analysts might make decisions when faced with time pressures but it applies to all kinds of decision-making in the workplace. When faced with choices, employees will generally go along with the expectations of their organization or their leadership in order to support their own career goals (Lavis, 2006; Maras, 2017).

d) Organizational structure

In a review of the KMb literature, Hemsley-Brown (2004) found that organizations with a more formal structure, with more internal boundaries, more movement of personnel, and more competition, are less likely to develop learning environments or utilize research material. Internal boundaries and other conditions that hinder communication work against information-sharing (Vaughn, 1999; Hemsley-Brown, 2004). Where organizational structure is less formal, there is more open communication between employees and this provides an environment where ideas and knowledge can be brought in from external sources (Vaughn, 1998; Hemsley-Brown, 2004).

Other organizational factors that might affect KMb efforts include policies and the authority structure (Lavis, 2006). For example, if organizational policies do not provide any support or incentive for individual employees to use research, it is less likely to be used (Rich & Oh, 2000; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006). Similarly, if an organization does not promote learning or

have programs for continued professional education, where employees would gain more experience in dealing with academic research, research is less likely to be used (Hemsley-Brown, 2004).

Finally, the use of research material is also dependent on having a process or infrastructure that promotes awareness and facilitates the use of research material (Carroll, 2001; Stone, 2002; Ouimet et al, 2009; Head, 2015). This involves both technology and human resources (Lahneman, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009; Head, 2015). Human resourcing will determine if there are employees available, with the right skills, to promote the awareness of research material and support requests from employees. This works in conjunction with having the appropriate technology for employees or library staff to locate and access the requested research material (Oh, 1997).

e) Time Constraints

One final factor, that flows through all of the other factors, is Time. When employees are under severe time pressures, it is easy to see how all of the above-noted factors become more important. Time constraints are determined by the work of the organization and the resources available to do that work. When employees are under time pressure, they will have to make decisions about the best use of their time. That decision will be influenced by what the employee believes their organization needs, what their manager wants and expects, the resources that are available, how other employees might handle the same situation, and the employee's personal career interests. These factors in KMb are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 - Factors in Knowledge Mobilization

Factors in Knowledge Mobilization	
Accessibility	Physical access to research material – availability, awareness Access to outside sources / researchers Intellectual / Cognitive access – language of material
Relevance of material	Relevant content - to address user needs or organizational interests Quality of content - use of relevant data / accurate synthesis and analysis Applicability of content to practical or policy use Timeliness
Organizational Culture	Leadership – background, views, goals, interests Attitudes towards research or learning (management and peers) Trust / credibility of research or researcher Decision-making routines or habits
Organizational Structure	Operational priorities, goals, policies, rules Formality – internal boundaries and communication Infrastructure to facilitate knowledge mobilization / implement research Incentives for users
Time Constraints	Time available to access and use material or sources of evidence; as determined by other factors noted above

In summary, early KMb studies found that the main factors affecting the use of research by government organizations were access (both physical and intellectual), the relevance of the research to organizational interests, an organizational culture and leadership that values research; an organizational structure that encourages and facilitates the use of research, and time constraints. Overall, research suggested that characteristics of the organization, not the individual user, play the dominant role in determining if research will be utilized or knowledge mobilization will be supported. (Rich & Oh, 2000).

Strategies for Knowledge Mobilization

With the growing interest in evidence-based decision-making, there has also been growing international interest in the best ways to get evidence or research to practitioners and

policymakers (Nutley et al, 2010; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017; Nutley et al., 2019). Since the 1990's, this focus has intensified and organizations such as the World Bank and UNESCO have also studied KMb and strategies for strengthening the connection between research and its use in policy or practice (Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). Considerable research has also been conducted in Canada regarding the development and improvement of KMb processes (Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al., 2017).

Early methods of knowledge mobilization focussed on the research material, or explicit knowledge, and the idea that simply making data and information more readily available would improve knowledge for use in policy or practice (Weiss, 1979; Landry et al, 2001; Lahneman, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Nutley et al, 2010). This was the *research-driven perspective* or *knowledge-driven model* and involved the ***'push' or 'science push'*** model of information-sharing (Weiss, 1979; Lavis, 2006). In this model, the producer or researcher disseminates their research findings with the thought that, if available, their audience would use the material (Weiss, 1979; Landry et al, 2001; Lavis, 2006; Campbell et al, 2017). This is a linear model where information flows in one direction from the researcher to the users and it is the researcher who is making the active effort to share information (Weiss, 1979; Oh, 1997; Landry et al, 2001; Nutley et al, 2010; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). To take that one step further, researchers could focus dissemination efforts towards those who they thought would be most likely to use their research (Oh, 1997).

However, Weiss (1979) acknowledged that researchers cannot control what policymakers read and, in the social sciences, unless some topic becomes a serious concern, it is unlikely that the research would be noticed or have an effect. Rather, the use of research in the social sciences is usually the result of trying to address a specific problem, therefore this suggests a *problem-driven model* (Weiss, 1979; Phipps, 2011). In this perspective, a problem is identified by the user who then searches for existing knowledge on the topic or they may commission specific research (Weiss, 1979; Lavis, 2006; Phipps, 2011). This ***'user-pull' or 'demand pull'*** model is also a linear model, with the information flowing from the researcher to the user, though it is now the user or practitioner who is making the effort (Weiss, 1979; Landry et al, 2001; Lavis, 2006; Sudsawad, 2007; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017).

When research is commissioned, there is an assumption that a 'customer-contractor' relationship is established in that the researchers respond to the user's needs (Landry et al, 2001). However, Weiss (1979) noted that, even for commissioned research to be well-used it has to travel through a complex path where the need is well-defined; the research meets those needs; the results must be firmly supported and clear; the research must reach the right people; in a timely manner; and should not conflict with organizational or political interests. Weiss (1979) speculated that, in most cases, the research may not directly affect decisions but would only provide some context or present different ways of looking at an issue. It is also possible that, as noted earlier, relevant research may still be ignored if it runs counter to organizational interests and priorities (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Ouimet et al, 2009).

Studies found that these early push-pull methods of KMb were not very effective in promoting the use of research by policymakers and practitioners; (Lahneman, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Maynard, 2006; Nutley et al., 2019). Even though technological advances have gradually made it easier to access research material, it has also led to the growth of " 'fake news' and unsubstantiated claims" (Nutley et al., 2019: 314) that make it difficult to know which information is accurate. For these reasons, studies continue to support direct interaction between researchers and practitioners as being more effective in improving information-sharing and the use of research in policy or practice (Landry et al, 2001; Lavis, 2006; Maynard, 2006; Sudsawad, 2007; Ouimet et al, 2009; Qi and Levin, 2011; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017; Farley-Ripple and MacGregor, 2024).

For example, Landry, Amara and Lamari (2001) explored the use of social science research in Canada and found that the use of research material had less to do with the content of the material, or the research methodology, and more to do with the dissemination processes and linkages. The use of research material was found to be more closely related to the communication between the two parties as well as a researcher's ability to adapt their research to the user's needs (Landry et al, 2001). Later, Ouimet, Landry, Ziam and Bedard (2009) studied the use of research material by civil servants in Canada. They similarly found that direct communication between civil servants and academic researchers was the best method for promoting the absorption of research knowledge into the civil servant's government work. Lavis (2006) also found that interactions between researchers and policymakers was an important factor in increasing the likelihood that research would be used in policy decisions.

Other factors that were found to affect the use of research in policy or decisions included its timeliness, decision-maker attitudes towards research, and the decision-maker's own skills and expertise (Lavis, 2006).

The consensus in KMb studies was that the most effective way to share information is through direct human interaction between researchers and practitioners and that these relationships should be encouraged and supported by an organization's leadership (Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Sudsawad, 2007; Phipps, 2011; Qi and Levin, 2011). A positive relationship between researchers and users promotes the use of the research while feedback from the users may help to improve future research and thereby further promote the use of research in practice, potentially creating a reinforcing loop of information-sharing. In this way, "the relationship between knowledge and use runs in both directions; practice affects research just as research affects practice" (Levin, 2008:6).

This led KMb efforts to look at **relationship models** and how to improve interaction or 'linkage' where both researchers and knowledge-users were involved in the process of getting research to the end users (Lahneman, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Nutley et al, 2010; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). This interaction model incorporates the 'push' and 'pull' models and adds building relationships.

> Unlike the prior models, this one suggests giving a greater attention to the relation ships between researchers and users at different stages of knowledge production, dissemination and utilization. (Landry et al., 2001:335).

These relationship models could also include the use of intermediaries, like knowledge brokers, to assist in connecting researchers with users and possibly to re-package research for easier consumption by the users (Stone, 2002; Lavis, 2006; Phipps, 2011). However, in these relationship models, the information still tends to flow from the researcher to the user.

In order to provide an audit and feedback function, that could help to improve research, the information needs to flow in both directions (Hemsley-Brown, 2004, Phipps, 2011; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). To facilitate this, KMb needs to go beyond the traditional methods of conferences, lectures, and seminars (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017) and hopefully arrive at a **systems model** where there is full engagement between the two communities, with information regularly flowing in both directions, such as collaborating on or co-producing research (Lavis 2006; Phipps, 2011; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). "Central to the success of KMb is the value of relationships and the mutual respect that underpins them" (Farley-Ripple and MacGregor, 2024:841).

To summarize, these are the methods that are commonly identified for the translation or mobilization of knowledge (Lavis, 2006; Phipps, 2011; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). These are also outlined in Table 2 below.

- 'Producer Push' or 'Science Push' methods are initiated by researchers who seek to share their information with interested parties. This is a research-driven linear model wherein the researcher will disseminate their research to a potential or likely audience.

- ‘User Pull’ or ‘Demand Pull’ is when the practitioners or policy makers actively seek out information to answer their questions or concerns. This is a problem-driven linear model where the information still flows only from the researcher to the requestor.
- ‘Facilitating User Pull’ or 'Knowledge Brokering' is when researchers or knowledge brokers (such as lobby groups or think tanks) assist in connecting research to users. This method involves promoting relationships but the information still generally flows in only one direction, from researcher to user.
- ‘Knowledge Exchange’ involves expanding relationships and creating networks or partnerships on the way to establishing a system model of knowledge exchange, where information flows in both directions. This could include different levels of collaboration and ultimately to the ‘co-production of knowledge’.

Table 2 - Approaches to Knowledge Mobilization

MODELS	APPROACHES	INFORMATION FLOW	
Linear	Producer Push Science Push	One-way (researcher -> users)	Researchers disseminating or sharing information – i.e. articles, books, lectures, etc.
Linear	User Pull Demand Pull	One-way (researcher -> users)	Practitioners in the field seeking information or requesting articles – i.e. using libraries, searching on Internet, etc.
Relationship	Facilitating User Pull Knowledge Brokering	One-way (researcher -> users)	Finding ways to make it easier for users to find information; connecting users with information; re-packaging AM for easier user consumption e.g. think tanks, research groups
Relationships & Systems	Knowledge Exchange	Mostly one-way	Creating and fostering networks or partnerships to facilitate information to flow in both directions e.g. conferences, associations, workshops, networks
Systems	Co-production of knowledge or Collaboration	Both ways	Regular exchange of information between researchers and practitioners; working together on research projects

(Lavis, 2006; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017)

Therefore, effective knowledge mobilization "is not a single event or process but a system, a suite of services working together to support the multidirectional connection of researchers with decision-makers" (Phipps, 2011:1) and to build learning environments that continue to stimulate innovation and advance knowledge in a field. The growth of the Internet with its websites and blogs, the creation of more publications, and the establishment of more conferences and workshops can all play a part in promoting these advances (Nutley et al, 2010; Qi and Levin, 2011).

Chapter Summary

With the growing interest in evidence-based decision-making, knowledge mobilization (KMb) research has examined ways to strengthen the connection between research and its use in policy or practice. KMb research recognizes that knowledge is socially-constructed and information on its own is not knowledge. Information becomes knowledge once it has been filtered and analyzed to the point that it can be used in an applied setting. For that to happen, it requires adding the human component of 'tacit knowledge' or the knowledge that comes from experience that tells us if and how research may be applied to practice.

As a basic measure of the researcher - practitioner relationship, KMb studies have examined how much academic research is utilized by practitioners in different fields. These studies have revealed that there are some common factors that affect the uptake of academic material by practitioners such as the accessibility of research, the relevance of research, the organizational culture, and the organizational structure. An additional factor relates to time constraints in

that many practitioners do not have the time to seek out and utilize relevant research unless the organizational culture and structure requires it or supports it. These studies also found that these factors contributed to some level of disconnect between researchers and practitioners in most fields.

In seeking ways to improve knowledge mobilization and reduce the disconnect between researchers and practitioners, KMb research found that the most effective methods involved personal interaction that could lead to the development of collaborative relationships. They found that the traditional methods of 'producer push', where researchers disseminate information, and 'user pull', where users seek out information, were not very effective in translating knowledge to practice. These methods only involved the one-way flow of information from the producers to the users, with little to no feedback about the value or use of the research. Therefore, KMb researchers developed a number of strategies to promote ongoing relationships between researchers and practitioners with the goal of establishing information flow in both directions. These kinds of relationships serve audit and feedback functions that should improve the quality of each group's work and thereby improve knowledge in a field.

However, KMb studies have also shown that, even though there is support for the idea of information-sharing in most fields, it is less supported in practice. This is because building and maintaining relationships or networks requires commitment and effort so organizations have to see it as beneficial to them. To move forward, research suggests that an organization's

leadership and senior managers are key to developing a culture that values research and learning. Meanwhile, researchers need to consider what kind of research may be relevant or useful to the practitioners in their field. However, these factors can only be addressed if the two communities talk to each other.

Using the methods and findings of KMb research, this study looks at the researcher - practitioner relationship as it relates to the uptake of academic research on terrorism by the IC and the factors that play a role in that situation. This data provides some insight into how knowledge is mobilized within the IC as well as how the IC views academic research in the field of terrorism. However, in discussing knowledge mobilization with the IC, there are additional and unique factors that go beyond the common factors that KMb research has identified and add another layer of complexity to the AC - IC relationship. The next chapter introduces the obstacles and considerations that play a significant role in knowledge mobilization between the AC and the IC.

CHAPTER 4: KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

While there are a number of factors that influence knowledge-sharing in other fields, the situation becomes even more complicated when it comes to the intelligence community (IC). Fields such as health and education traditionally have fairly close relationships between their research community and practitioners (Qi and Levin, 2011). This may be, for example, through requirements to maintain professional standards, attend conferences, or take courses to stay abreast of developments - all of which create opportunities and avenues to introduce new research or obtain feedback (Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Qi and Levin, 2011). We also know of teaching and research hospitals that promote close ties between research and practice in the health care field.

However, intelligence organizations do not normally maintain such relationships and have a reputation for being reluctant to collaborate or share information with outside agencies. In fact, they are often accused of hoarding information (Lahneman, 2004; Sageman, 2014; Maras, 2017; Nadim, 2021). Maras (2017) thinks that, to provide the best possible information to our governments, information should be a 'club good' – something that is available to all members – and that intelligence organizations should see themselves as part of a 'club' or larger intelligence community. Sharing information with a wider array of experts, who can provide different analyses and interpretations may result in greater insight into the larger issues and result in more timely use of the information (Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020). "As such," Maras states, "the power lies in the sharing of information and not the hoarding of it" (Maras, 2017:191).

But this literature is in reference to information-sharing within the intelligence community itself - or 'the club' - which includes other intelligence organizations as well as government and law enforcement agencies. When dealing with organizations outside of the larger IC, such as academia, there are additional risks and barriers involved. If we are going to apply insights from knowledge mobilization research to the disconnect problem in the AC - IC relationship, we need to take these additional factors into consideration. We also need, as this study argues, to augment the larger academic discussions of this problem with more primary data on the views of the IC specifically as it relates to academia.

Obstacles to Information-Sharing

One of the major impediments to information-sharing between intelligence organizations and other agencies is thought to be the IC's organizational culture, namely its **culture of secrecy** (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Dover 2020). Information sharing is generally determined by the culture of an organization, which influences how the organization operates as a whole as well as the rules, assumptions, and beliefs that its members work with on a daily basis (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). In intelligence agencies, the organizational culture is seen to be insular and secretive, zealously protecting their information (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017).

This culture of secrecy begins in the hiring process and who we let into an intelligence organization in the first place (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Grey, 2014; Dover, 2020). According to Grey (2014), a culture of secrecy is created and maintained through three key aspects of an intelligence organization that are identified as ignorance, silence, and surveillance. Ignorance relates to the fact that work is compartmentalized, there are internal boundaries as part of the structural secrecy, and employees are not told everything. They are only told what is believed to be needed to do their jobs. Silence is expected in that people have to sign the Official Secrets Act and are constantly reminded not to discuss their work with anyone who is not authorized to know it or there would be severe consequences. Surveillance refers to the fact that employees are vetted before being hired and then monitored throughout their careers (Grey, 2014). In some organizations, like CSIS, this also involves polygraph examinations before being hired and at different times throughout one's career. On an individual level, this sometimes leads employees to be even more secretive than necessary out of fear of accidentally saying too much (Grey, 2014). Another consequence of this is that it leads to the formation of in-groups and out-groups, both within the organization and with outsiders (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018).

Secrecy is further ingrained through security briefings and the extensive physical security measures that become routine to those of us who have worked in intelligence organizations - locked cabinets, restricted access to areas, key cards, regular password changes, encrypted computers, and other rules around protecting information. The division of labour, with the

corresponding separation of offices and work units, serves to further compartmentalize employees and discourage asking questions of employees who are working in other areas (Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). With all of these requirements and procedures, IC employees develop practices that make it easier to do their jobs but this also makes it very difficult to break any of these habits when changes are desired or required (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Grey, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018).

This culture of secrecy derives from the fact that intelligence work involves collecting information, often surreptitiously, and then carefully guarding it (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). The need to collect information surreptitiously occurs when it is information that someone does not want you to have or that you are not supposed to have for whatever reason. Therefore, no one should know that you have this information or how you obtained it. As a result, the organizational culture in the IC is based more on security concerns and the perceived risk of disclosure (Berkowitz, 2003; Maras, 2017) rather than on the views of their leadership as reported in other fields of study.

This risk of disclosure is the overriding concern in the IC. Berkowitz (2003) studied the use of technology in the CIA and found that they, and probably other government departments, fell behind the private sector in terms of keeping up with advances in technology because of their security posture. While businesses in the private sector also have information and intellectual property that they wish to protect, they understand that it may cost them more if they do not use the most advanced technology to their advantage (Berkowitz, 2003). Consequently, the

private sector focuses on 'risk management' (Lahneman, 2004; Berkowitz, 2003) while "the CIA's approach, at least in terms of technology, was not 'risk management' but 'risk exclusion'" (Berkowitz, 2003). By doing this, Berkowitz (2003) states that the CIA may be handicapping their own ability to maximize the information that they possess.

The **classification of information** is another part of the risk reduction process that tightly controls the flow of information. Every intelligence agency has policies and systems for classifying information at different levels of secrecy - Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Special Access, or whichever terms they choose to use. These classifications will determine the rules around who can access the information (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Vogel & Dennis, 2018). However, it has been suggested that not all of the information that an intelligence organization collects are necessarily sensitive or 'intelligence' (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). In today's world, there is much more openly available information so there may be a lot of information that does not need to be kept 'secret' (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000). Some authors also note that some information only becomes 'intelligence' once it has been analyzed and placed in the context of the interests of the agency (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). Therefore, some scholars note that the secrecy in intelligence organizations tends to be excessive, going far beyond what is necessary (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Grey, 2014; Horgan, 2014; Sageman, 2014; Juneau and Carvin, 2022).

When considering the classification of information, there are a number of factors that may determine if information is sensitive or requires protection. As suggested above, some

information may be open and only becomes 'intelligence' once it is placed into context and becomes an important piece of a larger puzzle. However, there may also be cases where some innocuous piece of information may be deemed sensitive simply because, as mentioned earlier, it is information that someone did not want you to have. It is neither open information nor is it secret information - it is just information that someone does not expect you to have and should not know that you have. Further, there may be a need to protect the source of the information or the method by which the information was obtained (Carroll, 2001; Lefebvre, 2018). These factors complicate matters when considering sharing information with anyone outside of the organization because simply revealing the information might threaten the security of the source, particularly human sources, or the tradecraft that was used to collect the information (Carroll, 2001; Lefebvre, 2018).

Finally, it is worth noting that some of the information that an intelligence organization holds may not be their own (Lefebvre, 2018; Fyffe, 2021; Grossman and Davis, 2021). It may have come from allied sources who set their own level of classification and caveats for the use of the information that they provide. This is something that may not be considered when the IC is pushed for more information - perhaps it is not theirs to give. If allies cannot trust an intelligence organization to protect their information, those allies will hesitate to share information in the future. "If you can't keep secrets, no one will share it with you" (Fyffe, 2021).

All of these considerations lead to the security classification of a report. At this point, it is important to clarify that the classification level of a report is not related to the balance of sensitive or open information within the report. A report must be classified to the level of the most sensitive piece of information within it, while the rest of the material may provide context. Therefore, while some documents may contain an abundance of sensitive information and others may contain only one or two pieces of sensitive information, these reports may still be classified at the same level of secrecy. For the individual who is writing or classifying a report, it is always safer, when in doubt, to default to the higher level of classification and avoid any possible risk of disclosing sensitive information (and possibly ruining one's career).

Beyond the regular classification of information, there is the added requirement of the '**Need to Know' policy**. Just because an individual has a Secret or Top Secret clearance does not mean that they can have access to all material at that level of classification. They must also have the 'need to know', which is the added determination that the material is relevant or essential to that individual's work, in order to be granted access to that material (Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). This creates another form of internal boundary or structural secrecy so that employees may be unaware of what others are working on, even if it may be related to their own work (Grey, 2014).

Maras (2017) notes that this added 'need to know' requirement is also another step in the organization's reduction of risk. It suggests that the intelligence organization is in the best position to know who needs what and, in so doing, they tend to assume that the risk of

disclosure outweighs the benefits of the information sharing (Berkowitz, 2003; Maras, 2017). Therefore, not only does the intelligence organization analyze the data and interpret its importance, they also decide who should be informed of that information (Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). But critics ask "how can you know in advance who needs to know what?" (Grey, 2014:118).

The result of these classification systems, and the fact that different organizations may have different defined functions, may lead to 'stovepiping', or knowledge 'siloing', when information is set up to be contained and not shared (Lahneman, 2003; Lahneman, 2004; Vogel & Tyler, 2019). If IC members hoard or withhold information from other IC members, this means that information may be presented without its full or proper context (Vaughn, 1999; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014) which, as we discussed earlier, can lead to intelligence failures.

Further, it is noted that information can also be used as “an instrument of power” (Maras, 2017:190). Definitions of intelligence always include an element of exclusivity in that it is information that not everyone has or has access to (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). Grey (2014) notes that this can make intelligence professionals sometimes feel that they are 'special' or part of a 'privileged inner circle'. If the 'knowledge is power' attitude prevails, the IC may be reluctant to share that power (Merari, 1991; Horgan, 2014) and it may lead some agencies or employees to hoard information to use as a bargaining chip or as a way of 'defending their turf' (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017).

> The IC does not share because it acts according to the interests and objectives of the agency at the expense of the wider IC. (Maras, 2017:190)

Internally, the strict control of information also supports the hierarchy and power structure of the organization (Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). Senior managers will presumably always know more than their subordinates. Individual employees at lower levels may also hoard information that they collect, to use when it is most advantageous to them, but it may be at the expense of organizational performance and reputation (Lahneman, 2004).

In terms of the organizational structure, another factor that may hinder information sharing is that most intelligence organizations lack the **resources or infrastructure** to facilitate it (Carroll, 2001). Before CSIS can release any information, those reports or documents must be individually and manually edited to remove any sensitive or identifying information. Not only does this require time and resources but it also requires that the individual doing the editing have sufficient knowledge of the material and context to understand which pieces of information, alone or in conjunction with other information, may be sensitive. While it is a relatively simple task to remove things like names, dates, and places, there would be other details that might require making a judgement call.

Carroll (2001) noted that editing information to be released would require someone with the experience to consider not just the content but the source of the information and the method by which it was obtained. Most organizations do not have the experienced personnel to spare for this kind of work because it would mean a trade-off. Even if there was a desire to declassify and share some information outside of the organization, it would mean re-allocating valuable resources from the main work of collection and analysis (Carroll, 2001). The bottom line is

that, even if the need is there and the permission is given, information-sharing would require weighing the benefits of sharing that information against the time-consuming and costly exercise of sorting through and declassifying the relevant information. Being a smaller organization, CSIS does not have the infrastructure to allow for extensive information-sharing. This means that the only information likely to be released includes the organization's open publications, such as those posted to the CSIS website, and responses to requests under the Privacy Act, the Access to Information Act, or the courts.

Clearly, all of the security protocols of an intelligence organization are designed to prevent unnecessarily over-sharing information but it is clear that under-sharing, by accident or intentionally, can also cause problems. In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that sometimes, with structural secrecy or the division of labour, information may not be disseminated to the right people at the right time and lead to intelligence failures (Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017; Britten, 2018). Beyond that, it may hinder the work of the intelligence organization when some problems might be solved more quickly if units within the organization could share more information (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Grey, 2014).

Another problem that may arise when information is withheld and decisions are made with incomplete information is a loss of trust and damaged relations between agencies or departments (Lahneman, 2004). There is a growing body of research that emphasizes the importance of trust in making it possible for intelligence organizations to work together while still maintaining their own secrets (Tuinier et al., 2023). Given what is at stake in intelligence

work, particularly as it pertains to terrorism, it is vital that the different organizations and agencies can trust each other to provide essential information when making decisions that affect national security and public safety (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Tuinier et al., 2023).

For the IC to move forward with information-sharing, these hurdles would have to be addressed and scholars suggest that that it would require a significant shift in the organizational culture of the intelligence organization (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Such a shift would have to start at the top, with organizational leadership that would communicate and create a knowledge-sharing culture, including the necessary technology, but it would also require the participation of all employees in following through with different programs and efforts towards sharing knowledge (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017). To gain the acceptance and participation of employees, and counter the culture of secrecy, it is suggested that there would also need to be some training and incentives for employees to see the value of using research and how their own tacit knowledge can be combined with research to better inform decision-making (Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Vogel and Tyler, 2019).

The Canadian Situation

In their 2017 report on information-sharing with the intelligence sector in Canada, the Conference Board of Canada (CBOC) stated that "the effective sharing of information and intelligence is a critical component of national security" (Vroegop, 2017:27). In 2016, the CBOC conducted a survey of individuals in the public and private sector about information sharing

with domestic intelligence agencies. The CBOC survey looked at the sharing and receiving of information between the IC and other groups, as well as the frequency of sharing, the quality of the information received, and any barriers to sharing. The anonymous survey was sent to 500 security professionals in the public and private sectors, which included different levels of government and law enforcement, as well as crown corporations, trade unions, private companies, university / hospital, and such. Overall, they reported an average response rate of 10% for most questions. While this response rate is very low, some themes emerged and these provide a basis and direction for further discussion.

The CBOC survey found that security clearances and the classification of information were significant barriers to sharing with domestic intelligence agencies. Their survey results found that classifying reports and other information as 'Secret' was generally the default classification for all documents and followed a 'better safe than sorry' approach in that it was considered safer to over-classify a document than to under-classify it (Vroegop, 2017). However, they also found that, beyond these document hurdles, there seemed to be an overall reluctance of domestic intelligence agencies to share information.

> [W]e also found that while legal barriers to sharing government information and intelligence were limited, a culture of unwillingness to share was more of an issue. (Vroegop, 2017:24)

Further, survey respondents indicated that when information was received from domestic intelligence agencies, it was not considered to be of very good quality.

> In fact, one in three private sector respondents chose "poor" to describe the quality of information and intelligence received from domestic intelligence agencies. This is a worrisome figure, as intelligence agencies play a vital role in safeguarding national

> security and the private sector owns the majority of the critical infrastructure. (Vroegop, 2017:23)

In their final recommendations, the CBOC report (2017) suggested that, when it comes to information-sharing, intelligence agencies should move from a 'need-to-know' stance to a 'need-to-share' position. The best method for overcoming some of the noted hurdles was thought to be through personal relationships between members of the public and private organizations that deal with security and intelligence, while also conceding that the frequent movement of government personnel might mean this requires more effort at times. The report also emphasized the importance of leadership in helping organizations to adapt so that individual employees might feel freer to develop relationships with external partners (Vroegop, 2017).

> This is particularly important in Canada's counter-terrorism activities, where bringing together information from a variety of sources across different levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal) enables a better understanding of the threat environment.....the timely sharing of information and intelligence enables us not only to better understand security risks but also to prevent and disrupt attacks from occurring. (Vroegop, 2017:3-4)

While this CBOC study provides some insight into the relationship of the IC in Canada with those who might benefit from their information-sharing, the response rate was low and the respondents involved a variety of different end-users. It is clear that more such data is required to provide a better picture of IC information-sharing with different outside organizations and the factors that affect those relationships.

KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION BETWEEN THE AC AND IC

Having considered the different hurdles and obstacles related to general information-sharing with the IC, this section focuses on the characteristics that are unique to the AC - IC relationship. In the previous chapter, KMb research identified some common factors that affect the level of information-sharing between researchers and users (policymakers or practitioners) in different fields of study. These factors included the accessibility of academic material (AM) (including the language of the material); the perceived relevance of AM (including timeliness); organizational culture (attitudes and social context); and organizational structure (policies, resources, infrastructure).

To these common factors, this chapter has added hurdles that are unique to intelligence organizations, such as the culture of secrecy and the classification of information. The next step then is to consider how these factors play a role in the relationship between academia and the IC. Further, are there any additional factors that are unique to this particular relationship?

As far back as 1991, Merari (1991) discussed the possibility of closer interaction between the AC and the IC as a way to advance research into terrorism and improve our responses to it noting that "the most effective way by which academics may attain a significant influence on government policy is through direct contact with government officials" (Merari, 1991:101). However, Merari (1991) also questioned whether the AC could produce the type of research that the IC could use to improve their policies and operations around security and intelligence matters. It was noted that the interests of government and researchers may not align in that researchers seek to improve their understanding of terrorism, while those in government are

more interested in knowing how to deal with it (Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021).

Along with this, it is noted that the AC and IC work on different timelines so it is unlikely that the AC can produce what the IC needs at exactly the right time (Merari, 1991; Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Schmid, 2014a; Dover, 2020; Gendron, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021). In the field of terrorism, events happen quickly and usually require an immediate or timely response and the AC may not be able to provide the necessary information on short notice. Even if they could, the IC may not have the time to review or incorporate the material into their work (Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Nadim, 2021). Further, the AC can only access open source information or data in their research while the IC has their own classified information (Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021).

> There are three key complications or obstacles to engagement between the two communities: the need for secrecy, the need for speed, and the changing requirements of the intelligence community. (Dover and Goodman, 2020: 349)

Merari (1991) suggested that the first step in promoting the AC - IC relationship would be to ask the IC what kind of research it needs and can use and then determine if the AC could produce the relevant material.

> Before we complain that the client does not appreciate our merchandise, we must be sure that the goods are good, that the client really needs them and that he does not already have a better product that he makes on his own. (Merari, 1991:99)

In 2006, Schmid (2011b) conducted a survey about the state of the literature on terrorism in which some respondents commented that the academic research reflected a lack of

understanding on a number of different topics in the field. Some of the comments also pointed out that most of the authors had no practical experience in counter terrorism and did not have access to classified data (Schmid, 2011b) which might explain some of the problems in the literature.

Schuurman (2019) noted that, while many fields of study gather end-user feedback in order to ensure that their products are useful to their target community, there has been little effort to do this with terrorism research. Therefore, Schuurman (2019) produced a 23-question anonymous survey to gather feedback about the content and use of academic material (AM) by intelligence professionals. Individuals who had attended events with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) or received their newsletter were invited to answer questions about their use of AM, the quality of the material, and whether they found that the AM addressed their needs. The final sample (n=59) included a variety of intelligence-related professions with the largest sector being with police organizations (34%). Further, 20% of the sample indicated that they were in operational roles and 19% worked in policy areas. Overall, the results indicated that most respondents found AM to be a valuable resource but many also found that AM on terrorism and radicalization tended to be too theoretical and, therefore, not as useful as it could be. While this situation was believed to be improving, the majority of respondents thought that academic research could be more closely tied to the needs of the IC, and they supported closer AC - IC engagement as the best way to achieve that goal (Schuurman, 2019).

The data and comments from these studies provide a glimpse of the problems that practitioners see in the current state of research on terrorism and support closer co-operation between the AC and the IC as a way to improve the situation. However, more data is needed to clarify what may be problematic with the research on terrorism and how those problems might be addressed. Therefore, this study expands on the idea of end-user feedback by gathering empirical data, specifically from IC personnel, about the extent and use of academic research in the IC.

Perceptions and Misperceptions

While the literature on terrorism reflects a growing consensus that, to both improve our knowledge of terrorism and give the IC the kind of research that it can use, there should be more information-sharing between the AC and IC, the question is whether closer co-operation is even possible. While some of the factors that inhibit information-sharing with the IC have already been discussed, another major impediment to AC - IC information-sharing is thought to be a disconnect between the two communities (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel & Dennis, 2018). Studies in knowledge mobilization identified that most fields of study experience some form of a 'gap' or 'disconnect' between researchers and users, so this is not exclusive to the AC - IC relationship, however there are some aspects that are unique to these two communities and may be deepening the divide.

It has been said that the AC and the IC live in "different worlds" (Schmid, 2014a) and that this gap between the two communities involves not only a lack of sharing but a general lack of understanding (Sageman, 2014). Some scholars (Schmid, 2014a; Crosston, 2013) believe that

the two communities hold preconceptions about each other that are contributing to a divide between them and a lack of collaboration that

> [H]ints at underlying prejudices on both sides that only exacerbate attitudinal bias. If not overcome this problem threatens to undermine both the capabilities of future Intelligence Community practitioners and the quality of academic community scholars within Intelligence Studies. (Crosston, 2013:40).

Nadim (2021) examined the AC - IC relationship in Pakistan and noted that neither community trusted the other and academic research was generally seen as being irrelevant. Besides his own experiences, Nadim (2021) drew on interviews with government officials, academics, and other experts who had experience working with the national security agencies. He noted that the IC's reluctance to share meant that academics had to use open information or outdated government data, and then the government would at times discredit the resulting academic research. If the IC or government did selectively release data to academics, it was usually for their own benefit - to achieve some goal or present a certain image. These practices also served to reinforce the power hierarchy in Pakistan and remind academia of their lower position. As a result, academics in Pakistan preferred not to work with the government or the IC (Nadim, 2021).

It is clear that the major factor that affects the AC - IC relationship is the classification of IC information and the culture of secrecy that has been built around that. The AC - IC divide therefore centres around those who have access to classified information and those who do not (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021). As discussed earlier, this classification of information, in conjunction with the

'culture of secrecy', creates in-groups and out-groups as well as providing the IC with a form of power that they may not wish to share (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Maras, 2017).

Not only does the AC not have the same information as the IC but many academic researchers do not have any real-world experience with terrorism or counter-terrorism, which leads to the general IC view that outsiders cannot possibly understand the nature of their work (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020). From this follows the notion that academic research is unlikely to be relevant or valuable to IC work because it is too far removed from the practical work of intelligence (Schmid, 2014a; Schuurman; 2019). Crosston (2013) notes that this reflects "a simple lack of respect for what the academic scholar does and how s/he goes about collecting scholarly information" (Crosston, 2013: 47 - 48) and this is one of the barriers to the AC - IC relationship.

Academics, with their focus on critical thinking and their writing style, may also be seen by some IC members as introverts who sit in their 'ivory tower' and write unnecessarily long and unintelligible articles, focussing on theories, instead of providing their findings in concise and clear terms (Schmid, 2014a; Crosston, 2013; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Riley-Smith, 2020; Nadim, 2021). Given that a lot of academic writing is difficult for the IC to understand, Merari (1991) also noted that some of the IC attitude may stem from a "fear of [the] intellectual superiority of academics" (Merari, 1991:95). This also highlights how the two jobs generally require very different personality types, operating in very different environments, that may add to the problem and lack of understanding (Crosston, 2013).

Further, there may be some tension and resentment that is tied to the use of the word 'expert' since this term is used freely and inconsistently by the media and other public sources. So, is expertise defined by education or experience? (Dover, 2020).

All of this leads to the IC being hesitant or unwilling to accept advice or input from the AC. As a result, they may ignore or discount academic research (Schmid, 2014a; Crosston, 2013; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021) and fail to appreciate that AM can provide valuable contextual material (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020). Horgan (2014) stated that, there was

> [A] tendency not to share existing information, associated with exaggerated security constraints; a failure to appreciate the practical value of multidisciplinary research; and a failure to integrate multiple and sometimes overlapping levels of analysis. (Horgan, 2014:156)

While the status of terrorism studies, and those academics who study terrorism, may have improved since 9/11, with increased funding and publications (Grossman and Davis, 2021), it is unclear whether this has changed the way that IC members view the AC. One would think that the situation would be improving given that there are an increasing number of individuals with experience in both worlds and more academics are conducting field research.

Conversely, for ethical reasons, many in the AC have a deep mistrust of anything related to the IC (Crosston, 2013; Osman, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Because intelligence work is conducted in secrecy, those outside of the IC generally do not know what the IC is doing or have any understanding of how it conducts its business. When intelligence organizations are in the news, it is usually when something has gone wrong or there is some alleged misconduct. At

these times, given their security requirements, the IC often cannot defend itself or offer explanations, which means that everyone is left wondering what is true. As a result, people tend to be suspicious of IC activity and generally question the IC's actions and motives (Shohet, 1997; Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Osman, 2020). This is compounded by the fact that intelligence work is often controversial, politicized, and definitely newsworthy (Nutley et al, 2010; Crosston, 2013).

We have all heard or seen stories in the press about the IC reportedly using torture during interrogations or undermining some governments while propping up others. The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) conducted a review of CIA actions following 9/11 (2001 to 2009) and criticized some of their detention and interrogation practices, while Human Rights Watch has published a number of articles about the CIA's use of torture (Human Rights Watch, 2022). CSIS was also implicated in some of the practices at Guantanamo during those years, most notably in the case of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, who eventually received a financial settlement from the Government of Canada because his rights were allegedly violated while he was detained. While such a payment may simply be a strategic and cost-efficient way to avoid the potential costs of further legal proceedings and the risk of further disclosures, many in the media and public tend to treat it as an as an admission of guilt which may increase their concerns about the activities of intelligence agencies.

In many cases, when media articles describe IC malfeasance, the IC cannot confirm or deny the information, due to secrecy requirements, so journalists can usually write what they want and

the public can believe what it wants. From these reported cases, people may believe that all IC personnel regularly lie and break the law to get what they want. Clearly, there are ethical risks involved in intelligence work and there are times when efforts 'for the greater good' may have gone too far (Osman, 2020; Omand, 2021). However, that is another topic in itself and the point here is that people may tend to believe the worst from the incidents that have been publicized. The end result is that academics are sometimes fearful that simply being associated with the IC may negatively affect their status or reputation in academic circles or draw attacks from other political or special interest groups (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Nutley et al, 2010; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021).

Beyond the optics, another concern for many researchers is their academic independence and whether the IC would try to influence the direction or outcome of their research if they were working together (Schmid, 2014a; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Gendron, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Nadim, 2021). This may also relate to the timeliness of research if an academic feels pressure to conduct their research quickly in order to satisfy IC timelines. No academic wants to be seen as a 'state puppet' (Nadim, 2021) and this may be more likely to occur if the researcher obtains a security clearance and gets access to classified information (Lefebvre, 2021). Along the same lines, some researchers may worry about how the IC may use or misuse their research once it is completed or how the IC might react if the research does not give them what they want or is critical of them (Horgan, 2012; Schmid, 2014a; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Nadim, 2021). When the research is completed, unless results are used in an IC open

publication, the academic may have no way of knowing how the research was used or if it was used at all (Grossman and Davis, 2021).

As a result of these concerns, many members of the AC may avoid contact with the IC and intelligence personnel are often not welcome on campuses (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021). In my own career with CSIS, I do not recall having any negative experiences with academics or universities. I found that most were keen to learn more about intelligence work, though a few academics simply refused to talk to me.

> Much of the academic bias percolating around college campuses today is dangerous simply because of how ignorant it is. A few exaggerations here and there can be innocent mistakes. A systematic approach that seems to foster the development of purposely inaccurate myths, however, is something that needs to be actively engaged and defeated. (Crosston, 2013:52)

Clearly, there are members in both communities who do not trust each other, possibly even resent each other, and it is believed that this will continue to exist if there is limited interaction between the two communities (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014).

> Often what restricts the sharing of information is issues of mutual mistrust and suspicion, and, sometimes, poor experiences, and naturally, of course, issues of national security. Most of the time, however, it relates to more basic issues of power and control, but again the mutually beneficial subject is one of value: how can both communities benefit from some sort of increased involvement with one another?" (Horgan, 2014:167)

As Horgan (2014) notes, it comes down to whether it is beneficial for each community to develop better relations with the other community. It is important for the AC to show how they and their research can be useful to the IC while it is equally important for the IC to provide feedback in terms of telling the AC what they need and can use (Merari, 1991; Horgan, 2014). Both sides need to be clear about what they need or want from each other but they need to

communicate more in order to achieve that (Merari, 1991; Horgan, 2014; Grossman and Davis, 2021).

> The key for Intelligence Studies is to not let practitioner arrogance or academic ignorance get in the way of true cooperation that has that rare possibility of being theoretically valid, empirically important, and impactful on policy. (Crosston, 2013:53)

Overall, the literature has suggested a number of benefits (as discussed in Chapter 2) and concerns that each community has about the other. While pursuing better relationships between the AC and IC may yield considerable benefits, these must be weighed against the risks and concerns that have been noted in the literature. Table 3 provides an overview of the different benefits and concerns that have been discussed.

Table 3 - Potential Benefits and Concerns around AC - IC Relationships

	Academic Community	Intelligence Community
Benefits	Potential for more primary data for AC research Feedback from IC – identify where research needed; validation Gain Tacit knowledge for use in future research and teaching Gain better understanding of IC perspective and processes Establish points of contact / communication channels Social Capital / Gain trust of IC	Analysis – evaluate CT programs; analyze unused data Collection / Analysis of open information - re: future trends / foresight / other IC needs Training – help train IC analysts; provide relevant courses to IC Provide new knowledge and perspectives; avoid groupthink Provide support for CT decisions through Independent research Social capital / Gain trust of AC
Risks / Concerns	Different interests / different questions Different timelines – need time to be thorough Effect on intellectual independence / IC influence on research Effect on academic reputation / personal safety Ability to publish during or after involvement with IC Need to clarify how research will be interpreted and used (fear of misuse of research)	Relevance of AM to IC work Different timelines – need timely information Risk of being criticized for actions / operations Risk of disclosure - giving out too much information Need to clarify how information will be used and (if) disseminated Availability of infrastructure / resources to facilitate relationships

It is worth noting that, as far back as the 1980's, CSIS has tried at times to establish contacts with business and academia to provide information about the risks of working with foreign citizens and entities. We would provide protective security briefings to company executives and academics who would be receiving foreign delegations or would be travelling abroad, particularly when it involved countries of concern such as Russia (or the former USSR) and China. It was always a hard sell and sometimes we were turned away. Even if briefings were arranged and the recipients showed up, they often scoffed at the idea that they might be targeted in some way. While our security culture has certainly improved since the events of 9/11, it seems to have taken the recent revelations about foreign interference, and the public inquiry that followed (Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference), for members of the public and academia to accept that there is a need to communicate and work together if we want to protect our intellectual property and businesses. In this new atmosphere, perhaps organizations and universities will be more amenable to finding ways to establish lines of communication or improving existing ones.

Strategies for AC - IC Information-Sharing

Scholars who have studied the AC - IC relationship have suggested, as KMb research has also shown, that the best way to share information is to go beyond simply 'pushing' research and move to developing relationships and working together (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Lefebvre, 2021). Going beyond the earlier discussion of knowledge mobilization in different fields (Chapter 3), a number of specific

strategies have been recommended for improving knowledge sharing and collaboration in the AC - IC relationship.

1. Networking Opportunities

Traditionally, AC - IC relationships have been encouraged but largely limited to events such as conferences, seminars, workshops, or participation on advisory panels. While participants seem to find these interesting, in most cases they do not appear to have any lasting effect (Merari, 1991; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021).

> [G]overnment attenders of such events usually listen attentively and then return to their offices where they have to cope with a terrible flow of urgent problems. (Merari, 1991:101)

Many IC personnel may not see the relevance of the information or understand how to apply it to their work but often they simply do not have the time to incorporate new ideas into their regular duties (Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021). Further, secrecy requirements place restrictions on what can be discussed and this limits the value of any discussion or exchange (Dover, 2020). Nonetheless, it is thought that these networking opportunities should be continued and expanded.

2) Bring Academics into the IC

A number of scholars have suggested that movement between the AC and IC would be the best way to foster relationships and give an academic the kind of real-life knowledge that would keep them grounded in their research (Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Riley-Smith, 2020). It would also provide the most direct way for

the AC to advise and influence government policy on terrorism (Merari, 1991). However, entering the IC world may be difficult for the academic. We have already noted concerns about the optics of working with the IC and how it may affect the academic's reputation as well as the issue of academic independence but there are further considerations.

Entering the IC would also require being vetted for a security clearance and this is a deterrent to some members of the AC (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021). The vetting process can become quite involved and anxiety-producing for some individuals. For a higher level clearance, the background investigation may extend not only into the finer details of one's personal life but may extend into the lives of their family members. As noted earlier, some clearances with CSIS also involve a full security interview and/or a polygraph examination.

Once an academic has a security clearance and becomes involved with the intelligence organization, some academics may be concerned that this would increase their risk of being targeted by a foreign entity, particularly if the academic may be travelling to a country of concern. While the academic may have only limited access to classified information, due to the 'Need to Know' policy, they may have access to other sensitive information such as the intelligence organization's physical premises, technological capabilities, and the identity of intelligence employees. These concerns, or the vetting process itself, may deter some members of the AC from obtaining a security clearance.

Another consideration is that embedding with the IC would take time away from the academic's own research and publishing efforts (Nutley et al, 2010; Vogel & Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020) while it is also unlikely that they would be able to publish anything from their time inside the intelligence organization. Even after leaving the IC, there is concern that future work may also need to be vetted to ensure that they have not accidentally divulged any sensitive information gained from their time in the IC (Dover, 2020). Such vetting of future publications could cause significant delays or disruptions and thereby affect an academic's career. It may also lead some in the AC to question whether the academic's work is truly independent and free of IC influence.

Beyond this, there may be family and practical considerations such as the potential cost of moving or time spent travelling to an IC office (Dover, 2020). Overall, there are not a lot of incentives for an academic to become embedded with the IC other than the personal motivation to gain a better understanding of the IC environment, as well as the tacit knowledge that may come from that experience (Nutley et al, 2010; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021). Further, contrary to previously-noted concerns about the optics of working with the IC, it is also possible that working with the IC may serve to elevate an academic's profile and that of their institution (Weiss, 1979; Lefebvre, 2021). As Schmid (2014b) noted, there are increasing numbers of researchers with experience in both worlds.

For the intelligence organization, beyond the security risks, there are a number of other considerations involved in bringing in an outsider. The IC would have to vet the individual for a

security clearance, decide on what the academic's role or research would involve (that would determine how much access they may have), and also commit the time and resources to assist or manage the individual (Dover, 2020). It would require the time of a supervisor and co-workers to follow the academic's work and ensure that the academic follows all security protocols at all times. The intelligence organization would also have to provide the academic with the various equipment and briefings involved in gaining access to their physical premises and electronic systems (Dover, 2020). Anyone who has worked in government knows that this will likely require presenting a business case, a lot of planning, and many discussions. This is where the intelligence organization has to decide if the costs are worth the potential benefits.

3) Commission academics to do research / out-source projects

Intelligence organizations could also out-source some work or commission academic researchers for specific tasks or projects that do not require tacit knowledge or classified information (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2003; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021). Some academics might prefer this option rather than being embedded in the IC because it does not require a security clearance, leaves them in their own environment, and there is the potential for some publication. However, as Weiss (1979) noted, even when work is commissioned, there is still no guarantee that the end product will be utilized by the practitioners. Commissioning research may also be a form of symbolic use in that commissioning the academic research may just be to serve a political goal or provide the appearance of responding to some concerns, with no actual intention of using the end product

(Weiss, 1979; Landry et al., 2001; Sudsawad 2007). As noted earlier, the academic may never know if or how the research is actually used (Grossman and Davis, 2021).

4) Send IC personnel out to Academia

On the other hand, it has been suggested that the IC could send their people out to work or study in industry and academia, to later return with the added knowledge gained from those experiences and share it within their own organization (Shohet, 1997; Vogel & Tyler, 2019; Lefebvre, 2021). Intelligence personnel could also teach university courses, provide guest lectures, or attend conferences that could improve students' understanding of what intelligence organizations do and why they are important for public safety (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Vogel and Tyler, 2019; Lefebvre, 2021). IC personnel could also participate in some research projects, or submit articles for publication, that do not contain classified information but include some of their IC perspective (Lefebvre, 2021). Another important benefit may be that simply having IC personnel on campuses in these ways may encourage conversations, dispel myths, and gradually build some public trust and confidence in the IC.

However, this option to go out to academia may not be attractive to some IC members and may not be possible for others. Clearly, if some IC employees are involved in sensitive or covert operations, where they cannot be identified as service personnel, this would not be an option. Openly engaging with academia in this way would only be an option for those who can be publicly identified, depending on their position or if they are nearing retirement. Further, unless there are incentives involved, younger members may feel that it is time lost from their

career progression. Even taking secondments outside of the organization leads some members to worry that managers may overlook them when it comes to choosing people for certain assignments or opportunities - 'out of sight, out of mind'. Considering all of this, intelligence organizations could review their policies to add some incentives for their members to teach courses, upgrade their own qualifications, or simply to use research in their daily work (Maras, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018).

While going out to teach or work in academia may not be attractive to some IC personnel, it may also not be supported by some in academia. Universities or members of the AC may have concerns that an intelligence person may try to influence activity on campus or in their department. When it comes to working together on projects, even though they are in their own environment, members of the AC may have concerns about the IC exerting influence on the project, thereby leading others to question the independence of their research. Further, as noted earlier, there may be some stigma attached both to research in terrorism but also to working with an intelligence organization (Schmid, 2014a; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Gendron, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021), regardless of where the research is conducted. Therefore, having IC personnel go out to teach or work in academia involves concerns and considerations for both communities. At a formal level at least, these concerns could be mitigated by drafting contracts and memorandums of understanding designed to protect the autonomy of the academic research, as has already been done on occasion. But overall, more thought and attention need to be given to enhancing the possibilities for such collaboration.

5) Intelligence Reserve Units

It has also been suggested that some intelligence organizations could develop a reserve corps of academics, similar to the military reserves (Shohet, 1997; Dover, 2020). These would be individuals in the AC who volunteer to participate and have relevant knowledge and skills. They would receive some general orientation to the IC (unless they have previously worked in the IC), and maintain a valid security clearance, so that they can be called upon as the need arises (Shohet, 1997; Dover, 2020). In the interim, they could provide established points of contact at their academic institutions and forward relevant open information or 'passive data collection' (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Lefebvre, 2021).

Overall, any movement between the AC and IC, in either direction, is considered to be beneficial (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020; Riley-Smith, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Vogel and Tyler (2019) studied five different programs of IC cross-sector collaboration, including the AC, in the United States. They concluded that the different types of engagement all provide some benefit, some more than others, but all of them require a significant commitment of "time, effort, leadership, strong communication, and dedicated resources" (Vogel & Tyler, 2019:876).

The Canadian Context

Many of the above-noted suggestions have been tried by different intelligence organizations, including CSIS. The Service reports on their website, in "*One Year Through: Taking Stock of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's (CSIS) Program of Outreach to Experts" (Doyon, 2010),*

that, in 2006, they started occasionally seeking out experts in academia to speak about their knowledge and perspective on various security issues. In 2008, CSIS created a unit for Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement to engage with outside experts in an effort to promote transparency, improve relations, and build confidence in the Service. It was thought that this would provide a better understanding of current and emerging national security issues for all involved. To this end, the Service began to invite high-level speakers, as well as hosting conferences, seminars, workshops, and lunch-time discussions. Reports from the conferences were reportedly distributed in-house and some key findings were posted on the Service's website. CSIS also reported having commissioned some open-source research by academics. While the Service now regularly posts unclassified publications on their website, Shohet (1997) noted that CSIS was one of the first intelligence organizations to provide unclassified publications in the form of a newsletter called The Commentary (later replaced by publications on the CSIS website).

The 2010 report (Doyon, 2010) also notes that the Service is a member of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence (CASIS) that provides informed debate about security and intelligence issues and whose membership is open to all interested parties. It was thought that, by doing these things, the Service would have a more holistic view of the challenges facing Canadian society which would allow them to better advise decision-makers on security and intelligence topics. While the Service continues to put out unclassified publications on their website, there does not appear to be an updated review of their Academic Outreach Program.

Chapter Summary

Building on the previous chapter about Knowledge Mobilization and the common factors that affect the researcher - practitioner relationship, this chapter has added the literature about factors that uniquely affect knowledge mobilization and information-sharing with the IC. Intelligence organizations are built around the work of gathering information, analyzing it, protecting it, and using it for their own work or to advise government. To that end, they have a 'culture of secrecy' that is built around the classification of information that, combined with the Need to Know policy, highly restricts access to information both within the organization and with outsiders. The IC culture of secrecy also involves an element of power because there is a certain prestige to knowing things that other people do not know and this creates in-groups and out-groups, both internally and with external organizations. At times, this 'knowledge is power' concept may also mean that information may be withheld, both internally or from other organizations, to be used when it provides some advantage. These elements of the IC culture may compromise the work of the organization or affect trust relationships with others. Further, because the idea of sharing information, particularly with those outside of the larger intelligence community, runs counter to the traditional operation of an intelligence organization, there may not be the infrastructure or resources to facilitate it.

When it comes specifically to the IC relationship with the AC, it is suggested that an additional obstacle is a 'disconnect' between the two communities based on past experiences and some misconceptions that make them suspicious and cautious of each other, possibly even resenting each other. The IC's main concerns may revolve around security issues and the risk of exposure

while AC concerns are thought to revolve around ethical issues, the optics of working with the IC, and concerns that the IC might influence or misuse their academic research. However, these concerns cannot be addressed if there is limited communication between these two communities. Scholars have proposed a number of strategies for improving knowledge mobilization between the AC and the IC, with the most favored options involving the movement of personnel between the two communities. It is thought that these efforts may also improve relations between the AC and the IC as each community develops a better understanding of the other.

At this time much of the literature on information-sharing with the IC is in reference to sharing with other intelligence organizations, law enforcement, or government agencies. There are few studies that explore information-sharing between the AC and the IC and the literature is limited to a review of the academic understanding of this situation because we lack sufficient empirical evidence of IC views. Therefore, this study seeks to address this gap by directly surveying members of the IC in Canada for their views about the current state of terrorism research and prospects for closer engagement and knowledge mobilization with the AC.

The next chapter provides the methodology for this study as it seeks to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data about knowledge mobilization within the IC and their views on improving relations with the AC. While incorporating elements of KMb research, the methodology chapter also outlines how this study was tailored to meet the unique requirements and

obstacles of using intelligence personnel as the subject pool. Through this, a clearer picture emerges of the AC - IC relationship in Canada and the possibilities for future co-operation.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

To address the issue of the AC - IC relationship, this study asks "Is academic research utilized by the intelligence community in Canada and what does this state of usage tell us about the nature of the relationship between the intelligence and academic research communities?" In order to answer this question, this study goes directly to former and current Canadian intelligence personnel for their input about the utility of academic material in their work. To date, there is little formal research involving interviews or surveys directly with intelligence professionals because it is a difficult group to access and obtain co-operation from. However, my former career in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS, hereafter also referred to as the Service) provides me with a unique opportunity to explore this issue from the perspective of the intelligence community (IC).

This exploratory study used a mixed methods approach to gather information directly from individuals who have been involved in terrorism investigations in Canada. Because this is a population that is difficult to access, a mixed methods approach was used in order to maximize the amount of data, both qualitative and quantitative, that could be collected in one study. Through questionnaires, interviews, and a focus group, intelligence professionals were asked about their use of academic material during their training and during the course of their duties. They were asked for their feedback about the quality and relevance of currently available research, as well as their input and recommendations for improving the mobilization of knowledge between the intelligence community and academia.

While the questionnaires allowed for responses from a larger group, the interviews and the focus group went well beyond the survey questions to provide additional details about the larger context and underlying issues. In the interviews and focus group, participants were also directly asked about their view of the relationship between the intelligence community and the academic community in Canada. The information obtained from the different methods can also be compared, not only to identify consensus or differing viewpoints, but also to identify problems with the research design itself. As a whole, these questions can begin to tell us how far apart the two communities are, and how we can improve on this situation.

SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Since this study seeks information from a very specific category of individuals, this study used non-probability and purposive sampling. Due to time and cost restrictions, this study was also limited to former and current members of CSIS, though in future it could be expanded to include other intelligence organizations in Canada or abroad. The sample for this study included those former and current members of CSIS who have been involved, directly or indirectly, in the field of counter terrorism during the course of their career. The only inclusion criteria were employment with CSIS and some experience in the area of counter terrorism.

For the participation of former members, convenience and snowball sampling methods were used. These are common methods when dealing with groups that are difficult to access or to obtain co-operation from (Heckathorn, 1997; Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Martin, 2017). Snowball sampling has been presented as being particularly useful for 'hidden populations' (Goodman,

1961; Heckathorn, 1997; Raifman, DeVost, Digitale, Chen & Morris, 2022) where there is no existing sample frame and where access and co-operation may be hard to obtain due to privacy concerns (Heckathorn, 1997). In such cases, referrals provide an introduction, some instant rapport, and may yield a higher response rate (Martin, 2017).

For this study, former members were recruited through my own personal network and then expanded to mutual contacts or referrals. These members included mostly individuals who had retired from the Service after full careers but there were also some former members who had left mid-career for other employment. For former members, employment with the Service was verified through my own knowledge of them. In the end, the sample for this study consisted almost entirely of my own contacts with only two referrals, who were also known to me.

Because these former members are a convenience sample, it could be argued that it is not representative of the target population and may provide only one point of view (Martin, 2017). However, given that this is exploratory research within a limited and defined group of people, who have little representation in the body of research, the use of this kind of sample provides a reasonable-starting point. "Non-probability-based sampling methods can be valuable during exploratory or formative studies with unresearched populations" (Raifman, DeVost, Digitale, Chen & Morris, 2022:39). It is further noted that, even though CSIS publishes estimated numbers about the size of its establishment, those numbers are not exact and not everyone works in the area of terrorism. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate a total size for the target population.

In designing a study that involves intelligence professionals, there are some important considerations. A primary consideration is the legislation that prohibits a person from revealing classified information without the proper authorization. In Canada, this legislation includes the Security of Information Act, (R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5), formerly known as the Official Secrets Act; the Criminal Code of Canada as it pertains to Treason (CCC, S. 46); as well as the lifelong Oath of Secrecy that intelligence professionals must take. For members of CSIS, these are further established within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23) as well as the CSIS Code of Conduct and Operational Guides for the handling of classified information, documents, and other assets of the Service.

Related to this is the consideration that, whether by nature or training, intelligence professionals tend to be wary and suspicious of any requests for information made of them. They are in the business of gathering information and holding onto it until it is needed and are not in the habit of giving it out. Therefore, when asked for information, an intelligence professional's first instinct is often to say No or to question why someone wants the information. In other words, it is not easy to get intelligence professionals to talk about their work - even when you know them. In light of both of the above considerations, the topic and questions in this study had to remain fairly general and benign.

In addition to the above considerations, there is the issue of protecting identities. Current members of the Service cannot openly reveal their identities and it is an offence under the CSIS

Act (S. 18) to publicly identify a member of CSIS without proper authorization. Even retired intelligence professionals may not want their identity disclosed for various reasons. Depending on the nature of their work, or where they are in their present or second careers, some former members may have different requirements or views about disclosure of their identity. Finally, some former members have difficulty, often out of habit, with anything that involves the least bit of personal information or exposure.

Therefore, while face-to-face semi-structured interviews would be the preferred method to secure the most complete and reliable data, the research design had to include an option that would allow for complete anonymity. In interviews, identities can be protected in that only the interviewer would know the participant's identity but a higher level of anonymity can be provided through an anonymous questionnaire. By adding this option, not only would more individuals feel comfortable participating in the study but it is also a cost-effective way to reach a larger sample than just using interviews which are more time-consuming.

To maintain a participant's anonymity, the questionnaire did not ask for any identifying information, only basic demographic and career information. For complete anonymity, questionnaires could be completed as paper copies and returned by regular post without a return address. Unlike email surveys, this would eliminate any possibility of responses or comments being traced to a specific individual.

The participation of current members of CSIS was limited, by necessity, to the anonymous questionnaire while former or retired members of CSIS had a greater choice of options. They could choose to complete a questionnaire (anonymously or not), they could participate in an interview, they could participate in a focus group, or any combination of these.

Because this study uses human participants, it was also reviewed and received Ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201, 2020). Ethical considerations, such as anonymity and informed consent, are discussed further as this paper explains the protocols for the different tools that were used. For the participation of current members of CSIS, approval was also required from the Director of CSIS.

Study Tools

a) Information Letter / Invitation to Participate

In any study with human participants, an essential part of ethics approval is the principle of Informed Consent. This involves ensuring that the subject knows exactly what their participation involves and the risks and benefits that go with each type of participation. While intelligence professionals are all familiar with the principle of Informed Consent, full information about this study was provided in the Information Letter / Invitation to Participate for both former and current members (Appendix A & B).

The information letter explained the purpose and significance of this study, as well as who may participate and what their participation may involve. Separate information letters were

written for current and former members of CSIS because, while the information about the study was the same in both letters, the letter for current members of CSIS referred only to the questionnaire (Appendix A) as they would not have the option of participating in an interview or focus group. The letter for former members (Appendix B) included thorough descriptions of the process that would be followed for all three types of participation. Potential participants were also informed that participation is voluntary and that they could withdraw their consent at any time during the study. No material incentives were offered and it was noted that the benefits of participation primarily involved the personal satisfaction of adding their voice to the discussion and thereby helping to further knowledge on the topic. The risks of participation in this study centred mainly around the issues of confidentiality and anonymity.

For the interviews and focus group, separate consent forms were provided that outlined the risks and benefits specific to that tool (Appendix E). For the questionnaires, no consent form was required as the act of returning a completed questionnaire indicated consent and the anonymity meant that a questionnaire could not be withdrawn once submitted.

b) Questionnaire

In order to support and encourage completion, the questionnaire had to be designed in such a manner that it would be fairly general and not touch on any topics that could be considered sensitive by the intelligence community, while still addressing the topics of concern. To that end, the questionnaire did not contain any reference to specific events, tradecraft, or specific types of terrorism.

The questionnaire first establishes a baseline about the use of academic material by intelligence professionals in CSIS and the factors that affect that situation. Building on that, it goes on to ask about the types of academic material that have been found to be useful and why. From there, it collects comments about the type of academic material that would be useful going forward and the efforts that could go into providing that.

To provide both quantitative and qualitative data, the questionnaire included a variety of question formats. Some questions provided fixed or limited choices for responses but also allowed for the addition of comments, while other questions were open-ended to allow individuals to provide additional information, opinions, or experiences. Further, each question was designed to stand alone so that participants were able to skip any question that they did not feel comfortable answering without invalidating their entire questionnaire or their responses to other questions. While questionnaires may not provide the rich detail of an interview or focus group, they also have the advantage of allowing participants to code some of their own answers and thereby remove researcher influence for those questions (Bryman and Bell, 2016; Martin, 2017).

Another consideration in designing the questionnaire for this particular study was that it was likely a one-shot deal. For a population that is difficult to access, it was unlikely that this particular population could be approached again in the near future to ask follow-up questions.

For that reason, without making the questionnaire too long, it was important to obtain as much information as possible in one attempt.

In summary, the questionnaire was designed to encourage maximum participation and responses from a sample that is traditionally difficult to get information from. The questions were therefore designed to be fairly general and benign while still focussing on the topics at hand and collecting as much information as possible. The full questionnaire with instructions can be found in Appendices C and D, for current and former members respectively. It was divided into three major sections as follows.

PART A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION established the demographics of the participants (gender, age range) and provided details of the individual's level of education both prior to and since joining their organization. This provided some information about an individual's past experience in using or writing academic material, and any training in data analysis, to see if there was any correlation with later use of academic material in the work setting. It was hoped that, with a good number of responses, gender differences or historical trends might be observed. This section included five (5) fixed-choice questions, leaving room for clarification if needed.

PART B - CAREER INFORMATION established each participant's work background as it related to counter terrorism (CT). This section included four (4) fixed-choice questions that asked for their years of experience in CT and their work roles during those years, such as data collection, data

analysis, management, research, or foreign postings, in the event that comparisons could be made between the different job functions. This information could also provide some personal context when looking at differing viewpoints on some of the questions and the recommendations that were made for the future.

PART C - USE OF ACADEMIC MATERIALS addressed each participant's use of academic material during the course of their training and regular duties, as well as the factors that affected this situation. These questions addressed the following areas.

- Access to, and use of, academic materials in their training with CSIS
- Training in data analysis
- Access to, and use of academic materials during the course of their regular duties
- Factors that may affect their use of academic material such as access issues, time constraints, job requirements, relevance of academic material, etc.
- Organizational requirements that may affect their use of academic material

Questions then delved into their opinions about currently available academic material and possible information-sharing between the academic community and the intelligence community. These questions addressed the following areas.

- The quality and usefulness of currently available academic material
- The use and value of lectures by visiting academics
- The types of academic material that they have found to be most useful
- Factors that may increase their use of academic material
- Comments and opinions about information-sharing with academia
- Recommendations for future use of academic material in intelligence practices

Overall, Part C included nineteen (19) questions, including sixteen (16) fixed-choice questions and three (3) open-ended questions. The fixed-choice questions in this section include frequency Likert scales, check-all-that-apply questions (CATA), yes/no questions, as well as a couple of rank order and multiple-choice questions. Most of these questions also provide room for additional clarification or comments. In addition, there are three (3) completely open-ended questions, relating to the use of AM and recommendations for the future, so that respondents would have additional opportunities to provide input or opinions that may not have been specifically addressed in the other questions.

The questionnaire for both current and former members was identical except that, at the end of the questionnaire, former members were invited to participate in a focus group while this was not an option for current members of CSIS.

c) Interviews

As outlined in the Invitation to Participate, former members could volunteer for a face-to-face semi-structured interview. While the questionnaire still formed the basis for the questions, and the demographic information in Parts A and B was still required, the interview setting allowed for the flexibility to probe for more details and insight through follow-up questions and discussion. The participant also had greater opportunity to express opinions, voice concerns, or go off on any tangent that they believed might be pertinent to the topic. As Martin (2017:86) notes, interviews "can allow for both control and spontaneity".

While interviews can provide rich detail, they also introduce other potential problems and considerations, some of which are unavoidable. It is noted that the success of an interview depends partly on first building a rapport with the interviewee (Bryman & Bell, 2016). In these interviews, rapport came easily given that the sample was made up of former colleagues and relationships already existed. However, this also raises the issue of bias and researcher neutrality since interviews are a social interaction and, in these interviews, both researcher and participants come from the same professional background. The questions of each party's stake and interest are always at play in an interview and, in this case, both researcher and subject may be on the same footing (Potter and Hepburn, 2005). However, without these pre-existing relationships, this particular study may not have been possible.

This also leads one to an individual's motivation for volunteering. The research on those who tend to volunteer for research projects suggests that people volunteer either for intrinsic or extrinsic motivation (Martin, 2017). Intrinsic motivation reflects volunteering because participation provides some personal satisfaction such as the desire to talk about a specific topic or even to talk about themselves (Martin, 2017). Extrinsic motivation usually relates to volunteering as a result of some incentive, often money, or because of a belief in the importance of that particular research (Martin, 2017). In this case, because the interviewees are former colleagues of mine, and no incentive was offered, there is also the possibility that they volunteered, not only to assist the research but also to assist the researcher.

There are also the traditional interview problems of memory issues and deception but, given the topic and sample, these are not considered to be an issue in this study. Since this is an exploratory study, in an area of little research, these problems are something to be mindful of but not a major concern at this time. Further, the presence of substantial quantitative data provides comparative information that would identify any major discrepancies and thereby assist in validating the interview data.

d) Focus Group

Other than questionnaires and interviews, former members could also volunteer to participate in a focus group which would provide yet another opportunity for discussion and airing views. The advantage of including focus groups in a study is to use group interaction to bring out discussion that may not come out otherwise (Kitzinger, 1995; Martin, 2017). Some individuals may feel more comfortable participating in a group than in an interview while others may be willing to participate but feel that they have nothing to add until they hear others talking about a topic (Kitzinger, 1995). Focus groups can be useful to "examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way" (Kitzinger, 1995: 299). It may also cause some individuals to modify their positions as new information is discussed (Martin, 2017). Focus groups can highlight consensus but also bring attention to differing opinions (Kitzinger, 1994).

In terms of anonymity and confidentiality, the focus group exposes a person more than an interview because other members will know who they are and what they have said. It is possible that some individuals may feel intimidated by other members of the group and

therefore participate less (Kitzinger, 1995). On the other hand, some members may open up discussion by bringing up taboo topics or saying what other members are afraid to say (Kitzinger, 1995).

In this study, where it was likely that members of a focus group would know each other, the question was whether this would contaminate the discussion and how. Would some people feel a pressure to conform to the group opinion, especially if some members had been more senior in the organization at retirement? Would those members who were more senior at retirement be more vocal or overbearing? Or would people feel more comfortable to challenge each other's views? As with the interviews, dealing with former colleagues also brings in the possibility that they may say what they think the researcher wants to hear. Even if, as moderator, I am careful not to involve myself, it is possible that my former colleagues would have preconceived ideas about what I wish to hear. The option to participate in a focus group was offered at the end of each questionnaire and interview.

DATA COLLECTION

Former Members

Beginning in January 2021, the study Information Letter / Invitation to Participate was sent to 61 former members of CSIS, starting with my first level contacts and then expanding to a wider network. First-level contacts were those individuals who were already in my contact list and who are well-known to me, such as my classmates from training or long-time colleagues. The second tier of contacts included those individuals who are well-known to me but who I do not

maintain regular contact with. Third-tier contacts included those individuals that I had worked with briefly or we have mutual contacts. Some of the individuals in these latter two categories were located, and invited to participate, through LinkedIn or the Pillar Society. The Pillar Society is the veterans' organization for former CSIS members, that began with former members of the RCMP Security Service, such that some members have experience in both the RCMP and CSIS. Members of the Pillar Society include all manner of former employees, at all levels, including intelligence officers, analysts, surveillance, screening officers, and support staff.

Finally, participants were asked to send the Information Letter / Invitation to Participate to any other former members who might be interested in participating in the study. Individuals did not need to reply to the Information Letter unless they wished to participate or required more information.

Contact with former members was conducted through individual email messaging. Early in the process, two group emails were sent out (17 and 9 individuals respectively) but they provided little response so this required reverting to individual emails. It was found that an individual, more personal approach yielded much better results though it was more labour-intensive and time-consuming. In some cases, an initial email was needed in order to verify that the listed email address was accurate and still in operation. In other cases, it involved first requesting a connection through LinkedIn. It could be said that, by messaging people individually, recipients might feel more pressure to participate. This is a valid point but some of the respondents noted that they tend not to pay much attention to group emails and missed the earlier group

emails. Further, since the questionnaires are anonymous, anyone could ask for a questionnaire and then simply not return it.

If individuals chose to receive the questionnaire (Appendix D), they had the option of receiving it by email or by regular mail but all questionnaires were to be returned by regular mail (to ensure anonymity). If individuals provided an address, they were sent a paper copy of the questionnaire along with a self-addressed stamped envelope for its return. If they received the questionnaire by email, they simultaneously received an e-transfer for $ 3.00 to cover the cost of return postage from anywhere in Canada (whether they actually returned it or not). At the end of the questionnaire, participants were invited to volunteer for a focus group. If they were interested, they could contact the researcher directly so that their questionnaire could remain anonymous.

One problem with anonymous questionnaires is being able to verify that they have been completed by actual members of the target audience. For this reason, dissemination of the questionnaire was closely controlled and sent only to those whose employment with CSIS could be verified. By distributing to former colleagues, that verification came from my own knowledge of them. Even for a referral, the individual would have to contact me directly in order to obtain a copy of the questionnaire, which would provide me with an opportunity to verify their background through my associates or the Pillar Society, in the event that I did not know them personally. While I would know who received the questionnaires, they would still be anonymous in that I would not know who returned them unless they returned it

electronically. While it is possible that the intended recipients were not actually the individuals who answered the questions, this is highly unlikely given the nature of the work.

After the invitations went out, forty-three people (out of 61 invitations) responded to the invitation letter (70.5 %). Individuals were also invited to forward the invitation letter to other former colleagues, who could then contact me directly. This resulted in two volunteers for a total of 45 individuals who indicated an interest in participating in the study. All of these individuals received a copy of the questionnaire, either by regular mail (15) or by email (30). Along with the questionnaire, individuals received a letter of appreciation for their participation (Appendix H) because, if returned anonymously, there would be no opportunity to thank them later.

The method of distributing the questionnaires did not appear to have a significant effect on their return. Of the 15 paper questionnaires that were sent in regular mail with a stamped, self-addressed envelope, twelve (12) were returned for a response rate of 80.0 %. Of the 30 questionnaires that were sent by email, 19 were completed and returned in the mail, 5 were completed and returned by email, and 2 people (the referrals) volunteered for an interview but did not fill out a questionnaire, for a response rate of 86.7 % when sent by email.

Questionnaires - Once received, the questionnaires were numbered and the responses were coded and added into a spreadsheet. Any quotations used from the questionnaires are

anonymous and referenced to the questionnaire / participant number. Coding guidelines can be found on the copy of the questionnaire in Appendix D.

Interviews - From the individuals who responded, six (6) individuals offered to participate in an interview. Some of these individuals volunteered for the interview before even receiving the questionnaire while others volunteered after having read the questionnaire. If they hadn't already received the questionnaire, they were sent a copy so that they could see what was required in terms of demographic information and be made aware of the specific areas of interest that would be discussed. Four of the six individuals completed the full questionnaire as well as participating in an interview which provided hard data while allowing more of the interview time to be spent in open discussion. Two interviewees did not complete the questionnaire though some of the questions were answered during the course of their interview.

Prior to the interview, each interviewee was also provided with the consent form (Appendix E) so that they could review the options for audio recording and the use of quotations. Confidentiality was assured and their identities are known only to the researcher and the faculty supervisor, unless they chose to have any quotations attributed directly to them. Participants are otherwise only identified by a number.

Audio recordings were not transcribed but were only used for accuracy in reporting the content of the interview or using quotations. If any subject chose not to have the interview recorded,

only paper notes would have been taken but all interviewees consented to recording their interviews. Finally, the consent form outlined the participant's right to withdraw their participation during the interview and for a limited amount of time following the interview. None of the interviewees withdrew. Following the interview, these participants were sent a letter of appreciation (Appendix H).

At this point, it is also important to note that this study was completed during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given the restrictions of this period, all interviews and the focus group were required to be conducted online. Therefore, the security of online interviews and discussions was also noted in the consent forms.

While online interviews can have some drawbacks, there are also considerable advantages. Virtual interviews were most cost-efficient and made it easier to schedule interviews since no travel was involved and individuals could participate from the safety and comfort of their own homes. For most participants, this was an important consideration due to geographic distances. The main drawbacks of virtual interviews include the chances of missing visual cues or instances where technical equipment or internet service might fail. However, in recent years, and particularly since the Covid-19 pandemic, most people have become accustomed to online meetings and are prepared for these possibilities. As such, the benefits of virtual meetings were believed to outweigh the drawbacks.

Ultimately, face-to-face virtual interviews were conducted with six individuals between February and July 2021. Each interview was conducted using the Zoom virtual meeting platform and lasted between 40 minutes and 2 hours. While audio recording can be done through the Zoom platform, this option was not utilized. Instead, it was felt that it would be more secure to record the interviews on a simple mp3 recorder. These recordings, as well as any paper notes, were retained in accordance with the requirements of the ethics approval. Any quotation that is attributed to a participant is done with their express approval.

Focus Group - Following the questionnaires and interviews, 6 individuals volunteered to participate in a focus group therefore only one focus group was held. Three of these individuals had participated in an interview while the other three were individuals who contacted me directly after completing an anonymous questionnaire. All volunteers for the focus group were provided with a set of instructions that discussed the issues of anonymity and confidentiality as they relate to a focus group (Appendix F). They also received another consent form for the focus group (Appendix E).

Because it was an online focus group, members of the group would be aware of each other's identity. It was possible for participants to keep their camera off or use a different onscreen name, but other participants may still recognize their voice and would know what they said. Further, it fell to all members to maintain the confidentiality of the group. The risks were outlined in the instructions as well as their options for withdrawing their participation. The consent form also included the options for recording and the use of quotations.

Once the participants had the opportunity to review the instructions and consent form, a date and time was arranged. The focus group was held, via Zoom, in July 2021, and lasted approximately 2 hours. Only five (5) individuals participated as the sixth person ended up having a time conflict. All participants consented to recording and had their cameras on. It is worth noting that all members of the focus group were familiar with each other and there was an easy rapport throughout the discussion. As with the interviews, recording was not done through Zoom but on a separate mp3 recorder. The recording and paper notes were retained in accordance with the requirements of the ethics approval. The audio recording was not transcribed but was used for accuracy of information and quotations.

Overall, 38 former members participated in the study in some capacity. Thirty-two (32) people completed only the questionnaire; 1 person did only an interview; 3 people completed the questionnaire and participated in the focus group; 1 person did an interview and participated in the focus group; while 1 person participated in all three options - the questionnaire, interview, and focus group.

Current Members

To obtain participation from the current members of CSIS, the approval of the Director was required. In respect of their security needs, the participation of currently serving members of CSIS was limited to the anonymous questionnaire. In January 2021, a letter was sent to the Director along with the package of study materials that included the Information Letter / Invitation to Participate (Appendix A); the Questionnaire with instructions (Appendix C); and a

Letter of Appreciation (Appendix G). For this sample, employment verification was not a concern however we had to rely on each participant to accurately represent their background experience relative to counter terrorism operations.

Once the Service agreed to participate, discussions were held with members of the Academic Outreach Unit to explain what was required in terms of distributing and collecting the questionnaire packages, in line with the project's ethics approval. To maximize the number of responses, there was no specific requirement about the type of position or role that participants filled. Therefore, participants could include intelligence officers, analysts, surveillance personnel, screening personnel, support staff, and such. The main concern was that individuals completing the questionnaire have been involved, in some capacity, in counter terrorism operations.

For distribution, the Service had the option of distributing paper copies of the questionnaire package, which the researcher would supply, or distributing the questionnaire package by email. The Service chose to distribute the questionnaire, via internal email, to selected departments and units involved in counter terrorism work. Should a member decide to complete the questionnaire, they were instructed to print it off, fill out a paper copy, enclose it in an envelope, and seal the envelope.

For the return of the questionnaires, the Service was given the option of having their members mail it directly to the researcher or to place a secure drop box in a common area, located where

it would be easily accessible to all members. The Service decided to use only the secure drop box option for the return of the completed questionnaires. They were not comfortable with allowing their employees to mail in anonymous questionnaires but preferred to collect them internally. Members would print off the questionnaire, complete it, seal it in an envelope, and place it in the secure drop box located in a common area of their building. Once the study period as determined by the Service was complete, the questionnaires would be picked up from the Service's offices.

After this point, the distribution and collection of questionnaires was completely in the hands of the Service. The initial distribution of the questionnaire package took place in March 2021 in their Ottawa Headquarters complex. It was reported that a secure drop box was placed in an empty office in the Academic Outreach unit. After 6 weeks, the Service indicated that they had three (3) completed questionnaires in the drop box.

In examining this low return, the first problem appears to have been with the Service's method of distribution. The invitation and questionnaire were reportedly disseminated through group mail boxes where the individual responsible for the mailbox would have the responsibility of forwarding it to other members of their department or unit. It is noted that, according to information from the Service, when the questionnaires were sent to the initial mailbox, those recipients were asked to distribute the survey to anyone who *may be interested* in completing it. This communication introduced an added level of discretion such that it is likely that the questionnaires did not reach all intended recipients. Some of the people responsible for these

group mailboxes may have decided, for any number of reasons, that they would not distribute it further. Distribution was not tracked beyond this point therefore there is no record of how many members actually received the study package.

Further, the location of the drop box may have played a role in the low turnout. Unless it is in a common area, where a person's presence would not be unusual or unexpected, it may have been uncomfortable for some participants to go to a particular office to drop it off. This is particularly true in a place such as CSIS where it is noticed if a person enters an area that is not their usual area. It is possible that some individuals did not feel comfortable going to the Academic Outreach unit to drop off a questionnaire.

The Service also noted that, given the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, their Ottawa employees were facing a number of other challenges. It was noted that working through a pandemic was putting added stress on their already tight resources as some employees were away on sick leave and everyone was working with restrictions, both internally and when dealing with outside individuals or organizations. Further, not all employees were working in the office on a regular basis so it would be difficult for some to complete a questionnaire and put it in the drop box. In these cases, the mail-in option would have been better but it was not allowed. Overall, it was suggested that the low response to the survey was more an issue of timing rather than for lack of trying.

It is true that the timing of this study could not have been worse. Covid-19 wreaked havoc in most organizations and, with the added pressure of Covid-19 restrictions and health concerns, many people would not be inclined to want to do any more than necessary. Many people in general were of the mindset to just get through each day safely.

In addition, employee morale within CSIS was another factor to be considered. It was noted that some employees were not happy with having to go into the office during a pandemic - though this is part of what is required from an essential service. News articles had also been detailing employee concerns over the Service's handling of the pandemic in terms of employee safety and equal treatment ("Before Covid-19 hit CSIS, intelligence officer fought for mandatory masking but was rejected", Bell, 2021; “Spy agency staff accuse CSIS of bad faith bargaining, discrimination", Brean, 2022).

What is clear is that the Service was dealing with operational priorities, reduced resources, and disgruntled employees during a pandemic. This environment was not ideal for conducting any study. Given the results in their Ottawa offices, it was agreed that the Service would distribute the survey package to all staff in the Toronto Region office. This distribution would again be conducted via internal email and a secure drop box would be placed in a common area within their Toronto office.

However, in the interim, it was conveyed to me that the Director-General of Internal Security decided that he/she was not comfortable with their employees answering some of the

questions in the questionnaire. It was noted that respondents could skip these questions but the Service decided to take them out of the questionnaire to ensure that those questions would not be answered. In particular, they chose to eliminate questions 9, 15, 20, 21, 22, and 23 before distributing the questionnaire in Toronto. Some of these questions seemed like odd choices. For example, Question 15 asks if they have a databank or service that can assist with locating relevant academic material. Meanwhile, the CSIS website provides information about Academic Outreach and their library so this information is openly available. Because these questions were included in the questionnaires that were previously completed in Ottawa, it also meant that those questionnaires were withheld. These excluded questions are identified as the results are presented in Chapter 6 and are further examined and discussed in Chapter 9.

The distribution and collection of questionnaires in Toronto lasted approximately 3 months through the summer (2021). As in Ottawa, the questionnaires were distributed by internal email and collected in a secure drop box in a common area of the Toronto office. Again, timing was not helpful here. This distribution was in a regional field office where employees are not in the office every day, let alone during the summer months and during a pandemic. In such a situation, field employees would be trying to stay out of the office. Therefore, this distribution resulted in only 4 completed questionnaires in the secure drop box. These four questionnaires were eventually released to the researcher; however, it is noted that they were not in sealed envelopes but in one unsealed envelope. It appears that the questionnaires had been vetted so it is not clear if this was the original number of completed questionnaires or if other questionnaires from Toronto were withheld.

In the end, the Service reported that approximately 750 members should have received the questionnaire package between the Toronto and Ottawa offices. However, as there was no record kept of actual distribution and receipt, it is impossible to calculate a response rate for this sample. Further, conversation with some current members of the Service, in relevant areas of work, revealed that they did not receive the questionnaire package but, if they had, they would have completed it. It would appear that the problem lies more with the distribution and collection than with individual willingness to complete the questionnaire. This, however, was out of the control of the researcher. As a final point, while I am familiar with some current members of the Service, it would have been unethical to have approached them directly.

In October 2022, with the pandemic seemingly under control and people back in their offices, the Service was approached again, through the Academic Outreach Unit, to see if they would consider trying to get more completed questionnaires for a better Service representation. The head of the Academic Outreach Unit declined the offer, citing the same reasons as earlier.

Overview of Sample

In total, forty (40) participants completed questionnaires and two (2) former members (the referrals) went straight to an interview, for a total sample of 42 people. This number includes 38 former members and 4 current members. Out of this sample, the focus group was made up of 5 former members who had previously completed a questionnaire, an interview, or both.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the final sample of respondents and their participation, including both former and current members of CSIS.




Figure 1 - Overview of Final Sample and Participation (n = 42)

DATA ANALYSIS

This study provides us with both quantitative and qualitative data towards answering our research question. Data collection began with the questionnaire, followed by the interviews and focus group, such that the data was sequentially integrated and analyzed. The questionnaire provides quantitative data, through a variety of fixed-choice responses, about the use of academic material and related issues but also provides qualitative data from the additional comments and open-ended questions. The semi-structured interviews used the questionnaire as a template, thereby adding to the quantitative data, but significantly more

qualitative data was obtained. Finally, the focus group provided the opportunity to add more depth and understanding to the issues as well as to validate the themes that emerged from the questionnaire and interview data. Using these multiple data sources and cross-verifying the data serves to enhance the reliability and validity of the results.

Questionnaire Data

To combine and analyze the data from the questionnaires, a spreadsheet was created with a column for each question that was not open-ended and a row for each participant. The responses to Parts A and B were entered into the spreadsheet to provide information for each respondent's profile and identify the general characteristics of the sample. The five (5) questions in Part A collected demographic information including gender, age range, level of education prior to and since joining CSIS, and whether a respondent had taken any courses in data analysis. The four (4) questions in Part B provided each respondent's work experience in the area of counter terrorism (CT). These questions provided overall years of experience in CT as well as the type of job functions that were fulfilled during that time, such as experience in data collection, data analysis, or liaison with other organizations. Where required, fixed-choice responses, other than Yes / No questions, were coded by number for ease of entry to the spreadsheet. When combined, this data describes our sample but also establishes their qualifications and their range of experience, both individually and as a group, to address the topics in this study.

The questions in PART C address the sub-questions that, in their entirety, seek to answer the main research question of this study. These questions examine the use of AM in the course of IC work, the factors involved in that situation, and explore the potential ways to improve upon the current situation. As in Parts A and B, where required the fixed-choice responses were coded by number and transferred to the spreadsheet for subsequent analysis. As an example, in frequency Likert scales, 'Not at all' is coded as 1 and 'Regularly' is coded as 5. While these types of questions allow for easier coding and analysis, it also limits the level of analysis to the frequency and distribution of the available response choices.

Further, it is important to keep in mind that there is still some subjectivity involved as respondents may interpret some questions or the available responses differently. For example, respondent definitions for 'often' and 'regularly' may differ even though most dictionaries define 'often' as doing something frequently, while 'regularly' is defined as doing something habitually or as part of a routine.

The comments and open-ended questions in Part C partially address these problems by providing opportunities for additional input that may provide some clarification or explanation to the fixed-choice responses. Further, this qualitative data also provided some insight into whether the questions were interpreted differently by some respondents. In some cases, respondents used the open-ended questions to address multiple points so portions of those comments were parsed to the relevant questions. All qualitative data from the questionnaires was compiled into one document, organized by question. These comments are also presented

verbatim in Appendix J. Overall, the data obtained from the questionnaires provided a preliminary understanding of the issues and some themes began to emerge.

Interview Data

Information obtained in the semi-structured interviews added to both the quantitative and qualitative data for this study. The background and career information (Parts A and B) for each interviewee was collected and entered into the spreadsheet to create their profile. Where possible, the same fixed-choice questions (Part C) were presented and answered so that those responses could also be added to the spreadsheet for further analysis.

However, the interviews provided significantly more qualitative data as it allowed for more open discussion on all areas of the questionnaire as well as the topic of AC - IC relations. The interviews were audio-recorded and, while they were not transcribed, those recordings were reviewed as needed to ensure the accuracy of each subject's information and attributed quotes. Since the interview participants were all volunteers, interested in the topic of this study, deception was not an issue and their comments were accepted at face value.

The interview data was subjected to thematic analysis, an iterative process of reviewing data, coding and organizing the responses to identify patterns and emerging themes, then gradually refining those themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Nowell, Norris, White and Moules, 2017). Thematic analysis was used because it adapts easily to different types of qualitative data and allows for rich and detailed accounts of participant perspectives (Braun and Clarke, 2006;

Nowell et al., 2017). While there is software available that can aid in the reduction and organization of qualitative data, it was not used because it does not offer any significant time saving for smaller samples while potentially losing some of the context or richness of the data.

Coding the interview data involved both deductive and inductive approaches. Because the questionnaire served as a template for the interview discussion, it provided some pre-set coding (Elliott, 2018) such that some comments from the interviews could be easily attached to the appropriate sections of the questionnaire. Where interview comments did not relate directly to items in the questionnaire, or introduced new elements, they were categorized and grouped separately as emergent codes (Elliott, 2018). Interview recordings were carefully reviewed multiple times throughout this process. Additionally, selected quotes were used throughout the discussion in order to stay true to an interviewee's perspective and illustrate the nuances of the language that they used. Such quotes also serve to demonstrate emerging themes and support the validity of the analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). (Notes and full comments are provided in Appendix J.)

Overall, the views expressed by the interviewees were generally consistent with the questionnaire data so that many of their comments could be added to supplement questionnaire comments and few additional categories were required. As each interview was reviewed, patterns began to emerge in the data, some connections were observed, and themes were becoming more refined. Once all of the interview comments were combined with the

questionnaire data, this led to some questions being grouped together in the analysis and provided additional points for discussion with the focus group.

Focus Group Data

The themes and views that emerged from the questionnaires and interviews provided the basis for the focus group (FG) discussion that is presented in Chapter 7. This focus group provided a valuable opportunity to validate and refine the data analysis, as well as to add further insight and clarification on the relevant issues. The focus group was presented with three main questions.

- *Is academic research on terrorism being used by the intelligence community? Why or why not?*
- *How do we increase the utility of academic material to the Intelligence Community?*
- *Is there a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is hindering knowledge mobilization between the two communities?*

The ensuing discussion yielded a significant amount of qualitative data in addressing these questions. The opinions of the FG members were generally consistent with the earlier data but their comments helped to provide a clearer picture and more complete understanding of the issues. Within this discussion, they also identified some sub-themes that contributed to the further refinement of the data and highlighted areas for further discussion. Finally, the FG added some clear recommendations and considerations for the future of AC - IC knowledge mobilization.

Results Overview

In the following chapter, the questionnaire responses are presented in a straightforward manner through frequency tables and charts, to illustrate the current situation. This provides a baseline about the use of academic material in the intelligence community and provides some insight into the reasons for this situation. Further, the questionnaire data provides an overview of opinions about the current literature on terrorism, the type of material that would be most useful, and the type of information-sharing that might be possible between the AC and IC.

While the questionnaire submissions included many comments to explain responses, the information from the interviews and focus group supplements that and adds much more depth to the reasoning and explanations behind some of the commonly-held views about academic material and academia in general. They reveal common themes, as well as differing viewpoints, but overall show where some gaps exist and how things may be improved. Selected quotes are used throughout the following chapters to provide respondent views and concerns in their own words.

The interviews and focus group went well beyond the questionnaire in providing views about different topics including the future of knowledge mobilization between the AC and the IC, and what that might look like. These participants were also directly asked if they believed that there is a disconnect between the two communities and, if so, the reasons behind it. Their

comments and quotes provide a great deal of insight into the IC perspective and what they believe is needed to move forward.

Because this study covers uncharted territory, these results do not lend themselves to comparison with other studies. Likewise, there are other comparisons that cannot be made due to the size or representation in the sample. The responses of former members cannot be compared to those of current members because the four questionnaires from CSIS members provide too small of a sample to be considered even remotely representative of the current membership of CSIS. Therefore, the questionnaire responses of the current members have been combined with those of former members. However, some comments by current members are highlighted.

Similarly, it is impossible to look at any historical trends in the use of academic material, during training or regular work duties, because almost the entire sample consists of former members who completed full careers and would have started around the same period of time, working within the same culture. There are too few current or younger members to allow for any historical comparisons.

The lack of representation from current members of the Service may also raise questions about the currency of the information and opinions expressed by the respondents. As a result of using my own network as the initial access point, our sample is predominantly former members who had completed full careers with the Service before leaving or retiring. However, since my

cohort was hired in 1985 and shortly after, and a full career is defined as 30 years, most of these respondents are known to have retired in 2015 or later. Their knowledge of the Service's working was therefore still quite current at the time of our data collection. Further, when it comes to a voluntary study, particularly one that deals with a hidden population such as the intelligence community, a researcher is not in any position to choose who will respond but be grateful for those who do.

Similarly, the demographics of the sample (provided in Chapter 6) reveal that the primary experience of this sample is weighted more towards data collection (37%) and management positions (25%), as opposed to data analysis (10%), though a significant number indicated having roughly equal experience in a combination of these roles (23%). This might be interpreted as some respondents not having much experience in an analytical or research unit where they would be more likely to use or understand the value of academic research. However, in the early years of the Service, there were no designated analyst positions outside of the research unit so intelligence officers had to do their own tactical analysis and many of them rotated through the research and analytical units. Therefore, many former members would have experience in both data collection and data analysis, and this is supported in the demographics where a majority of respondents (76.19%) indicated having worked in an analysis unit as an intelligence officer. We might also consider that, while analysts may have more use for academic material on a regular basis, it is important to determine the utility of academic research to the data collectors as well since the information that is collected provides the foundation from which analysis and decision-making follow.

Overall, as an exploratory study with a largely unresearched population, the analysis of results is mostly limited to being descriptive with the comments and quotes providing some explanation of those results. However, the sheer number of comments provided by the participants provides us with a much clearer picture of where we stand as two communities and where we can go from here.

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The survey for this study involved a series of questions about the utility of academic research to intelligence professionals in Canada. These questions, as a whole, attempt to answer our main research question about the intelligence community's (IC) use of academic material in the course of their duties and what that says about their relationship with the academic community (AC). The different sections of the survey explored the present use of academic material, the factors that influenced that situation, and the possibilities for improving the mobilization of knowledge between our two communities.

This chapter will look at the core findings in the data. Because this is an exploratory study, with a limited group of respondents, the quantitative data derived from the surveys is primarily presented in a descriptive manner. The qualitative data, from the questionnaire comments and the interviews, provide added insight and context to aid in understanding the data and any noted issues. Instead of looking at each question individually, the questions are grouped by the key topics or themes, with the corresponding data and quotations. Since the focus group discussion was not limited to these questions but went well beyond them, those comments are not included here but follow in the next chapter.

To begin, Part I of this chapter describes the key demographics of our respondents as well as their experience in the area of counter-terrorism. This establishes the qualifications of these individuals to speak to this topic in terms of their years of experience and the range of job functions that are included in the sample. Part II examines how much academic material has

been used by the respondents, as well as the factors that influenced that situation and the kinds of academic material that have been found to be useful. Part III explores the respondents' views about what might increase their use of academic material and whether collaborative efforts, in various forms, might be an option in that endeavour.

While the sample for this study was not very large, those individuals who chose to participate were not shy about sharing their views and there is an abundance of interesting comments and insights, more than can possibly be included in the body of this chapter, therefore additional comments supplied by the participants can be found in Appendix J. In this chapter, comments from the questionnaires and some interview comments are reported verbatim. In some cases, comments or opinions from the interviews are summarized for brevity and referenced to the respondent.

When discussing the results in Parts II and III, former members are identified as respondents R1 through R38. Since there were only a few completed questionnaires from the Service, the responses of the current members of CSIS are combined with those of former members. The current members of CSIS are identified as respondents R39 through R42.

It is also noted that, because respondents were able to skip questions, and the Service removed a few questions, the number of responses may vary with each question. For that reason, the number of responses (n) is provided for each question and is noted on the tables and charts.

Where percentages are used, they therefore represent the percentage of those who answered the question.

PART I - Demographics of Sample

This section provides an overview of the key characteristics of our sample, such as details of age, gender, education, and career experience. This illustrates the depth of background and experience that the respondents possess in the area of terrorism, including a variety of job functions that include data collection, data analysis, liaison, management, foreign postings, and such.

Former Members

The sample of former members consists of 32 males (84.2 %) and 6 females (15.8 %). The age distribution of this sample skews heavily to the 60+ age range, with only 2 members in their 40's (1 female, 1 male) and 5 members in their 50's (1 female, 4 males). The remainder are in the 60+ age range. Of this sample, most members had completed full careers with the Service (25 + years) and only three members are known to have left mid-career for other employment. The large majority of this sample began their careers in the 1980's or possibly earlier. They either began as RCMP Security Service, or joined CSIS at its inception in 1984 or shortly thereafter. This was a time when women were still under-represented in certain areas of work and this includes the intelligence organizations. In Class 1 at Camp Borden, there were 33 trainee intelligence officers of which only 8 were women. Through the 1990's and 2000s, the

ratio of women to men dramatically increased and, at this time, there is an approximately equal representation of men to women in the Service.

Current Members

The sample of current members of CSIS consists of 2 males (50.0 %) and 2 females (50.0 %). They represent a younger age group, evenly divided by gender and age. Two members are in the 30 - 39 age range (1 female, 1 male) and two members are in the 40 - 49 age range (1 female, 1 male).

Our combined sample therefore consists of 42 individuals of whom 34 are male (80.95 %) and 8 are female (19.05 %). The age and gender distribution for the combined sample is provided in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 2 as follows.

Table 4 - Age / Gender Distribution of Sample

Age Range (years)	20 – 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 – 59	60+	Total
Female	0	1	2	1	4	8
Male	0	1	2	4	27	34
Total	0	2	4	5	31	42




Figure 2 - Age / Gender Distribution of Sample (n = 42)

Even with the participation of these younger colleagues, our sample is still mostly male and the mode and median are in the 60+ age range. Therefore, it is not feasible to look at gender differences and further analysis will not focus on this differentiation. Likewise, with so few current members participating in the study, historical trends cannot be observed or examined. However, the comments of the current members provide some up-to-date insight.

Highest Level of Education

The survey asked about levels of education prior to joining CSIS and additional education after joining (Questions 3 and 4). In addition, it asked about any course work or studies specifically in data analysis (Question 5). These questions were asked in order to provide some information about prior exposure to, and use of, academic material and its analysis. With a large enough sample, it might have been possible to compare responses between those with different levels of exposure to academic material or experience in analysis. Given the size of our sample, and

particularly the sample of current members, these comparisons are not possible. However, their educational background provides some idea of their exposure to, and experience with, academic material.

Former Members

For former members, there is some variation in the education levels prior to joining the Service because some members came from the RCMP and some joined CSIS directly, and the educational requirements are different for these two organizations. Those who joined CSIS directly were required to have completed an undergraduate degree while the minimum educational requirement for the RCMP is a high school diploma. Therefore, in the sample of former members, 4 individuals had a high school diploma (2 female, 2 male); 2 individuals had college diplomas (2 male); 25 individuals had an undergraduate degree (3 female, 22 male); and 7 individuals had a professional (2) or Master's degree (5).

After joining CSIS, ten (10) of these individuals obtained further education including Bachelor degrees (4), Master degrees (6), and a doctorate (1). One individual completed both a Master's and a PhD whilst employed with the Service.

Twenty-two of the 38 respondents (57.89 %) indicated having taken at least one course on research methods and/or data analysis (Question 5). Eighteen (18) respondents reported having taken such a course at the undergraduate level while four (4) individuals had taken one

at the graduate level. Almost all participants indicated having taken various additional courses, either internally or externally, since joining the Service.

Current Members

For current members who participated in this study, an undergraduate degree was a requirement for employment. Two members held undergraduate degrees (1 female, 1 male), one member held a Master's degree (1 female), and one member held an MBA degree (1 male). Three (3) of these individuals indicated having taken courses in data analysis, two of them at the graduate level. This group also indicated having taken additional courses since joining, both internal and external to the organization, but no additional degrees were obtained. Figure 3 illustrates the highest level of education for the combined sample of respondents, both before and after joining CSIS.




Figure 3 - Highest Level of Education (n = 42)

Figure 3 also illustrates that the number of high school and college diplomas decreased as some former members upgraded their education. Overall, this indicates that most respondents would have had significant exposure to academic material while pursuing post-secondary education, either before or after joining CSIS.

Career Experience related to Terrorism initiatives

In terms of career experience, the focus was on those years spent in areas that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism. These questions were intended to illustrate the breadth and depth of experience of our respondents, both to provide validity to their responses but also to illustrate that their views encompass a variety of perspectives.

When asked to estimate the total number of years that they worked in positions that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism initiatives (Question 6), it appears that some individuals may not have answered the question correctly as they listed their entire years of service. While it is possible that some individuals did spend their entire careers working in counter-terrorism, it is highly unlikely. Intelligence organizations routinely rotate their personnel to different areas so that they acquire more knowledge and varied experience. In particular, intelligence officers are usually generalists so that they can quickly respond to changes in the landscape of intelligence work. Further, those members who started with the RCMP would have done some service in general policing duties in their early years. For these reasons, those who listed 25 + years in terrorism-related areas were not included in the

calculations of experience in terrorism-related work as it would be likely to add more error to the estimates than already exists.

For female respondents, the average number of years of experience in terrorism-related work was estimated to be 14.36 years (n = 7) and, for male respondents, it was 13.14 years (n = 28). This simply establishes that the individuals participating in this survey have, on average, a fair amount of service in terrorism-related areas.

When we look at the different types of job functions that were fulfilled by these respondents (Question 7), it is clear that there is a vast breadth of experience. In this sample, most individuals (36) indicated having fulfilled three or more different job functions while working in terrorism-related areas. The frequency table in Table 5 illustrates the number of individuals who reported having experience in the different job functions. This table reveals the considerable and varied experience of the respondents and also illustrates how intelligence organizations move their people through different positions in order to gain experience and exposure.

Table 5 - Job Functions in relation to Terrorism (n = 42)

Job Functions in relation to Terrorism	Number	Percent of sample (n = 42)
Data Collection - Investigator / Intelligence Officer	38	90.48 %
Data Collection - Other (i.e. Screening, Surveillance, etc.)	21	50.00 %
Data Analysis - Intelligence Officer	32	76.19 %
Data Analysis - Intelligence Analyst	17	40.48 %
Data Analysis - Other (specify)	6	14.29 %
Management (related to CT or CVE decisions)	25	59.52 %
Research / Evaluation (e.g. writing briefs, assessments)	26	61.90 %
Training (providing training to others, any level)	21	50.00 %
Liaison (with other agencies)	31	73.81 %
Foreign Posting	14	33.33 %
Legal Affairs	8	19.05 %
Support Staff	2	4.76 %
Other - please specify 1 - National and international committees 1 - Instruction to outside agencies 1 - Internal Security	3	7.14 %

In terms of experience in data collection, 40 out of 42 respondents (95.2 %) reported having experience in one or more of the data collection roles - as an intelligence officer or in other areas of data collection such as surveillance officer, security screening officer, or such. This is to be expected as intelligence work starts with gathering the information so that is often where intelligence officers begin their career.

Further, 36 out of 42 individuals (85.71 %) reported having had some form of experience in both data collection and data analysis. This illustrates that, in this particular sample, the majority of respondents could respond from both the tactical and analytical points of view.

Only two respondents in this study indicated no experience in either data collection or data analysis while working in terrorism-related areas. Of these two, one (a former member) indicated having only been involved in counter-terrorism in a management capacity and one (a current member) indicated only having been involved in a support role.

Part of the reason that almost all members of this sample have experience in both data collection and data analysis is also a function of time and place. This sample involves mostly former members, who would have started with the RCMP or CSIS in the 1980's or early 1990's, when they were required to do both data collection and data analysis as it was rare to have designated intelligence analysts at that time. As the Service grew, headquarters played a greater role as the central clearing house for information and intelligence. Intelligence analyst positions were created and there was some gradual differentiation of duties, though this was less so in the field offices and intelligence officers could still rotate through analyst positions. The creation of specific intelligence analyst positions meant that some individuals who were conducting analysis had no field experience and perhaps lacked the tacit knowledge that could aid them in doing their analysis. Unless they worked closely with the data collectors, some information could be missed or assessed incorrectly. However, because this sample is mostly former members, from before analyst positions were created, this is not the case here.

Respondents were further asked what their primary job function was while they were working in areas related to Terrorism (Question 8). Figure 4 provides a breakdown of the primary job

functions of respondents in terrorism areas, further illustrating the diverse experience of our sample.




Figure 4 - Primary Job Function in relation to Terrorism (n = 41)

Interview Sample

Six male individuals volunteered to participate in an interview (respondents 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36). All six of these interviewees had been intelligence officers. Five (5) of them had completed full careers with the Service, had participated in both data collection and data analysis, and had retired from middle to senior level management positions. The sixth interviewee had left mid-career for other employment with experience only in data collection.

Focus Group Sample

Five male individuals participated in the focus group. Of these individuals, four had been intelligence officers and had been involved in a number of different job functions while the fifth

individual was primarily involved in data analysis. Two of the individuals in this group had retired at the highest levels of the Service.

In summary, this information demonstrates that the respondents in this study have considerable experience in intelligence work related to terrorism, from the front lines through to senior management. They were well-positioned to answer the questions that were posed to them and have provided considerable valuable insight.

PART II - Use of Academic Material in the IC

This section will examine the key questions regarding the use of academic material (AM) by the intelligence community. The responses to the questionnaire provide some statistical overview while additional comments from the questionnaires and the interviews provide insight into these results. Because respondents provided so many comments, only some selections are included in this chapter while additional comments may be found in Appendix J. The six questions that were removed by CSIS from the questionnaires of current CSIS members are also identified as the results are presented here. They are examined and discussed in more depth in Chapter 9.

How much is Academic Material used by the Intelligence Community?

To begin, let us look at the current situation. This provides a baseline as well as a starting point for understanding how and when AM is used by the IC. Respondents were asked about their use of AM during their training with CSIS (**Question 10**) and during their regular work duties

(**Question 12**). Response choices ranged from 'Not at all' to 'Regularly'. Table 6 provides a frequency table of responses to this question.

Table 6 - Frequency of Use of Academic Material during work and training (n = 39)

How much did you refer to, or use, academic material?	During training	During training (%)	During work	During work (%)	% Change
Not at all	3	7.69 %	1	2.56 %	- 5.13 %
Rarely	11	28.21 %	10	25.64 %	- 2.57 %
Occasionally	17	43.59 %	16	41.03 %	- 2.57 %
Often	6	15.38 %	8	20.51 %	+ 5.13 %
Regularly	2	5.13 %	4	10.26 %	+ 5.13 %
Total Responses (n)	39		39		

Because this is ordinal data, and the intervals between responses cannot be measured, we can only look at central tendency in terms of the mode and median. The responses to both questions were quite similar with the mode and median for both (during training and during regular work duties) falling in the category of 'Occasionally'. However, the results skew slightly higher for the use of AM once people were into their regular duties. Figure 5 illustrates this slight increase. This is interesting in that, during training, when one is actively learning, one might expect more use of AM. Likewise, once a person is into their regular duties, one might expect there would be less time to do research. However, this slight increase in the usage of AM may be a result of new awareness of terrorism research and where or how to access it.




Figure 5 - Frequency of Use of Academic Material during training and work (n = 39)

It is also significant that AM was only used 'occasionally' during training because it suggests that that this is one place where improvements could be made. While new employees may have different educational backgrounds, in-house training sets the tone for how things are done and what is expected within the organization. Perhaps with more exposure to AM during training, new personnel might not only be more aware of the type of AM that is available to them but also receive the message that it is worth using AM in their work. Along these lines, it is also worth considering that perhaps training officers would be in a good position to provide some feedback about the AM that they use and what kind of material would be more useful to them. This might be one place to start in building relationships and examining what is right or wrong in the current literature.

Factors affecting the use of Academic Material by the Intelligence Community

What determines how much AM is used by the IC? Why is AM only used occasionally in their work? In **Question 14**, respondents were presented with a list of possible factors that could

affect their use of academic material. These included time constraints, characteristics of the academic material, and organizational requirements. Table 7 provides a breakdown of the significance of the various factors to study respondents.

Table 7 - Factors that affect the use of Academic Material (n = 38)

FACTOR	Very Significant	Somewhat significant	Occasionally significant	# Responses	% Responses (n = 38)
Time Constraints	13	15	4	32	84.21 %
Material is not easily accessible	4	11	11	26	68.42 %
Material is not relevant to my work	9	5	9	23	60.53 %
Material is too theoretical / hard to understand	4	6	11	21	55.26 %
Not required for my work	10	3	7	20	52.63 %

All of the listed factors were found to play some part in the use of AM but the factor found to have the most effect, as 'very significant' and 'somewhat significant', was time constraints. There simply wasn't the time to incorporate AM into their work. However, many of the comments did not allude to time specifically but to other factors that affected how they prioritized their time, such as job roles and management. This was followed, to varying degrees, by issues of access (68.42 %) and the relevance of AM to their work (60.53 %). Some respondents (52.63 %) stated that AM was not required for their work and 10 (50.00 %) of those respondents stated that this was a 'very significant' factor in whether or not they used AM. The following paragraphs will examine the different factors in more detail and the insight

that was provided in the comments. Different factors were combined because they were often connected in the comments from the respondents.

a) Not required for work

In the comments from respondents, the issue of time was generally related to whether or not using AM was seen to be required for their work. Relative to this, over half of the respondents (52.63 %) included 'Not required for my work' as one of the factors relating to their use of AM. In short, if including AM was not seen to be a requirement of the job then it is unlikely that time would be allotted to include it.

However, it was also clear from the comments that 'not required for work' was being interpreted in different ways. Using AM in one's work could be a real requirement or a perceived one as many jobs do not explicitly list the use of research in their duties. Some respondents focussed on **explicit job requirements** and this was often related to jobs that involved data analysis as opposed to data collection. Further, many comments referred to such data analysis as being conducted only in headquarters, thereby suggesting that AM is not required for work in field offices (R7, R12, R38).

> The number of academic materials used depended on the position I was in. As a field investigator, it was occasional; as an Operational Analyst, it was often and, as a Strategic Analyst, it was on a regular basis. (R32)

> Working in a regional capacity as an IO, emphasis was on data collection. Assessment and analysis of a wide variety of intelligence / research / data, etc. would be more of an HQ function. (R7)

Part of this was because some respondents could see no practical or tactical use for AM. "Academic material is virtually irrelevant when collecting tactical intelligence in a regional office (field)" (R14). The view that AM has no use in field investigations also shows up when we discuss the relevance of AM to IC work later in this section.

Meanwhile, other respondents focussed on the **perceived requirement** for AM as derived from the organizational culture or the attitudes of their leadership (R3, R7, R30, R32). R7 noted that using AM was "Not valued by supervisor / manager (old school)". To this point, R30 explained that CSIS came out of the RCMP which was generally anti-academic so they did not place much importance on AM or research in the early days. Back then, there were no footnotes or facting in warrants. Investigators did not normally look beyond what was in an investigative file and were not encouraged by managers to do more research. "Management was not appreciative of academic insights" (R30) and this attitude was absorbed by some of their subordinates.

R34 agreed that, in the early days of the Service, there was a general "anti-intellectual attitude" and if a person was seen in the library, they would often be teased about it (R34) or called an 'egghead' (R30). R30 noted that this may also have something to do with the lack of experience that some managers had with AM, given that many managers in the old RCMP Security Service only had high school diplomas. In any case, this has contributed to a culture where some investigators dismiss the value of research (R30, R34).

However, some respondents added that the culture is changing and, as the Service matures, more employees are beginning to see the value of including academic material in their work, if not for the work itself then sometimes for their own career progression (R32, R33, R34).

> Culturally, it's changed too.... The organization has evolved into being an intelligence service and became a lot more sophisticated in that way..... they (new generation of intelligence officers) take it for granted that it's part of the culture (to look up information in journals, etc.) (R33).

> I see this more in the younger IOs - but it was often more motivated by their careers than about finding the truth. So, they are more likely to do this (look up academic material). Also, more material is accessible these days (on the Internet) and this is a resource that comes automatically to younger people. (R32)

Therefore, whether or not someone had the time to use AM or do additional research could be related to whether or not it was seen as being required for the job. If including AM was not seen as a requirement, and employees faced time pressures, then the time was not made to include it.

Along the lines of job requirements, **Question 22** asked more specifically "In your organization, are you required to support operational decisions with research?". *This question was removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members*. For the former members who responded, the median response was 'Occasionally' while the mode was 'Regularly', illustrated in Figure 6.




Figure 6 - Requirement to support operational decisions with research (n = 32)

This result would seem to contradict what has just been said and the fact that 52.63 % had stated that using AM was not a requirement in their work - so why would they use research regularly?

> Operational decisions need to come from a holistic belief that all available information is put forward (both classified and open source material) in order to make an informed operational decision. (R22)

However, it became clear that, when mentioning the use of open-source research in their work, a number of respondents were referring to sources other than academia. R26 commented that they regularly used research "but research based on intelligence NOT academics" (R26). Many respondents referred to obtaining information from allied agencies, think tanks, professional experts, even the media (R3, R19, R20, R24, R27, R29, R30, R36). "The research was primarily based on the research and analysis of intelligence partner countries (not academic material)" (R15).

Given that some respondents referred to other sources of information, when did respondents refer specifically to AM? **Question 21** asked "When you have referred to academic material for your work, is it generally when you are directed to do so, when it is a requirement of the job, or your own choice?" Out of 33 respondents, 25 (75.75 %) said that it was their own choice. Five respondents (15.15 %) said 'Both' (it could be both a requirement and self-initiated), while three respondents (9.10 %) said that they only used academic material when it was a requirement of the job. *Question 21 was removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members.*

> It was always my own choice to introduce academic material into my work. I can never really remember the Service being particularly interested in an academic component of our work - at least at the intelligence collection side of our work. (R29)
>
> It was my experience that the number of academic materials used was generally at the discretion of the employee and usually very little input from the supervisor or management. (R32)

Therefore, fully three-quarters of respondents stated that their use of AM was self-initiated. Considering this finding, what motivated different intelligence personnel to use AM? Some respondents reported using AM when they felt it would be useful for a specific investigation, either for providing background material or to support their decisions (R1, R5, R7, R19, R23, R25). "By my own choosing, but predominantly when I felt I required such information to properly discharge my duties." (R10).

Meanwhile, other respondents commented on using AM "more out of my own sense of professionalism.... and intellectual honesty" (R6). Some respondents went as far to say that the onus to use AM should rest with the investigator because managers have other demands

on their time and an investigator should be able to work independently (R20, R30, R32). "You should not have to be directed - it should be instinctive." (R20). R30 reminds us that, in most fields, it is up to the individual to be professional and keep up with knowledge in their area of work (R30, R34).

> Any intelligence officer who doesn't read and keep up-to-date on issues, even after work hours, is doing a disservice to themselves and to the Service as that is what is required to be a professional in any field. (R30)

Further to the topic of personal professionalism, **Questions 18 and 19** asked respondents about how much research on terrorism they did in their spare time, whether it was reading articles or books, or attending lectures in person or viewing them online? Table 8 provides a snapshot of how many respondents pursue (or pursued) knowledge in the field of terrorism outside of any Service initiatives. Most respondents (87.5%) indicated having done some reading about terrorism on their own time while 70% of respondents indicated having observed a lecture on terrorism.

Table 8 - Research into Terrorism outside of Work Hours (n = 40)

In your spare time, do you..	Read material related to Terrorism ? (Question 18)	Attend or view lectures related to Terrorism? (Question 19)
Not at all	5 (12.5 %)	12 (30.0 %)
Rarely	9 (22.5 %)	13 (32.5 %)
Occasionally	10 (25.0 %)	12 (30.0 %)
Often	9 (22.5 %)	1 (2.5 %)
Regularly	7 (17.5 %)	2 (5.0 %)

As noted earlier in the comments, some of this additional research involved material from sources other than academia, such as books, articles, and lectures from professional experts and investigative journalists (R3, R20, R21, R27, R30, R36).

Ideally, the requirement to use academic research to support one's work should involve a combination of good leadership and individual professionalism. R30 and R34 commented that, if managers do not have the knowledge themselves, or do not value education, they are not likely to direct their employees to find and use AM or to give them the time to do it. R30 stated that it is also up to managers to maintain their own levels of knowledge in the field to properly supervise their staff or, at the very least, encourage their employees to educate themselves. As an example, R34 noted that he would ask the library to compile a package of AM on certain topics and then provide it to his staff to read, but most managers would not do this. R16 also commented that "As a senior executive, I often sought out research to answer questions and fill in knowledge gaps for the understanding of our organization and employees." This is not just for the benefit of the service but also for the benefit of the employee (R30, R34).

Given the time constraints that many intelligence personnel face, R34 thought that the use of AM should also play a greater role in the organization's training requirements because once a person is sent to a specific area, they do not normally get much time to learn that area. Therefore, it is very important to "frontload knowledge" so that you know the finer points of an area or topic before you go to the field so that you can ask the right questions once you get there. R34 explained that he learned this the hard way, when he was thrown into a new area

with too little background knowledge. This is especially important when someone is posted overseas and needs to hit the ground running. Not only is this crucial for getting the best and most useful information for our government, but it can also make or break one's career and the Service's reputation. R34 added that many investigators are only interested in the "tactical stuff" so they jump to specializing without the basic knowledge (R34). By increasing the use of AM during training, the organization would not only better prepare their personnel but it could show employees the value of AM and encourage them to make the time to use it in their work.

Overall, when respondents chose the statement that AM was 'not required for my work', it was not always determined by specific job requirements but by the perception of its importance as learned from their training experience and the organizational culture.

b) Accessibility of Academic Material

The accessibility of AM was cited by 68.42 % of the respondents as a factor in its use, though most did not see it as being the most significant factor. It was seen to be 'somewhat significant' or 'occasionally significant'. **Question 13** asked "During your regular duties, how do / did you get access to these academic materials?". The large majority (89.47%) cited using the organization's library and internal resources. Doing internet searches (55.26 %) and referrals from colleagues (52.63%) were the next most popular avenues. Figure 7 shows the percentage of respondents who have utilized the various sources to obtain AM.




Figure 7 - How Academic Material accessed by respondents (n = 38)

It is worth noting that in the early years of the Service, the internet was not available to all employees so research was not as easily accessible as today. At that time, research was something that investigators often had to do in their off-hours, by going to the library or seeking out academics. Further, regional offices usually had small libraries or, depending on the size of the region, there may not have been a library at all. In such cases, respondents noted that they could ask library personnel to locate material for them. It is also important to remember that, as previously noted, there was a lack of research on terrorism in the 1980's and 1990's. Therefore, even if a person went looking for research, there may not have been a lot to find. "Library service provided excellent open source research. Lack of relevant material was the main problem." (R5)

As CSIS has grown, its library resources have expanded, with professionally trained staff, and an Academic Outreach unit was created to bring in lecturers and co-ordinate gatherings.

> In early days, it was mostly libraries. Later, Academic Outreach was created - started linking academic outreach to operational areas - brought in world class experts to hold seminars and working lunches - trying to create a professional interest in academic research. Limited success with that because some people don't understand the full value of it. (R34)

To inquire about this, **Question 15** asked "In your organization, is there a databank or service that can assist you with locating relevant academic material?". *Question 15 was removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members, even though information about the Academic Outreach Unit and other resources is on the Service's website.* Thirty-one of 36 former members (86.11 %) stated that the Service has such facilities and R32 noted that, even in the past, there was always more access to AM in headquarters. Interestingly, two respondents said "No" (there were no such internal resources) and three respondents indicated that they didn't know.

The majority of respondents had only positive things to say about the library resources at CSIS headquarters and R32 noted that " CSIS library / open information branch is terrific. They would find anything that was needed from open information or reports. They have also been putting more books and articles online so easier to access." Beyond using the library resources, respondents also reported that they would reach out to colleagues, in-house analysts, and their research unit for additional research (R28, R31, R33).

While most respondents stated that they used the variety of in-house resources, some respondents also reported going outside of the Service for publications and reports from allied services, independent thinktanks, investigative journalism, the Canadian Centre for Conflict

Studies, and the core terrorism journals (R3, R8, R19, R29). While some respondents referred specifically to books and articles by academics (R7, R11, R13, R27), others indicated more interest in books and articles from the other noted sources (R3, R8, R30, R36).

> Journals: Terrorism & Political Violence; Intelligence & National Security; The Journal of Conflict Studies; Perspectives on Terrorism. Studies by organizations such as: Rand Corp, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Israel) (R8)
>
> Research materials from international thinktanks and various intelligence related organizations were most useful. They were viewed as more trusted sources of information rather than random information on the internet. (R19)
>
> During the Tamil Tiger shipping incident, when ships were being dispatched to Canada with refugees and possible terrorists on board, I was able to obtain a significant amount of pertinent research material from the South African Institute of Security Studies (ISS). (R29)

A few respondents noted that they had sought out a scholar in their field of interest, naming notables such as Janice Gross Stein, Lorne Dawson, Amar Amarasingam, and Wesley Wark (R12, R18, R21, R22, R26). Overall, many of the comments suggested that accessibility was not a very significant factor in determining their use of research but rather that they sometimes obtained the information that they needed from sources other than academia.

c) Material is not relevant to my work / Material is too theoretical

Over half of our sample (60.53 %) stated that the relevance of AM, or how theoretical it is (55.26 %), played some role in how much it is used. These two factors often overlapped in the comments because whether some AM was seen to be relevant to one's work could depend on an individual's ability to understand the theoretical material.

As noted in KMb research (Chapter 3), the relevance of material relates to how well it meets the needs of the end-user. Three factors that are involved in the perceived relevance of AM involve the quality of its content, the language it uses, and its timeliness. If material is too theoretical or written in language that is hard to understand, practitioners may not understand the content of the material or may not understand how it is relevant to their work. Whether research is seen to be produced at the right time will also affect how useful it is. These same factors show up in the comments of our IC respondents.

> Academic material is often too lengthy, unfocussed, too theoretical, and dated (needs to be timely, focussed & relevant). (R28)

> Far too much academic material in Canada is purely theoretical and has no relevant data. (R26)

A number of respondents reported having little use for AM because they see it as being too theoretical and not having any **tactical or practical use**. This was also mentioned in the earlier section where some respondents stated that AM was 'not required' in field work because they saw no tactical or practical use for it. These respondents appear to want material that provides practical information or specific answers that can be used during an investigation.

> It really comes down to the academic - if what she / he has to say (is) strictly theoretical or does it have practical applications at a grass roots level. (R21)

In some cases, this focus on practical or tactical use was also connected to the **timeliness of AM** as respondents commented that the AC and IC have different objectives and work at different speeds. "The tempo of operations matters here. CT moves faster, dealing with smaller groups, and there are time pressures" (R32). It was thought by some that academia moves too slowly for its information to be useful as it relates to terrorism (R6, R32, R29).

> Academic research is often useful but not essential to investigations as it is based on data / situations in the past. Investigations are by definition forward-looking where there is no data to examine. (R6)

For these reasons, some of these respondents thought that AM would be more useful in headquarters for data analysis, planning programs, and writing policy (R7, R11, R12, R35) rather than data collection and field investigations.

However, other respondents recognized that, even in the field, an investigator needs to know the context and underlying issues because this can help to direct their investigation so they are not wasting time (R19, R30, R32, R33, R34). This kind of information relies less on timeliness and can include historical, cultural, or political information to provide context. It also helps an investigator interpret information, ask the right questions, and get down to "that 10% of information that is most valuable" (R34.) AM in areas such as psychology can also be useful when dealing with individuals in the field (R33). R30 added that it can also reflect poorly on the Service if an intelligence officer has to testify in court or make a presentation and they aren't fully informed about all aspects of their field of investigation (R30).

These comments reveal that there are different understandings of how AM may be used in the course of one's work. As R34 noted, there are some intelligence officers who are only interested in the tactical work and do not take the time to consider how AM might help with that. Meanwhile, others understand the value of AM to provide contextual information or of learning from the past to inform future decisions.

> It depends on individual perspective and understanding the value of different kinds of open information; understanding what is relevant to your work; when you should be

> looking for supporting data; understanding what kind of data you can find in the research; etc. (R32)

However, this understanding of AM, and therefore its relevance, is also tied to how the material is presented. As KMb research noted, the **intellectual or cognitive accessibility** of the material is also a factor in its uptake by practitioners. Some of the respondents pointed out that AM is difficult to read and interpret (R26, R34) so it would be helpful to IC members if material was "shorter, focussed, and easily digested - (it) will be ignored if it is too long or too theoretical" (R34).

> Many (intelligence personnel) don't know how to incorporate theory into practice. From academic side, academics should also think about how to make theoretical modelling more applicable to practice. aka Know your audience. To be fair, some academics probably assume higher level of understanding in the Service. (R34)

Therefore, whether AM is seen to be relevant to IC work is connected not only to its content and timeliness but also to the way that it is written. These factors all contribute to whether IC personnel take the time to read AM, are able to understand it, and then be able to apply it to their work.

The Utility of Academic Material to the Intelligence Community

Having considered the factors that influence how much AM is used by intelligence professionals, we turn to the kinds of AM that the IC has used thus far and whether they found them to be useful. **Question 16** asked "During your regular duties, when you have referred to academic materials, have you found them to be useful for your work?". Table 9 illustrates that, when used, AM has been found to be somewhat useful. While the mode and median fall into the category of 'Occasionally', we can see that the results skewed higher towards 'Often' and

'Regularly'. This is also illustrated in Figure 8 and suggests that, when used, AM has, more often than not, been found to be useful.

Table 9 - Utility of Academic Materials (n = 40)

Was academic material useful?	# respondents	% respondents
Not at all	1	2.5 %
Rarely	2	5.0 %
Occasionally	18	45 %
Often	14	35 %
Regularly	5	12.5 %




Figure 8 - Utility of Academic Material (n = 40)

To further this topic, **Question 20** asked "Can you describe an example of when you sought out research to assist you in your work? Were you able to find relevant research? How and where did you find it?". *Question 20 was removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members*

Over half of the respondents indicated that they had used AM primarily to inform themselves about a particular group or issue. It was also noted that the use of AM could come at various stages of an investigation or operation. AM may be useful for identifying areas that require investigation and justifying the beginning of an operation. "Quantitative research can tell us that something is definitely a problem or an issue" (R34) and can help to "kickstart" an investigation (R20). R5 pointed out that open-source material is also routinely required to support warrant applications. As an operation progresses, AM can be used to verify source information (R19) and "assist with interpreting the intelligence product" (R20).

> It will never replace secret privileged information - that's not what we're talking about - but it can certainly better inform it and direct it ...so that you don't waste time and if you have people that have done thorough studies - and they have all sorts of tables and all those numbers we don't like - I think then it's less likely that you're going to miss it. And maybe that's the end game - is to not miss it and have another 9/11 or that kind of stuff..... Avoid intelligence failures and strategic surprise. (R33)

Another purpose for AM is to add weight and credibility to arguments or opinions so that it is not just an investigator's opinion or the Service's opinion that is being reflected (R8, R19, R25, R32, R33). R30 noted that the support of AM can be especially important when defending one's position or actions to a judge or in the court of public opinion. For example, when one of my former colleagues had to testify about their operational decision-making, I was able to direct them to AM on radicalization that aided in the successful defense of their position.

R34 noted that, in order to face new challenges and provide our government with the best available intelligence, the Service has to go beyond the basic knowledge of an area and obtain a deeper level of knowledge and understanding. In this effort, the Service's Academic Outreach

unit has brought in some very distinguished scholars and speakers to provide lectures on various topics so **Question 17** asked if respondents found these lectures by scholars to be useful. As shown in Table 10, most respondents found these lectures to 'Occasionally' be useful though the median for responses fell into the 'Often' category.

Table 10 - Usefulness of Lectures by visiting scholars (n = 39)

Were lectures useful?	# respondents	% respondents
Not at all	1	2.56 %
Rarely	4	10.26 %
Occasionally	12	30.77 %
Often	8	20.51 %
Regularly	9	23.08 %
Did not attend any lectures	5	12.82 %

Though there were few comments for this question, a few respondents indicated that they had a preference for speakers who were also practitioners as opposed to those from academia (R5, R10, R36). In some cases, the reason for this was that professional experts were easier to understand and generally spoke 'the same language' as their audience.

> The most useful are always practitioners who are subject matter experts and who have an ability to teach; a combination of academic study, practical experience and the ability to synthesize and explain often complex issues. (R36)

The type of **content** that was found to be most useful was addressed in Question 23. *Question 23 was removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members.* In general, respondents were more interested in practical and fact-based articles as opposed to theoretical or philosophical approaches (R1, R28). For example, "statistical analysis of terrorism trends and activities" are seen to be useful in identifying problem areas or activities of particular concern"

(R25). Articles about radicalization also appear to be well-received and useful in operations, particularly if they involve firsthand accounts or personal interviews (R18, R24, R26, R28).

> I found certain research on radicalization to be extremely applicable to operational challenges. It improved our efforts with human sources, with assessing the threat accurately, and assigning / prioritizing resources accordingly. (R2)

> Articles about risk factors are used in targeting and warrants. AM in the areas of psychology and sociology help answer questions about why people escalate to violence. Those are things that are very personal and individual; based on personality and life experiences. (R33)

Many respondents also cited articles that provide contextual information such as the historical, cultural, political or religious details related to a country or a terrorist organization.

> Country profiles are invaluable. So too are academic summaries of the history of a region or group (clan, tribe, city, province or state, country, religious denomination, political party) or whatever. (R32)

> Publications providing historical context of terrorist entities can be useful when initially investigating them. Thereafter, they become less effective, generally speaking, in predicting group behaviour, or uncovering existing or potential adherents. (R10)

Overall, the topics that were most sought after (Question 20), or the AM found to be most useful (Question 23), are listed here beginning with the topics most frequently mentioned in the comments.

- Terrorist group profiles (political / historical / religious / cultural)
- Radicalization and mobilization to violence - particularly first-hand accounts
- Country profiles (political / historical)
- Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
- Insider threat information
- Detection of deception
- Homeland terrorism / violence in diaspora
- International relations / political science
- Interviewing techniques

PART III - Increasing the Utility of Academic Material to the IC

Where do we go from here? At this point, we have some insight into how much the intelligence community uses academic material and the factors that influence this. The remaining questions in the questionnaire asked for respondent opinions about how to improve the utility of AM to the IC and the role that knowledge mobilization could play in those efforts.

Question 24 asked "What factors do you think would increase the likelihood that you or your colleagues would refer to academic materials in the course of your work?". Seven options were provided that might address the earlier-noted issues of time, accessibility, and the relevance of AM from different angles. Table 11 illustrates the variation in support for the different factors as a means of increasing the use of AM by intelligence professionals.

Table 11 - Factors likely to increase use of Academic Material (n = 37)

Factor	Likely to increase use	Somewhat likely to increase use	Might increase use	# responses	% responses (n = 37)
More time to do research	12	7	11	30	81.08 %
Better access to AM	10	9	9	28	75.68 %
More relevant AM	23	6	5	34	92.89 %
AM circulated within organization	14	9	9	32	86.49 %
Opportunities to interact with scholars / researchers	13	9	9	31	83.78 %
Ongoing access to networks of academics / researchers	11	10	9	30	81.08 %
Collaborating on projects or articles	11	5	11	27	72.97 %
Other - Management direction	3			3	8.11 %

Thirty-seven individuals replied to this question and, while all of the options received considerable support, "More relevant AM" was mentioned by 92.89 % of respondents as a factor, and 62.16 % mentioned it as the factor most likely to increase their use of AM. The fact that all of the options were considered as possible ways to improve the use of AM by IC members also suggests that there is plenty of room for improvement and that most respondents are open to trying different ways to improve upon the current situation.

Organizational Options

Organizational options for improving the use of AM included more internal circulation of AM (86.49%), better access to AM (75.68%) and more time to do research (81.08%). In addition, three respondents wrote in, under 'Other', that they would use AM more if management directed it.

A number of respondents focussed on the role of management in encouraging IC members to use AM and in providing the resources and environment to do that (R7, R30, R34, R36). R34 noted that leadership is important here and management can do more to encourage employees to educate themselves before running out to meet people and do interviews. It is also up to the leadership to lead by example as well as to change an organizational culture that still harbours some old attitudes that may discourage the use of AM (R34, R36). One of the current members of CSIS agreed that the Service needs "more acceptance, interest, and belief in its (AM) value. Historically, (the) organization doesn't value or know if, or agree with, academic research being of assistance" (R42). Some respondents have acknowledged that,

while old attitudes are changing, there is more to be done in order to become a top tier professional intelligence organization (R33, R34).

Academic Options / Interacting with Academia

For Improving the use of AM by the IC, options that involve promoting interaction between the IC and academia also received significant support. These options included opportunities to interact with scholars (83.78%), ongoing access to networks of academics (81.08%), and possibly collaborating on projects or articles with academics (72.97%). Both questionnaire and interview comments supported the need for better communication between the AC and the IC in order to provide feedback and improve the relevance of AM to the IC.

> Institutional relationships are key, but are a two-way street. Agencies need to reach out but academics with relevant terrorism papers should consider "pushing" those to relevant depts. Academic independence can still be maintained, but less "ivory tower". (R27)

Beyond just communication, **Question 25** asked "Do you think that it would be beneficial for the academic community and the intelligence community to combine their knowledge on research projects? Why or why not?". Forty individuals responded to this question, including the four current members of CSIS, and the majority said 'Yes' (57.50 %) while the next highest response was 'Maybe' (30.00 %). Table 12 illustrates the balance of opinions on this matter.

Table 12 - Would it be beneficial for the AC and IC to combine knowledge? (n = 40)

Response	# responses	% responses
Yes	23	57.50 %
Maybe	12	30.00 %
No	4	10.00 %
Unlikely	1	2.50 %

Meanwhile, four respondents (10.26%) said a definite 'No' to combining efforts while one other respondent said that it was unlikely to happen (R3, R5, R8, R29, R40).

> No, never! Intelligence professionals become subject matter experts through classified investigations. There is a firewall between open information and classified information obtained through sources. (R5)

> There is too great a disconnect between the plodding analysis that is needed to advance a CT case file and the types of material that is routinely available from most academic sources. The type of intelligence material required for a case file tends to be very specific and individual and not the sort of material that is or can be produced in an academic setting. (R29)

Despite these comments, the large majority of respondents thought that combining knowledge would be beneficial and that working together, on selected topics, would help to supplement knowledge, fill in gaps, and offer fresh perspectives (R2, R7, R9, R23, R25, R31, R34, R35, R37, R39, R42). Some respondents noted that, in other sectors, it is fairly common for government and academia to work together.

> Absolutely. Universities + govt + private sector pursue joint efforts in the health sector with highly sensitive info. Why not more on the terrorism issue? Classified & unclassified options are available where there is a will. (R27)

Further, it was noted that other countries have established links and programs to combine efforts and Canada should as well.

> Yes. Virtually every other Five Eyes and NATO country invests seriously in this except Canada (really CSIS is the outlier despite heroic efforts by the Academic Outreach office in RAP).....CSIS lacks a model for disclosure - no real relationship with academics because afraid of it - but it can add understanding - need to share to understand the world. (R36)

In terms of working together, some respondents also noted that the Service has hired or commissioned academics in the past to conduct some studies (R32, R36). It was also pointed out that the Service already has a professional internal research system in headquarters, that includes academics, but suggested that this could be expanded and include more work with academia (R1, R10, R23, R28, R32, 33).

> Our organization employs many academics that respond directly to our research needs, thereby supporting current investigations. Moreover, we have a robust academic outreach program where (we) collaborate with outside researchers to achieve this same goal. Increasing the collaboration already in place would be helpful, providing it resulted in better advice to government leaders. (R10)

To gather input on some other avenues for co-operation, **Question 26** asked "What form of collaboration can you envision that might benefit research into terrorism?". Four options were presented that involved different levels of working together, as shown in Table 13.

Table 13 - Possible Types of AC - IC Collaboration (n = 35)

Types of Collaboration	# responses	% responses
Intelligence professionals providing input on articles before publication	20	57.14 %
Inter-group discussions on specific projects and outcomes	21	60.00 %
Intelligence organizations providing anonymized data	22	62.86 %
Co-production / conducting research projects together	19	54.29 %

Thirty-five (35) individuals responded to this question, including three current members of CSIS. Most respondents agreed that all forms of collaboration should be considered, and the majority supported all of the four options, however comments revealed a continuing skepticism about whether the different obstacles to co-operation could be overcome.

> I cannot picture any scenario that would be acceptable to an intelligence agency re a collaborative relationship with academia - with respect to terrorism-related research. (R3)

Considerations and Obstacles to AC - IC Collaboration

a) Classified information and Security Clearances

The majority of comments made mention of security concerns revolving around the use of classified information and the risks of disclosing sensitive information (R11, R13, R24, R36). In this regard, R3 was also concerned that allied agencies might no longer trust the Service if they thought that their information might be leaked (R3).

Therefore, a number of respondents suggested that the only way to manage any combined projects would be for the academics to come into the IC, with a security clearance, so that they could have access to raw data and discussions could be more open (R12, R15, R26, R32). Otherwise, inter-group discussions or "collaborating with academics / researchers on projects may be of little value because of the need to water down information to an unclassified level in order to share" (R12). It also appeared to be understood that any such AC - IC collaboration would likely only work at the national level, in headquarters, and not in the regional or field offices (R4, R11, R14).

> The CIA and other intelligence organizations have substantive academic outreach enabling the permeability of academics to enter for a period of time to these intel orgs and vice versa. Harness the academic community to be SMEs (Subject Matter Experts) in certain areas. Give them a clearance and put them in with analysts e.g. during sabbatical years. Some academics would love this and it would be beneficial for internal research while giving academics an understanding of intelligence work. (R30)

However, as discussed in Chapter 4, some academics may not wish to get a security clearance or deal with any of the risks or requirements that go with that. They may also not want to deal with the restrictions surrounding classified information and what it would mean for their ability to publish both during or after their experience in the IC.

> "Security clearances will always be an obstacle as will inability for academics to publish their findings based (on) that collaboration. ... Very tricky to manage." (R26)

Overall, most respondents supported the idea of AC - IC collaboration but they also questioned how far it could go without involving the need for the academic to obtain a security clearance.

b) Costs and Benefits

Aside from the issues noted above, some respondents questioned who would actually benefit from such efforts? Interestingly, there were some who thought only the IC could benefit, while others thought that the value would be to the AC. For example, R20 commented that "Secret intelligence and academic research make for strange bedfellows. The intelligence community would benefit from academic research but any reciprocation would be tricky, if not unlikely".

Meanwhile, R35 thought that it would benefit the AC for practitioners to "put their lens on academic research" and help them interpret their data better. However, R5 provided an

example of when such a co-operation (providing input on an academic article) went sideways, causing problems for the Service and making them question the benefits of co-operation.

> We once reviewed an academic paper and provided only advice on where they were totally off track in statements and conclusions. Academic then presented the paper at a conference, saying that it had been vetted by the organization. Front page story resulted. Ouch! (R5)

Some other options present more significant costs to be weighed against potential benefits for each community. The option of "intelligence organizations providing anonymized data" to the AC received the most support as a form of collaboration (62.86%) but seemed to be quickly discounted due to the cost - benefit analysis. It was acknowledged that the Service holds a lot of data (R33, R34) and there is little doubt that releasing some of that data would increase the accuracy of academic research.

> We (CSIS) overclassify everything. There's a real reluctance to share....What's the benefit of having all this wonderful information intelligence if you don't tell anybody about it and nobody knows about it? So, you can go and collect and be the greatest organization but if you just hang on or hold it tight what does it actually do for the betterment - whether it's to work an investigation or just to inform the public? And I don't know if we ... the Service ... has found that balance. (R35)

For example, R33 noted that typologies of terrorists that are based on open information, even court transcripts, do not give enough information to allow for a complete understanding of underlying motivations and factors. Therefore, providing data to the AC would undoubtedly improve this kind of research.

However, there are significant obstacles to releasing anonymized data. R34 explained that, beyond the significant privacy and legal implications involved in releasing data, the issue of infrastructure also comes into play. The classification of information means that everything has

to be edited before it can be released. Not all information is Secret or Top Secret but documents are classified at the highest level of any information in them. Therefore, there might be only one or two bits of information that are actually sensitive but the entire report or document will be classified to that level of sensitivity. Therefore, editing data for release would require a whole unit and people who are knowledgeable enough to do the editing properly. CSIS is not set up for this so the costs, in time and resources, would be quite high. (R33, R34)

R33 suggested that one area that might be of benefit to the Service would be to use academics for post-operation analysis. R33 explained that, if there is a big operation, some analysis may be done afterwards but otherwise the data may not be used because counter-terrorism moves fast and, once something is over, everyone needs to move on to the next thing. In addition, the Service is cautious about retaining data for too long because they have been criticized at times for their retention of information. Therefore, perhaps the Service could use academics for that post-operation analysis so that their own people could move on to the current priorities and the data can still be used. (R33) However, this may still require the academic to obtain a security clearance depending on the type of data and its recency.

In terms of working more closely with the AC, a few respondents noted that the Service's research unit or strategic analysts could be the 'bridge to academia' (R5) so perhaps the research unit might also be in a better position to determine what kind of information might be available to be anonymized or otherwise provided to the AC.

c) Perceptions and Misperceptions

Additionally, some respondents commented on how AC - IC co-operation might be viewed by different people, including the two communities, the media, and the public. As noted in Chapter 4, the AC is designated as a 'sensitive sector' in Canada so if CSIS shared data or worked with the AC, there would likely be people who would say that the IC is influencing AC research or vice versa (R33).

> "Unfortunately, there are institutional and legal challenges to this beyond what is already being done. Academia must remain unfettered and independent. Police and especially intelligence agencies continue to rely on classified sources that must be kept secret and private." (R16)

> I think in many cases it would be beneficial - the issue I tend to find is that the intelligence community tends to be very closed to the idea of collaborating with 'outsiders' (i.e. those not subject to the same secrecy oaths that we are), and also a somewhat legitimate concern that our involvement with the academic community could risk tarnishing the reputation / nature of the academic institution. (R41)

Part of the problem is that academia and the public do not really understand the nature of the work that intelligence organizations do - and how they do it. So, they tend to be distrustful of intelligence organizations and suspicious about IC activities. To counter this, a few respondents thought that the Service needs to provide more context of what they do (R34, R35). R34 noted that many people do not understand that the Service is held to a higher standard than the private sector or the public. As an example, it is very difficult for the Service to get anonymized data from social media even though the private sector can get and exploit the same kind of data (R34). The Service often needs warrants to do something that the private sector does regularly (R35). This not only makes it harder for the Service to do their job but uses up more time and resources that could be better used for the actual work (R34).

R35 also noted that news reports about Service violations do not provide an accurate picture because the statistics do not provide any details. There are different kinds of violations. Some violations are very minor or accidental while others are more serious. Yet, they all make people think the worst of the Service. R35 suggested that it would be helpful if the Service could share more information so that academia and the public had more context and could better understand what is happening. This might also increase trust in the Service. (R35)

> If the Service only releases snippets of information that doesn't tell the whole story. There is more information that we could share to help people understand. (R35)

Such misperceptions also affect relations between the AC and IC so that advancing knowledge mobilization between the two communities would also require overcoming some feelings that each community may hold for the other.

> The Service has relied on "secrecy" and its fear of the outside to rationalize a deep disconnect with the academic community.....This is not helped by the often open hostility by the academic community towards CSIS and the frequent refusal to work with the Service. It's a nasty cycle that has long roots and is linked to the lack of a political national security culture such as exists in the US, UK, Australia, France, etc. (R36)

R33 also commented on these impediments to co-operation. "Here's the thing. A lot of universities have disdain for the Service." Because of news stories or incidents, like the stories of torture in Guantanamo, there are some in academia who believe that "we're bad people - and they don't want to be associated with us.... So, it's not just about the Service reaching out." Some academics don't want to think that their work might be used to hurt people - or be used in any way that goes against their personal values - while intelligence agencies worry that their information might be leaked or misinterpreted. There is distrust on both sides. Therefore, any co-operation between the AC and IC would have to build in safeguards and protections for both

sides. This is difficult because, unfortunately, it is impossible to control everything and people are unpredictable. (R33)

Overall, while respondents supported the idea of collaborating with the AC, and supported various types of collaboration, they were skeptical that it could actually happen given that each option involves obstacles that would need to be overcome. Most respondents thought that, in order to be fruitful, any collaboration would require the academic to obtain a security clearance so that information and discussions would not have to be watered down and potentially lead to mistakes or misunderstandings. There are costs and benefits to this for both sides. Beyond that however is the issue of how each community views the other and whether they even want to work together.

On the topic of collaborating, a current member of CSIS (R41) summed it up by stating

> I definitely think there is a lot to be gained from both sides; Academic research is often very useful in looking at mass quantities of information, broad trends, motivations, and a variety of areas that the intelligence community doesn't spend enough time on, but can benefit from learning about, and the intelligence community also has their areas of expertise from the extraordinary powers and unique access that they enjoy which could be of great use to academic researchers. The hard part is to get the two together while preserving secrecy for the intelligence community and credibility / reputation for the academic community. (R41)

Recommendations for Future Research

Finally, Question **28** provided an opportunity for respondents to add their final comments or thoughts on any of the topics covered in the questionnaire. Many respondents provided lengthy comments and opinions which can be found in Appendix J. Notable among the comments were suggestions for future research in the field of terrorism, including that research

should be more predictive and that there is a need for academic research and articles that are better related to Canada and Canadian interests. A few comments also reiterated the need for information that is practical and easily digested.

> The focus needs to be on ' what's next?' / what is over the horizon. CVE research lagged too far behind the reality. Help the community be more effective with what is coming. (R2)
>
> Would like to see more research into the radicalization process, CVE, and counter / de-radicalization specific to Canada. (R13)
>
> This is a given but actually going to a conflict area - getting an appreciation for an area is huge. I know not always practical but you can soon tell who visited the area by tone and nuance of writing. (R21)
>
> Ensure the subject matter is relevant, the final report is concise and applicable to today's threat environment or what can be anticipated in the near future. Yesterday's terrorist barely resembles the terrorist of today - particularly in the areas of motivation and capabilities. (R28)
>
> Intelligence professionals are more often than not generalists who require contextual information that is easily consumable. (R31)
>
> Research that is more specific to Canada. We rely too much on other country info that is not always applicable to our situation. For practitioners in the field, could use more information on things like
> - the nexus between mental illness and violent extremism
> - group dynamics - psych articles are good here too
> - profiling articles / typologies are only good at the general level - provides context - then the individual characteristics kick in - but the research helps IOs assess people. (R35)

Chapter Summary

Overall, it was found that AM is occasionally used by intelligence professionals in the course of their duties. 'Time constraints' was the most cited factor (84.21 %) in determining how much AM was used. However, the issue of time was also related to whether or not using AM was

thought to be required for the work. Respondent comments revealed that, unless an individual was in a research-related position, the requirement for AM was generally not defined by the organization or the managers but by the individual employee. Therefore, the use of AM was most often self-initiated (75.75 %).

Whether or not AM was used, or seen as a requirement, was also influenced by the culture within the organization and its leadership. It was noted that, since the Service was created out of the RCMP, there was initially an anti-intellectual or anti-academic culture with little use for AM in their work. As the Service is maturing, and new cohorts are all university graduates, there may be increasing understanding of the value of AM in helping to inform and direct investigations. Some respondents commented that change needs to be driven by management - to lead by example, to incorporate more AM in training, and to encourage their employees to educate themselves. However, other respondents thought that the onus is on the individual to educate themselves, as professionals do in any field.

The physical accessibility of material on terrorism was said to be a significant factor in the past but less so today. Comments on this topic were few and generally positive, praising the Service's in-house resources and library staff, as well as the calibre of speakers being brought into CSIS headquarters. A few respondents mentioned seeking out scholars in their area of interest, either because they couldn't find relevant research articles or because they preferred one-to-one conversations.

Finally, a number of respondents stated that AM was not relevant to their work (60.53 %) or that it was too theoretical or hard to understand (55.26 %). Some respondents saw no use for AM in the field because they could see no tactical applications or because it was not timely enough. Meanwhile, other respondents understood that AM was not meant to be used in the minute but to provide a solid foundation of knowledge for any position. As R35 stated "More knowledge equals more tools in the toolbox". What is clear is that, whether AM is found to be relevant or not, depends heavily on the individual being able to understand the material (cognitive accessibility) and then understand how to apply it to their work.

To address some of these problems, respondents suggested that AM needs to be more relevant and practical, filling in gaps in information, or providing some predictive value. It was suggested that academic articles need to be shorter, focussed, and easily digested because intelligence personnel don't have the time, or perhaps the understanding, to try to decipher what is being said.

When AM was used, most respondents (92.50 %) stated that they found it to be somewhat useful for their work. In terms of base knowledge, there was general agreement about the importance of background and historical information, about countries and terrorist organizations, to provide context or 'the big picture'. Datasets, that can provide an overview of where problems exist, were also considered to be useful in helping to focus intelligence efforts. Articles about radicalization and what moves individuals or groups to violence were also mentioned as useful topics for understanding individuals or target organizations. However,

respondents also noted that such information does not have to come from academic sources and there was some preference for using research from those who they thought better understand the nature of intelligence work - such as allied agencies, thinktanks, and practitioner experts.

The last few questions in this study addressed the possible ways to increase the use of AM by the IC. The factor that was found most likely to increase their use of AM was to improve the relevance of AM to their work. Respondents were open to different avenues and different levels of co-operation in order to achieve this goal but, despite their openness to pursuing closer relations, it was noted that there are considerable barriers to this such as the classification of information and the risk of damage should any information be leaked. Meanwhile, some respondents noted that the AC may have concerns of their own and may not want to work with the IC. It was thought that there is deep distrust between the two communities that would need to be addressed and overcome.

While some of these hurdles might be managed, many of the respondents thought that it would be no easy feat. In the following chapter, the input of the focus group is added to the discussion and the suggestions of an AC - IC disconnect are directly addressed.

CHAPTER 7 – FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

The questionnaires and interviews in this study provided us with data about how much AM is used by the IC and the reasons for that situation. Respondents were also surveyed for recommendations about how to improve this situation. As a final step in collecting data on this topic, a virtual focus group (FG) was conducted to discuss the results of the survey and to probe for a deeper understanding of some of the results.

The focus group consisted of 5 male respondents. Four members of the focus group were intelligence officers who had completed full careers with the Service, some of them retiring at the highest levels of the Service. One of these intelligence officers was also a former RCMP officer who had been with the RCMP National Security Branch from which the new Service was created. The fifth member of the focus group had not been an intelligence officer but had a full career in the government as an analyst focussed on terrorism and had spent half of his career working with the Service during which he had spent some time working in the Service's research unit. Three of the five members hold multiple degrees. As such, these members were all well-acquainted with the topic of terrorism and represent a good cross-section of experience with the Service's counter-terrorism efforts.

All of the members of the focus group had previously completed a questionnaire and/or an interview. Since some of the members of the focus group had completed anonymous questionnaires, members of the group cannot be referred to by previous respondent numbers.

Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, members of the group will be referred to as F1, F2, F3, F4, and F5.

Rather than discussing the individual questions, the focus group discussion was about obtaining a deeper understanding of the overall results of the survey. Since the group members were all familiar with each other, the conversation flowed easily and individual members did not appear to be reluctant to voice their opinions, resulting in some interesting comments and additional questions. While the overall discussion went back and forth between topics, this report is organized in the same general order as the results in the previous chapter.

The Use of Academic Research on Terrorism by the IC in Canada

> *Is academic research on terrorism being used by the intelligence community? Why or why not?*

The results from the questionnaires and interviews revealed that AM is "occasionally" used by the IC and the survey results pointed to two main themes. The first theme was that the lack of use of AM was related to *time constraints* and the feeling that AM was *not required for their work*. In short, if one is pressed for time, and the use of AM is not seen as a requirement or as being important to their work, there is no time made to use or incorporate AM. In survey responses, this was also related to leadership and management in that intelligence officers would usually take their lead from their superiors. Therefore, if managers did not request or encourage the use of AM, it was not seen to be important or required. Comments from the survey also revealed that this was probably a holdover from the early days of the Service when, having come out of the RCMP, there was no inclination or resources to promote the use of AM.

The end result was that the use of AM was reportedly left up to the judgement or interests of the individual intelligence officer.

The second theme that emerged in the survey results was that many respondents thought that AM was *not relevant to their work or was too theoretical*. Therefore, given time constraints and job requirements, Service members were even less inclined to use AM if they could not find something relevant and if, once found, it was difficult to interpret. Further, a number of survey respondents stated that AM is not timely, lagging behind the fast-paced work in terrorism, and does not provide any practical or tactical information, therefore it is not useful in the field but could possibly be used at the national level in developing policy or programs. For these reasons, many survey respondents thought that AM is not relevant to their work. However, other respondents noted that some intelligence officers simply do not understand how to apply theory to practice. Despite these differing views, there was general agreement that the best use of AM was to provide background knowledge or context on an area or issue. The accessibility of AM was also mentioned but did not appear to be as much of an issue today as it was in the past.

Focus Group Discussion

Within the FG, the consensus was that the use of AM on terrorism by the IC was "not much". Focus group members agreed that the use of AM, or the perception that it was ***not required for their work,*** begins with the organizational culture and an anti-intellectual orientation that was held by managers in the "old Service" (F2). This refers to the fact that CSIS was created out of

the RMCP National Security Branch, and was originally made up of former RCMP officers, with no real history of using AM in their training or in the course of their duties. This was evidenced by the lack of library resources at Camp Borden and in the regions when CSIS was created in 1984 (F2). It was noted that, in the past, there was a generic approach to investigations that gave no thought to looking at history or foundational knowledge (F2).

F4 noted that, when RCMP officers were assigned to the Security Branch, the training for intelligence work was very basic and practical. It focussed on where the RCMP fit within the Canadian political landscape, as well as some tactical training. There was no additional training given in relation to different cultures or particular areas of focus. When an officer arrived on a desk, they were expected to learn the area by reading operational files, from others in the unit, and then on the streets. Because of this, F4 believes that mistakes were made, especially in recruiting sources because intelligence officers generally had little understanding of different cultures. F4 noted that he learned by turning to his area translator, who would explain about the history and culture of the area, as well as giving him books to read. That set F4 on the road to doing more research and looking at AM more. However, F4 noted that this research was at his own initiative and he was never directed to do any of it. F4 thought that it was important to note that these RCMP managers were the same managers who hired the members of the new service so those attitudes carried over into the new Service.

F2 added that this carried over into the new service and, back then, it just never occurred to most managers or members that collections could or should be supported by research or other

knowledge. F3 agreed that there was no thought given to allocating some time for academic pursuits, such as studying the history of an area or learning the language. This was partly due to tight resources, so Intelligence officers were told to read the files and get out on the road (F3). However, FG members agreed that, in order to properly conduct an investigation or recruit a source, intelligence officers need to understand what they are looking for and why they are recruiting that source. To do that, they need sufficient background knowledge of an area to make the best use of their time in the field and to ask the right questions.

Ultimately, intelligence officers were left to their own devices if they wanted to learn more background about their assigned areas. Given that library resources were also very limited at that time, the environment was not conducive to seeking out AM (F2, F3). While the situation has improved, there are still traces of the old posture that AM is not relevant to intelligence work (F2, F3, F4).

F3 noted that there was also an element of intellectual apathy among some members of the Service that contributed to the lack of interest in AM. For example, the Service instituted an academic component in the training for candidates who were being posted to hostile environments (F3). Prior to being sent to these areas, in addition to the tactical skills, these candidates would have to read a considerable amount of research material about the area where they would be going. There was "tremendous opposition" (F3) from the candidates but, after a few months overseas, the candidates agreed that the knowledge was useful and it was

good to have some academic underpinning in their training (F3). Unfortunately, this did not result in any real change within the Service and that apathy still exists (F1, F3).

This intellectual apathy is further exacerbated by the Service's practice of moving intelligence officers fairly often (F3). Many intelligence officers do not see the value of doing research in a particular area if they know that they will be moved soon (F3). F3 noted that this is short-sighted on the part of the intelligence officer because it would make them a better intelligence officer, which would not only help the Service but also improve their own career progression.

The movement of officers has been the subject of debate within the Service for many years. It has often been referred to as the 'generalist versus specialist' debate and involves whether some intelligence officers should be allowed to stay and specialize in a particular area. If they remain in an area for an extended period, they would have the time to do additional research as well as having experience and historical knowledge within that area. Experience has shown that, when an intelligence officer arrives in a new unit, reading files is not enough to learn that area (F2, F3). Having specialists in an area can reduce the amount of time that it takes for a new member to get up to speed. However, FG members agree, the Service has prioritized having generalists so that it is easier to deploy people to different roles and areas as needed.

F4 noted that, over the years, headquarters has brought in more speakers and improved training but there was still no regular reading of AM because people were just too busy and it was difficult to convince managers and members alike that an academic component is

essential, or even important, to their work. F3 commented that, in the past, the Academic Outreach Unit (AO) had invited academics to come into the Service and speak to certain topics, followed by question-and-answer sessions or small group discussions. These were useful but transactional because there was no concerted effort to build and maintain relationships with the AC so that the AC could provide "practical support instead of esoteric theories" (F3).

Further, F3 added that this lack of effort is also noticeable internally regarding the disconnect that exists between the operational side and the analytical side. Everyone does their part but there is little collaboration, like "two silos" operating independently (F3). Intelligence officers collect the information and pass it along to the analysts who turn it into a product, but there has "never been a robust collaborative relationship" (F3) between operations personnel and analysis branch. Many intelligence officers do not seem to be interested in the work of the analytical branch (F1, F3). F1 agreed that some intelligence officers are hesitant to trust anyone who is not an intelligence officer and did not go through the same training or experiences. There is a definite intelligence officer versus non-intelligence officer division within the Service (F1) and FG members agreed that this is likely a holdover from the law enforcement mentality. FG members believe that the Service's research branch is the only unit that regularly makes use of AM.

Overall, F3 noted, there is no desire to turn intelligence officers into academics but rather there is a need for a "curated approach" (F3) to provide intelligence officers with the information that they need to do their jobs. Individual members should not have to do all the work on their own

time. It should be built into the culture that, along with the other training, they should frontload knowledge (F3), so that intelligence officers have the foundational knowledge that they need before they go knocking on doors. It was noted that most allied agencies expect their personnel to have at least a basic understanding of an issue or area before they go into the field or sometimes even before they are hired (F3).

Besides whether it was required for work, F1 pointed out that there were a number of other challenges involved that deter intelligence officers from using AM even if they want to. It was noted that, before the events of September 11, 2001, there were few people interested in terrorism and there were only a handful of scholars studying terrorism. All of that changed when the World Trade Centre was attacked and then terrorism research and publications increased dramatically. (F1). When CSIS personnel looked at this growing body of terrorism research to see what they could use, they found that most research was not written for them. Articles tended to use "opaque terminology" (F1) and were ***too theoretical*****.** Historically, they were also very data-poor with little good first-hand information. This was not really a surprise since the AC and IC have different goals, and academics were not writing with the practitioner in mind, but it meant that some of the articles were "unintelligible to the average intelligence officer" (F1). F3 noted that the IC is not interested in theories but in what will help them collect that 10% of information that will really get to the heart of an investigation.

With the increased amount of research into terrorism, the problem also became one of sheer ***volume and access*** (F1). The increased volume of articles meant that one had to look through

more research to find anything relevant or of value. As F1 noted, they did not have the time to do that and were not being paid to read and interpret AM. Further, some research was "buried behind paywalls" (F1) which could make availability an issue. Unless you were with an organization that had access or was willing to pay for access to articles, the cost could be a deterrent, particularly if a person was not sure that the article would even be relevant or useful to them (F1). Within CSIS, library resources had been expanded and the AO unit had been created so accessibility was much improved but the issue of the relevance of AM was still a deterrent.

However, it is hard to determine if some AM is relevant if the reader cannot understand it. As F1 had noted, AM tended to use terminology that is "opaque" and unfamiliar to intelligence officers. In addition, as seen from the survey results, some intelligence officers did not seem to understand how to translate theory into practice. Therefore, sometimes the relevance of AM was not just about the content but about how an article is written. FG members agreed that, if authors want the IC to understand their articles, perhaps they could use straightforward terms and language or even take the extra step of explaining how their theories might relate to work in the field. This would help some intelligence officers make the connection between theory and practice.

Overall, FG members agreed that AM could be useful both in the field and at the national level and mostly to provide foundational and contextual information, whether it was historical, political, cultural, or about trends. F2 mentioned that articles about the indicators of

radicalization have been used in some taskings and as a risk assessment tool, and this can be useful both in the field and at the national level. F5 noted that one area where academic research could also be useful would be in providing insight into trends and what kind of security issues might be coming next. F2 added that, when it comes to using AM, people in the IC also have to look beyond terrorism research. One also has look at the machinery that enables intelligence officers to do their job, such as warrants and the courts. F2 emphasized that there are other areas of academic research that can help with the broader concepts of intelligence collection, such as research on legal disclosure that might allow the Service to provide more disclosure to the courts. That would help the public understand the Service better and possibly help with the collection of information going forward (F2).

Increasing the Utility of Academic Material to the IC

How do we increase the utility of academic material to the Intelligence Community?

The results of the survey indicated that the most important factor in increasing the utility of AM to the IC would involve increasing its relevance and that this would require some communication and collaboration between the two communities. To this end, the majority of survey respondents were open to further collaboration with the AC, and were also open to different methods of doing this, but skeptical about how this could be accomplished and whether it would be worth it in the long run. Along these lines, F3 asked "How do we reach out to the AC and say "help us" but help us in a way that is useful to us?".

However, before we could get into the FG discussion about how to improve the utility of AM to the IC, FG members raised some questions about the need for or value of closer collaboration between the IC and the AC. Do the two communities even need or want to work with each other? What kind of benefits would it provide - and to whom? Is it worth the risks?

> There is a place for the two (communities) to come together but I don't know how beneficial.... how does it help an academic, without bringing them into the classified fold ..... what is it they do for us that we can't do for ourselves when we have others, who work with us, who have the same brainpower as those academics? (F5)

F1 noted that it was his understanding that the Intelligence Assessment Branch (IAB) of the Service was supposed to fulfil the role of doing research for the Service. F5 added that the IAB plays a dual role in that they respond to internal requests but also produce reports for government. It was noted that members in IAB have the academic background, some have PhDs, and their positions are not mobile which means that they can specialize in researching different areas (F1, F5). F1 went on to ask, with the presence of IAB, what role would the AC play? Further, F5 questioned why anyone would think that it is important for the Service to develop academic outreach and create a linkage with the AC when the IAB can do the same job. "*How is us (IC) collaborating with you (AC) going to help us protect Canadians?*" (F5).

F5 went on to say that, even if AM is available, he hesitates to listen to any academics other than those within the Service or our allied agencies. The Service's 'inside academics' have the academic background, their own experiences, and full access to classified information from the Service and its allies. Therefore, since they have all or more pieces of the puzzle, F5 feels that their (IAB) work has more credibility. F5 stressed that this is not an anti-academic view but the view that the AC simply does not have all of the pieces to make their theories credible.

Further, since the creation of CSIS in 1984, intelligence officers have university degrees and most are academically-inclined. They will go and find the information that they feel they need, even if it is on their own time, and that information will be more contextual and foundational, or perhaps about trends in terrorism, but not theoretical. The research might also be from sources other than the AC. So why do we want to promote more outreach with the AC? (F5)

Other members of the focus group responded that academics can provide different perspectives on the same topics (F2). There was also some discussion and debate about whether the IAB has the time and resources to "do it all" (F4). F5 acknowledged that, in the past, the Service has brought academics in to help with perspectives and to do work that the Service did not have time for and this was found to be very helpful.

F3 noted that, in order to produce intelligence that the government needs and wants, intelligence officers need to understand what they are collecting and why. Perhaps the AC could play a role in helping intelligence officers understand the bigger picture so that they understand where their own investigations fit in.

> But what are we looking for from academia? In the CT space, are we looking for more theories about radicalization and such OR are we looking for people to come in and teach us more about context - cultural, historical, foundational stuff? Or ethnocentric issues that we need to be aware of? So, is academia looking to be more relevant to IC or just looking to sell more papers? (F3)

F2 noted that, besides adding different perspectives, academics also have knowledge of, and access to, other researchers. If they don't have the answers to your questions, they may know

who does. Academics could also be useful in doing rigorous operational analysis of past work or when an operation ends. It was noted that, unless there was a problem with an operation, there may not be much post-operation analysis done due to the lack of time and resources. Perhaps this is something that the AC could do while internal researchers move on to the next thing (F2). F5 added that the AC could also be useful in predicting future trends though it might require more inside knowledge to do it accurately. F2 suggested that perhaps members of the AC could be used on a case-by-case basis for these types of research.

However, F2 added that any collaboration between the IC and AC would require academics to overcome their fears or concerns about working with the IC. Some members of the AC distrust the IC and have ethical concerns about intelligence work. F1 agreed, noting that he knows some academics who want nothing to do with the Service. Academic researchers are held to a very high standard about what research they do, how they do it, and how they use it. Given that the IC is seen to exploit people to obtain information, F1 questioned if any academics would even want to come into the Service for a temporary exchange? How would the academic benefit from such a collaboration? (F1)

FG members thought that some academics might be curious about the Service or would want to do something to serve their country. However, F5 noted that this kind of patriotism or nationalism may not be as strong in Canada as in some other countries. For example, in the United States, despite some questionable practices, the CIA is still held in high regard and people are eager to help. This is also the case with the British security services. F1 noted that,

in these other countries, intelligence organizations are older, larger, and have bigger budgets. CSIS by comparison is still very young and small so the Service does not have that same kind of history or allure.

F2 noted that, in his view, most members of the AC want to produce research that is relevant and useful, regardless of their field of study. As others have noted, the IC and AC work on different timelines so AM is not useful in the immediate sense but can provide foundational and contextual information that can be used to support decision-making, as well as to respond to committees and courts. Having AM to underpin recommendations or actions might help with obtaining some approvals or to provide support in court. Some academics might find it rewarding to see their work used in these ways (F2).

Whatever their reason, F2 added that there has to be a need both for the Service and for the academic. The Service has to have a need for the academic's particular knowledge or skill but there also has to be a need within the academic - whether it is curiosity, patriotism, or to see their work used. Therefore, promoting relationships and collaboration would also require identifying academics who want to help build bridges between the AC and the IC. Perhaps this could be done through the Academic Outreach Unit or the IAB. (F2)

F1 wondered about the academic's "publish or perish" dilemma. If an academic works with CSIS, and they can't publish for 5 years, would they still want to collaborate? What would the academic get out of it if they can't publish? Other FG members suggested that the academic

would gain a better perspective that would help with their future research or writing, as well as something to put on their curriculum vita. Exposure to the IC might give them some ideas about where there are gaps in the research and what to look at next. It was suggested that perhaps the academic could concurrently work on their own research and publish that, or perhaps the Service could publish more unclassified articles. F5 noted that such research would likely still have to be vetted to ensure that no Service information was used, which might also be interpreted as the IC directing the academic's research.

Another reason for the IC to collaborate with the AC would be to make more accurate information available to the public. FG members agreed that it is important that better information be available in the public sphere.

> First off, Canadians are incredibly stupid when it comes to the appreciation of risk - whether it's CT or CI. ..... As far as the CBC is concerned, the Jihadi threat went away a long time ago - and now it's neo-Nazis and white supremacists. (F1)

But, F1 noted, Jihadis are still responsible for most attacks around the world. "*Maybe that's the role of the Service and RCMP - to reveal a little more of what's going on.*" (F1). F1 noted that CSIS Annual Reports provide more 'meat' now than in the past about threats and that they would hope that people believe CSIS reports more than what is in the news or in AM. However, FG members agreed that the Service's reputation has taken a beating in recent years so they question if people will trust CSIS reports.

FG members thought that public distrust of CSIS is partly due to what is presented in the media and how it is presented. F5 noted that, even though there is more information in the public

domain these days, a lot of it is still incomplete or inaccurate. F1 noted that sometimes only a fraction of the information makes it into court and into the transcripts. For example, F5 stated, if someone claims that they only confessed because they were tortured, people tend to believe the torture, whether it actually happened or not, and subsequently assume that everything that person said was untrue and was only said because of the torture - even if some or all of the information was actually true. Further, if torture was involved, "*How can a judge be the final arbiter of what CSIS knew or didn't know?"*. F5 was referring to how much the Service may have known about torture in Guantanamo. In the end, everything depends on the source and accuracy of the documents that are provided to the court and that the judge uses in making their decisions.

Unfortunately, most people believe what is reported and these inaccuracies can, when published, reflect negatively on the Service leading to more distrust (F5). To be fair, F5 noted, academics are also at a disadvantage because they can only work with what they have and, as noted, open information is often faulty. In this respect, collaboration might benefit both the AC and the IC in that, with more accurate information, the AC may produce better research for IC consumption while also better reflecting the IC perspective in the public realm.

Knowledge Mobilization Strategies

Having debated the potential value of any AC - IC collaboration, the FG discussed how improved linkage might be accomplished. F4 noted that, if academic research is to be more useful to the IC, the AC has to look at it as a product and the IC has to provide more and better feedback.

When resources are tight, AM has to be concise, clear, and relevant (F4). To this end, the IC needs to reach out to the AC and tell them what kind of research is needed (F3). This should not be construed as an attempt to direct IC research but simply to identify the kind of research that the IC would like to see or might find useful.

In discussing the different methods of communication and knowledge mobilization, FG members noted that the Service has tried different things - like bringing in speakers, conferences, smaller group discussions, and such - but what it really requires is a concerted effort, from both sides, to develop relationships that provide practical support and not just theories (F3, F4). F2 commented that the IAB should be the bridge between the IC and the AC. F3 added that senior leadership is also important here because you need to impose the linkage or members will just revert back to the old ways and focus on tactical methods.

Looking at the **push and pull methods** of knowledge mobilization, FG members thought that the AC still needs to push articles that they believe may be useful to the Service because, when members search for articles, they generally do not go beyond the resources within the Service. Also, when information is requested by intelligence officers, library staff will seek out information but it would be helpful if the information was already in their library. Therefore, the AC should forward relevant AM to the Service's library. To facilitate this push and pull, F2 suggested that the Service could create and maintain a **databank for terrorism research**, with an easily recognizable icon, and relevant AM could be loaded directly into this databank. With clear abstracts and identifying tags, it would make relevant articles easier to find.

When considering options for closer collaboration, it is clear that the main obstacles to any type of collaboration are the culture of secrecy and the classification of information within the IC. As noted in the survey results, the IC's main concern would be the repercussions of giving out too much information, that could be twisted or reflect negatively on them, or if classified information is accidentally leaked. Any leakage of classified information could also affect information-sharing and trust with allied agencies. For these reasons, intelligence organizations are very risk averse and reluctant to share information.

In terms of having the **IC provide input on academic research** prior to publication, it was thought that providing input on academic research would be difficult given the caution required to not disclose any classified information. Additionally, this brings us back to whether some academic researchers might feel that their work was being directed by the IC or that other members of the AC might see it that way. If other members of the AC thought that a researcher's work was being co-opted, that might affect their reputation in the AC and their future work.

While it was accepted by FG members that releasing **anonymized data** would increase the accuracy of open research, this idea was generally discarded because it was thought that it would be too difficult to accomplish. F3 noted that, given the risks involved, any disclosure of information faces a whole host of challenges and everything would have to be vetted. Therefore, releasing anonymized data would have to meet those challenges and it would also

require an entire unit of employees with the knowledge and experience to know what can and cannot be released. This process would be very onerous and, at this stage of their growth, the Service does not have the infrastructure or resources for this. Therefore, while this option did not appear to be objectionable to the FG, it was not thought to be possible at this time.

F3 noted that there is also the concern that, if you release some anonymized data, would the AC accept it at face value? F3 suggested that the AC would likely want to see the source of the information, such as source files or reports, in order to assess its reliability. Since the Service would not be able to allow that, would academics trust the reliability of any data that is given to them? The AC would also likely have concerns about how the information was obtained and need some assurance around ethical issues. Even if the AC was satisfied with the data that was released, would they be satisfied with the amount of data or would they start asking for more? In short, would they (the IC) be opening a can of worms?

> I guess I'm wondering... What is the question? Is this about how does academia better support the intelligence process or is it about how the intelligence process better supports academic research? (F3)

F3 went on to say that he interprets it to be about how the AC can develop research that has more relevance for the operational activity of an intelligence organization. In that case, as already discussed, it is a matter of the IC providing feedback to tell the AC what is needed (F4). However, that requires better linkage because, at this time, there is no real bridge or linkage between the AC and the IC (F2, F4). F4 noted that some conferences provide opportunities to connect academics with law enforcement and intelligence agencies and those informal

conversations can be very productive. However, FG members agreed that maintaining relationships is difficult and particularly so with the movement of IC personnel.

Therefore, in terms of **closer collaboration or collaborating on projects**, the main suggestions involved the movement of individuals between the two communities. The first suggestion involved bringing scholars into the Service and giving them a security clearance so that they could fully participate in any Service research. This could be done on a case-by-case basis, for certain projects, or to bring them in on a more permanent basis. It was noted that many other intelligence services have programs for this. While the Service has done this on occasion, it appears to have been infrequent and short-lived. It was also suggested that the Service could look to allied countries to see how they manage such programs.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, FG members questioned whether any academics would be interested in such a placement within CSIS. Given that there is not a lot of trust in the Service within some academic circles, some academics may not want to work with the Service for fear of tarnishing their reputation and affecting future academic collaborations. Anyone who would come in to work in the Service would also face the 'publish or perish' dilemma as they would not be able to publish any of the work that they do in the Service. Even if they were simultaneously conducting their own research, FG members thought that any publications would have to be vetted in order to ensure that no Service information was involved. However, it is possible that some research conducted within the Service, that does not involve classified information, could be approved for open publication. Additionally, the knowledge gained from

working with the Service may add credibility to an academic's future work. F1 noted that it would likely be easier to work with academics who are not affiliated with a university so they are not restricted by university or funding requirements.

Instead of bringing academics into the Service, it was also suggested that the Service could send intelligence officers to work on projects in academia. However, it was noted that the Service already has a program to support members who pursue graduate education so some members may see this approach as being somewhat redundant. However, a similar angle would be to send intelligence officers to teach and lecture at universities, as recent years have seen the growth of intelligence studies at universities around the world. F2 noted that, in the United States and England, academia is more connected to the intelligence community so they have better relationships and collaboration. F4 added that the CIA has sent some former intelligence officers to lecture at universities and this is about gaining credibility with the AC and being more transparent. In Canada, the University of Ottawa now offers certificate programs related to national security and intelligence, through their Professional Development Institute, and these courses are taught by former intelligence personnel. F2 thought that having intelligence officers working in the AC in Canada could help to break down barriers and, through these professional relationships, build trust of the Service within the AC.

Overall, it was agreed that improving knowledge mobilization between the AC and the IC would require a concerted effort, from both sides, to create and maintain relationships and explore the different methods of interaction and collaboration. Unfortunately, when this has been

attempted in the past, the movement of people within intelligence organizations has led to lost connections and a lack of sustained effort. It was further noted that IC leadership would need to play a significant role in any such efforts.

Is there an AC - IC Disconnect?

> *Is there a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is hindering knowledge mobilization between the two communities?*

Scholars have suggested (Chapter 4) that there is a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is hindering research into terrorism. The responses to the questionnaires and the interviews also brought up discussion about the how the relationship between the two communities affects co-operation and therefore knowledge mobilization. A number of responses referred to distrust, and even animosity, between the two communities. This topic also came up at different points during the focus group discussion when discussing whether any academics would want to work with the Service.

Members of the focus group thought that a lot of academics do not want to be associated with intelligence organizations because they see intelligence organizations as something "evil" (F1) and are suspicious of any and all intelligence activities. F2 added that different organizations or universities may have different views based on past experiences with the old Security Service. In the past, some professors may have been investigated leading some universities to not trust intelligence organizations (F2) and this is sometimes reflected in the different levels of co-operation or opposition from different universities.

F2 mentioned that some academics are concerned that their work might be used in a way that goes against their moral values, and some may have experienced this already. For example, F2 cited how some psychologists are concerned about how research on deception might have been used in Guantanamo to violate human rights. There may be suspicion about the end use of their research and this comes out of a lack of trust. Academics would want safeguards to ensure that their research would not be misused or used in a way that they objected to morally (F2). Other researchers may require some assurance that the IC would not be trying to direct their research in a way that they do not want (F2).

F3 noted that it is understandable that people might be suspicious of the IC. Given the secrecy of intelligence work, it is difficult for intelligence officers to speak freely to outsiders so it is only natural that people would be suspicious of their actions and motives. Intelligence officers need to be able to explain what they are investigating and why, without giving out classified information. F3 noted that this also leads back to educating intelligence officers about how their investigation fits into the larger scheme of things. If the intelligence officer can clearly explain the threat, and the academic agrees, then the academic will help. However, if the intelligence officer is vague or does not explain enough, then the academic will be suspicious of their intent. The academic may also disagree with their threat assessment and choose not to co-operate. Saying too much or not enough can make the difference in establishing trust and obtaining co-operation and this is a fine line to walk (F3). F5 added that, since universities are identified as a sensitive sector in relation to investigations, some intelligence officers are wary of such contact or avoid it altogether.

FG members also noted that one point of contention may be the use of the word 'expert'. It was generally agreed that the experts are those who work in the field or the practitioners, and that academics are scholars but not experts. F1 noted that, even as a practitioner, he does not describe himself as an expert but says "This is what I know and this is what I don't know".

> I am appalled by the arrogance of a lot of academics today who claim to have the theory, the framework, the paradigm that is going to say, you know, I can tell you who is going to move thought to action. (F1)

The general view seems to be that, because academics don't have the inside information, the IC is hesitant to listen to them and do not view them as experts. Further, *"it's like they're trying to tell us how to do our jobs" (*F1). To be fair, F5 noted, it is often the media who labels scholars as experts. Media members seem to prefer the word expert and they tend to overuse it, referring to everyone as an expert (F5).

On a final note, F4 thought that some people, including some members of the AC, just like to attack the Service because it is fashionable to describe the Service as their opponent. Intelligence work is always topical so attacking the Service usually makes it into the news. Further, some people may still see the Service as "cowboys" (F4) because of the RCMP past. F3 added that the public does not realize the difficulties involved in doing intelligence work. Some people assume that the Service can do whatever it wants and trample on individual rights when, in fact, warrants are required for investigations and there is considerable oversight (F3). To counter this misperception, the IC needs to make the effort to build bridges with the AC and build trust (F4). There is a saying that the only time the Service is in the news is when it is bad

news, as in when the Service makes a mistake or misses something. The good stuff is rarely reported.

During this focus group discussion, it was mentioned a few times that it would be interesting to hear an academic's point of view on some of these points. Since the focus of this study is the IC perspective, obtaining similar input from the AC was not part of the methodology though it would be the logical next step for conducting further research on this topic and is therefore one of the recommendations discussed in Chapter 9.

Chapter Summary

Overall, the views of the FG are in line with and support the results from the questionnaires and interviews. Members of the focus group agreed that AM is not used as much as it could be because of issues generally relating to the organizational culture as well as the perceived relevance of the AM. In terms of the anti-intellectual culture inherited from the RCMP, this is seen to have improved over time though some remnants of it still remain. Some intellectual apathy, on the part of individual members, was also reported. This is partly due to time constraints, where there simply isn't the time during the work day to do additional research and many individuals prefer not to do it on their own time. This may also be a result of the Service's habit of moving intelligence officers fairly regularly, such that some individuals do not want to invest the time to do additional research in one area if they know they will soon be moved to another area.

In terms of the AM itself, it was agreed that AM tends to be too theoretical and sometimes difficult to understand. That, in conjunction with the sheer volume of material on terrorism since 2001, is a deterrent to using AM in their work. To address this, the FG suggested that articles could be written more clearly, with straightforward abstracts, and possibly include some insight as to how the information might translate to practical use.

Before discussing how to improve the utility of AM to the IC, FG members questioned whether closer linkage is worth the effort and how it might benefit each community. FG members questioned what the AC can do for them when they have their own research branch, with academics who have access to classified data, to address Service needs. However, it was noted that outside academics can provide fresh perspectives on topics and possibly do research that the IAB may not have time for. Further, using AM to support decisions or recommendations might be useful whenever the Service is required to justify their actions before a committee or in court. FG members also noted that a lot of information in the public sphere is inaccurate and may reflect negatively on the Service so, with IC feedback, perhaps the AC could help provide more accurate information to the public thereby increasing trust in the IC.

Having said that, FG members questioned whether any academics would want to work with the Service and what benefit they would derive from it. Besides the fact that some academics distrust CSIS, it was noted that academics would face publishing restrictions that might stall their careers and it might also affect their reputation within some segments of the AC. They

felt that the only benefit for academics would be some tacit knowledge that may carry over into their future work or they might derive some satisfaction from contributing to the IC's work.

To improve the relevance of AM to the IC, FG members acknowledged that the IC needs to provide more feedback to the AC and the logical place to build a communication bridge would be the Intelligence Assessment Branch (IAB) within the Service. While some attempts have been made in the past, there has been no sustained effort to establish and maintain linkage with the AC. FG members discussed the different knowledge mobilization strategies and concluded that the best options involved the movement of individuals between the two environments. Bring academics into the Service for selected projects and provide them with a security clearance or send intelligence personnel to lecture or work at universities. This would help to improve the accuracy of information to the public, increase public awareness of threat, and possibly build trust between all parties.

Finally, the AC - IC disconnect appears to go beyond the common factors that KMb research has identified. FG members stated that, from their experience, many members of the AC hold a deep distrust for the IC, questioning IC motives and ethics, and sometimes labelling them as 'evil'. Meanwhile, some IC members question the knowledge and credibility of AC members who do not have access to classified information or do not conduct field research. There is also some IC resentment tied to the media's use of the word 'expert' when referring to academics since the IC views practitioners as the experts. These are additional hurdles that need to be overcome if the AC and the IC hope to work more closely together.

The results of the questionnaires, interviews, and focus group have provided a significant amount of data and insight into the issues surrounding the use of AM by the IC, including how relations between the two communities play a role. Further, the different methods of collecting data on this topic have yielded consistent results and opinions as it relates to both KMb and the AC - IC relationship. The following chapters will review the themes observed in this study and provide some recommendations for where we go from here.

CHAPTER 8 - DISCUSSION

A review of the literature on terrorism revealed that a number of scholars believe that there are two main problems that are hindering the advancement of research into terrorism. These two problems are reported to be a lack of primary data in terrorism research and a disconnect between the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC) that prevents information-sharing.

These two problems are seen to be connected in that, while academia faces obstacles in collecting primary data and firsthand information, intelligence organizations collect such data in the course of their regular duties and therefore hold a vast amount of data and experiential knowledge. However, scholars have questioned whether the IC has sufficient time and resources to analyze all of the data that they hold. Therefore, it has been suggested that each community may be able to help the other. The AC may be able to assist the IC by analyzing some of their information and providing fresh perspectives and more context to intelligence information. Meanwhile, the IC may be able to provide the AC with some primary data and tacit knowledge that could help them in their future research or in interpreting their own data. Ultimately, there may be significant benefits for both communities if they could work more closely together but it is thought that a 'disconnect' between the two communities is standing in the way of such co-operation.

Improving relations between the AC and the IC has been an important topic of discussion for some time. Since the events of 9/11, many governments and international organizations have

recommended that intelligence organizations work more closely with outside experts and academics in order to improve the analysis and sharing of information, with the goal of preventing intelligence failures and improving counter-terrorism strategies. However, intelligence organizations are traditionally reluctant to share information with outsiders and may not see or accept the value in using outside research and expertise.

While the issue of primary data in terrorism research has been well-documented and is being addressed in newer research (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2008, 2009; Silke and Schmidt-Petersen, 2017; Schuurman, 2020), little research has been done to examine the reported disconnect between the AC and the IC. The literature describes how the AC perceives the AC - IC disconnect but there is little research that addresses the disconnect from the perspective of the IC. This study therefore sought to examine the AC - IC relationship, strictly from the IC perspective.

Studies in the area of Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) have examined the relationship between researchers and practitioners in other fields and tell us that information-sharing between these two communities is thought to lead to improved performance and better outcomes in policy and practice (Lahneman, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). Ultimately, they suggest that improved information-sharing between researchers and practitioners could provide some benefit to both communities as well as advancing knowledge in a field.

By examining the factors that commonly affect how practitioners use academic research, KMb studies provide us with one key way to assess the strengths and limitations of the relationship between the AC and the IC. The common factors identified in KMb research include the accessibility of academic material (AM) to the practitioners, the relevance of the AM for use in practice or policy, as well as factors within the organization (culture and structure) that can either promote the use of AM or create obstacles to it (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2014). A final element that permeates any information-sharing is time - because researchers and practitioners tend to work on different timelines and practitioners generally face more time pressures (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Talbot and Talbot, 2015). As a result of these factors, KMb research also found that most fields experience some level of disconnect between researchers and practitioners (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2006; Head, 2015; Tkachenko, Hahn, Peterson, 2017).

When it comes to the field of terrorism research, there are additional factors that complicate the relationship between the AC and the IC. The literature notes that information-sharing with the IC faces additional obstacles that relate to a culture of secrecy that has been built around the classification of information and the added 'need to know' policy. The IC culture has been characterized by a reluctance to share information with those outside of the IC and, sometimes, even with partners within the IC. This reluctance to share is largely attributed to the fear of disclosing too much sensitive information but it may also relate to a sense of power that comes with having access to secret information and that the IC may not wish to share with others

(Merari, 1991; Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Sageman, 2014; Maras, 2017; Dover, 2020; Nadim, 2021).

These factors, as well as the different functions of different IC agencies, may lead to the hoarding or siloing of information that, in a worst-case scenario, may lead to intelligence failures when information is not shared with the right people at the right time (Vaughn, 1999; Lahneman, 2003; Grey, 2014; Vogel and Tyler, 2019). It has been suggested that the IC needs to share more information rather than hoard it (Maras, 2017; Vroegop, 2017; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020).

This study explores the issue of an AC - IC disconnect, in the Canadian context, through an examination of how much academic material (AM) is used by the IC in Canada and the factors that are involved in that situation. This study asks "Is academic research utilized by the intelligence community in Canada and what does the state of such usage tell us about the nature of the relationship between the intelligence and academic research communities?"

To answer the research question, this study went directly to former and current Canadian intelligence personnel for their input about the utility of academic material in their work, the factors that have affected that situation, and where to go from here. Through questionnaires, interviews, and a focus group, 42 former and current members of CSIS provided considerable input and comments about their use of AM which also provides some insight into the relationship between the AC and the IC in Canada. Those who completed a questionnaire and /

or participated in an interview are identified here as respondents R1 through R42. Beyond this, this study was able to directly address the issue of an AC - IC disconnect during the discussion with the focus group (FG), whose members are identified as F1 through F5.

Overall, respondents revealed that they only occasionally use AM in their work and this has as much to do with factors within the organization as it does with elements of the AM that affect its relevance to the IC. As it stands, many respondents thought that AM does not meet their needs though there may also be a lack of awareness in the IC of the type of AM that is available or how to apply it to their work. Clearly, more feedback and better communication are required between the AC and the IC in order to change this situation.

In looking at the responses in this study, the first thing that becomes clear is that there is an internal divide between those in the IC who look at their work from a strictly tactical or practical point of view and those who can see the bigger picture of IC work. These two different perspectives are reflected in the comments throughout the study - from how much AM is used, to the factors involved, to whether and how improved relations can benefit both communities. One segment of the IC understands how AM can be useful in a variety of ways while the other segment appears not to. One segment understands how closer relations between the AC and the IC may improve knowledge in the field, while the other segment appears not to. So, while comments allude to a disconnect between the AC and IC, there is also evidence of a division within the IC itself that also affects the AC - IC relationship.

However, even those IC members who support closer relations between the AC and IC seem skeptical about how much can realistically be done to improve information-sharing and knowledge exchange, mainly due to the classification of information. Further, the comments reveal that, at this time, there is no real linkage between the two communities and it would require a concerted effort from both sides to improve that situation. To that end, the discussions include a number of recommendations for improving both the relevance of AM and the AC - IC linkage that may facilitate that.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the key findings from the surveys, interviews, and focus group (FG) that establish the current use of AM by the IC and the factors involved in that situation. This is followed by an examination of how the use of AM by the IC could be improved while taking into account the additional obstacles that are involved when dealing with intelligence organizations. Comments and questions also brought up the topic of potential benefits and which community might benefit more from increased information-sharing. Within these discussions, a sampling of quotes is included; however, one may refer to the preceding chapters and Appendix J for full data and comments. The questions that were removed by CSIS (Q9, Q15, Q20, Q21, Q22, Q23) are identified throughout the discussion with a closer examination in the following chapter. From the comments that have been provided throughout this study, some observations are also made about the AC - IC relationship from the IC perspective.

The Utility of Academic Material to the IC in Canada

In response to the initial questions (Q10, Q12) about how much AM is used by the IC, the survey results indicated 'occasionally' but the focus group (FG) said 'not much'. While survey data indicated that the use of AM improved slightly after training was completed and respondents went to their regular duties, the response was still 'occasionally'. This slight increase that comes after training may indicate that respondents became more aware of the existence of research during their training period but may not have had the time to pursue it until after training was completed. This finding also suggests that there is room for more AM to be used during training which might carry over into its use during regular duties. Working from this baseline about the use of AM, the study questions addressed the different factors that may have an effect on the use of AM in practice.

The survey results identified **time constraints** (84.21%) as the most significant factor in whether or not respondents sought out AM in the course of their regular duties. This was followed by access to AM (68.42%), the relevance of AM (60.53%), that AM was not required for their work (52.63%), and that AM was too theoretical (55.26%). However, there were few comments directly about time constraints; rather, the comments were about the other factors and how they were influenced by time constraints. In short, when IC members are facing time pressures, they will not use AM unless they think that it is important. The question then becomes what defines the importance of using AM in their work and this varied among respondents. Comments indicated that the importance attached to using AM could relate to organizational factors such as the accessibility of AM, specific job requirements, or the organizational culture,

but it could also relate to elements of the AM itself, such as its relevance, timeliness, or language.

Organizational Factors

The data showed that the most significant factor in the use of AM was time constraints (84.21%) which was usually tied to one of the other factors and most closely connected to the view that AM was **not required** (52.63%) for their work. However, the comments revealed that there were different reasons that caused respondents to determine that AM was not required for their work. Some survey respondents referred to real or perceived **job requirements** while others referred to their leadership and the organizational culture.

For those who were focussing on real or perceived job requirements, some respondents stated that, unless they were working in a specific unit that required research, AM was not required for their work and so they would not take the time to use AM. For example, some respondents thought that AM would only be a requirement in certain positions in headquarters, such as analyst positions or in the research unit, and that it would not be required in regional field work or investigations. This difference was because a number of respondents could not see any tactical or practical use for AM, therefore they determined that it was not required in field work. These different perspectives come up again when we look at how some respondents defined the 'relevance' of AM.

Meanwhile, some respondents defined whether AM was required for their job based on the views and expectations of their **leadership** or the **organizational culture** in general. If a manager did not require or promote the use of AM, employees thought that using AM was not important and therefore not required for their work. Similarly, if it was not a part of the routine way of doing things in the organization, employees did not consider using AM.

> As mentioned, I did not refer to academic materials for my work. and, in further answer to the question above, it is perhaps worth noting that I was never directed to do so nor was it ever a requirement of the job. (R3)

Therefore, without direction from job requirements or managers, it would be up to the individual to determine if using AM was 'required'. As a result, if respondents used AM, it was usually (75.75%) self-initiated (Q21) and often done outside of work hours.

Yet, when asked directly if they were required to support operational decisions with research (Q22), the median was 'Occasionally' however the mode was 'Regularly' (10 respondents). This result appeared to contradict what many had just said about not requiring AM in their work. However, it became clear that the main reason for this difference was that many respondents were referring to research other than AM. Therefore, they were saying that it was important to support their work with research but not necessarily academic research. Rather, they would often look to support their decision-making from sources such as their internal research units, allied information, or reports from thinktanks (R15, R26, R28, R29). The literature on KMb also indicated that practitioners often look to sources other than AM because they provide more timely and practical information (Lavis, 2006; Talbot and Talbot, 2015).

> Investigative research was always a requirement in support of operational decision-making; that research though always came from in-house or from "allied data" - it was never based on academic material. (R3)

It is noted that Q21 and Q22, about requiring research to support their work, were removed from the questionnaires of current CSIS members. It would seem that CSIS did not want current employees to comment on the Service position of supporting work with research material. Perhaps CSIS management thought that this may reflect negatively on the organization or their leadership.

In explaining these results about their limited use of AM, interviewees and focus group members noted that CSIS came out of the RCMP where the minimum educational requirement was a high school diploma and using AM was simply not a part of the organizational culture. Some respondents described an anti-academic or anti-intellectual attitude in the RCMP and noted that this carried over into CSIS when it was created out of the RCMP because those same managers recruited and trained the new members. Some interviewees and FG members reported that remnants of this anti-intellectual attitude still exist though it is believed that the newer generations, who have higher academic qualifications and have more experience with AM, are changing that. These observations are not entirely surprising given that KMb literature has also noted the presence of anti-intellectual attitudes among some practitioners (Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Head, 2015; Miller, 2022).

However, some survey respondents also made the point that managers have other priorities and the onus should be on the individual employees to educate themselves and keep up with the literature in their area as professionals in most fields are expected to do.

> Intelligence personnel are expected to use their initiative and to do so in an efficient, logical, pragmatic and disciplined manner. Supervisors and management generally had other matters to attend to. (R32)

In this regard, part of the problem is also attributed to individual apathy and the fact that Service employees are transferred to different positions fairly often. As a result, some employees do not want to waste time studying a topic when they know that they will not be there for very long. There has been an ongoing debate in CSIS for many years about whether all intelligence officers need to be generalists, to allow for easier movement, or whether some members should remain in an area to develop a greater depth of knowledge and expertise, as some other allied services do. In any case, referring back to comments about individual professionalism, some respondents (R30, R34) noted that it is short-sighted if employees do not make the effort to educate themselves or participate in extra training, regardless of how long they are in a job, because it could help both the Service and their career.

Of course, the ideal situation would be for both managers and employees to take some responsibility for improving their knowledge and in using academic research to do so. Just as the KMb literature identified leadership as playing a key role in creating an organizational culture that values research (Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015; Nutley, Walter and Davies, 2009; Kothari and Cameron, 2023), both interviewees and FG members noted that changing these attitudes would have to start at the top with leaders who can see the value of using AM in their work and are committed to promoting its use. It requires "*a change in culture that believes that the only credible information comes through classified channels*" (R36). Some respondents added that the

Academic Outreach Unit in CSIS has tried to promote the use of AM by bringing in speakers and holding conferences but, without consistent support from senior management, it has been an uphill battle.

It was also suggested (R34, FG) that emphasis could be placed on using more AM in training, both entry level training and at various times throughout one's career, to both promote the awareness and use of AM but also to provide a better foundation of knowledge before starting duties in an area. R34 noted that it is important to 'frontload' knowledge so that when an employee goes to a subject area or an overseas posting, they already have a solid base of knowledge to work from. This is important given that time constraints may not allow for the time to learn an area once posted to the job. While respondents thought that the Service is improving in this regard, it was noted that many members are still only interested in tactical training.

> It is very difficult for people who are working flat out on .....(various things).... to find the time to study terrorist issues. It's also a challenge when an IO is rotated between very different files and branches. It takes about 2 years to become comfortable on a new desk without having to run to the database all the time. Training needs to improve, people need to be sent to courses off site to be immersed in these issues. (R36)

Another factor under organizational control is the **physical accessibility** of AM. In the survey, 68.42% of respondents cited this as a significant factor but there were fewer comments and it did not figure heavily in any discussion. Interviewees and FG members noted that CSIS has been expanding its library resources over the years and this includes specialized staff. Along with the advances in internet technology, physical access to AM appears to be less of an issue

than in the past. However, as noted earlier, some respondents were including other types of research in their comments around accessibility.

Therefore, it is also possible that IC members do not seek out or use AM because they may not be aware of the kind of AM that is available on terrorism. A few respondents mentioned that, even if some employees may not be aware of what AM is available, library staff are very helpful in that regard and will pull material when requested. However, if one is looking for AM on their own, or the Library does not have it, they sometimes do not know where to look or subscription fees to journals or databanks may also be a deterrent. Interestingly, CSIS removed the question about the existence of their library (Q15) even though there is information about it on their website.

Academic Material Factors

The other factors involved in the uptake of AM relate to the material itself and how it may be viewed by IC members. Some survey respondents noted that they did not use AM because it was **not relevant** (60.53%) or **too theoretical** (55.26%) and these two factors were sometimes conflated in the comments. Overall, determining the relevance of AM is a more complex issue and the different comments illustrate that some individuals in the IC see only the instrumental use of AM as determining its relevance, while others could also see the conceptual and symbolic uses of AM. Meanwhile, if AM is too theoretical, there were some who could not understand the material to begin with or could not understand how it might be applied to their work.

In general, the majority of respondents recognized that AM could be relevant and useful in providing contextual or background information. However, some respondents only saw AM as being useful in national headquarters or research units because they could see no practical or tactical use for it, with some noting that AM was "virtually irrelevant" (R14) to field work. Therefore, to these respondents, AM would only be useful for data analysis and research but not for data collection.

> Much of the academic material available to Intelligence Officers when it really comes down to it was / is not grounded in the reality of counter terrorism work. (R29)

Meanwhile, other respondents recognized how the same contextual and foundational information could also be used to help inform investigations and guide data collection in a field investigation (R20, R22, R32, R33, R34). The FG members noted that AM can be used at all levels. For example, F2 noted that research on indicators for radicalization can be used as a risk assessment tool useful at both the field level when assessing individuals and in headquarters for analyzing information or developing programs. The knowledge that comes from AM can also provide the background that helps a field investigator to know what kind of information they need and which questions to ask, or which sources to recruit, in order to obtain that information (R32, R34). Therefore, AM can provide knowledge that may save time and resources during data collection.

A few respondents also recognized the importance of AM in adding credibility to an investigator's arguments or decisions in the course of their investigations and this kind of support could be very important if one has to defend their work to superiors or in a hearing

(R19, R24, R30, R32, R33). This is something that the literature has also suggested may be an important use for AM in the IC (Dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021).

Another element of AM that came up during the discussions, and affected how some respondents viewed the relevance of AM, was the **timeliness of AM**. Just as KMb research identified that different objectives and timelines affect the uptake of AM in other fields (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Lavis, 2006; Talbot and Talbot, 2015), respondents also noted that the AC and IC have different objectives and work at different speeds. While the AC moves more slowly and seeks to understand terrorism, the IC is under time pressures and needs practical and timely information or solutions. While AC research is usually looking to the past to examine things or events that have already happened, IC work involves looking forward to anticipate terrorist behaviour and prevent terrorist events. For this reason, some respondents discounted AM or reported that it was unlikely that the AC could produce relevant research at the right time.

> Academic research is slow, and is conducted according to professional standards which - in the case of the study of terrorism - do not allow for action / contain actions as quickly as is oftentimes required. (R3)

Meanwhile, other respondents understood that past events or past behaviour of individuals or groups can be used to understand and predict future behaviour and that this information can also be useful at the level of field investigations. R32 noted that understanding how to use AM depends on the individual's perspective on their work and also their understanding of the value of different kinds of information, some of which comes from experience. To this point, a few respondents stated that some of their colleagues simply do not understand how to put theory

into practice (R32, R34) so perhaps some people need to learn how to use AM and this may be part of some training.

The issue of material being deemed **too theoretical**, and therefore not relevant, also has a couple of components, one of which is the ability to understand the material in the first place. As KMb research has pointed out, not only do researchers have different goals and timelines than practitioners, they also use different terms and language (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009). Therefore, while physical accessibility of AM ties into access, the **intellectual accessibility (or cognitive access)** of AM ties into its relevance. If a practitioner cannot understand what they are reading, they will not go out of their way to search for it or use it, and this will not become part of their routine. Just as in other fields of study, this appears to be the case in the IC as well.

Some respondents noted that many academic articles were too long and used language that was difficult to understand, "opaque", even "unintelligible" (F1). "*Most material was written in academic jargon and hence not as useful*" (R26). Focus group members acknowledged that the AC does not write specifically for them but if an individual cannot understand an article, they will not take the time to read it and it will deter them from looking for AM in the future. F1 also noted that the sheer volume of research on terrorism, in addition to the fact that most of it is data-poor, makes it even more difficult to find relevant AM. In short, when pressed for time, IC members are not going to make the effort to locate, read, interpret, and try to apply AM to their work. Therefore, respondents noted that, if academia wants the IC to use their research,

it would be helpful if academic articles could be more clearly written with concise abstracts. As one respondent noted "Know your audience" (R34).

The second component of theoretical articles, even if someone understands the language of the article, is whether they know how to incorporate it into their practical work. For this reason, it would also be helpful if the author could provide some insight about how the AM might relate to IC work in a practical sense or in the 'real world'. Therefore, the way that an article is written is another factor that may have an effect on its use by the IC.

This intellectual inaccessibility may also be one of the reasons that the majority of respondents (Q13) indicated that they look first to internal research or the organization's databanks (89.4%) - because they are more likely to find material that fits into their work and is written in language that they understand. Studies in KMb also found that government employees are more likely to look for research internally, not only because it is easier to access and saves time, but also because organizations tend to hold material that uses common language and that is in line with their own beliefs or views (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Ouimet et al, 2009). However, this may also add to the problem of groupthink or ingrained views when there is an absence of different perspectives from outside of the IC (Crosston, 2013; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Britten, 2018; Dover, 2020). To counter this problem, it is important to increase the utility of AM by the IC and the recommendations about language and intellectual accessibility may be an easy place to start.

In terms of the relevance of AM as it relates to **content**, respondents were asked about the kind of AM that was found to be most useful (Q23) and that was most sought after (Q20). From these questions, and as taken from other comments, a list of topics was compiled from the respondent comments. Given that most respondents understand the importance of AM for foundational and contextual information, the main topics were predictably related to profiles of terrorist groups and countries. In terms of research that might be more useful in the field, respondents referred to AM on radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence, as well as practical skills such as interviewing techniques and detecting deception.

- Terrorist group profiles (political / historical / religious / cultural
- Radicalization and mobilization to violence - particularly first-hand accounts
- Country profiles (political / historical)
- Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
- Insider threat information
- Detection of deception
- Homeland terrorism / violence in diaspora
- International relations / political science
- Interviewing techniques

It is noted that these questions about topics of interest (Q20, Q23) were removed by CSIS, presumably because they may have been concerned that current members who completed the questionnaire might divulge too much detail about current areas of interest or concern within the Service.

Overall, the results are consistent with previous KMb studies regarding the uptake of AM by practitioners. In terms of government employees, Talbot and Talbot (2015) conducted a survey of civil servants in the United Kingdom, who were involved in various policy-making roles. From

340 responses, they found that many questioned the value of academic work to the practitioner. They also identified some of the same concerns - such as how practitioners were to implement research into their work as well as how the volume and diversity of research made it increasingly difficult for practitioners to find AM that was both relevant and useful. "The message, though, is clear that there is a disconnect between what is wanted or needed and what is provided." (Talbot and Talbot, 2015: 193)

Increasing the Utility of Academic Material to the IC

Having established a baseline of how much the IC uses AM in their work, and the factors involved in that situation, respondents were asked about the factors that would be most likely to increase their use of AM (Q24, Table 11). Organizational options involved circulating more AM within the organization, providing more opportunities for interaction with academics, and allocating more time to use AM. While all of these options received considerable support, the factor that was found to be most likely to increase the use of AM was to increase its **relevance** to the IC (92.89%). However, to increase the relevance of AM to the IC would require some feedback and communication between the AC and IC so three other options were presented that involved different levels of interaction with the AC, from simply networking to collaborating on projects.

Organizational Options

While respondents had earlier indicated that they often did not use AM because it was 'not required', the more highly rated organizational options related to increasing the awareness and

accessibility of AM**.** The top suggestion for the organization was "**AM circulated within organization**" (86.49%) suggesting that this might address an issue of awareness while also promoting AM as a resource that should be used. Additionally, respondents recommended "**Better access to AM**" (75.68%), presumably referring to physical access and possibly library holdings. These options reflect the simple linear approach of information sharing by disseminating AM and having it available for users to pull as needed. While KMb studies have shown that these approaches are not very effective on their own (Weiss, 1979, Lavis, 2006), they are an important foundation for KMb efforts.

While a number of comments praised the Service library and its staff, the FG suggested that the AC should also **'push' relevant articles** and send them to the Service since many members do not look outside of the organization's databank. Further, given the sheer volume of articles on terrorism, library staff may not find the desired material when they look outside of the library databanks. To assist in this effort, F2 suggested that the Service could establish a central **open database** dedicated to terrorism research that could be easily accessed by Service employees as well as academia. IC personnel or the Service's research unit could also contribute unclassified articles to this database. Any work that is commissioned from the AC, or research that is out-sourced, could also be housed here. The main concern here might be that, without a clear understanding of what kind of material is relevant to the IC, it could lead to a huge volume of AM put into the database again making it difficult to find what one needs. While developing such a database could be very useful, it would require very clear use of tag words and summaries.

As it relates to the organization and its leadership, "**More time to use AM**" was cited by 81.08% of the respondents while three respondents (8.11%) wrote, under 'Other', that they would be more likely to use AM if **management** directed it. These responses reflect the role that managers can play in improving the use of AM, both by allotting more time to use AM and by encouraging and reinforcing its use. As some of the respondents noted, and KMb studies also suggest, organizational change needs to start with the leadership and managers who set an example and promote a culture that values learning and using research in one's work. It is noted that this question (Q24) was not removed by CSIS but current members did not mention leadership direction in their comments. FG members noted that this would require a real shift in attitudes as well as developing a cadre of managers who understand the value of AM and would promote that to their employees. This topic came up again in discussions about possible information-sharing strategies which are discussed later in this chapter.

Interacting with Academia

The factor that was considered most likely to increase the use of AM was to provide "**More relevant AM**" (92.89%) for the IC to use. As discussed earlier, the relevance of AM can involve different aspects of the material such as its intellectual accessibility, its timeliness, or its content. Addressing these factors is where understanding and communication between the AC and IC is highlighted.

AM may be considered **too theoretical** or **not relevant** if it uses language that makes it difficult to understand and respondents had suggested that they would be more likely to read articles if they were shorter, focussed, and more easily digested. In this regard, article abstracts or executive summaries that are concise and clear would also be helpful. AM may also be considered too theoretical if practitioners cannot understand how to apply it to practice so it was suggested that authors could also tie their research to real world events or how it might relate to a local community. These suggestions, of language and applicability, would improve the intellectual accessibility or cognitive access of AM to the IC.

AM may also be deemed 'not relevant' if the content is not seen or understood to be timely, does not deal with a topic of interest to the IC, or does not provide any practical support or advice. Part of this is related to an individual's experience and ability to understand how to use AM in IC work. To this point, the FG acknowledged that the IC needs to do a better job of **providing feedback to the AC** as well as communicating what the IC needs. While Q20 and Q23 identified some topics that the IC would be interested in learning more about (listed in the previous section), it is clear that addressing the relevance of AM at a deeper level requires a constant effort towards better communication between the AC and IC. AC members would need a better understanding of what the IC needs and can use while the IC has to understand the limits of what the AC can provide and how to use that. It may also require more training for IC members in how to interpret and incorporate AM into their work.

Along these lines, respondents reported that "**Opportunities to interact with scholars / researchers**" (83.78%), "**Ongoing access to networks of academics / researchers**" (81.08%), and "**Collaborating on projects or articles**" (72.97%) could all improve their use of AM. If we look back at how people accessed AM (Q13), 39.47% of respondents indicated that they had obtained information in the past through "Contact with academics or experts in the field". Some of the comments also mentioned seeking out academics or preferring face-to-face conversations to discuss material (R12, R18, R21, R22, R26, R38).

> In the past, I have sought out university scholars to provide insight into political / cultural situations in nations undergoing current terrorist activities that had potential to spill over and impact our national security. In most cases, those scholars were university professors. (R12)

Further, when respondents were asked if they found it useful when scholars were brought in to provide lectures (Q17), the mode and median were both 'Occasionally' but results skewed higher towards 'often' and 'regularly'. It was noted that the best parts of these lectures were the question-and-answer periods or the personal discussions with the lecturers that followed the lectures. These responses reflect what KMb research has also shown - that most people prefer personal interaction as the best way to share information and transfer knowledge (Landry et al, 2001; Lavis, 2006; Maynard, 2006; Sudsawad, 2007; Ouimet et al, 2009; Qi and Levin, 2011; Phipps, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). When done properly, these interactions also offer the potential to spark ongoing relationships based on common interests. Therefore, it makes sense that creating more opportunities to interact on a personal level should increase the use of AM in the IC and respondents seemed to welcome this idea.

AC - IC Information-Sharing in Canada

Given that the different options all received some support as ways to improve the use of AM, did respondents really think that it would be beneficial for the AC and IC to work together? When asked (Q25), the majority of respondents (57.5 %) thought that there might be some benefit in working together to improve AM and its use by the IC, while 30% said 'Maybe' and 10% said a definite 'No'.

> The more diverse the perspectives are on threats posed by global terrorism the better prepared we will be to effectively diminish the threat. There should always be room for fresh insights. (R7)
>
> Sharing perspectives would likely give rise to more nuanced understanding of terrorist motivations, incentives (?), and likely outcomes. (R31)

While the majority of respondents generally agreed that working together could be beneficial in some ways, even many of those who said 'Yes' seemed skeptical about whether it could really happen given the added hurdles of classified information and the IC culture of secrecy. In this regard, they mirrored some of the comments of those who said 'Maybe' or 'No'.

> If a combined approach was possible, then yes - joint research projects between the academic and intelligence communities would be beneficial - because the common good would be better served. As mentioned, though, I do not foresee such a possibility. (R3)

KMb research has also indicated that, while there is considerable support for the idea of information-sharing and mobilizing knowledge, it is not widely supported in practice due to a lack of effort from both researchers and practitioners (Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015). More recent studies have also found that efforts and funding for KMb tend to be limited or short-term therefore there is a need for dialogue and more sustained efforts (Nutley et al., 2019). However, the amount of effort that an organization will put into KMb depends on the benefit that they expect to get out of it.

To this point, some respondents pointed out that CSIS has its own internal research unit so they questioned how increased collaboration with the AC would benefit the Service. Respondents in Talbot and Talbot's 2014 survey in the United Kingdom had the same question (Talbot and Talbot, 2015). It was noted that the CSIS Intelligence Assessment Branch (IAB) contains members with academic backgrounds, including PhDs, who are specialists and conduct research in response to internal requests but also produce open CSIS publications. Since they also have access to classified information, F5 noted that their research may also be more accurate and up-to-date than that of the AC. Therefore, F5 questioned why it would be important, in the interests of national security, for the IC to create more linkage with the AC. F5 noted that this question was not intended to reflect an anti-academic posture but rather questions what the AC can add to internal research that would be worth the effort for the IC.

In response, other FG members noted that the AC could undertake some data analysis that the Service may not have time for. Time pressures mean that Service analysts and researchers have to handle current and urgent priorities, meaning that there are occasions where post-operational analysis may not be completed because analysts have to move on to the next priority. Additionally, there may not always be time for Service members to collect and analyze open source information so this is another area where the AC may able to assist. As specialists in their area, AC members would likely be able to provide open source reports on specific topics much quicker than Service analysts who may be dealing with a variety of demands and may not have the same depth of knowledge on a specific topic. Such open source reports could assist IC

personnel in seeing the 'big picture' and where their investigations fit in. In terms of commissioning such open source research from the AC, FG members thought that the Service has done this on occasion in the past but that this option is not often pursued. FG members could also see a role for the AC in helping to train Service analysts or perhaps to provide courses tailored to Service needs.

It was also suggested that the AC and IC working together could improve the accuracy of information that is provided to the public because, as F1 noted, the Canadian public is woefully ignorant when it comes to threats to national security. Further, the public does not understand how the IC operates and the restrictions that they have to deal with (F3). AC members who have a better understanding of IC work can provide more accurate opinions when asked by media or when teaching courses. Similarly, IC input may correct errors in some academic research or articles. This kind of co-operation may benefit both communities in terms of credibility and building trust in each other and with the public. These suggestions coincide with those of scholars who have advocated for increased AC - IC information-sharing (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; dover, 2020; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021).

In talking about the potential benefits of AC - IC co-operation, the question also came up about which community would benefit more. Some respondents thought that co-operation would be more beneficial to the AC by helping them with their research and to interpret their data while AM may not be that useful to the IC.

> But the value is to academics, giving them a closer understanding of events as they unfolded. Intelligence is predictive, it gets done in real-time without benefit of thorough analysis of all data as investigations are never fully complete pictures of real-time events. (R6)

In contrast, others thought that the IC would benefit more because the IC would be able to take knowledge from the relationship but give little in return.

> The intell community is by nature collaborative with other like entities and given that community works with classified information I'm not sure how the academic community could benefit. That said anything relevant that the academic community provides to the intell community is welcome! (R22)

Again, the different views appear to relate to an individual's perspective of IC work and the value of AM. Ultimately, the discussion about the benefits and possibilities appeared to come down to whether or not it would be worth it for the IC to make the effort, and accept the risks, to become more involved with the AC. The implication was that, before the IC would make the effort, they would need to be convinced that there would be enough benefit to them.

Possible Forms of AC - IC Collaboration

Having accepted that there may be a role that the AC can play in assisting the IC, the different strategies for information-sharing were explored along with the obstacles, risks, and benefits that might be associated with each. The potential risks and benefits of AC - IC co-operation have already been discussed in Chapter 4 where Table 3 provides an overview of the risks and benefits as suggested in the literature.

In the questionnaire, respondents were asked (Q26) about the different forms of collaboration that they could envision as benefitting research into terrorism. All of the options received

considerable support (Table 13) however some were discounted fairly quickly. To begin with, the option of "**intelligence organizations providing anonymized data to the academic community**" received the most support (62.86%) as potentially benefitting research into terrorism but was generally ignored in survey comments and quickly discounted by interviewees and the FG. Interviewees and members of the FG acknowledged that there is likely data that is not being analyzed because the Service does not have the resources to analyze everything. Further, there is some data that probably does not need to be classified because as one respondent noted "*We overclassify everything*." (R35). While it was earlier noted that the AC could be helpful in analyzing unused data, it was also generally agreed that this would have to be done in-house, partly because CSIS is still a young and relatively small organization so they do not have the infrastructure and resources to declassify large amounts of material.

Further, FG members questioned, as some scholars have (Merari, 1991; Grossman and Davis, 2021) whether the AC could even use IC data since IC collection methods do not meet scientific standards. Would they accept IC data at face value or would they want to see source reports? Would the AC keep wanting more data? Would they understand what they are analyzing? Overall, would this be creating more problems for the Service? It was thought that the risks of disclosing too much information, coupled with the personnel and expertise required to sort and cleanse the material, or respond to questions, would make it too costly to be worthwhile for the IC. Some respondents also questioned if allies would be concerned about their information getting out. Therefore, giving out anonymized data was deemed to be an unlikely option.

For promoting relationships, the options, "**inter-group discussions on specific projects and outcomes**" (60.00%) and "**intelligence professionals providing input on academic articles before publication**" (57.14%), both received similar support. One of the problems with these options came back to the issue of time and how much time would be required to read articles or books and provide feedback, or the time required to participate in discussions or review boards. It is also important to note that, even if time is allocated for such things, some members may not feel that it is a good use of their time and may not want to participate. In any form of collaboration, Service employees would also be concerned that they may say too much, or that their input would be misunderstood, or that the academic may think that they are trying to influence their research. There have been incidents in the past where CSIS input was distorted or incorrectly reported and resulted in news articles (R5). As a result of these different considerations, it was suggested that many IC members would likely avoid participating in such options unless required to do so.

In terms of fostering **relationships**, FG members noted that, for many years, CSIS has brought in world-class speakers, held conferences, panel discussions, and such. While these events can be interesting, respondents do not believe that they have much lasting effect because people are too busy to incorporate the new knowledge into their work or they do not know how, something that the literature has also noted (Merari, 1991; Lefebvre, 2021; Nadim, 2021). As one respondent (R35) stated, they simply used the lunch-time lectures as an opportunity to socialize with their colleagues. The most useful part of such occasions was reported to be the question and answer portions or the opportunity to have one-on-one discussions with the

speakers. Respondents thought that such networking opportunities should continue, possibly with shorter presentations and more time allotted for questions or personal discussions, but there also has to be a concerted and consistent effort to develop these relationships and focus on practical support, not theories. "*This should be a 'must' not a 'nice to do' thing*." (R34)

KMb studies have suggested that the best way to improve information-sharing is through systems models, such as the co-production of research or collaborating on projects, where researchers and practitioners work together and information flows in both directions (Lavis, 2006; Phipps, 2011; Qi and Levin, 2011; Campbell et al, 2017). In Q26, the option for "**Co-production / conducting research projects together**" (54.29%) received the least support in the survey results yet, in later discussion, seemed to be the most favoured approach, but only if the academic worked inside the IC or, at the very least, obtained a security clearance. This is because the move to more collaborative models introduces the classification of information as a major hurdle.

> For such endeavours to be truly fruitful, access to classified intelligence for the academic partners would be required. (R10)
>
> Absolutely. They do (collaborate) already and should do more provided the academics can be security cleared and relied upon to be discreet. (R32)

Some terrorism scholars have suggested that the best way to improve AC - IC co-operation and understanding is through the movement of personnel between the two communities (Merari, 1991; Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020). Sending IC personnel out to work or teach in academia was believed to be the easier way to improve relations between the two communities and this option has the advantage that it does not involve classified information (Shohet, 1997; Vogel and Tyler, 2019; Lefebvre, 2021).

Respondents (FG, R36) agreed that **sending IC personnel to work in academia** could go a long way towards breaking down barriers between the AC and the IC, as well as educating those who may be interested in careers in intelligence. Further, the tacit knowledge of the IC person who is working in academia may contribute to better discussions and interpretation around academic research. The question then turns to whether any IC personnel would be interested in doing this, and taking time away from other work and career opportunities, as well as whether the AC would be interested. It was noted that there would have to be some career incentive for an IC member to do this or they could do it once they have left their organization. Some respondents (F1, F2) noted that the University of Ottawa Professional Development Institute offers courses related to intelligence and security, many of which are taught by former Canadian intelligence professionals, and this has been well-received. There are also some such partnerships in the United States where intelligence personnel teach in academia (R30, R36, F4) so it was suggested that we should look to our allies to see how they manage such relationships.

However, the FG expressed that **bringing academics into CSIS**, with a security clearance, was likely the best option for direct collaboration. It was noted that there have been occasions in the past where the Service has brought in academics to assist with research or analysis, and this was helpful, but this is believed to be a rare occurrence and there is no established program for it. The discussion again becomes one of costs and benefits.

As discussed in Chapter 7, FG members wondered if many academics would want to participate in such an endeavour given that there may be stigma attached to working for the Service and how that could affect their academic reputation. The IC community is generally viewed with suspicion that comes from being involved in secret activities. Beyond that, the academic faces other risks and inconveniences which include having to undergo the security clearance process and do all of their work in a Service office. This may also raise concerns about whether or how they might be targeted by a foreign organization, particularly if they travel to foreign countries. Additionally, the academic may not be able to do their own research or publish while working for the Service and, even after leaving the Service, their work might need to be vetted prior to publication. Basically, the FG thought that the only incentive for an academic would be acquiring some tacit knowledge and a better understanding of the IC world that might help them in their future research. Other than that, perhaps the academic would derive some personal satisfaction from feeling that they have contributed to the work of the IC.

From the IC perspective, bringing someone into the organization is not a simple process and involves significant costs beyond the risks of information disclosure. First, the nature of the project and the academic's role in it would have to be defined and approved. Then there are the practical aspects of a security clearance, determining remuneration, providing access to buildings and technology as needed, as well as assigning personnel to supervise or assist the academic. Each of these steps involves numerous meetings and decisions, taking up time and resources, that have to be weighed against the potential benefits. FG members noted that this would likely have to be done on a case-by-case basis and, because of timelines, would most

likely involve projects in headquarters, not in the field. The topic of establishing Intelligence Reserve Units among the AC, as suggested in the literature (Shohet, 1997; Dover, 2020), was not directly addressed in the discussions. However, respondents noted that, once an academic has obtained a security clearance and worked with the IC, their security clearance could be maintained so that they could easily be called upon again.

Overall, respondents indicated that AC - IC collaboration of any kind would face a number of challenges not the least of which is the organizational culture within the Service. Any future collaboration between the AC and IC would require firm support from the senior leadership and that would require leaders who value the use of AM. Therefore, the Service would have to focus on hiring or promoting leaders who understand the role of AM or have experience with it and who could guide other managers in its use. Finally, management would have to communicate this purpose and identify methods for using AM in the workplace, as well as providing incentives for employees to participate and not fall back into old habits.

> Developing a culture where understanding the background; cultural, religious, geopolitical background of terrorist movements is viewed as essential and not an "academic" or "theoretical" waste of time. The realization that without this depth of understanding you can't do your job at the level you need to. Luckily, IO's hired in the last 25 years or so are much more worldly and culturally diverse than previous generations – that represents an immense knowledge base though often implicit rather than explicit. (R36)

It was also noted that the Intelligence Assessment Branch (IAB) and the Academic Outreach Unit (AO) would be the likely bridges with academia, not only for their academic background but because their staff do not move around as much as other intelligence personnel. The frequent movement of personnel can be a problem when trying to build and maintain relationships with the AC.

What is clear from the comments and discussion on these topics is that, even if some respondents see the value of AM and the benefit that may come from working with the AC, respondents appear to be skeptical about whether there is the will, from both management and regular personnel, to actually do it. While the main objective hurdle is the classification of information and all that entails, there is also the hurdle of an organizational culture that does not seem to want to change or see any reason to. The individual comments illustrate the different views of just how high these hurdles are or need to be. Additionally, FG members noted that any efforts at information-sharing would first have to address the negative feelings that exist between the AC and IC.

> Start - by all means - but be well aware going forward of the limitations and risks that will no doubt be encountered. Tradition and prejudice and bias will need to be overcome - and methodology will have to be mutually respectful, conducted in near-absolute secrecy, within a very small compartmentalized realm. (R3)

The AC - IC Disconnect

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, there have been a number of articles that have discussed the disconnect between the AC and the IC and how this is believed to be a major impediment to information-sharing (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a; Sageman, 2014; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). While KMb research noted that there is some disconnect between researchers and practitioners in most fields of study, the disconnect between the AC and IC is thought to run deeper because of the added component of dealing with classified information and the culture of secrecy that has been built around that. Based on past experiences and

misconceptions, the two communities tend to be suspicious of each other and may even resent each other (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a).

> There are historical impediments to co-operation - misuse of academic material or leaking confidential information. There are some academics who have disdain for the IC because of negative reports like Guantanamo / torture. This goes both ways. (R33)

In this study, the survey questions did not directly address this disconnect, or IC perceptions of the AC, though it comes through in some of the comments. Additionally, the topic was directly addressed with the FG (Chapter 7) who said what others may have just suggested.

It is clear that the IC's main concerns in dealing with the AC revolve around the potential disclosure of sensitive information and how that might affect national security or their own organization's reputation and many of the survey comments touched on this as well. However, there are other elements to this disconnect that are on a more personal level. It was earlier discussed that there are still some remnants of an anti-intellectual or anti-academic attitude within CSIS that come from its evolution out of the RCMP and police work.

The IC is said to have a perception of academics sitting in their ivory towers and writing long, theoretical articles that no one can understand (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Nadim, 2021). Some respondents in this study also revealed this view as they commented on finding a lot of AM to be too theoretical, often because they could not understand the language of it. While FG members understood that AM is not written specifically for them, they wondered 'who then is the intended audience?'. Are scholars just writing for each other? Or do they actually want their research to be used by the IC? Members of the FG questioned if some members of the AC want closer co-operation just to

publish more articles and sell more books - or because they really want to help the IC. This comes back to the question of who would benefit more from closer co-operation and whether the IC sees it as being worth the effort.

The fact that articles may be 'unintelligible' to the average IC person may also be seen as an attempt to show intellectual superiority and suggesting that those not in academia are somehow inferior. Merari (1991) commented that the IC attitude may have something to do with a "fear of intellectual superiority" (Merari, 1991:95). When this is combined with a media that refers to scholars as 'experts', this is bound to antagonize some members of the IC. Some respondents felt that it was "arrogant" of scholars to think that they know more than members of the IC and F1 expressed that "it's like they're trying to tell us how to do our jobs". There is clearly some resentment around scholars being referred to as 'experts' when many of them have never met a terrorist, though FG members acknowledged that it is the media who over-uses the term 'expert'. Going through the comments about when and how AM was used, it was also clear that many respondents referred to other IC sources before AM because they feel those sources are the experts, or subject matter experts (SME), and are more trustworthy and credible due to their similar backgrounds and experiences.

> Scholar lectures rarely useful; professional experts - yes!! (R5)
>
> To me, the study of Counter Terrorism in an academic setting has little resemblance to the day to day realities of the study of a Counter Terrorism target. (R29)

The literature also suggests that there is a cultural arrogance in the IC, and perhaps feelings of elitism or power, that come from having access to classified information that outsiders do not, thereby creating in-groups and out-groups (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Crosston, 2013;

Maras, 2017). This is also suggested in some of the comments where respondents do not see the value of AM, routinely discount AM, and suggest that only information from classified sources is relevant or credible (R36, F5) while disregarding the amount of work and study that goes into academic research. For these reasons, there are those in the IC who think that academic researchers cannot possibly understand the nature of their work or produce AM that would be relevant to them so they are reluctant to use AM.

Further, as the literature notes, the real value of AM is that it is independent and free of the bias or influences that may affect other forms of research (Raphael, 2009; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a). For this reason, in Canada, the AC is also defined as a 'sensitive sector' and CSIS members require special permission to conduct investigations that may involve educational institutions or their staff (R3, R23, F5). Because of past experiences with academics and the understanding that the AC cannot be seen to be influenced, CSIS investigators tend to be cautious with members of the AC and, at times, avoid dealing with them altogether.

Meanwhile, respondents speculated that the risks and benefits for the AC would involve concerns around ethical issues and how working with the IC may affect their academic careers. Given the secrecy involved, and media reports of IC misbehaviour, many in the public and the AC hold negative views of the IC and IC members are acutely aware of this. As FG members noted, some in the public and the AC think that people in the IC are "evil" and they are suspicious of any IC activity. Therefore, the IC understands that working with them may have some stigma attached.

Scholars have also noted that being associated with the IC may draw unwanted attention from authorities and foreign entities or have a negative effect on academic relationships and careers (Breen-Smyth, 2009; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Lefebvre, 2021). Researchers may also be concerned that the IC may want to influence the direction of their research or misuse it once it has been completed (Schmid 2014a; Breen-Smyth, 2009; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Respondents understand these views and concerns which is why FG members thought that many academics would not want to work with the IC.

> I believe that persons such as these latter (researchers and professors) have an essentially natural caution / hostility toward the intelligence community which leads to a distrust and a fear of loss of free expression and legitimate dissent. - bound by law / regulations to respect academia as 'sensitive sector'; therefore, IC cautious about interacting with academia. (R3)

However, it is worth noting that any collaborative research generally comes with some purpose or requirements. Whenever research is published or presented, one also looks at who participated in or funded the research and what their purpose may have been in doing so. It is also understood that some research may not be published if those who funded it are not happy with it. In this regard, collaborating on research with the IC would be no different. What is different is the level of suspicion that surrounds the IC and that may transfer to suspicion about the research. Ultimately, as in any business relationship, if collaboration is not going to sufficiently benefit both parties, or if both parties are not comfortable with it, they may decide that it is not worth doing.

The level of mistrust of CSIS has not been helped in recent years by court decisions where CSIS has been admonished for not being entirely forthcoming with the courts. In multiple cases, judges have decided that CSIS withheld important information in relation to some of its warrant applications and operations. These judges (Justice Richard Mosley, 2013; Justice Patrick Gleeson, 2020; Justice Henry Brown, 2021) and the Federal Court of Appeal (2014) stated that CSIS had breached its duty of candour to the court. Overland (2011) notes "the implications of moral culpability transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrong doer might find themself" (Overland, 2011:134). In short, if they did it once, they may have done it before and may be more likely to do it again. While Overland is referring to individuals, this 'moral taint' might also be applied to organizations. In an organization, 'trust failures' can involve the actions of decision-makers at different levels (Bachmann, Gillespie, and Priem, 2015) but it reflects on the entire organization. While an organization is a living, breathing organism where membership periodically changes, and the wrongdoers may leave, rebuilding trust in an organization is a very complex and time-consuming process (Bachmann et al., 2015).

FG members had suggested that any collaboration with the AC is more likely to occur on a case-by-case basis between individual members of the AC and IC who can see beyond these issues and develop positive relationships. This is already happening on a small scale, as some respondents mentioned in their comments. Having said that, even individual IC members, who were not involved in any wrongdoing, will have been tarred by the same brush and may face difficulties in developing trust relationships with members of the public and academia.

Overall, respondents thought that both communities are wary of the other as well as possibly harboring some resentment. Each side may also feel that the other is disrespecting them and discounting their credentials. In such cases, it is human nature to push back though that does nothing to improve relations or advance knowledge. Therefore, any cost-benefit analysis related to increased collaboration between these two communities will have to factor in these unique circumstances. FG members also thought that it is more likely that AC - IC relationships will be developed through individual efforts rather than from the actions of the larger IC or its organizations.

This study has examined the factors involved in how much AM is used by the IC and how that relates to the relationship between the two communities. The results of this study suggest that there is a disconnect between the AC and IC in Canada as illustrated by the IC's limited use of AM and their perceptions of the AC. Clearly, better feedback and communication could address some of the issues that have been identified and recommendations have been made in that regard. However, as the literature mentions, there may be misperceptions and misunderstanding on both sides that lead to a reluctance to work together, which may be standing in the way of advancing knowledge in the field of terrorism. The focus of this study was to explore the IC perspective of this situation - but this is only one-half of the equation. The logical next step would be to address the same issue from the AC perspective in order to gain a better understanding of the attitudes and issues that may be blocking greater co-operation between the AC and the IC. This and other recommendations are provided in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION

Given the concerns surrounding a disconnect between the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC), and what that may mean to terrorism research, this study sought to explore this topic by examining information-sharing between the academic and intelligence communities in Canada. At its most basic level, information-sharing involves how much practitioners make use of scholarly research in the course of their duties and decision-making. Therefore, this study asked the question "Is academic research utilized by the intelligence community in Canada and what does the state of such usage tell us about the nature of the relationship between the intelligence and academic research communities?"

This approach was guided by the literature on knowledge mobilization (KMb) between researchers and practitioners in different fields of study. Knowledge Mobilization theory holds that when researchers and practitioners share information, combining the explicit knowledge of academic research with the tacit knowledge of practical experience, this can advance and improve the body of knowledge in a field that, when used by policymakers and practitioners, may lead to better performance and outcomes (Weiss, 1979; Lavis, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Nutley et al., 2019).

Studies in KMb have been conducted mostly in the fields of health, education, and government, and they have identified some common factors that affect the uptake of academic material (AM) by practitioners in those fields. These common factors include the accessibility of AM, the relevance of AM to the practitioner, as well as elements within the organizational structure and

organizational culture that may help or hinder the use of AM. A final factor that was found to affect the use of AM is time, both time constraints and the timeliness of information, because practitioners tend to be under greater time pressures than researchers (Oh, 1997; Rich and Oh, 2000; Stone, 2002; Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Maynard, 2006; Qi and Levin, 2011; Head, 2015). Through these studies, KMb research has also identified that a 'culture gap' or disconnect exists between researchers and practitioners in most fields (Oh, 1997; Stone, 2002; Tkachenko et al., 2017; Miller, 2022). It was also found that, even though there is considerable support for the idea of sharing information to improve knowledge in a field, this is generally not supported in practice (Head, 2015; Nutley et al., 2019).

Given the findings of KMb research, a disconnect between the AC and IC is not entirely unexpected but it is also believed to be magnified by the unique circumstances of intelligence work. The main hurdle to AC - IC information-sharing is that the IC deals with classified information that creates a barrier between those who have access to classified information and those who do not. The fear of disclosing too much classified information creates a 'culture of secrecy' that is gradually ingrained in intelligence personnel from the moment that they are hired, beginning with the security clearance process, and continuing through regular monitoring and stringent security protocols within the organization (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017; Dover, 2020). The classification of information, along with the 'need to know' policy, creates in-groups and out-groups, based on the levels of access to information, both within the organization and with outsiders (Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017). It may also lead to an elitist attitude among some members of

the IC who may feel that 'knowledge is power' and may not want to share that power (Merari, 1991; Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Horgan, 2014; Maras, 2017). Unfortunately, a lack of information-sharing between the AC and the IC may lead to intelligence failures (Lahneman, 2004; Grey, 2014; Maras, 2017; Britten, 2018) which, in the field of terrorism, can be catastrophic.

This reluctance to share information and a lack of transparency also lead many in the public and the AC to view the IC with suspicion and concern about their activities. Members of the AC may have ethical concerns about how the IC goes about collecting information as well as the potential to misuse their powers or the information that they have collected (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000; Crosston, 2014; Grossman and Davis, 2021). Meanwhile, because many academic researchers do not conduct field research, the IC may view members of the AC as being out of touch with the real world of terrorism and incapable of understanding the true nature of intelligence work (Crosston, 2013; Schmid, 2014a; Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Dover, 2020). Misconceptions about each other, and perhaps some negative past experiences, may lead each community to be wary, suspicious, or resentful of each other (Crosston, 2013; Horgan, 2014; Schmid, 2014a). These attitudes and perceptions may be another factor that is hindering information-sharing that could help advance knowledge in the field of terrorism.

Thus far, most of this discussion surrounding the AC - IC relationship has come from academia with limited input from intelligence professionals. Therefore, this study set out to add more balance to the literature by focussing on the IC perspective through an examination of IC use of

academic research in their work and the factors involved in that situation. This study not only provides a basic measure of the current AC - IC relationship in Canada but it adds IC views about the possibilities for the future of this relationship.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCESS

To answer our research question and explore the different factors that may be involved in the AC - IC relationship, this study sought the input of former and current intelligence personnel of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS, also referred to as the Service) about their use of AM in the course of their training and regular duties. The only inclusion criterion was that respondents should have had some experience in the area of counter terrorism during their tenure with CSIS.

Given that we would be dealing with intelligence professionals, a mixed methods study was designed to allow for different levels of anonymity. For complete anonymity, a questionnaire was designed based on the factors that KMb research had highlighted. Using a variety of fixed-choice and open-ended questions, the questionnaire addressed the accessibility of AM on terrorism, the relevance of the AM to practitioners, factors in the organization's culture and structure, as well as the issue of time constraints. Essentially, it asked respondents how much they used AM in the course of their training and work and which factors most affected their use. Beyond that, the questionnaire asked about how the use of AM might be improved and gathered opinions about different strategies for information-sharing. While the issue of the AC - IC disconnect could not be directly addressed in the questionnaire, it was expected that some

indicators would arise in the responses and comments. From the questionnaires, respondents could also volunteer to be interviewed or to participate in a focus group (FG), where the issue of an AC - IC disconnect could be addressed more directly. These latter options ensured confidentiality but not complete anonymity since the interviewer would know the respondent's identity.

Former or retired members were recruited through my own personal network and then expanded to a few mutual contacts or referrals. A request was also made to CSIS to allow for the participation of current members to complete an anonymous questionnaire. In approaching CSIS for their participation, there were two goals in mind. The first goal was to obtain up-to-date information about the utility of academic research to members of CSIS. Current members are, overall, a younger group than the former members and would have had better access to academic research due to technological advances and the mountains of research that have been published since 9/11. Many former members did not have the same access to material early in their careers because it either did not exist or it was not readily available. Since the Service is a relatively young organization, the 1980's and 1990's represented growing years both in terms of size as well as access to AM through their library or the internet. Therefore, it was thought that including current members of CSIS could provide more up-to-date information.

The second goal in approaching the Service was to engage them in the discussion about AM and potentially start a continuing dialogue about the benefits of information-sharing. As the Service

has grown so has the educational profile of its employees and many applicants for intelligence officer or analyst positions now hold graduate or multiple degrees. With this increased level of exposure to academia and AM, it would have been interesting to see how much anti-intellectual bias remains in the Service. Perhaps this newer generation would see more value in using AM and be more amenable to building relationships with the AC.

When the Service agreed to distribute the survey to its members, this was a positive start. Unfortunately, a number of factors came into play that affected the overall engagement of the Service. Timing is everything and the Covid-19 pandemic made for bad timing. In the face of meeting their intelligence requirements, the Service faced new issues of members being away sick, Covid-19 precautions within the offices, and the effect of it all on employee morale. As an essential service, and particularly one that deals in classified information, it is difficult to allow certain members, or categories of employees, to work from home. This created the situation where some employees were rarely in the office while those who were in the office were very busy and sometimes not happy about not being able to work from home. Clearly, in this atmosphere, completing an academic survey was not a priority on anyone's list. Service personnel indicated that approximately 750 employees should have received the questionnaire but there was no tracking, some employees were sick or not in the office, and a few employees advised me that they had never seen the survey material. As a result, the actual sample size for current members of CSIS is unknown.

Further, partway through data collection, some members of CSIS management determined that they had concerns about some of the questions resulting in six questions being removed from the questionnaire. Questionnaires that had already been completed (containing those 6 questions) were subsequently withheld, thereby reducing this sample. Overall, while the Service's intent to participate was greatly appreciated, and they were faced with urgent priorities under pressing conditions, it is unfortunate that the Service did not maximize this opportunity to provide feedback on this topic. In the end, only four questionnaires were returned by current members of the Service and they were returned in one envelope which suggests that they had been vetted prior to release. Given this small response, it was impossible to make any comparisons between current and former members of CSIS so the questionnaires were combined with those of former members.

In total, the study gathered data from forty (40) anonymous questionnaires (36 former members and 4 current members), six (6) individual interviews with former members, and one focus group with five former members, providing both empirical data and firsthand information to examine how much AM is used by intelligence professionals and the factors that influence that situation. Beyond that, respondents provided their thoughts about whether this situation could be improved and the strategies that might be useful. Because some people in the interviews and focus group had also completed questionnaires, there were 42 participants in total. Respondents were very open and candid in their remarks, providing a significant amount of information and insight.

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, the findings of this study are consistent with the literature both as it relates to the common problems of knowledge mobilization and also as it relates to the difficulties of information-sharing with the IC. This includes those elements of the AC - IC relationship that may also be hindering information-sharing between the two communities.

The Utility of Academic Material to the IC

The first part of the questionnaire established that AM was only occasionally used by the IC in the course of their training and work, and highlighted the same common factors that were found in KMb studies. While the main factor was reported to be time constraints (84.21%), the comments generally referred to time in relation to some of the other factors, most notably that AM was not seen to be required for their work (52.63%) or was not considered relevant to their work (60.53%). In short, if the use of AM was not considered to be required or relevant to their work, the time was not made to include it.

When respondents reported that AM was **'not required'** for their work, their comments revealed that this was largely rooted in the organizational culture and the structure that has come from that. Respondents reported that AM is only occasionally used in training and it is not required or encouraged in their regular work, such that there are no incentives or time allotted to use AM. This sends the message that management does not view AM as being useful or relevant to their work. Therefore, when AM was used, it was generally at the discretion of the individual employee (75.75%) and often done outside of work hours.

This situation was explained in terms of the Service's creation out of the RCMP. Respondents noted that, when CSIS was created, the original workforce came from the RCMP and many of those managers did not have post-secondary education so there was little thought given to using AM in the course of their work. The police view of operations involved a generic approach of getting out of the office and investigating, with little thought given to doing background research. These same managers were training the new members of the Service so some of that anti-intellectual or anti-academic attitude carried over into CSIS when it was created in 1984. Since then, all intelligence officers hired into CSIS require an undergraduate degree, so it was thought that this situation is improving though some old attitudes still remain.

Because of this background, there are no explicit job requirements to use AM unless one works in a research unit or possibly a few other areas in headquarters. When the use of AM is not part of the job requirement and not encouraged by managers, it was left to the individual employee to determine whether they thought it was required. While most respondents agreed that AM could provide valuable background or foundational information, there were some IC members who believed that AM was only useful at the national level in headquarters and could not be applied to other areas such as data collection in the field. Therefore, some of these respondents stated that AM was not required for their work because they could see no practical or tactical use for it.

One of the factors that affected respondents' views of the utility of AM was its **timeliness.** Some respondents pointed out that the AC and IC have different objectives and work on different timelines. Where the AC seeks knowledge and understanding, the IC needs timely and practical solutions. Where academic research moves slowly and looks at past events or behaviour, the IC moves quickly and looks forward to prevent terrorist events. Therefore, some respondents seem to expect AM to provide practical answers right when they are needed and consider AM to be outdated by the time it is finished or published. Meanwhile, other respondents did not take issue with timeliness and indicated an understanding that we learn from the past and can use that knowledge going forward. Therefore, for some respondents, seeing the value in AM also came down to their ability to understand how it can be used in different ways.

Another factor that was highlighted in the responses and comments was the accessibility of AM (68.42%) though few comments were made about the physical accessibility of AM and many respondents commented favourably about the Service's library and its staff. Rather, respondent comments placed more emphasis on the **intellectual accessibility** of AM (55.26%), noting that articles were often too theoretical, too long, or used language that was too difficult to understand. While it was recognized that the AC is not writing their articles specifically for practitioners, respondents suggested that they would be more likely to use AM if articles were shorter, used common language, and had clear abstracts. This is considered to be especially important given the increased volume of AM since the events of 9/11 and the time required to sift through more material. Even those respondents who understand the value of AM in

providing important foundational information for all levels and aspects of intelligence work reported being deterred from using AM because much of it is too theoretical or too difficult to understand. Faced with time pressures, even these respondents would be unlikely to make the effort (and the time) to locate, read, interpret, and then use AM in their work. For these reasons, some respondents stated that they are more inclined to seek research material from sources other than the AC, such as internal sources, allied agencies, thinktanks, or other practitioners in the field. This is also because, as some comments revealed, some members of the IC do not see members of the AC as a credible source of information on terrorism because those in the AC do not have access to classified information and most academic researchers have never even met a terrorist.

Therefore, the deemed relevance of AM is influenced by a number of factors including the organizational culture and elements of the AM such as its timeliness, its content, and its cognitive accessibility. The reputation of the scholar is also considered and those who have conducted field research are seen as more credible. Any one or all of these factors may lead members of the IC to determine that the available AM is **not relevant** to their work. The role that these factors play also depends on the individual's own initiative, experience, and understanding of how to use AM in their work.

Increasing the Utility of Academic Material to the IC in Canada

When asked which factors would be most likely to increase their use of AM, there was broad support for all of the different options which included allotting more time to use AM, better

access to AM, more networking opportunities with academics, and direction from management (Table 11 refers). However, the factor cited as most likely to increase the use of AM was to increase its relevance to the IC (92.89%). As noted above, the **relevance of AM** can involve different factors and members of the focus group (FG) acknowledged that, in order to improve the relevance of AM, the IC needs to do a better job of providing feedback to the AC. This could include feedback about articles or presentations, identifying topics of particular interest, identifying where they see problems in the research, or collaborating on projects. For example, it was noted that the IC was investigating Islamic fundamentalism long before it became a topic in public circles. Perhaps if the IC had shared this interest with the AC, relevant academic research could have been done earlier so that governments would have had more information to work with. Therefore, better communication and co-operation could lead to relevant research in the early stages of a problem which might also address the timeliness factor.

Just as KMb literature found, direct personal relationships and discussions were favoured as the best way to provide this feedback and to share information. Some participants stated that they have reached out to certain academics when they had questions, and they found these relationships to be very fruitful. Often these relationships came out of chance meetings at a conference or a lecture, wherein the intelligence professional then pursued and maintained the relationship. Others also noted that the best part of the lectures and conferences was the opportunity to talk to academics one-on-one to gain a better understanding of their work. These opportunities can help to inform each group and provide basic feedback about the other's work and interests albeit within the limits of classified information.

To go beyond this kind of information-sharing introduces the issue of dealing with classified information. While most respondents agreed that working more closely together or sharing some classified information would be very likely to improve the relevance of AM, they were divided on whether such co-operation was possible. Deeper collaboration means having to navigate the security requirements and protocols around the use of classified information which adds time and costs to any such collaborations. This adds a discussion of costs and benefits to any such proposal to determine if the effort is worth it.

The study questionnaire provided a number of options for information-sharing strategies and all of them received some support from the respondents (Table 13 refers). While the option that was considered most likely to improve the relevance of AM was to release anonymized data to the AC (62.86%), members of the FG dismissed this notion fairly quickly. They noted that providing anonymized data to academic researchers would require editing and declassifying documents which would require infrastructure that the Service does not have and expertise that the Service cannot afford to reallocate. Redacting documents to remove sensitive information requires both experience and good judgement which means that valuable personnel might be taken away from other important duties. Given that CSIS is a fairly small organization, FG members did not see this as a feasible option.

The information-sharing strategy that was most favoured, as some scholars have also suggested, involves the movement of personnel between the two communities. This kind of

interaction could help to break down barriers and build trust and confidence in each other. The most popular option involved bringing academics in to work in the intelligence organization for a period of time. This would require the academic to obtain a security clearance but, with access to classified data, this would allow for more freedom to work on a variety of projects. By working inside the organization, the academic would also be able to assist the IC with research, analysis, and training while acquiring a more realistic view of the IC that they could then take back to their work in academia.

Within this discussion, there was also some analysis of the costs and benefits to each group. To bring someone into the IC involves costs to the organization in terms of allocating time and resources to do a security clearance, organize the area of work, provide the academic with access to internal systems and resources, and assign employees to work with and/or supervise the academic. The question for some FG members was whether the Service would derive enough benefit in this to justify the time and costs. Given that the Service has its own research unit, including some members with PhDs, how would the Service benefit from this?

FG members also questioned whether any academics would even want to do this. They noted that, for the academic, there do not appear to be many incentives to working inside the organization other than some acquired tacit knowledge that may help with future research and analysis. Further, they noted that many academics are suspicious of the IC and may have concerns about whether the IC will try to direct their research or misuse it. Some academics may also balk at the prospect of having to undergo the vetting for a security clearance and

wonder about the risks, both personal and professional, that may be related to having access to classified information. Additionally, there are costs to the academic in being away from their own research and institution, and possibly time away from their families. The 'publish or perish' dilemma was also highlighted since academics are limited in what, if anything, they can publish from their interactions with the IC. Even after leaving the IC, their work may need to be vetted to ensure that no classified information is divulged. Therefore, even if an academic is amenable to working with the Service, they may determine that the costs outweigh the benefits to them.

If we are looking at improving relationships and channels of communication, IC respondents could also see value in sending IC personnel out to work and teach in academia. This approach has the advantage of not requiring security clearances and being more cost effective, while also breaking down some barriers between the two communities and building public trust in the IC. Such an exchange could also contribute to academic research through the tacit knowledge of the IC person, as well as adding to the education of those students who might be interested in a career in the intelligence world. The problem here, as with some other suggestions, is whether the resourcing issues could allow for the IC to lose an employee for a significant period of time. For some employees, being publicly identified as a member of the Service may not be an option, either for personal or career reasons. For other currently serving members, the concern might be that time away from their organization could negatively affect their career progression. Out of sight, out of mind. For this option to work, both the organization and the employee would need to understand how they might benefit from such an arrangement.

Respondents noted that, in Canada, more retired or former intelligence professionals are working in academia. As an example, they cited the University of Ottawa Professional Development Institute where intelligence-related courses are being taught by former intelligence professionals.

Overall, there was significant support for the idea of improving relations and information-sharing with the AC, but also significant doubts about whether it was possible or if there was the will to make it happen. At this time, there is no formal information-sharing relationship or program between the AC and IC in Canada. The Academic Outreach unit in CSIS has been promoting some communication by bringing in guest speakers, arranging conferences and such, but respondents indicated that they did not see consistency in this effort. The FG did not foresee any large-scale effort from the Service to improve information-sharing in the near future. They noted that this would require a significant shift in the organizational culture and that would require developing a cadre of leaders who are committed to making the necessary changes in the organizational structure that would encourage information-sharing. Rather, it was suggested that developing relationships between the AC and IC is more likely and very possible to happen at the individual level. Some respondents had indicated having already established some one-on-one relationships with academics. It was thought that if IC management recognized the value of such relationships, and added some encouragement or incentives, more such relationships would follow and help to increase understanding about the value of academic knowledge in IC work.

However, respondents also recognized that there are those in the IC who see little value in working with the AC while there are also some in the AC who may want nothing to do with IC personnel. Therefore, developing closer relationships would also require addressing the concerns that each community has about the other. It was suggested that more individual relationships with academics, who are willing to talk to IC personnel, might help others in the AC to overcome, or at least address, their own concerns about the IC.

The AC - IC Disconnect in Canada

Is there a disconnect between the Academic Community and the Intelligence Community in Canada? From the IC perspective, the survey results and comments suggest Yes. We have already discussed the common factors that create the initial gap between researchers and practitioners in most fields. With the IC, this gap is further widened by the issue of classified information that introduces organizational obstacles to information-sharing such as the requirement to obtain a security clearance or to de-classify information. Many respondents cited these as the main obstacles to information-sharing. However, it is also clear from some of the comments that, just as the literature suggests, the 'culture of secrecy' that is created around dealing with classified information creates divisions between the two communities that may also involve issues of trust, power, and even resentment.

Having been created out of the RCMP, some respondents stated that anti-intellectual or anti-academic attitudes still exist in CSIS and this is reflected in the fact that most managers simply do not give any thought to promoting or supporting the use of AM. Therefore, some employees take the lead from their managers and do not consider that AM may have some

value in their work. They simply do not think about it. Meanwhile, other respondents actively discounted the value of AM. This smaller segment of respondents said that members of the AC could not possibly understand the world of intelligence and counter-terrorism because they do not work in it and, therefore, their research is not likely to be relevant. While there is some truth to the idea that AC understanding of terrorism may be limited in some respects by their lack of first-hand exposure, some of the comments also suggest the arrogance or elitism that has been mentioned in the literature. Within the IC, it seems that a much higher value is placed on classified information than academic research simply because it is classified, while also reflecting a lack of respect for scholarly research.

This is also seen in the fact that some respondents questioned the value of improving relations between the AC and IC. While the majority of respondents saw benefits in working more closely with the AC, there was a small minority of respondents who questioned how it would benefit the IC since they have their own research personnel who have access to classified information. The implication by these few seemed to be that the IC does not need academia. After all, academic research is open information and the IC can turn to AM if and when they feel they need it. For this reason, some respondents thought that the AC would benefit more from the relationship because they might gain some access to classified information or acquire tacit knowledge that would help them in their future work.

This situation may also be exacerbated by the fact that academics are often referred to as 'terrorism experts' which appears to create some resentment among some IC members. The IC

view appears to be that those in academia are 'scholars' of terrorism while those in the IC are the 'experts' or 'subject matter experts' (SME). Therefore, IC members tend to seek research from other IC professionals or organizations before looking to AM because they view practitioners as the experts in the field. Some respondents noted that they would be reluctant to trust anyone who does not have the same training or experience that they do. However, a few respondents noted that the best information generally comes from those who have experience in both worlds.

Beyond the disconnect that is created by the issue of classified information, the IC in Canada also deals with the fallout from previous negative experiences that have resulted in academic institutions being defined as a 'sensitive sector' within CSIS. This means that, out of an abundance of caution, contact with academic institutions or their employees by CSIS members requires special authorization. This is essentially to determine if the benefit that may be derived from such contact with the AC is likely to be greater than the complaint or media attention that might follow. Even when permission is given, IC members understand that their inability to disclose too much information may also add to an academic's fear or suspicion of them. Further, FG members reported that IC personnel are well aware that some members of the AC are suspicious of or hold negative feelings towards CSIS and some respondents reported some animosity from academics. As a result, members of the IC are likely to avoid contact with the AC unless necessary.

Therefore, while KMb research found a disconnect between researchers and practitioners in most fields, this appears to be amplified between the AC and IC due to the value that the IC places on classified information above all else. The wall that this creates between the IC and other entities is not just about the risk of disclosing classified information but also involves ingrained attitudes and perceptions of each other. This means that improving information-sharing between the AC and IC faces the added hurdle of correcting misperceptions and changing attitudes.

STUDY LIMITATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE

In looking at the results of this study, there are some limitations that must be considered. First of all, as discussed earlier in this paper, one of the difficulties in collecting primary data in the field of terrorism is the difficulty of gaining access to the target population and this includes gaining access to intelligence personnel. Therefore, this study used convenience and snowball sampling, beginning with the network of contacts from my career with CSIS and then expanding to a few mutual contacts or referrals, to obtain the participation of former members. In the end, there were only two referrals and they were also individuals who were known to me. While employment with CSIS was verified through my own knowledge of these participants, their experience in counter-terrorism was self-identified.

Further, as a former intelligence officer, most of my contacts are also intelligence officers who would have worked in counter-terrorism primarily as data collectors or as managers. However, as previously noted, the Service did not have many designated analyst positions in the early

years of the Service so all intelligence officers of my generation would also have been involved in data analysis, or would have rotated through analyst positions, prior to the creation of designated analyst positions. The diverse experience of the sample of former members can be seen in the career details as shown in Chapter 6, Table 5.

Given this method of sampling, it could be argued that our sample is not representative of the population of former and current CSIS members who have worked in terrorism. However, such sampling is a common method for accessing hard-to-reach populations (Heckathorn, 1997; Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Martin, 2017), especially when we do not even know the actual size of our target population since those numbers are never published and some intelligence personnel may never work in counter-terrorism. Further, since this is exploratory research and we are not testing a hypothesis, this type of sample provides a reasonable starting point (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Raifman et al, 2022).

In designing this study, there were some other important considerations that resulted in a mixed methods approach. The first consideration was the issue of anonymity. In order to gain co-operation, even from former or retired intelligence personnel, an option to remain anonymous had to be included. For this reason, the basis of the study involves a questionnaire that could be completed and returned anonymously. From there, participants could volunteer for an interview or a focus group or both. The second consideration involved the regulations, such as the Security of Information Act (formerly the Official Secrets Act), that prohibit revealing any classified information and this is a lifelong requirement. Because intelligence

personnel tend to err on the side of caution, the topic and questions had to be fairly benign and stay away from sensitive topics so that participants would be more likely to respond to them. However, ample opportunities were provided for participants to add their own opinions and insight.

While this study also sought to examine the disconnect between the AC and IC, it is a difficult subject to approach directly on a large scale, therefore it was approached through the topic of knowledge mobilization, as in their use of AM which is the most basic relationship between researchers and practitioners. This, of course, means that the issue of a disconnect had to be deduced from the comments that were provided. Fortunately, this issue could be addressed directly with the interviewees and the focus group.

When participation in a study is voluntary, we are also mindful that people participate for different reasons. Some of the respondents may have a particular interest in this topic, some respondents may enjoy assisting with research in general, and some respondents may have participated just to help a former colleague. At the next steps, of volunteering for an interview or for the focus group, most of the participants are individuals who see value in the topic and, in this case, think that AM can play an important role in IC work. This may skew the results or comments to some extent. Having said that, the FG discussion was lively, and some members played devil's advocate at times. Further, because the questionnaires were anonymous (R1 through R42), and FG members were therefore allocated new reference numbers (F1 through

F5), the views of those who participated in the FG may also have been presented twice and may add unintended weight to certain comments.

Within the sample, there was also the issue that almost all of the respondents are former members and only a few current members participated. As a result, the responses of current members were included in the overall sample and comparisons could not be made between the two groups. This means that our sample is predominantly retired members with considerable experience. This is not necessarily a bad thing as they have a good overall grasp of the issues and most of them were only recently retired at the time of data collection, though it would have been helpful to get more views from current and younger members. With increased participation from the Service, it may also have been possible to do some comparisons about the utility of AM by job functions to see if there were significant differences between the views of the data collectors and data analysts. Unfortunately, when conducting a voluntary survey with a hard-to-reach population, particularly in the intelligence world, the make-up of the sample is out of a researcher's control.

Further, after the study had commenced, six questions (below) were eliminated from the surveys of current CSIS members (as identified in the results and earlier discussions). Therefore, any surveys that were completed prior to these questions being removed were withheld, further reducing the sample of current members. The following questions were removed by CSIS.

9. Does this experience include any postings to other agencies involved in counter terrorism? (If yes, please indicate number of years and, where possible, general type of agency).

15. In your organization, is there a databank or service that can assist you with locating relevant academic materials? Yes / No

20. Can you describe an example of where you sought out research to assist you in your work? Were you able to find relevant research? How and where did you find it?

21. When you have referred to academic materials for your work, is it generally when you are directed to do so, when it is a requirement of the job, or your own choice? Please comment.

22. In your organization, are you required to support operational decisions with research? Check the option that best describes your experience or opinion.
(Not at all / rarely / occasionally / often / regularly)

23. Over the course of your career, what kind of research materials have you found to be most useful for your work? Please give an example and indicate why you found it to be useful.

In looking at these questions, the logic behind their removal is not always clear but we can speculate. Question 9 refers to secondments and exchanges that the Service may not want revealed or where they might be concerned that employees might reveal relationships with specific organizations or agencies. Regarding Questions 21 and 22, these questions refer to the role of leadership and management in the use of AM, and it is likely that Service managers were concerned that this might reflect negatively on them or their organizational culture. The reasoning behind excluding the remaining three questions (15, 20, 23) is less clear since they relate to the access and use of open information. As noted earlier, Question 15 refers to the fact that the Service has an Academic Outreach unit and a library that are also mentioned on their website. Questions 20 and 23 relate to the kinds of open research material that members of the IC have found to be useful. While this refers to open information, it is possible that

management was concerned that this might reveal specific areas of interest or investigation. Overall, it appears that the Service was concerned that their employees may not be discreet enough in answering these questions despite the fact that simply filling out a questionnaire, with other open-ended questions, left ample opportunity for employees to be indiscreet if they had wanted to be. (I would add also that the Oath of Secrecy is lifelong and, being a former member of CSIS, that also applies to what I write here.)

The removal of these questions reflects the dilemma that comes up in any relationship between intelligence organizations and outside bodies. While the intelligence organization may want to engage with outside organizations and provide more transparency, how much is possible? There will be times when it is important to maintain separation and distance or where information simply cannot be shared at all. If an intelligence organization does agree to co-operate, outsiders may still question whether the intelligence organization is acting in good faith, and is sincere in these efforts, or if they just want to project the appearance of co-operating. How much is just optics? Unfortunately, removing six questions from the questionnaire raises these questions here.

Finally, this study is limited to members and former members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) which was created in 1984 with the primary goal of defending Canadian interests. The IC community in Canada is both younger and smaller in comparison to other countries that may have a variety of different intelligence structures and different functions and requirements within those structures. Therefore, the views and opinions

reflected in this study cannot be generalized beyond CSIS, not even to other Canadian intelligence bodies who may have longer histories and different relationships with academia. For example, the Canadian military has a longer history of working relationships between their researchers and practitioners through the establishment of two military universities - the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Therefore, their experiences may be very different.

Despite these limitations, this study contributes both primary data and firsthand information to the field by presenting the views of Canadian IC members about their use of AM on terrorism and the prospect of more information-sharing with the AC. This sample of intelligence personnel provides significant and rare insight into the IC perspective and addresses a gap in the literature.

To my knowledge, there are no other studies that have directly surveyed intelligence personnel on this scale to address their use of AM on terrorism, their views on information-sharing with the AC, and what that says about the AC - IC relationship. There have been some studies that have discussed information-sharing between the AC and the IC and some of these have included interviews with former or current intelligence personnel (Vogel and Dennis, 2018; Grossman and Davis, 2021; Nadim, 2021). The Conference Board of Canada (2017) addressed the topic of information-sharing with the IC by surveying other players in the security field such as law enforcement, other levels of government, and the security apparatus of businesses,

hospitals, and universities. Schuurman (2019) conducted a preliminary survey that gathered feedback about the use of AM by intelligence professionals though that survey involved a wider intelligence audience and was not limited to members of intelligence organizations.

Therefore, this study is a first look at these topics from the sole perspective of Canadian intelligence professionals. In so doing, this study also provides evidence to support what some scholars have written or speculated about information sharing with the IC as well as the disconnect between the AC and IC. Finally, the recommendations gathered throughout this study provide a path forward to improve both the use of AM by the IC and the AC - IC relationship in Canada. Improving relationships and the work of both of these communities should improve overall efforts in fighting terrorism and improving public safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the data and comments, this study has arrived at a number of recommendations for improving the use of AM by IC professionals as well as information-sharing strategies that may also help to improve AC - IC relations. The first section, summarized in Table 14 below, provides recommendations to address problems that are affecting the uptake of AM by IC personnel. This includes recommendations for future research as it relates to terrorism. The second section outlines different strategies for information-sharing, along with their considerations and potential benefits. These are summarized in Table 15 with an overview of AC - IC linkage possibilities in Figure 9. Finally, the third section provides recommendations for future research as it relates specifically to the AC - IC disconnect.

Recommendations to improve the use of AM

Thanks to the many comments from the questionnaire, the interviews, and the FG, a number of recommendations were gathered to address the use of AM in the IC. These include recommendations for both the IC and the AC. In terms of **accessibility**, some recommendations relate to increasing awareness among IC personnel about the kinds of AM that are available on the topic of terrorism. This could be done by circulating summaries or synopses of AM within the organization via internal email. It was also suggested that there could be a greater use of **AM in training** because that is when individuals have the time and curiosity to learn. Not only does this better prepare new employees but, once into their regular duties, time and support are not always there so using AM should be established as part of the process right from the beginning. Further, when employees are transferred to a new position, managers could allot more time for initial research to learn more about the area. R34 reported that, as manager of a unit, he/she would sometimes ask library staff to put together a package of material about their area and it was provided to the employees in that unit. It was suggested that more managers could do this.

R33 suggested that the Service could establish an **open databank** dedicated to terrorism research, with an easy to recognize icon, so that articles can be more easily found and accessed by intelligence personnel. This databank could include articles that are sent by researchers and academics as well as those that have been found by IC personnel. The articles could also be from different fields of study as long as they relate to terrorism in some respect. Further, this

databank could include any open publications or research from the Service itself. These efforts would necessitate some form of guidelines as to the type of material that goes into the databank, as well as clear tagging and key words, so that the volume is still manageable and easily searchable. Since the databank would consist of open information, perhaps it could also be made accessible to others doing research in the field of terrorism.

For their part, the FG suggested that the AC could **'push' articles** to the Service that they think might be useful because many intelligence personnel will not search beyond internal resources. These articles do not need to be specifically about terrorism but could also include articles that provide some history or background of a culture or organization, or topics in psychology and law, as they relate to terrorism. Respondents were also interested in more timely and fact-based articles, such as first-hand accounts or primary data.

Relative to this, it was also suggested that, where possible, authors could provide academic articles that are shorter, straightforward, and more easily digested by IC personnel. At the very least, more clear and concise abstracts would help intelligence personnel quickly ascertain if an article will be relevant to their interests before investing too much time in reading or incorporating them into their work.

In terms of **the relevance of AM**, the study participants also provided some recommendations for research content or topics that would be of interest to them. Further to the list of topics

provided in Chapter 8, some other suggestions were made, and they follow a few different themes. Clearly, research already exists on some of these topics, but more may be required.

a) Foresight analysis - Because the AC and IC work on different timelines, it has been said that it is unlikely that the AC can produce what the IC needs in a timely manner. Therefore, some respondents recommended more research that looks ahead to emerging issues and future trends. What is coming next?

b) Canadian content - Given that Canada is a relatively young but very multicultural country, respondents suggested that they would like to see more terrorism research that is specific to Canada. They mentioned topics such as radicalization, countering violent extremism, and violence in the diaspora as it relates to Canada and our communities.

c) Group and Individual Behaviour - Some respondents were interested in more research that describes group structure and dynamics. This includes typologies of group members as it may help identify those that are more likely to move to violence, who are more likely to become informants, or more likely to be disengaged or rehabilitated. The relationship between mental illness and violent extremism was also mentioned.

d) More First-hand information - Some respondents noted that AM on terrorism is data-poor, as we have already discussed, and suggested obtaining firsthand research or going to a conflict zone. This would provide evidence for theories and would help researchers to interpret their

data more realistically. This suggestion is a little unusual given that one of the reasons to pursue improved AC - IC relations is to help the AC understand terrorism better without necessarily having to put themselves in danger. However, this could also serve to improve some personal relationships between AC researchers and IC members as it may provide some shared or similar experiences.

Finally, to improve the use and relevance of AM to the IC would require information-sharing between the AC and the IC particularly as it relates to feedback about AM. As the FG members noted, improving information-sharing between the AC and IC would require a shift in the organizational culture and this would require developing a cadre of managers and senior leadership who see the value in AM and would be committed to creating a learning environment. This would also require making some organizational changes and introducing incentives for employees to buy into any new programs or policies.

Table 14 provides an overview of the current problems associated with the use of AM by the IC in Canada, along with the recommendations that were provided to address the different factors. These recommendations deal specifically with the uptake of AM by IC practitioners.

Table 14 - Recommendations for improving the use of AM by the IC

Factor	Component	Details of Problem	Recommendations for AC and IC
Accessibility of AM	Physical Accessibility	Lack of awareness of what is available If not in IC library, costs incurred to obtain AM	IC - Circulate AM within organization IC - Create central database of open Terrorism research AC - 'Push' relevant articles to IC database
	Intellectual Accessibility	Articles too long and hard to understand	AC - Clear, concise writing AC - Straightforward abstracts / summaries
Relevance of AM	Too theoretical	Articles hard to understand Difficult to relate to practice / policy	AC - Clearer writing (as above) AC - Tie material to real world / communities or events
	Not Relevant re: Timeliness	AM examines past events, IC looking ahead AM works at slower pace so AM not timely	AC - Foresight analysis AC - Identify emerging issues & future trends
	Not Relevant re: Content of material	Topics may not relate to IC areas of interest	IC - Provide feedback to AC AC - See suggested topics in responses to Q20 and Q23
Organizational Structure	Not required for job	Job / role requirements do not require AM Time Constraints - No time allotted to use AM Academic Outreach Unit lacks consistent support (see also Organizational Culture / Leadership)	IC – Expand use and awareness of AM in training Allocate more time to use AM / open-source info in work Provide incentives to include AM or open-source material Provide career incentives for employees to maintain or upgrade their knowledge base
Organizational Culture	Not required for job	Leadership, anti-intellectual attitudes, culture of secrecy (Power?) that suggest AM not required for IC work	IC – Develop cadre of managers who value AM to change attitudes, create learning environment, guide other managers

Recommendations to improve AC - IC information-sharing

Respondent comments indicated that, despite having an Academic Outreach Unit, there is no established process within CSIS for communicating with academia. In this study, the different KMb information-sharing strategies (outlined in Chapter 3) were considered as well as the suggestions that have come from scholars of terrorism (outlined in Chapter 4). These options were explored with the FG while keeping in mind the obstacles that are unique to IC information-sharing. It was noted that some of these suggestions may have been put forward or tried before but respondents reported that there has been no observable consistent effort.

Thus far, the Service has been bringing scholars in to provide lectures to their employees, as well as some conferences, panel discussions, and such. These are considered to be interesting but are not seen to increase the use of AM in intelligence work because these occasions are brief and transactional. It was suggested that such networking opportunities should continue but with more time allotted for personal discussions so that academics may get a better idea of the kind of information that the IC needs or wants while providing IC personnel with a better understanding of their work. Expanding these kinds of encounters would also provide more opportunities to develop one-on-one relationships.

It was also suggested that academics could be invited to teach a course on particular topics of interest to IC personnel. For example, a course on the theories of radicalization taught by a member of the AC would be more thorough and likely make better use of time than if IC personnel have to research the topic on their own. It is worth noting that, when CSIS members have pursued further studies, some of them have done it through the Royal Military College (RMC) and, at times, these courses have been offered within CSIS headquarters.

Complementary to this, the Service could establish a roster of scholars, with reference to their specific areas of knowledge, who are amenable to dealing with Service personnel. Whenever intelligence personnel require information or assistance on a particular topic, they could search this roster and easily find someone to contact for information or discussions. Should the Service need research on a particular topic, or a collaborator for a specific project, pre-existing relationships with members of the AC would make that easier or the roster could provide a

starting point for contacts or referrals. Further, since intelligence personnel move around fairly frequently, this roster could be maintained by library staff which may also provide a consistent contact point for academics.

For more direct collaboration on projects, the FG felt that bringing academics into the Service, with a security clearance, would likely be the best option. The Service has reportedly done this a few times in the past, but this is rare and there is no formal program in place. While some academics may not wish to work with the Service, for the reasons already cited, it was thought that there are others who would. Further, once an academic has a security clearance, this could be maintained so that they may be contacted to discuss topics, commission work, or collaborate on projects when the need or opportunity arises, similar to the idea of reserve units suggested in the literature (Shohet, 1997; Dover, 2020).

Table 15 and Figure 9 provide overviews of how the AC and IC might move towards better information-sharing and possibly to collaborating on research.

Table 15 - Strategies for AC - IC Information Sharing

KMb Strategy	Recommendations	Considerations	Potential Benefits
Push / Pull strategies	AC to push relevant articles to IC IC could circulate more AM internally	Requires IC feedback as to what is relevant material	Easier access to relevant material
	Establish a central open database within the IC for terrorism research IC could maintain a list of scholars & their areas of specialization	How to regulate what goes into the database; need clear tagging and abstracts / summaries AC members would have to agree to being contacted	Easier access to relevant material
	IC could commission open-source work from AC	CSIS already has internal research branch	IC saves time and resources when looking for open-source material
Relationship strategies	More networking opportunities with more time for Q&A or discussions with lecturers		Developing direct AC – IC relationships Helps AC understand what is relevant to IC
	AC could develop courses per IC needs	Availability of academic	Courses tailored to IC Saves IC time and resources in training
Systems / collaborative strategies	IC personnel to go out and work with academia	Classified information not required IC time away from regular work	Improved communication and understanding for both communities AC gains tacit knowledge IC gains awareness of AM on terrorism
	AC personnel to enter IC	Requires security clearance IC time and costs to manage project AC inconvenience, 'publish or perish' dilemma Potential stigma to the academic	Improved communication and understanding for both communities AC gains tacit knowledge More analysis of classified data or IC programs
	Intelligence Reserve Personnel in AC	Requires security clearance	Availability of AC personnel when needed

Finally, in talking about closer collaboration, respondents noted that those in academia would need to overcome their concerns about the IC. Without some communication between AC and IC members, any misperceptions will continue to go unchallenged allowing a disconnect to persist. FG members thought that it is more likely that relationships can be developed on an individual basis rather than to wait for some action from the organization. Some of these strategies offer opportunities to connect and it is suggested that individual members of the AC and IC establish their own relationships and, hopefully, more will follow.




Figure 9 - AC - IC Linkage Possibilities

Recommendations for Future Research into the AC - IC Disconnect

In looking at the IC's use of academic research in Canada, this study has added the voice of IC personnel to the discussion. This has provided information not only about the utility of AM to the IC but also provides some insight into the AC - IC disconnect in Canada. There can now be less speculation about what the IC thinks because the comments from past and present members of CSIS have been very revealing. However, in order to improve knowledge mobilization between the AC and the IC, further research into the AC - IC disconnect is needed.

In terms of this study, a higher representation from current members of CSIS would have allowed for more data analysis, particularly in terms of examining trends. For example, comparisons between older and younger respondents might have shown that anti-intellectual attitudes are decreasing. It may have also revealed what, if any, relationship existed between

an individual's level of education and their use of AM in their work. Similarly, with a higher response rate, it may have been possible to examine if the views of AM differed between the data collectors and data analysts. While data analysts may have a better understanding of academic research and how it can be used, there is no data analysis until the right data is collected. Therefore, it is also important to know what kind of AM data collectors think they need in order to collect the right information. These were among the list of considerations for data analysis but the lack of response from current members made those analyses impossible.

While the Co-Vid pandemic was partly to blame for the lack of response from CSIS, future research could look to improving the involvement of current CSIS members. This would include more rigour in the distribution and collection of the anonymous questionnaires. Additionally, interviews or a focus group of current CSIS members, conducted within CSIS, would add valuable insight into the use of AM, the prospects for future information-sharing, and their impressions of the AC - IC relationship. Needless to say, greater co-operation from CSIS would add much to the discussion of these topics.

Given that this study was focussed on adding the IC perspective of the AC - IC relationship, the natural next step on that topic would be to conduct a similar survey with members of the AC. While some respondents noted that they had developed one-on-one relationships with some academics, it would be interesting to see how those academics viewed those same relationships. Respondents thought that these relationships were fruitful but do the academics feel the same way? What, if anything, do the academics get out of it? Further, it would be

most interesting to see how members of the AC view the IC in general. Do IC members have the correct impression about how the AC sees the IC? Why is it that some members of the AC refuse to talk to members of the IC? In terms of the IC's use of AM, members of the AC could also be asked for their reactions to the IC comments and the options for information-sharing.

To delve deeper into the AC - IC disconnect, it may also be useful to conduct similar surveys with other segments of the IC in Canada. It is possible that the AC - IC relationship is closer in other sectors such as the Canadian military that has long combined practice and research through their two universities. Noting the differences in AC - IC relations with different organizations may lead to a better understanding of what is required to improve relationships.

Finally, as some respondents noted, other countries have more established relationships between their intelligence services and academia. Particularly since the events of 9/11, more countries have worked towards developing AC - IC relationships as well as programs for intelligence studies at their universities (Gendron, 2020). It would be worth looking to these models to see how they manage the movement of personnel between the two communities and how this contributes to the AC - IC relationship. Since CSIS is fairly young and small, it would also be worthwhile to look at the practices in countries that have an IC of similar size and function.

Final Thoughts

Scholars of terrorism have suggested that one of the main problems in terrorism research is a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is preventing these two communities from working together and combining their knowledge to advance research on terrorism. Knowledge Mobilization (KMb) theory also states that the combination of research (explicit knowledge) and experience (tacit knowledge) is thought to produce the best evidence upon which to base policies and practices. So, it would seem to make sense that the AC and the IC working together might increase knowledge on terrorism and provide benefits to everyone. However, studies in KMb have also found there is some level of disconnect between researchers and practitioners in most fields of study and this needs to be addressed in order to advance research. Thus far, the topic of an AC - IC disconnect has only been presented from the perspective of the AC with minimal input from members of the IC. What is missing in the literature is the clear voice of the IC supported by data. While academia sees a disconnect between the AC and the IC that is hindering terrorism research, does the IC see it the same way?

The objective of this study was to address that gap and inject some IC perspective into this discussion in order to provide a more balanced view. This study approached intelligence professionals in Canada about their use of academic research in their work as a way to provide some basic measure of the relationship between these two communities. From the IC perspective, which factors play the biggest role in their use of AM? Does this reflect a disconnect between them and the AC? What this study found is that, like other fields of study,

there is a disconnect between the AC and IC in Canada and the major reasons appear to involve a lack of understanding and possibly a lack of respect for each other.

When it comes to the IC's limited use of AM, the main reason cited was that it was not relevant to their work and part of this had to do with characteristics of the AM itself. Perhaps the content of the AM does not seem relevant to IC work. Perhaps the language is too academic or 'opaque' so that it is hard to understand. Perhaps the AM is too theoretical and IC members may not understand how to transfer this theory to practice. Or perhaps some IC members are simply unaware that the material even exists. These are all problems that might be addressed through feedback, communication, and training.

For example, some respondents did not consider AM to be relevant to their work because they could not understand how to use it. Making this connection between AM and its use in all aspects of intelligence work is very important if it can help to improve national security and protect our citizens. As a country made up of immigrants, an obvious use of AM is to provide political and historical information that helps us understand the behaviours and grievances of our immigrant or ethnic groups. While some respondents could only see AM being useful in headquarters or research units, it is also useful in the field in knowing how to approach people, how to talk to them, the right questions to ask, and understanding their responses. It is important for intelligence personnel at any level and any work location - whether in headquarters, in the field, or in an overseas posting - to understand this foundational

information so they know where their work fits into 'the big picture' and can collect the right information.

At the group level, AM also provides research into cultural beliefs, religions, and group behaviour that is useful for all levels of IC work. There is considerable AM that provides information about recruitment and group dynamics (Della Porta, 1988; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Crenshaw, 2011; McCauley and Moskolenko, 2011) as well as the role of charismatic leaders (Wiktorowicz, 2005; Slootman and Tillie, 2006; Hofmann and Dawson, 2014; Hofmann, 2016). All of this can be very useful at the level of field investigations. For example, Nesser's (2010) typology of group members, wherein he also suggests that a group is more likely to move to action once all of the necessary roles are filled, is the kind of article that may help an investigator or analyst to anticipate the actions of a group and its members.

At the level of the individual, understanding the factors in radicalization, or planning deradicalization programs, means looking at individual motivations for joining, staying, or leaving. As we can see from cases such as the Toronto 18, or Canadian foreign fighters who travelled overseas, everyone has their own reasons for becoming involved with a terrorist group and it often involves the interplay of different factors (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Dawson, 2017). Even with the same circumstances, every individual is unique and no two people experience things or respond to them in the same manner (Dawson, 2017; Khalil and Dawson, 2023). In the field, understanding these differences and what drives an individual to seek out a terrorist group, or fall victim to recruitment, can help an investigator determine

which members of a group might be more open to becoming informants, to being disengaged from the group, or to being rehabilitated. It also makes it easier to simply approach people, talk to them, and understand their perspective.

For those members of the IC who may not understand how to apply AM in their work, perhaps this needs to be taught and could be addressed in their training. Increasing this understanding of how to use AM would directly address the issue of relevance for some of these individuals. This is also why it may be beneficial, where possible, for academics to explain how their research or theories might relate to situations or events in the local communities.

Simplifying scholarly articles for easier consumption might also improve the use of AM by IC members though this may not be so simple for members of the AC. If articles are more practical and less theoretical, how might they be received by academic journals and peer reviewers? With increasing competition in the field of terrorism research, some journals may require more scientific and theoretical articles that may be even more difficult for a practitioner to decipher. However, given the increasing number of journals, there are some that are specifically written for a law enforcement and intelligence audience where more practical articles may be found. Perhaps the IC needs to be made more aware of these kinds of journals.

Clearly, there is a way forward in some of these areas, the question is whether there is any desire to tackle these problems at all and that is the bigger question. While there was much debate in the FG about the different benefits and hurdles related to information-sharing, in the

end it came down to whether there is the will to improve information-sharing between the AC and the IC and a major factor in that is how each community perceives the other. This is the part of the disconnect that is harder to fix because it involves organizational cultures and individual attitudes between the AC and the IC that also suggest a lack of respect from each side for the other.

As Schmid (2014a) noted, the academic community (AC) and the intelligence community (IC) appear to live in very different worlds. In fact, they do. Academics live in a very public world of information and knowledge and self-promotion. They teach at educational institutions and they face pressure to publish and speak at conferences to further their careers, obtain research grants, and secure their future work and standing in the AC.

Meanwhile, those in the IC work 'in the shadows' to gather intelligence and try to prevent bad things from happening. There is usually little recognition of a job well done and they do not all get awards or acknowledgements for their work - in fact, most never do. They cannot talk about it at home and, even within the intelligence community or agency, employees working in other areas may not know of their achievements. It might just be a note in a file. For the IC, visible and attributable successes are rare while their failures become global news. While the classification of information serves to protect information, it also ties the IC's hands when they want to defend their actions or justify a decision not to act. As Dr. Lorne Dawson noted in a conversation we had while I was completing this study, if they (the IC) tell the public too much information, they could be accused of fear mongering but if they do not say enough, it looks

like they did not know what they were doing or that they did something wrong. So, the IC has difficulty trusting outsiders and some may ask - is it possible to work more closely together and is it worth it?

There were some IC respondents whose comments revealed some disdain for the AC noting that academics cannot possibly understand the work of the IC since they do not work in it. They seem to disregard all of the work and study that goes into scholarly research. Among these respondents, there were some who, focussed on the value of having access to classified information, did exhibit some of the arrogance or elitism that the literature has also mentioned. This small segment of respondents also appeared to dismiss any idea of working with the AC without considering how it might benefit everyone else, including the public.

However, while the IC may not afford the AC the respect that it deserves, some members of the IC also appear to think that they do not get the respect that they deserve. IC members are well aware that many in the public and the AC do not trust them and suspect them of misusing their powers. People seem to focus on IC mistakes or misbehaviour that appear in the news but seem to ignore the fact that, most of the time, nothing bad happens which generally means that good work is being done behind the scenes. It also appears to bother some members of the IC when scholars are referred to as 'experts' in the media as if their opinions are more important or more accurate than that of the IC. Of course, nobody is saying that and the AC provides those sound bites that the media wants because the IC generally cannot.

Clearly, the wall between the AC and IC consists not only of government and organizational requirements surrounding the classification of information and security clearances, but also organizational and individual attitudes that are deeply entrenched - whether it is indifference, disdain, resentment, or outright animosity toward each other. Both scholars and study participants have pointed out that improving relations between the AC and the IC would require a significant shift in the organizational culture of the IC. However, it would also require more communication between the AC and IC in order to disabuse some members of the AC and the public of the idea that the IC is somehow evil. As some respondents noted, this will also require more transparency from the Service in order to improve public confidence and trust.

While doing all of this may seem daunting, there is no reason not to start chipping away at the problem by starting with the simplest and most do-able recommendations to promote communication at the ground level, such as increasing opportunities to network with academics or bringing academics into the IC to teach some courses related to terrorism and radicalization. Further, while the organization as a whole may be slow to move towards any formal arrangements, there is no reason that managers cannot start encouraging individual personnel to use AM or establish relationships with academics. For their part, the AC could be more open to meeting with IC personnel and forming their own opinions of them instead of listening to what others may be saying.

Finally, it would require the time to do all of these things - even while time is seen to be something that everyone feels constrained by. We need to make the time to do all of these

things in order to build better relationships, respect each other's work, and improve knowledge in the field for everyone. In that regard, the biggest hurdle is in convincing people that it is worth the time and that the end results will be worth it. This brings us back to the same problem that intelligence organizations often face when fighting for their programs or budgets - how do you convince people in advance that the time and effort will be worth it? Even if we can show that improving information-sharing changes the quality of information on terrorism, how can we show that this is an improvement? Even if some successes may come from such information-sharing, secrecy requirements may mean that no one will ever know. So how do you justify making the effort to change things that cannot be measured and may never be known? It takes a belief and faith in the value of talking to each other and a commitment to do everything that we can to protect the public.

In this discussion of working together, most of the focus has been on how the AC and IC can work together to improve the body of knowledge on terrorism. However, what may be more important for the IC is the role that the AC plays in the public sphere. As some scholars noted, improving communication channels and relationships with the AC could go a long way towards improving the IC's public image and building trust with the public. With better communication and information-sharing, the AC would have more information and understanding upon which to base their assessment of IC activities and the IC as a whole. Increased transparency and some demystification of IC work could also result in more accurate depictions of the IC to the public.

This may be the real benefit for the IC. Considering that a lot of intelligence field work involves going out and gathering information from all sorts of individuals, groups, organizations, and businesses, it only makes sense that you will get more information if people trust you and respect the work that you do. If academia can serve as a form of public oversight, this may counter some of the 'fear of the unknown' that cause the public to mistrust the IC. This might also carry over into increased public support for the IC and its initiatives or programs.

Another important reason for improving these relationships, and some respondents also commented on this, is that the public needs to be better informed about terrorism in order to counter all of the misinformation and disinformation. Over recent decades, immigration to Canada has increased dramatically and our society now has to deal with new issues related to cultural or ethnic differences. Much of the immigration to Canada has been driven by problems in other countries and sometimes those problems are brought here, including hatred and intolerance between groups or cultures. We have seen this in the past and we will continue to see it in the future.

It is important for the public to understand that, when terrorists commit attacks, it is not only about gaining publicity for their cause (Hoffman, 2006; Crenshaw, 2011), it is also about "mobilizing popular support at all levels, from the outer ring of a concentric circle of sympathizers to the inner ring of active members" (Crenshaw, 2011:10). When terrorist events move people to participate in protests and demonstrations, these groups often use such public events to identify individuals who would be vulnerable to being recruited, either as members or

for other kinds of support (Yayla, 2021). Additionally, extremists may infiltrate protests to direct them towards violence (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2019; Doxsee, Jones, Thompson, Hwang, Halstead, 2022) or to hijack their messaging (Askanius, Molas, Amarasingam, 2025). Through these actions, some well-meaning members of the public may be recruited while others may end up unintentionally supporting the efforts of a terrorist organization.

For these reasons, it is important for the public, as well as those in positions of authority and government, to have a better understanding of how terrorist groups operate so that we can prevent recruitment and radicalization (Yayla, 2021) within our communities. When it comes to radicalization to terrorism, families and communities are the first line of defense and intervention.

To that end, the academic community and the intelligence community can work together to combat terrorism through knowledge and education before the roots of terrorism spread so far that it becomes impossible to control. Canada has often congratulated itself as a country where people are nice and bad things rarely happen. However, we cannot be complacent and need to accept the reality that terrorism is growing here too, faster than we think. Professional differences must be set aside so that knowledge and experience can be combined to effectively combat terrorism from its beginning to its end.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A - Information Letter for Current Members

Title of the Study: "An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization."

Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Lorne Dawson, PhD, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. Phone: 1-519-888-4567 Ext. 35340, Email: ldawson@uwaterloo.ca

Student Investigator: Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. Phone: 1- 416-522-1859, Email: smajthen@uwaterloo.ca

Invitation to Participate

You are invited to participate in a research study about how academic research into terrorism is or is not used by the intelligence community in Canada. This study forms the basis of a PhD dissertation.

To help you make an informed decision regarding your participation, this letter will explain what the study is about, the possible risks and benefits, and your rights as a research participant. If you do not understand something in the letter, please ask one of the investigators prior to consenting to the study.

What is the study about?

As we all know, terrorism is not a new phenomenon but, following 9/11 and other major terrorist attacks around the world, the field of terrorism studies has grown exponentially. Much of the research into terrorism and radicalization is undertaken in the hope that it will be useful to intelligence organizations and governments as they make decisions relative to counter terrorism efforts.

This project seeks to understand how and why academic research is used by intelligence professionals and the factors or barriers that may be affecting the use of this research. Additionally, this project will seek input from security professionals about how to improve the mobilization of knowledge and research as it relates to countering terrorism and violent extremism.

I. Your responsibilities as a participant

What does participation involve?

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to fill out an anonymous questionnaire. Questionnaires will be paper copies, printed off from your email, and do not ask for identifying information. By filling out and returning the questionnaire, you are indicating your consent to participate in this study. Anonymous quotations may be used from the open-ended questions in the questionnaire.

Completing the questionnaire will take about 15 to 20 minutes. In the questionnaire, you will first be asked to provide some basic demographic information (e.g. age, gender, education). The rest of the

questions revolve around the use of academic material by intelligence professionals and the factors that condition that use. Questions will also seek your opinions about the relevance of academic research to your professional work, and your recommendations for enhancing the use of research by the intelligence community.

*Please note that you do not need to be familiar with the academic literature on terrorism in order to participate in this study. We are not asking about your knowledge of the material.

Who may participate in this study?

This study is intended for any members of the intelligence community in Canada who have been involved, directly or indirectly, in the field of counter terrorism. This includes but is not limited to those with experience in operations, management, intelligence analysis, research, screening, surveillance, assessments, legal affairs, etc. as it relates to terrorism initiatives (counter terrorism or countering violent extremism).

II. Your rights as a participant

Is participation in this study voluntary?

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may decline to answer any question that you do not wish to answer. Choosing not to answer certain questions does not invalidate your participation.

Will I receive anything for participating in the study?

There is no remuneration for participating in this study though we hope it will be satisfying to provide your input and opinions on this topic.

What are the possible benefits of this study?

While there may be no personal benefit to you, this study may benefit the academic community, the intelligence community, and society as a whole as we strive to improve the body of knowledge to aid in counter terrorism strategies.

What are the risks associated with this study?

There are no known or anticipated risks associated with your participation in this study.

Will my identity be known? (Anonymity)

We understand that anonymity is important to members of the intelligence community. Identifying information is not required in order to participate in this study. The questionnaires are to be returned anonymously, in a sealed envelope, by depositing them in a secure drop box in your building OR mailing them directly to the researcher (address follows here). Your employer will choose which method they prefer.

Will my information be kept confidential?

Responses will be aggregated and presented in that form. Any quotations that may be used in the study report will be anonymous. Please note that, once submitted, questionnaires cannot be withdrawn as they are anonymous and we will have no way of identifying which one is yours.

Collected data and materials will be securely stored on password protected computers and in locked cabinets. The information will be retained for 7 years, per research guidelines.

Copies of the final dissertation and any related publications or conference papers will be made available to you upon request.

III Questions, Comments, or Concerns

Has this study received Ethics Clearance?

This study has been reviewed and received Ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have any questions for the Committee, you may contact the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

Who should I contact if I have questions regarding my participation in this study?

If you have any questions regarding your participation in this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact the researcher, Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, or the Faculty Supervisor, Dr. Lorne Dawson. Our contact information is listed below.

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Appendix B - Information Letter for Former Members

Title of the Study: "An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization."

Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Lorne Dawson, PhD, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. Phone: 1-519-888-4567 Ext. 35340, Email: ldawson@uwaterloo.ca

Student Investigator: Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. Phone: 1-416-522-1859, Email: smajthen@uwaterloo.ca

Invitation to Participate

You are invited to participate in a research study about how academic research into terrorism is or is not used by the intelligence community in Canada. This study forms the basis of a PhD dissertation.

To help you make an informed decision regarding your participation, this letter will explain what the study is about, the possible risks and benefits, and your rights as a research participant. If you do not understand something in the letter, please ask one of the investigators prior to consenting to the study.

What is the study about?

As we all know, terrorism is not a new phenomenon but, following 9/11 and other major terrorist attacks around the world, the field of terrorism studies has grown exponentially. Much of the research into terrorism and radicalization is undertaken in the hope that it will be useful to intelligence organizations and governments as they make decisions relative to counter terrorism efforts.

This project seeks to understand how and why academic research is used by intelligence professionals and the factors or barriers that may be affecting the use of this research. Additionally, this project will seek input from security professionals about how to improve the mobilization of knowledge and research as it relates to countering terrorism and violent extremism.

I. Your responsibilities as a participant

What does participation involve?

If you agree to participate, you will have the option of either filling out an anonymous questionnaire or participating in an interview with the researcher. Both interview and questionnaires cover the same topic areas, though interviews will allow for more discussion and a greater opportunity to express opinions and concerns.

In the questionnaire or interview, you will first be asked to provide some basic demographic information (e.g. age, gender, education). The rest of the questions revolve around the use of academic materials by intelligence professionals and the factors that condition that use. Questions will also seek your opinions about the relevance of academic research to your professional work, and your recommendations for enhancing the use of academic research by the intelligence community.

Interviews will be conducted virtually (online video interview). The details of time and location can be arranged between the participant and the researcher. Interviews are expected to last between 30 minutes and 1 hour. If the participant consents, the interview may be audio-recorded to ensure accuracy. Anonymous quotations may be used in publications or presentations. Alternatively, you may choose to have your quotations attributed directly to you in the study results with your review and approval.

Prior to the interview, participants will be sent a copy of the consent form to review. The participant may sign and return the consent form by email or they may choose to provide verbal consent at the start of the interview. The verbal consent will be documented on a consent form that the researcher will retain.

Questionnaires will be paper copies and do not ask for identifying information. Completing the questionnaire will take about 15 to 20 minutes. By filling out and returning the questionnaire, you are indicating your consent to participate in this study. Anonymous quotations may be used from the open-ended questions in the questionnaire.

Participants can choose to receive the questionnaire by regular mail or by email. If an address is provided, a paper questionnaire may be mailed to the participant along with a self-addressed stamped envelope for its return. Participants who prefer to receive the questionnaire by email will need to print it off, fill it out, then return it by regular mail (postage will be covered by e-transfer at the time of receiving the questionnaire). For anonymity, do not include a return address on the envelope.

Focus Groups - At the end of the interview or questionnaire, participants will be invited to participate in a focus group to further discuss the same topics and questions. The focus group will be conducted through video conferencing and is expected to take about 1 hour. The date and time will be determined through consultation with those who volunteer for the group. The guiding questions for the focus group will be the same questions as in the questionnaire and interview. Anonymous quotations may be used in publications or presentations. Alternatively, you may choose to have your quotations attributed directly to you with your review and approval.

The focus group may be audio-recorded to ensure accuracy if all members of the group consent. Prior to the focus group, participants will be sent a copy of the focus group instructions and consent form to review. Participants may sign and return the consent form by email or they may choose to provide verbal consent to the researcher. Prior to the focus group, each participant will be contacted by the researcher to address any questions and logistical matters. At that time, the participant may provide verbal consent if that is their preference. The verbal consent will be documented on a consent form that the researcher will retain.

Who may participate in this study?

This study is intended for any members of the intelligence community in Canada who have been involved, directly or indirectly, in the field of counter terrorism. This includes but is not limited to those with experience in operations, management, intelligence analysis, research, screening, surveillance, assessments, legal affairs, etc. as it relates to terrorism initiatives (counter terrorism or countering violent extremism).

*Please note that you do not need to be familiar with the academic literature on terrorism in order to participate in this study. We are not asking about your knowledge of the material.

II. Your rights as a participant

Is participation in this study voluntary?

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may decline to answer any question that you do not wish to answer. Choosing not to answer certain questions does not invalidate your participation.

You may also withdraw your consent and request that your data be removed from the study by contacting the researcher within 15 days after the date of your participation. After that time, your data will have been incorporated into the results.

Interview - If you are participating in the interview, you may decline to have it recorded and the interviewer will only take notes. You may also end or leave the interview at any time and your information will not be used. You can decline to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with. You also have 15 days after you have left the interview to withdraw your consent, and request that your data be removed, by contacting the researcher.

Questionnaire - If you choose to complete the questionnaire, you may skip any question that you do not wish to answer. Please note that anonymous questionnaires cannot be withdrawn.

Focus Group - If you participate in a focus group, you may decline to have the focus group recorded. Your level of participation is up to you and you may decline to answer any question that you are not comfortable with. You may withdraw your consent and / or leave the group at any time and your information up to that point will not be used. You also have 15 days after the focus group to withdraw your consent, and request that your data be removed, by contacting the researcher. Please note that, due to the nature of focus groups, it may not be possible to remove all information associated with you.

Will I receive anything for participating in the study?

There is no remuneration for participating in this study though we hope it will be satisfying to provide your input and opinions on this topic.

What are the possible benefits of this study?

While there may be no personal benefit to you, this study may benefit the academic community, the intelligence community, and society as a whole as we strive to improve the body of knowledge to aid in counter terrorism strategies.

What are the risks associated with this study?

Given the current requirement to conduct interviews virtually / online, we are reminded that participation in online interviews or conferences carries its own risks. "If you choose to participate in an interview via online video-conferencing, please note that whenever data is collected via the internet, privacy cannot be guaranteed. There is always a risk your responses may be intercepted by a third party (e.g. government agencies, hackers). University of Waterloo researchers will not collect or use internet protocol (IP) addresses or other information which could link your participation to your computer or electronic device without first informing you." (University of Waterloo online privacy statement)

Will my identity be known? (Anonymity)

We understand that anonymity is important to members of the intelligence community. Identifying information is not required in order to participate in this study. Anonymous participation is provided through the questionnaire.

If you choose to participate in an interview, your identity will only be known to the researcher and the faculty supervisor. If you participate in a focus group, the other participants may also know who you are.

Any identifying information will be removed from the data that is collected and will be stored separately. Your name will not appear in any paper or publication without your explicit consent.

Will my information be kept confidential?

If you have participated in a focus group, the other participants will know what you said. While we will ask all participants of the focus group to maintain confidentiality, we cannot guarantee that they will do so.

Collected data and materials will be securely stored on password protected computers and in locked cabinets. The information will be retained for 7 years, per research guidelines.

Copies of the final dissertation and any related publications or conference papers will be made available to you upon request.

III Questions, Comments, or Concerns

Has this study received Ethics Clearance?

This study has been reviewed and received Ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have any questions for the Committee, you may contact the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

Who should I contact if I have questions regarding my participation in this study?

If you have any questions regarding your participation in this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact the researcher, Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, or the Faculty Supervisor, Dr. Lorne Dawson. Our contact information is listed below.

Sandra K. Majthenyi, PhD Candidate
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies
University of Waterloo
1-416-522-1859
Smajthen@uwaterloo.ca

Dr. Lorne Dawson, PhD
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies
University of Waterloo
1-519-888-4567 Ext. 35340
ldawson@uwaterloo.ca

Appendix C - Instructions & Questionnaire for Current Members

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research
to Intelligence Professionals in Canada:
A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization

Questionnaire Instructions

Thank you for participating in this study. This questionnaire has three parts.

PART A asks for basic demographic and background information. This information will only be used for statistical and comparison purposes.
PART B asks about career information so that we can situate your responses accordingly.
PART C asks about your experience with academic materials during the course of your training and regular duties.

PLEASE NOTE that you do not need to answer every question in order for this questionnaire to be useful. You may skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. We also welcome any additional comments, explanations, and opinions.

TIME REQUIRED: Approximately 15 minutes, plus time for any additional comments.

CONSENT
Participation in this study is voluntary. By submitting a questionnaire, you are indicating that you have read all of the information that has been provided, in the information letter and instructions, and voluntarily consent to the use of your responses as part of this project. Please note that anonymous questionnaires cannot be withdrawn.

ANONYMITY
The method of distribution of this questionnaire has been determined by your organization and the researcher will not be able to identify any individual participants. If you have received it electronically, please print it off, fill out the paper copy, and enclose it in an envelope.

You may then return it in the method that your employer has chosen. They will have chosen either to use a secure drop box in your building (location TBD by your employer) or ask that you mail it directly to the researcher by placing it in the outgoing mail (mailing address is below).

Since the questionnaires are anonymous, please be clear in your responses and submit only one questionnaire.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have questions for the Committee, contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

For all other questions, contact Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo, by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca or by telephone at 1-416-522-1859.

Mailing Address
Sandra K. Majthenyi
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies,
PAS Building, University of Waterloo,
200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario. N2L 3G1

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

PART A – BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your gender identity?
   Male _____ Female _____ Prefer to Self-Identity _____

2. What is your age range?
   20 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 +

3. Please indicate your level of education prior to joining your intelligence organization?
   - ☐ High school
   - ☐ College
   - ☐ Undergraduate degree
   - ☐ Master's degree
   - ☐ Doctorate
   - ☐ Other (please indicate) _____

4. Have you completed any additional education since joining your organization?
   - ☐ YES
   - ☐ NO

   If yes, please indicate the nature of the additional education?

   What was the degree, certificate, etc.? What did it entail?

   Was this education obtained internally or externally to the organization?

5. Prior to joining the organization, did you complete any courses during your education that were specifically related to research methods and/or data analysis?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO
- ☐ UNSURE

If Yes, please provide some details (such as level of course – college, undergraduate, graduate and / or specific topic or name of course)

PART B - CAREER INFORMATION

The following questions refer to your involvement in strategies or initiatives related to counter terrorism (CT) or countering violent extremism (CVE).

6. Please estimate the total number of years that you have worked in positions that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism initiatives.

Total Number of Years _____

7. Please indicate the type of job functions that you have fulfilled in relation to terrorism initiatives. **Check ALL that apply**.

- ☐ Data Collection - Investigator / Intelligence Officer
- ☐ Data Collection – Other (specify if possible, e.g. Screening, Surveillance, etc.)
- ☐ Data Analysis – Intelligence Officer
- ☐ Data Analysis – Intelligence Analyst
- ☐ Data Analysis – Other (specify, if possible)
- ☐ Management (related to CT or CVE decisions)
- ☐ Research / Evaluation (ex. Writing briefs / assessments related to CT / CVE)
- ☐ Training (providing training to others, any level)
- ☐ Liaison (with other agencies)
- ☐ Foreign Posting
- ☐ Legal Affairs
- ☐ Support Staff
- ☐ Other – please specify _____

8. With regard to the above question, which of these job functions did you spend the most time in? (if possible, indicate the number of years)

9. Does this experience include any postings to other agencies involved in counter terrorism?
   - ☐ YES
   - ☐ NO

   If yes, please indicate number of years and, where possible, the general type of agency. (i.e. other intelligence service, police, military, CBSA, etc.)

PART C - USE OF ACADEMIC MATERIALS RELATED TO YOUR WORK

'**Academic Materials'** - In this study, we are referring to materials that emanate from academic research. This would include articles, books, textbooks, reports and lectures by scholars in the field. Articles would be those from peer-reviewed journals. Reports refer to publications from think tanks and research centres. Lectures would include both online or in-person offerings by scholars.

Feel free to add comments for any question.

10. During your training, how much did you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

11. During your training, how did you get access to these academic materials?
Check all that apply.

- ☐ They were provided to us during training.
- ☐ They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
- ☐ I went to the public library or other external organization.
- ☐ I used Search engines on the Internet.
- ☐ They were provided by colleagues.
- ☐ Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
- ☐ Other _____

12. During your regular duties, how much do (did) you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

13. During your regular duties, how do / did you get access to these academic materials? **Check all that apply**.

- ☐ They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
- ☐ I went to the public library or other external organization.
- ☐ I used Search engines on the Internet.
- ☐ They were provided by colleagues.
- ☐ Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
- ☐ Other _____

14. During your regular duties, what factors have affected how much you refer to academic materials for your work?

Check all that apply and indicate their level of importance by assigning a number as follows.
1 - Very significant factor in how much I have used academic material
2 - Somewhat significant factor
3 - Occasionally significant factor

____ Time constraints
____ Material is not easily accessible
____ Material is not relevant to my work
____ Material is too theoretical or hard to understand
____ Not required for my work
____ (add your own factor) _____

Comments:

15. In your organization, is there a databank or service that can assist you with locating relevant academic materials?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO
- ☐ DON'T KNOW

If yes, please provide some description.

16. During your regular duties, when you have referred to academic materials, have you found them to be useful for your work?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly
- ☐ Have never referred to academic materials

17. Did you find it useful when scholars / professors were brought in to lecture on terrorism-related topics?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly
- ☐ Have not attended any such lectures

18. In your spare time, do you read academic material related to terrorism?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

19. In your spare time, do you attend or view lectures on terrorism?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

20. Can you describe an example of when you sought out research to assist you in your work? Were you able to find relevant research? How and where did you find it?

21. When you have referred to academic materials for your work, is it generally when you are directed to do so, when it is a requirement of the job, or your own choice? Please comment.

22. In your organization, are you required to support operational decisions with research? Check the option that best describes your experience or opinion.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

Comments:

23. Over the course of your career, what kind of research materials have you found to be <u>most</u> useful for your work? Please give an example and indicate why you found it to be useful.

24. What factors do you think would **increase** the likelihood that you or your colleagues would refer to academic material in the course of your work?

Check all that apply and indicate the likelihood by assigning a number as follows:
1 - very likely to increase use of academic material
2 - somewhat likely to increase use of academic material
3 - might increase use of academic material

_____ More time to do research
_____ Better access to academic materials (i.e. designated data bank or resource)
_____ More relevant academic material
_____ Academic articles being circulated within your organization
_____ Opportunities to interact with academics / researchers / other experts
_____ Ongoing access to networks of academics / researchers / other experts
_____ Collaborating with academics / researchers on projects or articles
_____ Other _____

Comments:

25. Do you think that it would be beneficial for the academic community and the intelligence community to combine their knowledge on research projects? Why or why not?

26. What form of collaboration can you envision that might benefit research into terrorism?

For example,

- ☐ Intelligence professionals providing input on academic articles before their publication
- ☐ Inter-group discussions on specific projects and outcomes
- ☐ Intelligence organizations providing anonymized data to the academic community
- ☐ Co-production / conducting research projects together
- ☐ Other _____

Comments:

27. Have you ever participated in an academic research project or study related to terrorism?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

If Yes, please describe the nature of the study (studies) and your role in it.

28. Going forward, what recommendations do you have for research into terrorism?

Final Comments: Is there anything that you would like to add?

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY!
Please submit it according to the instructions provided.

Appendix D - Instructions & Questionnaire for Former Members

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research
to Intelligence Professionals in Canada:
A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization

Questionnaire Instructions

Thank you for participating in this study. This questionnaire has three parts.

PART A asks for basic demographic and background information. This information will only be used for statistical and comparison purposes.
PART B asks about career information so that we can situate your responses accordingly.
PART C asks about your experience with academic materials during the course of your training and regular duties.

PLEASE NOTE that you do not need to answer every question in order for this questionnaire to be useful. You may skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. We also welcome any additional comments, explanations, and opinions.

TIME REQUIRED: Approximately 15 minutes, plus time for any additional comments.

CONSENT
Participation in this study is voluntary. By submitting an anonymous questionnaire, you are indicating that you have read all of the information that has been provided, in the information letter and instructions, and voluntarily consent to the use of your responses as part of this project. Please note that anonymous questionnaires cannot be withdrawn.

ANONYMITY
If you have provided an address, you will have received a paper copy of the questionnaire along with a self-addressed stamped envelope. Please return the questionnaire in the envelope without a return address.

If you have received the questionnaire via email, you will also have received an e-transfer for the maximum amount of postage required within Canada. Please print off the questionnaire, fill out the paper copy, and return it by mail to the researcher (mailing address is below). Do not include a return address.

Since the questionnaires are anonymous, please ensure that you are clear in your responses and only submit the questionnaire once.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have questions for the Committee, contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

For all other questions, contact Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo, by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca or by telephone at 1-416-522-1859.

Mailing Address
Sandra K. Majthenyi
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies,
PAS Building, University of Waterloo,
200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario. N2L 3G1

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research
to Intelligence Professionals in Canada:
A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

PART A – BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your gender identity?
   Male _____ Female _____ Prefer to Self-Identity _____

2. What is your age range?
   20 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 +

3. Please indicate your level of education prior to joining your intelligence organization?
   - ☐ High school
   - ☐ College
   - ☐ Undergraduate degree
   - ☐ Master's degree
   - ☐ Doctorate
   - ☐ Other (please indicate) _____

4. Have you completed any additional education since joining your organization?
   - ☐ YES
   - ☐ NO

   If yes, please indicate the nature of the additional education?

   What was the degree, certificate, etc.? What did it entail?

   Was this education obtained internally or externally to the organization?

5. Prior to joining the organization, did you complete any courses during your education that were specifically related to research methods and/or data analysis?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO
- ☐ UNSURE

If Yes, please provide some details (such as level of course – college, undergraduate, graduate and / or specific topic or name of course)

PART B - CAREER INFORMATION

The following questions refer to your involvement in strategies or initiatives related to counter terrorism (CT) or countering violent extremism (CVE).

6. Please estimate the total number of years that you have worked in positions that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism initiatives.

Total Number of Years _____

7. Please indicate the type of job functions that you have fulfilled in relation to terrorism initiatives. **Check ALL that apply**.

- ☐ Data Collection - Investigator / Intelligence Officer
- ☐ Data Collection – Other (specify if possible, e.g. Screening, Surveillance, etc.)
- ☐ Data Analysis – Intelligence Officer
- ☐ Data Analysis – Intelligence Analyst
- ☐ Data Analysis – Other (specify, if possible)
- ☐ Management (related to CT or CVE decisions)
- ☐ Research / Evaluation (ex. Writing briefs / assessments related to CT / CVE)
- ☐ Training (providing training to others, any level)
- ☐ Liaison (with other agencies)
- ☐ Foreign Posting
- ☐ Legal Affairs
- ☐ Support Staff
- ☐ Other – please specify _____

8. With regard to the above question, which of these job functions did you spend the most time in? (if possible, indicate the number of years)

9. Does this experience include any postings to other agencies involved in counter terrorism?
   - ☐ YES
   - ☐ NO

   If yes, please indicate number of years and, where possible, the general type of agency. (i.e. other intelligence service, police, military, CBSA, etc.)

PART C - USE OF ACADEMIC MATERIALS RELATED TO YOUR WORK

'**Academic Materials'** - In this study, we are referring to materials that emanate from academic research. This would include articles, books, textbooks, reports and lectures by scholars in the field. Articles would be those from peer-reviewed journals. Reports refer to publications from think tanks and research centres. Lectures would include both online or in-person offerings by scholars.

Feel free to add comments for any question.

10. During your training, how much did you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

11. During your training, how did you get access to these academic materials?
Check all that apply.

- ☐ They were provided to us during training.
- ☐ They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
- ☐ I went to the public library or other external organization.
- ☐ I used Search engines on the Internet.
- ☐ They were provided by colleagues.
- ☐ Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
- ☐ Other _____

12. During your regular duties, how much do (did) you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

13. During your regular duties, how do / did you get access to these academic materials? **Check all that apply**.

- ☐ They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
- ☐ I went to the public library or other external organization.
- ☐ I used Search engines on the Internet.
- ☐ They were provided by colleagues.
- ☐ Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
- ☐ Other _____

14. During your regular duties, what factors have affected how much you refer to academic materials for your work?

Check all that apply and indicate their level of importance by assigning a number as follows.
1 - Very significant factor in how much I have used academic material
2 - Somewhat significant factor
3 - Occasionally significant factor

____ Time constraints
____ Material is not easily accessible
____ Material is not relevant to my work
____ Material is too theoretical or hard to understand
____ Not required for my work
____ (add your own factor) _____

Comments:

15. In your organization, is there a databank or service that can assist you with locating relevant academic materials?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO
- ☐ DON'T KNOW

If yes, please provide some description.

16. During your regular duties, when you have referred to academic materials, have you found them to be useful for your work?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly
- ☐ Have never referred to academic materials

17. Did you find it useful when scholars / professors were brought in to lecture on terrorism-related topics?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly
- ☐ Have not attended any such lectures

18. In your spare time, do you read academic material related to terrorism?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

19. In your spare time, do you attend or view lectures on terrorism?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

20. Can you describe an example of when you sought out research to assist you in your work? Were you able to find relevant research? How and where did you find it?

21. When you have referred to academic materials for your work, is it generally when you are directed to do so, when it is a requirement of the job, or your own choice? Please comment.

22. In your organization, are you required to support operational decisions with research? Check the option that best describes your experience or opinion.

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Rarely
- ☐ Occasionally
- ☐ Often
- ☐ Regularly

Comments:

23. Over the course of your career, what kind of research materials have you found to be <u>most</u> useful for your work? Please give an example and indicate why you found it to be useful.

24. What factors do you think would **increase** the likelihood that you or your colleagues would refer to academic material in the course of your work?

Check all that apply and indicate the likelihood by assigning a number as follows:
1 - very likely to increase use of academic material
2 - somewhat likely to increase use of academic material
3 - might increase use of academic material

_____ More time to do research
_____ Better access to academic materials (i.e. designated data bank or resource)
_____ More relevant academic material
_____ Academic articles being circulated within your organization
_____ Opportunities to interact with academics / researchers / other experts
_____ Ongoing access to networks of academics / researchers / other experts
_____ Collaborating with academics / researchers on projects or articles
_____ Other _____

Comments:

25. Do you think that it would be beneficial for the academic community and the intelligence community to combine their knowledge on research projects? Why or why not?

26. What form of collaboration can you envision that might benefit research into terrorism?

For example,

- ☐ Intelligence professionals providing input on academic articles before their publication
- ☐ Inter-group discussions on specific projects and outcomes
- ☐ Intelligence organizations providing anonymized data to the academic community
- ☐ Co-production / conducting research projects together
- ☐ Other _____

Comments:

27.. Have you ever participated in an academic research project or study related to terrorism?

- ☐ YES
- ☐ NO

If Yes, please describe the nature of the study (studies) and your role in it.

28. Going forward, what recommendations do you have for research into terrorism?

Final Comments: Is there anything that you would like to add?

Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up focus group to discuss this topic further?
If yes, please contact the researcher by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca or by phone / text at 1-416-522-1859.

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY!
Please submit it according to the instructions provided.

Appendix E - Consent Form

CONSENT FORM - INTERVIEW or FOCUS GROUP

By providing your consent, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigator or involved institution from their legal and professional responsibilities.

Title of the Study: An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study conducted by Sandra Majthenyi, under the supervision of Dr. Lorne Dawson, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask questions related to the study and have received satisfactory answers to my questions and any additional details.

I was informed that participation in the study is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent by informing the researcher.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have questions for the Committee, contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519- 888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

For all other questions, contact Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo, 1-416-522-1859 or by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca.

_____

I agree of my own free will to participate in this study.

Yes _____ No _____

I agree to my participation being audio-recorded to ensure accurate transcription and analysis.

Yes _____ No _____

I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes from this research.

Yes _____ No _____

I agree to the use of quotations directly attributed to me in any thesis or publication that comes of this research only with my review and approval.

Yes _____ No _____

Participant's Name _____

o Verbal Consent was obtained.

Participant's Signature _____ Date: _____

Researcher's Signature _____ Date: _____

Appendix F - Focus Group Instructions

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research
to Intelligence Professionals in Canada:
A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

Focus Group Instructions

Thank you for indicating your interest in this focus group. These instructions and a consent form are being provided to you in advance of the group discussion so that you have time to read the information and make an informed decision about your participation.

The focus group discussion will build on the same questions that you answered in the questionnaire or interview. It will give us an opportunity to expand on the discussion, and gather more opinions, about the use of academic material by practitioners in the field of counter terrorism.

CONSENT

This focus group discussion is entirely voluntary and your level of participation is up to you. You may decline to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with. You may leave the discussion at any time and, if you wish it, your data will not be used where it can reasonably be separated from the group discussion.

Prior to establishing a date and time for the online focus group, you will be contacted by the researcher. At that time, you can ask any questions that you may have about your participation in the focus group. If you decide to participate, the researcher will review the consent form with you. You may provide verbal consent at this time or you may sign and return the consent form by email.

Audio Recording - There is also the option to record this group discussion, for accuracy purposes only, but such recording will not take place unless ALL members of the group consent. This option is identified on the consent form. Once all of the participants have provided their consent, the researcher will determine if recording can take place. If any person withdraws their consent for recording during the focus group, recording will end as long as they are still present in the group.

Once the focus group is over, you may withdraw your consent and request to have your data removed by contacting the researcher within 15 days after the date of the focus group. If there is an audio recording of the group discussion, efforts will be made to edit your comments out of the recording. Please note that, due to the nature of focus groups, it may not be possible to remove all information (notes or audio recording) associated with you.

ANONYMITY / CONFIDENTIALITY

Any quotes that may be used in the study report will be anonymous unless you wish it to be credited to you. This option is addressed in the consent form.

Due to the nature of focus groups, other members of the group may know who you are and will know what you said. While we ask that all members of the group maintain confidentiality, we cannot guarantee that everyone will comply.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have questions for the Committee, contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

For all other questions, contact the researcher, Sandra Kinga Majthenyi, or the Faculty Supervisor, Dr. Lorne Dawson, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. Our contact information is provided below.

Thank you again for your participation.

Sandra K. Majthenyi, PhD Candidate
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University of Waterloo
416-522-1859
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Appendix G - Feedback Letter for CSIS members

UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1

January 2021

I would like to thank the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and its members for their participation in the study entitled "An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization".

The contribution of Service employees is vital to understanding the role that academic research currently plays in the intelligence community's fight against terrorism. The input and knowledge of Service members will provide a tremendous contribution towards improving the mobilization of research and knowledge as it relates to countering terrorism, radicalization, and violent extremism.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have any questions for the Committee, you may contact the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

Once all of the data has been collected and analyzed for this project, it will be incorporated into my PhD dissertation. If you are interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this study, copies of the final dissertation and any related publications or conference papers can be provided to you upon request.

For all other questions, please feel free to contact me by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca or by telephone at 1-416-522-1859.

Thank you again to the Service and to those members who gave of their time and knowledge to contribute to this study.

Sandra Kinga Majthenyi
PhD Candidate
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Appendix H - Feedback Letter for Former CSIS members

UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1

July 2021

Dear Participant,

I would like to thank you for your participation in this study entitled "An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case study in Knowledge Mobilization". Your input and opinions about the use of academic research by the intelligence community in Canada will provide a valuable contribution towards improving the mobilization of academic research to those actively involved in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE # 42201). If you have any questions for the Committee, you may contact the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

For all other questions, please feel free to contact me by email at smajthen@uwaterloo.ca or by telephone at 1-416-522-1859.

Once all of the data has been collected and analyzed for this project, it will be incorporated into my PhD dissertation. If you are interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this study, copies of the final dissertation and any related publications or conference papers can be provided to you upon request.

Thank you.

Sandra Kinga Majthenyi
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Appendix I - Sample Demographics

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

This section provides each group's response to PART A and PART B to provide biographical and career details.

Total sample = 42 individuals (38 former members, 4 current members)

Former Members

PART A – BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your gender identity?
   Male __32____ Female ___6___ Prefer to Self-Identity _____0____

2. What is your age range?

Age Range	Female	Male
20 - 29	0	0
30 - 39	0	0
40 - 49	1	1
50 - 59	1	4
60 +	4	27
Totals	6	32

3. Please indicate your level of education prior to joining your intelligence organization?
   - ☐ High school F = 1 M = 3
   - ☐ College F = 0 M = 2
   - ☐ Undergraduate degree F = 3 M = 22
   - ☐ Master's degree F = 1 M = 4
   - ☐ Doctorate F = 0 M = 0
   - ☐ Other (please indicate) F = 2 M = 1

   One female had two undergraduate degrees; one male has a professional degree.

4. Have you completed any additional education since joining your organization? (n=36)
   - ☐ YES F = 2 M = 26
   - ☐ NO F = 4 M = 6

If yes, please indicate the nature of the additional education?
Since joining the Service, most respondents had completed some internal and external courses, some of which resulted in professional certificates.

Ten individuals had obtained additional university degrees (one did both an M.A. and PhD).
Female - 1 B.A.
Male - 3 B.A., 6 M.A., 1 PhD.

5. Prior to joining the organization, did you complete any courses during your education that were specifically related to research methods and/or data analysis? (n=36)

YES	F = 4	M = 19
NO	F = 2	M = 10
UNSURE	F = 0	M = 1

If Yes, please provide some details (such as level of course – college, undergraduate, graduate and / or specific topic or name of course)

Female - 4 / 6 had completed courses in research analysis; 2 at the graduate level
Males - 19 / 30 had completed courses in research analysis; 2 at the graduate level

PART B - CAREER INFORMATION

The following questions refer to your involvement in strategies or initiatives related to counter terrorism (CT) or countering violent extremism (CVE).

6. Please estimate the <u>total number of years</u> that you have worked in positions that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism initiatives.
   Female - average 15.3 years (5 respondents)
   Males - average 12.9 years (21 respondents)

7. Please indicate the type of job functions that you have fulfilled in relation to terrorism initiatives. **Check ALL that apply**. (n = 36 respondents)

34 Data Collection - Investigator / Intelligence Officer
20 Data Collection – Other (specify if possible, e.g. Screening, Surveillance, etc.)
29 Data Analysis – Intelligence Officer
15 Data Analysis – Intelligence Analyst
6 Data Analysis – Other (specify, if possible)
24 Management (related to CT or CVE decisions)
23 Research / Evaluation (ex. Writing briefs / assessments related to CT / CVE)
21 Training (providing training to others, any level)
30 Liaison (with other agencies)
14 Foreign Posting
8 Legal Affairs
1 Support Staff
2 Other – please specify
National and international committees; instruction to law enforcement agencies

8. With regard to the above question, which of these job functions did you spend the most time in? (if possible, indicate the number of years). (n=36)

Data Collection	F = 4	M = 10
Data Analysis	F = 0	M = 3
Management	F = 1	M = 7
Liaison	F = 0	M = 1
Foreign posting	F = 0	M = 1
Combination of above	F = 1	M = 8

9. Does this experience include any postings to other agencies involved in counter terrorism?

☐ YES F = 1 M = 11 (n = 36)
☐ NO F = 5 M = 19

If yes, please indicate number of years and, where possible, the general type of agency. (i.e. other intelligence service, police, military, CBSA, etc.)

Agencies included: PCO, RCMP, ITAC, CBSA, CISO, DND, JTF2, and various international committees

Current Members

PART A – BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What is your gender identity?

Current Members
Male ____2___ Female ____2____Prefer to Self-Identify _____0_____

2. What is your age range?

Age Range	Female	Male
20 - 29	0	0
30 - 39	1	1
40 - 49	1	1
50 - 59	0	0
60 +	0	0
Totals	2	2

3. Please indicate your level of education prior to joining your intelligence organization?

- ☐ High school
- ☐ College
- ☐ Undergraduate degree F = 0 M = 2
- ☐ Master's degree F = 1 M = 0
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Other (please indicate) F = 1 (MBA)

4. Have you completed any additional education since joining your organization?

- ☐ YES F = 2 M = 0
- ☐ NO F = 0 M = 2

If yes, please indicate the nature of the additional education?
Internal and external courses, no additional degrees involved

5. Prior to joining the organization, did you complete any courses during your education that were specifically related to research methods and/or data analysis?

YES	F = 2	M = 1
NO	F = 0	M = 1

If Yes, please provide some details (such as level of course – college, undergraduate, graduate and / or specific topic or name of course)

The two female respondents completed research analysis courses during their graduate and MBA work respectively.

PART B - CAREER INFORMATION

The following questions refer to your involvement in strategies or initiatives related to counter terrorism (CT) or countering violent extremism (CVE).

6. Please estimate the <u>total number of years</u> that you have worked in positions that were related, directly or indirectly, to terrorism initiatives.
   Female - Both females indicated 12 years of experience.
   Male - One male indicated 4.5 years; one male indicated 18 years of experience

7. Please indicate the type of job functions that you have fulfilled in relation to terrorism initiatives. **Check ALL that apply**.

2 Data Collection - Investigator / Intelligence Officer
1 Data Collection – Other (specify if possible, e.g. Screening, Surveillance, etc.)
1 Data Analysis – Intelligence Officer
2 Data Analysis – Intelligence Analyst
Data Analysis – Other (specify, if possible)
1 Management (related to CT or CVE decisions)
3 Research / Evaluation (ex. Writing briefs / assessments related to CT / CVE)
1 Training (providing training to others, any level)
2 Liaison (with other agencies)
Foreign Posting
Legal Affairs
2 Support Staff
Other – please specify

8. With regard to the above question, which of these job functions did you spend the most time in? (if possible, indicate the number of years).

R39 - Support - 12 years
R40 - Data Analysis - 7 years
R41 - Management - years unidentified
R42 - did not answer

9. Does this experience include any postings to other agencies involved in counter terrorism?

☐ YES This question was removed by CSIS.
☐ NO

If yes, please indicate number of years and, where possible, the general type of agency. (i.e. other intelligence service, police, military, CBSA, etc.)

Appendix J - Summary Results & Comments

An Assessment of the Utility of Academic Research to Intelligence Professionals in Canada: A Case Study in Knowledge Mobilization

Notes

- Data from both former and current members are combined in this appendix.
- Current members of CSIS are identified as respondents R39 to R42.
- Not all respondents answered all questions therefore the total number of respondents (n) is indicated for each question.
- Comments from the questionnaires are shown verbatim.
- Comments obtained in the interviews are identified as such and are either summarized or reported verbatim.

PART C - USE OF ACADEMIC MATERIALS RELATED TO YOUR WORK

'**Academic Materials'** - In this study, we are referring to materials that emanate from academic research. This would include articles, books, textbooks, reports and lectures by scholars in the field. Articles would be those from peer-reviewed journals. Reports refer to publications from think tanks and research centres. Lectures would include both online or in-person offerings by scholars.

Feel free to add comments for any question.

10. During your training, how much did you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation. (n=39)

3 Not at all
11 Rarely
17 Occasionally
6 Often
2 Regularly

R34 - had to do a couple of academic papers but that was about all

Most applicants made no comment or did not recall using any academic material in training.

11. During your training, how did you get access to these academic materials?

Check all that apply. (n=35)

22 They were provided to us during training.
23 They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
12 I went to the public library or other external organization.
12 I used Search engines on the Internet.
9 They were provided by colleagues.
7 Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
Other

R1 - book stores, personal research & readings
R33 - in training, almost nothing - had to go to library on your own time

12. <u>During your regular duties</u>, how much do (did) you refer to, or use, academic materials? Check the response that best describes your situation. (n=39)

1 Not at all
10 Rarely
16 Occasionally
8 Often
4 Regularly

<u>Comments</u>:
R3 - Most were generated by academics within the organization but I also occasionally attended lectures by outside academics as part of employer offered training courses.

R32 - The number of academic materials used depended on the position I was in. As a field investigator, it was occasional; as an Operational Analyst, it was often and, as a Strategic Analyst, it was on a regular basis.

R32 **Interview** - Strategic analysts need a more global perspective so are most likely to need all kinds of information and much of that is open information i.e. academic information.
- In HQ, had more access to academic materials and lectures by visiting scholars.

R33 - **Interview** - would read RAP / IAB (internal research) articles; used them in justifying targeting; not always well-referenced but used in risk management models - informs our opinions. AM supports what we know or want to say - adds weight and credibility to the arguments so it's not just investigator's or Service's word.

R34 - **Interview** - As a manager, pushed the use of academic research for those working for him. In Counter-Proliferation / WMD, they needed to learn the topics in their area (since they're not engineers or scientists) so they would be better informed for their work.

- R34 also designed a program for candidates for overseas postings - it included a one-week intensive academic program - brought in profs to lecture and employees were assigned reading lists to learn the background for their postings because, once there, they have to hit the ground running and no time to learn on the job. Also, it doesn't look good if you seem uninformed about your area. Initially, there were complaints but eventually people came to see the value of it - especially those who went overseas and gave positive feedback upon their return.

R35 - **Interview** - did not use much AM; did some research to learn new areas, mostly when got to a region; used mostly articles from newspapers, magazines, periodicals that were related to the area - just to get some background.

13. <u>During your regular duties</u>, how do / did you get access to these academic materials? Check all that apply. (n=38)

34 They were accessible through my organization's data bank or library.
8 I went to the public library or other external organization.
21 I used Search engines on the Internet.
20 They were provided by colleagues.
15 Through contact with academics or experts in the field.
1 Other

R1 - AO program, Library services, and lunch lectures
R5 - organizational strategic analysts; Other - foreign organization profiles and summaries;
R6 - Other - books and academic articles germane to area of investigation

R29 - On overseas postings, I had access to research bodies that I belonged to and used often.

R32 - Allied intelligence agencies would recommend certain academics. Also, academics in their employ would provide formal training to Canadian intelligence personnel either in Canada or abroad. Also, great library and staff.

R32 - **Interview** - CSIS library / open information branch is terrific. They would find anything that was needed from open information or reports. They have also been putting more books and articles online so easier to access.

R33 - **Interview** - there has been an evolution of tactical analysts - they are more tapped into academic research and this has been increasing over the years.

R34 - I**nterview** - In early days, mostly accessed through libraries. Later, AO was created and started linking to operational areas. They brought in world class experts to hold seminars and working lunches - trying to create a professional interest in academic research. This had limited success because some people don't understand the full value of it.

- R34 notes that some services (Brits, Israelis) hire people who already have a knowledge base, expertise, and/or languages in an area. CSIS is still young and not good at that - therefore need to do that within the Service.

R35 - **Interview** - Accessed info through Academic Outreach - also through discussion with colleagues.

14. <u>During your regular duties</u>, what factors have affected how much you refer to academic materials for your work? (n = 38)

Check all that apply and indicate their level of importance by assigning a number as follows.
1 - Very significant factor in how much I have used academic material
2 - Somewhat significant factor
3 - Occasionally significant factor

FACTOR	Very significant	Somewhat significant	Occasionally significant	Total
Time constraints	13	15	4	n=32
Material is not easily accessible	4	11	11	n=26
Material is not relevant to my work	9	5	9	n=23
Material is too theoretical / hard to understand	4	6	11	n=21
Not required for my work	10	3	7	n=20

<u>Comments</u>:

R3 - I have used n/a with regard to "level of importance" because - even if I had the time to refer to academic materials - I considered the works of academia re: terrorism largely inapplicable to my work (for various reasons - see final comments at end of survey).

R5 - Relevant material not published as open source

R6 - Academic research is often useful but not essential to investigations as it is based on data / situations in the past. (Intelligence) Investigations are by definition forward-looking where there is no data to examine.

R7 - Not valued by supervisor / manager (old school). Working in a regional capacity as an IO, emphasis was on data collection. Assessment and analysis of a wide variety of intelligence / research / data etc. would be more a HQ function.

R8 - (Academic) Material supplements or validates other information.

R14 - Academic material is virtually irrelevant when collecting tactical intelligence in a regional office (field).

R26 - Far too much academic work in Canada is purely theoretical and has no relevant data. It is not useful for intel analysts (moved from Ques. 24)

R28 - Academic material is often too lengthy, unfocussed, too theoretical, and dated (needs to be timely, focussed & relevant)

R29- Much of the academic material available to Intelligence Officers when it really comes down to it was / is not grounded in the reality of counterterrorism work.

R30 - **Interview** - The Service came out of the RCMP which has a history of being anti-military and anti-academic. Using AM was not a requirement back then. There was no facting or references in warrants, etc.
- When rules changed and you needed a degree to be commissioned, some went and got university degrees but only some of them took it seriously.
- Using AM starts with LEADERSHIP. You need encourage employees to get more education (whether formal or informal). Intelligence officers don't need to be experts but "deep generalists" .
- To be 'professional', one should always be keeping up with the knowledge base on their topic.

R32 - The tempo of operations matters here. CT moves faster, dealing with smaller groups, and there are time pressures - while CI moves slower (because it involves larger org'ns like other govts). Academia works at slower pace - therefore, maybe more useful for CI.
Interview - It depends on individual perspective and understanding the value of different kinds of open information; understanding what is relevant to your work; when you should be looking for supporting data; understanding what kind of data you can find in the research; etc.

R33 - **Interview** - We could ask for research and order books from the library and the staff were very helpful.
"Here's the point that I want to get across. Culturally, it's changed too..... The organization has evolved into being an intelligence service and became a lot more sophisticated in that way..." The new generation of intelligence officers take it for granted that it's part of the culture to look things up.

R34 - **Interview** - TIME is a major factor. There's not much time when a person is sent to a desk. R34 learned the hard way when they went out in the field and didn't know anything about their area. So, they made a point of learning about it on their own time. Therefore, it is important to "frontload" knowledge. We don't have time to send everyone on full courses so we need to hire people with certain knowledge and/or do more training at the beginning. We need more knowledge in order to understand the finer points in an area or topic. Many people

are only interested in the tactical stuff (get out in a car) so they jump to specializing without the basic knowledge.

Some IOs cannot understand how to put theory into practice (see Question re: lecturers)
Some IOs do not understand that it can make them better IOs - so they know which questions to ask - so they can provide information that is truly useful to government - and this can make or break a career.

R35 - **Interview** - R35 thought that AM was not really a need in their jobs. In the field, R35 left a lot of that kind of knowledge to the tactical analysts. In terms of attending lectures, R35 thought that the information was not necessary but would attend the lectures to socialize with other IOs.

R36 - This is a difficult question. As you know operational reporting and corporate briefing notes had limited scope for referring to 'open information'.

15. In your organization, is there a databank or service that can assist you with locating relevant academic materials? (n=34) (This question was removed by CSIS.)

30 YES
2 NO
2 DON'T KNOW

Comments:

R1 - What was useful in the day was asking our library services to do searches on our behalf

R2 - The Information Centre could assist, as well as the organization's analysis branch / program

R3 - Organizational databank and library.

R5 - Library service provided excellent open source research. Lack of relevant material was the main problem.

R6 - There were very useful and professional library / research personnel at HQ, and later on in Toronto Region, who could access most academic articles and/or books in a particular area of investigations.

R7 - Library Services , Academic research database

R9 - A databank could be searched to review relevant information from open sources.

R11 - Was not available during my tenure.

R12 - Our organization has its own resource centre. Through the resource centre, there were resource personnel that could provide suggestions to academic materials that could potentially be of assistance.

R28 - In-house library, training branch and section dedicated to writing intelligence assessments based on thorough research and analysis.

R30 - A slow evolution in hiring professional library staff - access of documentation studies etc. and data banks.

R31 - Materials were accessible through internal resources, either directly through colleagues immersed in analytics or via the orgs data base

R32 - CSIS Library and Open Sources Branch were very professional and helpful. Also, they were a most enthusiastic group of employees, keen to assist as much as they could.

R33 - One could task the analytical branch or the tactical analysts in the region.

R34 - **Interview** - The Service has really professionalized the library and academic resources since the 90's. Library staff are very helpful and would put together a whole package of information when requested. Unfortunately, not too many people availed themselves of the help of library staff.

R36 - CSIS Library staff were excellent and there were online research tools / catalogues, LexisNexis, for example.

16. <u>During your regular duties</u>, when you have referred to academic materials, have you found them to be useful for your work? (n=40)

1 Not at all
2 Rarely
18 Occasionally
14 Often
5 Regularly
0 Have never referred to academic materials

<u>Comments</u>:

R3 - The only "academic materials" I have ever used with some consistency were the works of certain 'thinktanks and research centres' - which I consider to be entities separate from academia.

R14 - Mostly in understanding culture and religion.

R30 - **Interview** - Definitely useful for understanding context and underlying issues. e.g. struggles between different Muslim factions. Need to know and understand context in order to interpret information and ask the right questions. Open source information is important for this.

R32 - Practitioners (especially if they don't have an academic or research background) often don't have "the big picture" - the strategic overview of something - so don't always know what to do with academic material - don't know how to apply theory to practice.
Academic material provides general context or framework to work within.

R32 - **Interview** - Depends on individual perspective as well as experience - and knowing what will help and where to find it. Experience affects this when you know what information you need and can use.

R33 - **Interview** - historical aspect is important

R34 - **Interview** - very important for understanding your area and how it works with other areas (e.g. political intricacies). Knowing which questions to ask. Very important for those going overseas to really understand their areas before they go.

R35 - **Interview** - only when getting to a region and need to do some background on an area

R40 - Regularly. I would only use the materials to support something.

17. Did you find it useful when scholars / professors were brought in to lecture on terrorism-related topics? (n=39)

1 Not at all
4 Rarely
12 Occasionally
8 Often
9 Regularly
5 Have not attended any such lectures

Comments:

R3 - have not attended any such lectures - though I faintly recall the presence of one or a few scholars during the period of training as a recruit.

R5 - scholar lectures rarely useful; professional experts - yes!!

R10 - Meeting with, lectures from CT practitioners were more useful.

R24 - They were not brought in in my day.

R32 - **Interview** - At HQ - the Service has been bringing in some world class scholars to lecture.

R33 - **Interview** - provides good background (also good optics for the Service) - important to understand background before you can really work in an area of CT - lunch lectures were very good

R34 - From academic side, academics should also think about how to make theoretical modelling more applicable to practice. To be fair, some academics probably assume higher level of understanding in the Service - but many still have just basic degrees.
R34 - **Interview** - this should be a 'must' not a 'nice to do' thing - he found lunchtime meetings, where you can interact and discuss, to be more helpful - people need to learn that any information can be valuable - should be able to incorporate something into their work. Many don't know how to incorporate theory into practice.

R35 - **Interview** - went to some lectures - but mainly to socialize with other IOs (his job was very isolating)

18. In your spare time, do you read academic material related to terrorism? (n=40)

5 Not at all
9 Rarely
10 Occasionally
9 Often
7 Regularly

Comments:

R32 - **Interview** (for both Q 18 & 19) - Some are more accurate than others - some are pointless / useless.

19. In your spare time, do you attend or view lectures on terrorism? (n=40)

12 Not at all
13 Rarely
12 Occasionally
1 Often
2 Regularly

20. Can you describe an example of when you sought out research to assist you in your work? Were you able to find relevant research? How and where did you find it?
(some crossover here with Q23) (This question was removed by CSIS.)

R1 - when reviewing documents prepared for the terrorist listing program; when setting up terrorist financing program; when considering the threat posed by individuals in security screening or internal security. Relevant research was not easily found and usually with assistance of CSIS library services.

R2 - very early in my career I sought, through HQ, books which studied the terrorist target I was investigating. They provided a small amount of material.

R3 - I never did seek out academic research to assist me in my work. When I needed research sourced from material other than organizational databases, and allied information, that research was sourced from independent thinktanks and investigative journalists, for example.

R4 - I would research country profiles in the library or online.

R5 - Open source research on foreign political situations; Understanding the political wing of a terrorist organization to explain funding links.

R6 - When I supervised HQ "analyst / experts" in various fields, I tried to read background materials in their respective fields so as to better assist them in writing papers germane to ongoing investigations.

R7 - Research related to Truth verification and the detection of deception. Research was provided during courses on the subject. Additional research was conducted reviewing books written by academics.

R9 - Information on a specific terrorist organization which was not very familiar to me was required to assess an individual for security screening and immigration purposes.

R10 - To understand the history of terrorist groups and the factors contributing to their formation.

R11 - I can recall learning of an academic paper that focused on "homeland terrorism" issues that purported to examine why diaspora communities often provided financial support to terrorist elements in their former homeland. I could never identify this research (supposedly at McMaster).

R12 - In the past, I have sought out university scholars to provide insight into political / cultural situations in nations undergoing current terrorist activities that had potential to spill over and impact our national security. In most cases, those scholars were university professors.

R13 - Information on various international terrorist groups, especially Islamist Extremist organizations. Information / research on radicalization and CVE.

R14 - Learning more about Islam. Found books in the library.

R16 - I sought out information via Academic Outreach on influences and influencers in the online space leading to radicalization and mobilization to violence. We commissioned a study and it was most useful in giving context to the issue.

R19 - Prior to meeting with and/or conducting interviews with individuals of interest, I always researched and read materials directly related to the subject matter. Whether it involved research into a particular region of the world, a religious belief and/or a specific national security threat, it assisted me during my interviews. Being somewhat familiar with these topics tremendously assisted in the interview / conversation with the individual and helped to yield more intelligence.

R21 - Sought the assistance and met periodically with Janice Gross Stein - political scientist and international relations expert who provided direction / advice on foreign policy and international conflict management. Excellent resource!

R23 - Regularly sought research from our in-house experts. Academics working for the service (e.g. IAB or RAP in the past)

R24 - An ally was able to provide relevant research, that they were aware of, that related to a new tarte that we had little previous experience with in Canada.

R25 - Preparing for presentations to external partner agencies. Access to the material was available from the organization's library.

R26 - Contact with U Waterloo Lorne Dawson when I was developing my understanding of terrorist radicalisation in Canada.

R28 - I was very interested in what triggers motivated extremists to become radicalized to the point of committing violence and if there were identifiable indicators which could help predict this activity. Academics within the organization conducted their own research including interviewing convicted terrorists and collaborating with other academics.

R29 - During the Tamil Tiger shipping incident when ships were being dispatched to Canada with refugees and possible terrorists on board, I was able to obtain a significant amount of pertinent research material from the South African Institute of Security Studies (ISS).

R30 - Research on motivation for CVE groups; research on operational methodology; research on historical evolution

R33 - Insider threat; risk management models

R35 - background on an area or issue

R36 - historical articles i.e. History of Sikhism, Irish extremism, far right / racist groups, history of middle eastern political movements and terrorism. Found it on my own or from recommendations from colleagues and friends with similar interests.

21. When you have referred to academic materials for your work, is it generally when you are directed to do so, when it is a requirement of the job, or your own choice? Please comment. (n = 31) (This question was removed by CSIS.)

Self - 24
Required - 3
Both - 4

Comments:
R1 - to be better informed before making decisions (in Mgmt)

R2 - Generally speaking, of my own choice, arising from a desire to enhance my knowledge.

R3 - As mentioned, I did not refer to academic materials for my work... and, in further answer to the question above, it is perhaps worth noting that I was never directed to do so nor was it ever a requirement of the job.

R5 - My own choice when it was relevant to investigative leads.

R6 - More out of my own sense of professionalism ...and intellectual honesty. I took the job seriously and read widely in all areas to do the best I could.

R7 - Normally by my own choice or as part of a training exercise. For example, a greater understanding of subject matter or motivations regarding terrorism i.e. homegrown terrorism, understanding the mindset.

R10 - By my own choosing, but predominantly when I felt I required such information to properly discharge my duties.

R16 - As a senior executive, I often sought out research to answer questions and fill in knowledge gaps for the understanding of our organization and employees.

R19 - It was generally my own choice as it helped me to become familiar with the subject matter I was dealing with at the time. This knowledge gave me the confidence to have a more in-depth conversation with the individuals involved.

R20 - You should not have to be directed - it should be instinctive. It should be a requirement of the job - unfortunately, it's not! Largely left to the individual discretion of the intelligence officer.

R21 - Own initiative! Sadly!

R22 - In many cases, it was my own choice. My first few years for example, it was more difficult to find materials on a CT subject. Nevertheless, it was expected that we find open source (academic) materials to add to our overall analysis. As more resources were available, this became easier to locate and use.

R23 - It is a requirement of the job. Specifically, when working at HQ overseeing national programs.

R25 - My own choice as it provided validation of the information I was presenting and demonstrated that the issue was of significance to warrant research by academics.

R26 - Own choice - never a requirement to do so. We were an intelligence organization NOT a thinktank. (??)

R27 - Generally brought to my attention by analysts under my direction - but not frequent.

R29 - It was always my own choice to introduce academic material into my work. I can never really remember the Service being particularly interested in an academic component of our work - at least at the intelligence collection side of our work.

R30 - There was a lack of experience by managers in research methodology - hence, my knowledge skill sets and personal professionalism deemed (?) the ways and means for academic research.

R32 - It was my experience that the number of academic materials used was generally at the discretion of the employee and usually very little input from the supervisor or management. Intelligence personnel are expected to use their initiative and to do so in an efficient, logical, pragmatic and disciplined manner. Supervisors and management generally had other matters to attend to.
R32 - **Interview** - (Do you see this more in younger IOs?) Yes, but it was more motivated by their careers than about finding the truth. So, they are more likely to do this. Also, more material is easily accessible these days (Internet) and this is a resource that comes automatically to younger people.

R33 - **Interview** - requirement to demonstrate due diligence in making a case / describing a threat. Always found something useful in history.

R35 - **Interview** - There was no expectation that we would be experts but a basic understanding was needed. He liked going to the library occasionally, see some presentations, or watch videos of past cases.

R36 - Lifelong learner.

22. In your organization, are you required to support operational decisions with research? Check the option that best describes your experience or opinion. (n=32) (This question was removed by CSIS.)

4 Not at all
6 Rarely
9 Occasionally
3 Often
10 Regularly

Comments:

R2 - During my experience in this area, there was no requirement to use academic research in support of operational decisions.

R3 - Investigative research was always a requirement in support of operational decision-making; that research though always came from in-house or from "allied data" - it was never based on academic material.

R5 - Regularly - Warrant applications require open source background summaries in affidavit. Operations start with an Intelligence Requirement (IR) and research, open source and classified sources, form the basis of operational decisions.

R6 - In this case, I am assuming you mean academic research on, for example, what factors drive Islamic Terrorism - the Shia / Sunni split, history of Islam, impacts of colonialism, wars, international commercial, oil, etc. - form a backdrop to all investigations and so are, loosely, used to support operational decision-making. But not directly.

R7 - It should be noted that my experience is both dated and limited. My career spanned transition from the RCMP Security Service to the new service. During that time, I was witness to the development of a sophisticated intelligence gathering organization that embraced academic research and analysis including the hiring of highly educated personnel / academics capable of harnessing the full potential of academic research.

R10 - Normally, this type of research is conducted by intelligence organizations (or other security organizations) and is extremely time sensitive (i.e. an academic study over a number of

years can become outdated if the threat environment has changed, as it sometimes does rapidly. e.g. AQ in Iraq morphing into ISIL in late 2013, early 2014).

R11 - Operational decisions at the regional or field level were mostly based on the CSIS Act, Criminal law. Investigations were narrowly defined with strict limits on intrusiveness vs. level of threat. The areas I worked had all experienced serious criminal acts (i.e. homicide) for political reasons.

R12 - Much of my work was at a tactical level, collecting information on possible threats. Information collected would be assessed at the headquarter level.

R15 - The research was primarily based on the research and analysis of intelligence partner countries.

R19 - Although the information ascertained from individuals was the most important component of the brief, having research information to corroborate and/or refute claims / statements made during the interviews assisted in verifying the veracity of the information.

R20 - Research informs and provides perspective to an investigation. I would use research for analytical purposes - hypothesis development as one of several tools in the toolbox - but not exclusively! The decisions are worked out on the basis of a threat - risk assessment paradigm, costs, resources, govt direction, etc. Research helps kick start an investigation / operation. To continue the operation, you need an intelligence product. Research has, at least in my experience, also been used to assist with interpreting the intelligence product.

R21 - Encouraged but not enforced.

R22 - Operational decisions need to come from a holistic belief that all available information is put forward (both classified and open source material) in order to make an informed operational decision.

R24 - All assumptions require support.

R26 - Regularly (but) research based on intelligence NOT academics

R27 - Research defined as analysis and data base research at the operational level. Broader focussed assessments would look more decidedly at open sources - but tendency is to rely more on media "experts" than academia - which is a flaw.

R28 - Not academic research but operational decisions were always based upon thorough research and analysis germane to the operational decision required.

R29 - I always got the impression that academic input was considered extraneous and for the most part lacked common sense and an awareness of intelligence collection realities. The

research component at the intelligence collection level was reserved for developing insights into the nuts and bolts of the case or the operation from collected material and case analysis.

R30 - Management was NOT appreciative of academic insights to research methodology nor leadership development.
Interview - Intelligence work involves gathering information - both open and classified. Need both. Also, need communication and relationships between analysts and collectors internally too.

R32 - Absolutely! All operational or investigational initiatives had to be backstopped by sound argument, supported by facts as known on the ground, prior history, rational speculation on the likely situation as well as the political fallout which could ensue should the initiative be discovered by the targets, prove successful, be determined to be a waste of time or resources, or be exposed in the media.
Interview - as above. AM provides general context or framework to work within.

R33 - **Interview** - Academic material can add weight to arguments so not just relying on your own experiences and beliefs. e.g. Indicators of radicalization

R36 - I am a strong advocate of research and (as a manager) provided both taskings and resources to pursue many research projects both internally and with external scholars.

23. Over the course of your career, what kind of research materials have you found to be <u>most</u> useful for your work? Please give an example and indicate why you found it to be useful. (This question was removed by CSIS.)

R1 - more realistic and fact-based rather than just theoretical or philosophical

R2 - I found certain research on radicalization to be extremely applicable to operational challenges. It improved our efforts with human sources, with assessing the threat accurately, and assigning / prioritizing resources accordingly.

R3 - The research materials that I found to be most useful over the course of my career were always - first and foremost - the operational reporting (past and present) of my organizational colleagues and allies. Otherwise, I benefited from thinktank publications, investigative journalism, and 'target' writings.

R4 - country profiles for immigration interviews

R5 - Operational internet researchers tasked to find open source material on a defined subject, person, or company. Names, addresses, phone numbers of persons to interview.

R6 - Wide reading of political events, international relations, defense studies, and socio-cultural examinations. Also Psychology and Religious Studies including comparative 'belief system' materials.

R7 - Presentations by academics / subject matter experts. Books, journals, articles, etc.

R8 - Journals: Terrorism & Political Violence; Intelligence & National Security; The Journal of Conflict Studies; Perspectives on Terrorism. Studies by organizations such as : Rand Corp, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Israel)

R10 - (from Ques. 14) Publications providing historical context of terrorist entities can be useful when initially investigating them. Thereafter, they become less effective, generally speaking, in predicting group behaviour, or uncovering existing or potential adherents.
Counter Intelligence lends itself better to the use of academic research as the adversaries (and their tendencies) remain more constant (and historical assessments remain relevant to current investigations).

R11 - Background material was the most useful to educate investigators in cultural and historical dynamics of a CT area. Background material and reputable media i.e. The Economist, Foreign Affairs. They provided good analysis of current affairs, so investigators could ask informed questions.

R12 - As noted above, I rarely accessed or referred to academic research or material.

R13 - Academic journals, Foreign Affairs, Canadian Centre for Conflict Studies

R15 - research and studies conducted by allied countries

R16 - open research into variety of conflicts, underlying issues, socio-economic drivers, and group dynamics and history

R18 - Articles by Amarnath Amarasingam on radicalization were very current and helpful.

R19 - Research materials from international thinktanks and various intelligence related organizations were most useful. They were viewed as more trusted sources of information rather than random information on the internet.

R20 - Media reporting for current updates. Internet research for historical information. Library services for academic and thinktank publications. Consultation with senior analysts and operations translators.

R21 - Most helpful "investigative journalism" books - which proved up-to-date / current , easy to grasp - generally written by people who visited areas / gained firsthand knowledge.

R22 - It depended on the analysis topic. ....Research papers as close to the subject I was interested in. These papers in many ways helped in creating better operational decisions. I cannot recall the specific paper but the author was Wesley Wark.

R24 - First person experience or exposure to particular organizations or individuals.

R25 - Statistical analysis of terrorism trends and activities as it was useful in demonstrating that the activity was of significant concern.

R26 - Shorter papers; rarely books. Most material was written in academic jargon and hence not as useful.

R27 - I would say the tendency was to rely more on media reporting / analysis rather than academic.

R28 - see Ques. 20 - radicalization to violence factors

R30 - professional articles; books pertaining to CVE groups, motivations; information that provides context and understanding of various issues

R31 - overviews of terrorist organizations placed into cultural and historical context

R32 - Country profiles are invaluable. So too are academic summaries of the history of a region or group (clan, tribe, city, province or state, country, religious denomination, political party) or whatever.

R33 - Historical in relation to terrorism and other threats.
R33 - **Interview** - Articles about risk factors for terrorism are used in targeting and warrants; these and risk mgmt models are used by collectors. Also, material in the areas of psychology and sociology help answer questions about 'why do some people escalate?' - can be very personal and individual; personality and life experiences. E.g. Insider threat is pure psychology - human behaviour is unpredictable.

Radicalization is really human psychology and human behaviour - very personal and individual - you can really only get that from academic research - what makes an individual pass the tipping point and resort to violence?
Accessing academia benefits IC because "it makes you a better investigator if you understand the whole context. It can't help but make your data collection better." (23:00)

(35:25)"It will never replace secret privileged information - that's not what we're talking about - but it can certainly better inform it and direct it - so you don't waste time .... and miss things. And that's the end game - you don't want to miss anything and have another 9/11. Avoid intelligence failures and strategic surprise. "

R34 - **Interview** - Mostly journals - socio-cultural, background, history - either geographically or issue-focussed. Data based research doesn't really fill this purpose.
Quantitative research gives you a basis; qualitative research gives you the nuance and insight. Quantitative research can tell us that something is definitely a problem or an issue; qualitative research will tell us more why.

R36 - The most useful are always practitioners who are subject matter experts and who have an ability to teach; a combination of academic study, practical experience and the ability to synthesize and explain often complex issues.
Scholarly articles and high quality journalism that are contemporaneous to ongoing terrorist threats and trends are essential reading.
Books written by subject matter experts.
Documentaries or well-researched fact-based movies can be useful as well.

24. What factors do you think would increase the likelihood that you or your colleagues would refer to academic material in the course of your work? (n = 37)

Check all that apply and indicate the likelihood by assigning a number as follows:
1 - very likely to increase use of academic material
2 - somewhat likely to increase use of academic material
3 - might increase use of academic material

FACTOR	Likely to increase use	Somewhat likely to increase use	Might increase use	Total (n)
More time to do research	12	7	11	30
Better access to academic material	10	9	9	28
More relevant academic material	**23**	6	5	34
Academic articles circulated within organization	14	9	9	32
Opportunities to interact with academics / researchers	13	9	9	31
Ongoing access to networks or academics / researchers	11	10	9	30
Collaborating on projects or articles	11	5	11	27

Comments:
R1 - AO program has done an excellent job improving access to academics and experts.

R3 - I doubt that 'more relevant' academic material is or will be available. I think that "interaction" and "on-going access to networks" may only be possible with non-academic researchers and experts. I do not foresee any academic - 'organizational' (i.e. intel agency) collaboration.

R5 - Organization strat(egic) analysts are bridge to academia.

R7 - Other - Management emphasis on the importance of academic material.

R11 - At field level, the greatest advantage of academic material was to educate investigators to be more effective in their interviewing techniques and critical thinking. My tenure is dated, but reference to academic material was rare. HQ may be different.

R12 - Collaborating with academics / researchers on projects may be of little value because of the need to water down information to an unclassified level in order to share.

R15 - I have attended conferences and many smaller meetings with academics, primarily while at PCO. These meetings were primarily to increase good will with academics than to use their knowledge.

R21 - All (factors) apply and are important. It really comes down to the academic - if what she / he has to say (is) strictly theoretical or does it have practical application at grass roots level.

R24 - It would be difficult to interact with academics / researchers who do not hold an appropriate security clearance.

R27 - Institutional relationships are key, but are a two-way street. Agencies need to reach out but academics with relevant terrorism papers should consider "pushing" those to relevant depts. Academic independence can still be maintained, but less "ivory tower".

R30 - Fostering academic development / education of IOs

R32 - **Interview** - VERY LIKELY - opportunities to interact with or have access to network of academics / researchers, etc. including collaboration
MIGHT INCREASE - more time, better access, more relevance
What else? Good salesmanship during training; easy icon on the computer screen; summaries or guides of information that is available; invite more academics to lecture; management encouragement (career motivator)

R34 - **Interview** - LEADERSHIP - encouraging or insisting that people get immersed and knowledgeable before running out to meet people and do interviews. Old attitudes in the Service used to make it hard - get razzed if seen in the library. Managers themselves should at least know the basics of the areas they cover. Lead by example. Guide people to the databases and library services.
There was a strong anti-intellectual current in the organization that has changed but still need to change more in order to become a top tier professional intelligence organization.

Re: Academic Research & Knowledge Mobilization -

Academic research needs to be encompassing and concise. Know your audience. Generally, need articles that are shorter, focussed, and easily digested - they will be ignored if too long or too theoretical.
Journal articles are most useful if written as noted above.
New research that fills in gaps in knowledge - instead of telling us what we already know.
Better access - will need to be a 'push system' - so people don't have to look for it (they are unlikely to do so).
Better website - like Google scholar - to connect the 'push' and 'pull' (*brokering)
Networks? The problem with networks is they are hard to sustain and hard to provide continuity - people move around and are busy and it requires effort to maintain.

R36 - Change in culture that believes that the only credible information comes through classified channels.

25. Do you think that it would be beneficial for the academic community and the intelligence community to combine their knowledge on research projects? Why or why not? (n=40)

Yes	23
No	4
Maybe	12
Unlikely	1

Comments:
R1- Yes, and I think there has been some work in that regard. There would be value for both.

R2 - Yes, on carefully selected topics. The operational stream is stronger and more developed than the analytical side (which has made great strides), and collaboration with academia can help to bridge that gap and enhance the overall effort.

R3 - If a combined approach was possible, then yes - joint research projects between the academic and intelligence communities would be beneficial - because the common good would be better served . As mentioned, though, I do not foresee such a possibility.

R4 - This could apply at the national level (as opposed to regional / field work)

R5 - "No, never! Intelligence professionals become subject matter experts through classified investigations. There is a firewall between open information and classified information obtained through sources."

R6 - Yes, generally. But the value is to academics, giving them a closer understanding of events as they unfolded. Intelligence is predictive, it gets done in real-time without benefit of thorough analysis of all data as investigations are never fully complete pictures of real-time events.

R7 - Absolutely. The more diverse the perspectives are on threats posed by global terrorism the better prepared we will be to effectively diminish the threat. There should always be room for fresh insights.

R8 - Don't believe that it would as uncertain as to the value of the final product. Publicizing the results of independently conducted research on the same topic would be useful.

R9 - Yes. Intelligence officers / teams are often generalists and could benefit from collaboration on research projects.

R10 - Our organization employs many academics that respond directly to our research needs, thereby supporting current investigations. Moreover, we have a robust academic outreach program where collaborate with outside researchers to achieve this same goal.
Increasing the collaboration already in place would be helpful, providing it resulted in better advice to government leaders.

R11 - At the field level, it may have limited use. The risk of disclosure, even inadvertent could be high. More likely it may be useful at HQ level where threat activity is put into a broader context.

R12 - That could only happen if the academic persons were in place within the intelligence agency and is given access to raw data and at the classified level. (Otherwise, watered down info - see Ques. 24)

R13 - In some cases, yes. But it would need to be carefully managed and attentive to the need to protect classified information.

R14 - HQ - Yes - in Analysis Branch. Region - No (with the exception of enhancing understanding of culture / religion; academic info has minimal value re: tactical intelligence.)

R15 - Only if academics were provided security clearances and full access to relevant intelligence.

R16 - Unfortunately, there are institutional and legal challenges to this beyond what is already being done. Academia must remain unfettered and independent. Police and especially intelligence agencies continue to rely on classified sources that must be kept secret and private. (move to Ques. 26 - types of collaboration)

R17 - Perhaps. Depends on where the information from the intelligence community comes from - how reliable it is. Same goes for the academic information.

R18 - It could be beneficial with some sort of mechanisms to preserve anonymity and discretion.

R19 - Absolutely. The academic community and the intelligence community have different line of sight into threats. As a result, they view these topics with different lenses therefore, if they combine their knowledge, the end result would be a more fulsome account of the particular research projects (topics?).

R20 - Secret intelligence and academic research makes for strange bedfellows. The intelligence community would benefit from academic research but any reciprocation would be tricky, if not unlikely.
To a certain extent, this already occurs. As long as the AC is given specific targeting - strategic in nature - and a system is set up to integrate this information into the analytical process on the operations side - it may be useful.

R21 - Yes, but (as above) must have practical application. Academia does well on "Why" - investigators need to pursue "how" - often the two just don't marry up.

R22 - Yes and No. The intell community is by nature collaborative with other like entities and given that community works with classified information I'm not sure how the academic community could benefit. That said anything relevant that the academic community provides to the intell community is welcome!

R23 - It would be beneficial. Expertise in diverse complicated issues is invaluable to complex investigations.

R24 - It would be beneficial but problematic for organizations. Potential to reveal targets, areas of interest.

R25 - Yes given that academics can provide an international perspective to the issue.

R26 - Maybe - security clearances will always be an obstacle as will inability for academics to publish their findings based that collaboration. .. Very tricky to manage.

R27 - Absolutely. Universities + govt + private sector pursue joint efforts in the health sector with highly sensitive info. Why not more on the terrorism issue? Classified & unclassified options are available where there is a will.

R28 - Yes - our organization has the benefit of a section dedicated to intelligence assessments which combines unclassified academic research with classified intelligence. More of this collaboration would be a good thing.

R29 - Not really. There is too great a disconnect between the plodding analysis that is needed to advance a CT case file and the types of material that is routinely available from most academic sources. The type of intelligence material required for a case file tends to be very

specific and individual and not the sort of material that is or can be produced in an academic setting.

R30 - The CIA and other intelligence organizations have substantive academic outreach enabling the permeability of academics to enter for a period of time to these intel orgs and vice versa.
R30 - **Interview** - harness academic community to be SMEs in certain areas - give them a clearance and put them in with analysts e.g. during sabbatical years - some academics would love this. Would be beneficial for internal research but also give academics an understanding of IC work.

R31 - Yes. Sharing perspectives would likely give rise to more nuanced understanding of terrorist motivations, incentives (?), and likely outcomes.

R32 - Absolutely. They do already and should do more provided the academics can be security cleared and relied upon to be discreet.
Interview - In RAP, they do some of their own studies and circulate internally and sometimes to other gov't depts - but all classified. Perhaps can declassify some and disseminate openly.
On strategic level, Service is going to have to be open to more collaboration with AC.
- hire academics to do some of the unclassified research that is needed (RAP hires academics and does their own studies but only distributed internally and through govt agencies)

R33 - Yes it would. It is already being done.
Interview - There are historical impediments to co-operation - misuse of academic material or leaking confidential information. Thinks that some academics have disdain for the IC because of negative reports like Guantanamo / torture. This goes both ways.
Thinks some academia believe we're "bad people" and don't want to be associated with us. So it's not just about the Service reaching out. Some academics don't want to think that their work might be used to hurt people - or in any way that goes against their personal values. It goes both ways. There's distrust on both sides. Would need safeguards and protections in order to collaborate - but can't control everything.

R34 - **Interview** - Absolutely.
Different agencies have different perspectives and needs. Academics may have to write articles to target different audiences.

R35. Yes. Anything to highlight what intelligence community does and where they need help.

R36 - Yes. Virtually every other Five Eyes and NATO country invests seriously in this except Canada (really CSIS is the outlier despite heroic efforts by the Academic Outreach office in RAP). The Service has relied on "secrecy" and its fear of the outside to rationalize a deep disconnect with the academic community. CSE has come a long way with efforts like the TUTT Institute - it can be a little easier when you are researching theoretical challenges but there is much more that can be done on intelligence matters, not just CT.

R36 - **Interview** - this is driven by two arguments 1) risky to disclose information and 2) precedent- if you do it once, you'll always have to do it - especially if it's for the common good.)

This is not helped by the often open hostility by the academic community towards CSIS and the frequent refusal to work with the Service. It's a nasty cycle that has long roots and is linked to the lack of a political national security culture such as exists in the US, UK, Australia, France, etc.

CSIS lacks a model for disclosure - no real relationship with academics because afraid of it - but it can add understanding - need to share in order to understand the world.

This is why I approached the University of Ottawa and ended up creating the Security Policy Institute at its Professional Development Institute - SPI is now known as SET .. Luckily I found an open minded Executive at UOttawa to start the program and it now has the support of the UO President and his executive.

R39 - It would be beneficial in terms of expanding theoretical knowledge and perhaps informing / benefiting / creating new investigative techniques.

R40 - No - it is too hard to disclose info

R41 - I think in many cases it would be beneficial - the issue I tend to find is that the intelligence community tends to be very closed to the idea of collaborating with 'outsiders' (i.e. those not subject to the same secrecy oaths that we are), and also a somewhat legitimate concern that our involvement with the academic community could risk tarnishing the reputation / nature of the academic institution.

26. What form of collaboration can you envision that might benefit research into terrorism?

For example, (n=35)

- 20 Intelligence professionals providing input on academic articles before their publication
- 21 Inter-group discussions on specific projects and outcomes
- 22 Intelligence organizations providing anonymized data to the academic community
- 19 Co-production / conducting research projects together

Comments:

R3 - I cannot picture any scenario that would be acceptable to an intelligence agency re a collaborative relationship with academia - with respect to terrorism-related research.

R5 - We once reviewed an academic paper and provided only advice on where they were totally off track in statements and conclusions. Academic then presented the paper at a conference, saying that it had been vetted by the organization. Front page story resulted. Ouch!

R7 - I believe the benefits outweigh the risks. It could be a complicated relationship, however, given the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter and the ramifications of any inadvertent leaks. All this could be managed.

R10 - For such endeavours to be truly fruitful, access to classified intelligence for the academic partners would be required.

R11 - All of the above could be useful within the right framework. Again, more likely at a National / HQ level.

R12 - I have difficulty envisioning what collaboration might benefit research into terrorism, specifically any information that may be provided by the intelligence community, given the highly classified nature of the information and what could and could not be officially published for access to a general population.
R12 - (moved from Question 24) Collaborating with academics / researchers on projects may be of little value because of the need to water down information to an unclassified level in order to share.

R16 - Unfortunately, there are institutional and legal challenges to this beyond what is already being done. Academia must remain unfettered and independent. Police and especially intelligence agencies continue to rely on classified sources that must be kept secret and private. (move to Ques. 26 - types of collaboration)

R17 - Conducting projects together might lead to sensitive information being released unexpectedly so I would discourage co-production.

R19 - Without breaching confidentiality, a middle ground could be established to generalize information to give insight into terrorism.

R20 - Co-production - I could see this for cyber threat related research.
(Re IC input on academic articles) No! Independence of academic research might be questioned.

R21 - This one I'm stuck! Personally, speaking as an investigator - more training is required prior to taking on responsibility / desk from both academic and senior investigator perspective.

R22 - I would prefer face-to-face discussions.

R24 - Was not a consideration in my day.

R28 - Co-production that involves classified intelligence would be very difficult to publish openly but could be used to inform operational decision making within the organization.

R29 - To me, the study of Counter Terrorism in an academic setting has little resemblance to the day to day realities of the study of a Counter Terrorism target. One needs to know the driving forces behind the CT movement, the ideologies and the targets, but when it comes down to the actual case work needed to gather intelligence, it comes down to personalities within the movements and that is something that academics rarely involve themselves with.

R32 - **Interview** - All forms of collaboration - make it more like NASA where there is a combination of skills all contributing.
RAP could hire academics to do internal studies and perhaps some of it could be unclassified and distributed outside of gov't - I think the Service already does this sometimes.
- in RAP, mostly PhDs with no field experience or IOs with no education in analysis
- Service could also provide anonymized data - would add accuracy and credibility to research output - but there will likely be some of those who would say that IC is influencing AC research - and vice versa
e.g. producing a typology of terrorists from open information - even court transcripts is not enough - a lot is not in there - need to know and understand underlying motivations
- Also issue of infrastructure - editing data before it can be released would require a whole unit and people who are knowledgeable enough to do it

R33 - Service has lots of data. If there's a big operation, some analysis done afterwards but that's about it. Once something is over, need to move on to current priorities - because CT moves fast. Sometimes not a lot of time for due diligence. Also, Service is afraid to hang on to too much information because have been criticized for retention. That's too bad - because more analysis would help to learn - could maybe use academics for that so their research people can move on to the current stuff. Also, after the fact, there is a lot of open information that can be incorporated if the analysts (internally) had the time.

R34. **Interview** -
Reviewing academic articles? - difficult to communicate on unclassified systems.
Anonymized data? No - too many privacy and legal implications - so very unlikely. Can't even get access to anonymized data from social media, etc. so unlikely to be able to give it out (even though private sector can get and exploit same kind of data)
* Service is held to higher accountability than private sector - so they can't get as much done or have to spend time and money to go through process to get same info - public doesn't understand that it makes it harder for them to protect Canadians. Charter needs to be reviewed - every other country reviews their charter but we haven't.

Collaboration? - Academics have been commissioned in the past to come in and do some research - mix of unclassified and classified papers. IAB already doing some research projects together - that are unclassified and posted on website or disseminated. There are some internal studies, quasi-academic, that use Service data.

R35 - **Interview** - Collaboration would provide for better research that the practitioner can use. More information = more tools in the tool box. Don't need to rely on the particular interest of the IO or the area.
"We overclassify everything. there's a real reluctance to share."

"Someone said to me 'What's the benefit of having all this wonderful information intelligence if you don't tell anybody about it and nobody knows about it?' So, you can go and collect - and be the greatest organization - but if you just hang on or hold it tight what does it actually do for the betterment - whether it's to work an investigation or just to inform the public. And I don't know if we ... the Service has found that balance."

The Service needs to provide more context of what we do. The public doesn't realize how hard it is for the Service to get a warrant and such. Reports about Service violations don't provide an accurate photo - statistics don't give the details. Can't lump different kinds of violations all together - some are very minor or accidental while others are more serious. It would be helpful if the public had more context.

"If the Service only releases snippets of information that doesn't tell the whole story. There is more information that we could share to help people understand." R35 thinks it would increase trust in the Service. Would also improve academic research.

"It would also help to have practitioners put their lens on academic research."

R36 - Org'ns like CASIS and others have the potential to foster a better relationship with the Service but HQ needs to be more open.

R41 - I think, as I said above, the main problem for any type of cooperation will be the fears of the intelligence community about our information becoming public, as well as the legitimate concerns that may exist regarding our use of information collected under our mandate for some other purpose (i.e. would this violate any of our legal / policy framework around privacy, etc.).

27. Have you ever participated in an academic research project or study related to terrorism? (n=40)

YES	5
NO	35

If Yes, please describe the nature of the study (studies) and your role in it.
In-house studies - cannot disclose

R13 - Yes. Research around the issue of intelligence to evidence.

R36 - **Interview** - Started researching terrorism in 1977 and hasn't stopped. Has worked on many projects and attended or participated in many events. Has lectured on Terrorism at West Point and conferences - and spent a lot of time explaining these issues to senior public servants and politicians in Canada and elsewhere.

28. Going forward, what recommendations do you have for research into terrorism?

R2 - The focus needs to be on ' what's next?' / what is over the horizon. CVE research lagged too far behind the reality. Help the community be more effective with what is coming.

R3 - (written in questionnaire)
Start - by all means - but be well aware going forward of the limitations and risks that will no doubt be encountered. Tradition and prejudice and bias will need to be overcome - and methodology will have to be mutually respectful, conducted in near-absolute secrecy, within a very small compartmentalized realm.

I doubt that academia and the IC could ever interact openly or effectively - even if they wanted to and even if for the common good.....there are a number of reasons for this

- Academic freedom is all but sacred in Canadian society and, although my investigations on-campus were always conducted with the assistance of campus police / security officers, or administrators, or technicians / technologists - NEVER with the assistance of professors or researchers or academic support staff. I believe that persons such as these latter have an essentially natural caution / hostility toward the intelligence community which leads to a distrust and a fear of loss of free expression and legitimate dissent. - bound by law / regulations to respect academia as 'sensitive sector' ; therefore, IC cautious about interacting with academia
- The intelligence community - meaning CSIS in my experience - is bound by the law (CSIS Act) to respect academia as a "sensitive social sector" and thus is bound, by an obligation only to conduct investigations on-campus under well-defined conditions when its officers have made a special case to do so and are thus given special permission, within limitations. CSIS, therefore, is very careful about going on-campus, and its own caution leads first to other means of investigation and an on-campus presence which is most often a last resort.
- Academic research is slow, and is conducted according to professional standards which - in the case of the study of terrorism - do not allow for action / contain actions as quickly as is oftentimes required
- The sharing of information between allies within the intelligence community would simply not be trusted if one or any of the allies concerned were known by the other(s) to be working together with university professors and researchers. The ally with such general academic associations would almost certainly be seen as compromised by the other(s).
- Most importantly, good and effective intelligence work - concerning counter-terrorism or any other threat to the security of Canada - requires the recruitment of human sources and the deployment of technical sources targeted against reasonably -

suspected persons of interest. Intelligence agencies do this; academia does not. An intelligence officer, therefore, will always be skeptical of what an academic can offer. (What can academia add?)

R4 - Emerging trends in the global community. Academic research more useful at national level.

R5 - Link between domestic politics and terrorist organizations. Terrorism as state-sponsored geopolitical actors.

R6 - Emphasis must be on objective analysis of intelligence as a product of the moment - subject to constant questioning and change. Threat assessments are not cast in stone - just in time.

R7 - Terrorism is an age old and global phenomenon that is only becoming more and more complicated and sophisticated with time. Every effort and avenue must be used to continue to suppress its effects. It would be foolhardy to ignore the vast insights academic can provide in this effort.

R10 - A rapidly evolving threat environment diminishes the likelihood that academic studies (over many years) will be attractive to CT practitioners who are responsible for uncovering and preventing today's terrorist threats. Understanding the origins and modus operandi of groups that are no longer a real threat to Canadians is of limited value.

R11 - It may be useful to look at models that our allies use.

R13 - Would like to see more research into the radicalization process, CVE, and counter / de-radicalization specific to Canada.

R14 - More focus on recruitment methods of terrorist organizations

R15 - At PCO, consulted academics in effort to identify upcoming trends

R16 - To be extremely cautious with primary and secondary sources of information. The nature of the subject lends itself to deception and misinformation knowing authorities cannot respond with evidence to counter a narrative.

R19 - I strongly believe that it would be beneficial to both the intelligence and academic community to collaborate on issues surrounding terrorism. Not only would it expand awareness and knowledge about the subject matter, but would also provide a forum for open discussion / sharing of ideas which would benefit all involved.

R20 - To remain relevant, we must be innovative - a closer relationship with select academic institutions would be beneficial - how we do this will require a shift in intelligence culture!

Designating certain academics across the country - security clearance - fund a chair at certain universities, etc.

R21 - This is a given but actually going to conflict area - getting an appreciation for an area is huge. I know not always practical but you can soon tell who visited the area by tone and nuance of writing.

R22 - Keep at it! More opinions are necessary to better identify future terrorist trends.

R23 - Dealing with academics outside of the Service is a delicate sensitive sector issue. The Service has established an Academic Outreach program which is attempting to deal with this issue realizing it is a gap that should be filled.

R24 - There are many more former academics who are associated with intelligence agencies, and former IOs who are academics, than in the past. This should afford greater access.
In my day, there was a reluctance to use any intelligence that did not originate with a reliable or trusted source. Times have changed.

R25 - Increased collaboration between practitioners and academics will benefit both parties and add a real world perspective to the issue.

R26 - More data, less theory. This will always be a challenge given classified nature of data.

R27 - Focus on Chatham House rules gatherings / forums between govt / academia - but build into that est. connectivity so that papers (academic) and govt reports (public) are pushed directly to experts in both spheres. There is nothing precluding academic freedom & independence while maintaining professional expert to expert connectivity.

R28 - Ensure the subject matter is relevant, the final report is concise and applicable to today's threat environment or what can be anticipated in the near future. Yesterday's terrorist barely resembles the terrorist of today - particularly in the areas of motivation and capabilities.

R29 - A very interesting research project. I think that unless an academic is doing VERY specific research that might be related to a CT case file, there is very little likelihood that there would be anything that could assist in a CT case. On the other hand, the specifics of that CT case could in all likelihood contribute to a larger study of Counter Terrorism that an academic might be involved in.

R30 - Evolving methodologies / evolving technical capabilities / evolving threats re: WMD - NBCD. We need to utilize and sponsor IOs who have an academic / operational interest and facilitate their capabilities through inter-government exposure and academic / operational experience.

Interview - need educated people at senior levels - or at least senior people who are open to new ideas and support education in their employees. Maximize employees' skills and interests to help with this.

R31 - Intelligence professionals are more often than not generalist who require contextual information that is easily consumable.

R32 - Going forward, I would like to see more post secondary educational institutions develop formal academic programs in Counter Terrorism, Counter Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Strategic Studies or Conflict Studies
Interview - as above, with instructors who have both experience and academic credentials e.g. Brits tend to hire people who already have the research background or area knowledge (CSIS still new for that - don't attract the same quality of people; not same prestige as in UK)
- Would be nice if we could share information more easily - but need political will and agreement of the keepers of the information

R33 - Intelligence failures and strategic surprise (Michael Handel)
Interview - create profiles backed by data. Need both data and the human aspect. AC can better inform and help direct IC work.

R35 - **Interview** - research that is more specific to Canada. We rely too much on other country info that is not always applicable to our situation.
For practitioners in the field, could use more information on things like
- the nexus between mental illness and violent extremism
- group dynamics - psych articles are good here too
- profiling articles / typologies are only good at the general level - provides context - then the individual characteristics kick in - but the research helps IOs assess people.

R36 - (comment in questionnaire)
1. Developing a culture where understanding the background; cultural, religious, geopolitical background of terrorist movements is viewed as essential and not an “academic” or “theoretical” waste of time. The realization that without this depth of understanding you can’t do your job at the level you need to. Luckily, IO’s hired in the last 25 years or so are much more worldly and culturally diverse than previous generations – that represents an immense knowledge base though often implicit rather than explicit.

2. Invest in your people. It is very difficult for people who are working flat out on warrants, TARC’s, reading message traffic or out debriefing sources to find the time to study terrorist issues. It's also a challenge when an IO is rotated between very different files and branches. It takes about 2 years to become comfortable on a new desk without having to run to the database all the time. Training needs to improve, people need to be sent to courses off site to be immersed in these issues.

CT as a branch has for many years sent a limited number of staff to courses in the Middle East. This is an excellent experience but there are simply cost and resource limitations on those courses. There are other courses with other services or even just academic programs that could be very beneficial.

3. Broaden the scope of relevant study. The right type of data, structured and unstructured can be of immense value but you need to be able to collect it and then make sense of it. This requires both specialized skillsets and specialized tools. The Service was driven into this world as result of technology, 9-11 and the Afghanistan / Iraq wars when we were exposed to programs in other Services that were very advanced and our people were drowning in data and using 'handraulic' tools to try to make use of it.

4. The concept of all-source integration of intelligence, OSINT (much more than open information), HUMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, academic study and the use of multi-disciplinary teams. This may mean legislative and policy changes but it also threatens old empires – at times the Service seems to be stuck in about 1995. This is driving people crazy and it is losing good people out of frustration.

This is a great topic to study. When I started in this business there simply wasn't a lot of academic literature on terrorism. It tended to be lumped in with military history. "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland and the Marxist / anarchist movement in Europe and the Middle East after the Munich Olympics attack opened up more academic study and more publications. Sikh extremism became a western threat in Canada with Air India / Narita – there were no books, we were the book… Literature on Islamism was very limited before 9-11 when it became an industry and WikiLeaks brought it into popular culture. I had been reading about the middle east and Russia for almost 25 years by 9-11 and I found it immensely frustrating to hear senior people in the Service and Government making serious decisions without understanding what they were talking about – and often parroting the American perspective.

R41 - I definitely think there is a lot to be gained from both sides; Academic research is often very useful in looking at mass quantities of information, broad trends, motivations, and a variety of areas that the intelligence community doesn't spend enough time on, but can benefit from learning about, and the intelligence community also has their areas of expertise from the extraordinary powers and unique access that they enjoy which could be of great use to academic researchers. The hard part is to get the two together while preserving secrecy for the intelligence community and credibility / reputation for the academic community.
