# An Examination of the Relationship Between Citizenship Orientations and the Way Public Leisure Services are Produced

By

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**Dedication**

To Diana C. Parry
(My favourite citizen)

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## Abstract

Fostering citizenship is often regarded as a salient rationale for the delivery of public leisure. Consequently, the adoption of a consumer metaphor to describe the recipients of public leisure services is viewed disparagingly by many leisure scholars. As such, in the literature, a dichotomy has been created between citizens and consumers. Each distinction reflects a certain relationship between recipients of services and government. The emphasis of the citizen distinction is problematic, though, because it is placed exclusively upon social citizenship. Moreover, the consumer paradigm is presented as something completely distinct from citizenship. Further exploration of the literature reveals that citizenship is composed of social, political and civil dimensions (Marshall, 1992). Thus, to imply that citizenship is absent from the role of a consumer is misleading. More appropriately, citizenship orientations are likely strengthened or weakened by the way public services are produced. When the state produces services directly it does so with the intent to deliver social benefits to the community. The role of the state producer is paternalistic, so decision making relies on professional judgement to define the public good. Citizens, though, are typically restricted to using services without much of a role in organizing or planning them. Alternatively, under privatization, a private contractor deliberately creates an arm's length relationship with the public in order to persuade them to consume services. As consumers, citizens are encouraged to forsake the public good for their own self-interest, and their ability to shape policy is limited. Finally, under co-production, public leisure services are produced jointly by the state and its citizens with the intent to build social capital. Decision making relies upon community input to negotiate the public good. Thus, the state facilitates the provision the resources necessary to assist citizens with service delivery. Private initiative is encouraged as means of addressing social needs. In theory, then, exposure to a particular model of service production influences citizenship orientations. Though theoretical analyses of this issue have appeared in the leisure literature, there is a decided absence of empirical research. The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to examine citizenship orientations and their relationship with the way public leisure services are produced. Responses for the study were gathered from individuals who were exposed to direct provision, privatization or co-production. Because citizenship was the defining variable in the study, a reliable and valid scale, called the Citizenship Profile scale, was constructed to measure social, civil and political citizenship orientations. At the time of this study, no scale had been designed with such a purpose in mind. A survey design was then employed to test empirically whether exposure to different models of service production fostered certain citizenship orientations in respondents. In sum, it was discovered that political and social citizenship orientations differed between those exposed to co-production and privatization. Moreover, the way public leisure services were produced appeared to have a greater effect on social and political citizenship than did the activities in which respondents participated. Finally, there appeared to be no discernible relationship between civil citizenship orientations and bias in favour of and exposure to different models of service production. Put briefly, this research provides empirical evidence in regard to the relationship between the way public leisure services are produced and citizenship orientations. Moreover, the findings give policy makers, elected officials and public administrators insight into the potential implications for citizenship of adopting a distinct model of service production.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## AN EXAMINATION OF THE CITIZEN-CONSUMER DICHOTOMY

Increasingly, as alternative models, particularly market oriented ones, emerge to produce public recreation services in local government settings, there is a tendency for public policy makers to regard citizens as clients, customers or consumers (Coalter, 1990; Hemingway, 1996, 1999; Ravenscroft, 1993). As Schultz, McAvoy and Dustin (1988) pointed out, "park and recreation professionals are embracing a more sophisticated lexicon to describe just what it is they do and for whom they do it" (p. 52). Because the term is derived from terminology used in the commercial sector, the designation of recipients of *public* recreation services as "consumers" is often met with indignation from leisure researchers who seemingly abhor the notion that leisure participation could involve exchange as the dominant form of interaction (Hemingway, 1996; Ravenscroft, 1993). Leisure, it is argued, should involve further interplay than that required to complete a commercial transaction, otherwise it introduces into leisure "a rationality foreign to leisure's communicative and normative content and reduces leisure's emancipatory potential" (Hemingway, 1996, p. 33). If conceptualized as a commodity, leisure becomes a passive form of consumption which encourages users to be self-interested, instead of a means through which a community can foster positive norms and values. Moreover, it is feared that the motive to produce and distribute public recreation activities will become profit driven such that the economic benefits become more important than the social ones, thereby ignoring the philosophical underpinnings of the public recreation field. Given the possibility that such scenarios could emerge, Schultz, McAvoy and Dustin (1988) believed that "public recreation ought to be governed by a social service ethic that rises above bottom-line thinking" (p. 54).

Presumably, the notion that a citizen could be regarded as a consumer illustrates the failure of public recreation agencies to appreciate their role in fostering citizenship.

Because the concept of fostering citizenship is discussed pervasively as a salient rationale for the delivery of public recreation services (Coalter, 1998; Hemingway, 1996, 1999; Johnson & McLean, 1994; Pedlar, 1996; Ravenscroft, 1993; Reid, 1995), the adoption of a consumer metaphor to describe participants is viewed as a bastardization of the term "citizen." What emerges from the literature, as a result, is a dichotomy between citizens, on the one hand, and consumers, on the other. Each distinction is presumed to embody its own set of characteristics which reflect the relationship between recipients of public recreation services and their (local) government. In particular, policy alternatives conflict between entrepreneurial autonomy in public agencies and democratic accountability; public entrepreneurial vision and citizen participation; entrepreneurial secrecy and democratic openness; and entrepreneurial risk taking and democratic stewardship (Bellone & Goerl, 1992). An examination of the term "citizen" in the leisure literature reveals that most scholars view it in a normative way such that it entails active leisure participation and a concern for the greater good within society (Coalter, 1998; Ravenscroft, 1996). A citizen's role, in relation to the state, is viewed as that of a stakeholder in government, whereas the state, by contrast, is seen as a steward of the public resources that are necessary to provide positive leisure experiences. Given this premise, Fox (1996) believed, "to recast citizens as customers [or consumers, for that matter] is to accede to the notion that government is no longer accepted as 'we,' but 'they'" (p. 260). Phrased differently, Saul (1999) wrote: "How can we choose between the government and the market? We are the government!" (p. 44). In effect, by distinguishing citizens from the state, a libertarian perspective of civil society is fashioned which dichotomizes the people and government, liberty

and power, individuals and the state, and voluntarism and coercion (Barber, 1999). The consumer metaphor implies that citizens are passive recipients of government services, and in doing so, presumes that people should relate to their government in much the same way they purchase a routine consumer product (Glover, 1998; Hemingway, 1999; Smith & Huntsman, 1997). In short, the dichotomy excludes the possibility that citizenship can be fostered in a setting where consumption is the nature of the activity (Coalter, 1998).

Mintzberg (1996) contended, however, that the relationship between citizens and government is more complex than that implied by the citizen-consumer dichotomy. Instead, he argued there are four different roles that people assume in society. The first, *client*, functions when a person receives a professional service from government. An example of such a service is public education. Students, under this premise, are clients of the state. The second role, *customer,* functions when an individual is sold goods or services. Public golf courses, marinas, and lotteries are three recreation-oriented examples of publicly delivered facilities or services that fall under this category. The third role, *citizen*, includes rights and freedoms that, in Mintzberg's words, "go far beyond those of customers or even clients" (p. 77). For example, highways, social security, and economic policy are the types of services that people come to expect as entitlements of citizenship. Such services are believed to be fundamental to full membership in a community. In contrast, the fourth role, *subject*, involves obligations to the state. For instance, a person is obligated, for the sake of collective order, to pay taxes and support government policy. In sum, the addition of the client and subject roles suggests that the relationship between citizens and their government is more complicated than simply a conflict between citizens and consumers or customers.

Indeed, Smith and Huntsman (1997) viewed citizens as customers, owners or investors, depending upon the relationship that citizens fashion with the state, and vice versa. Under a customer model, citizens, as customers, are encouraged to make self-interested purchase decisions about public services, whereas the state, as a manufacturer, is expected to produce and deliver quality services to its customers. Government, under this scenario, directs the relationship between citizens and itself. Despite being customer focused, the state's primary emphasis becomes oriented internally upon production and operational efficiency. Alternatively, under an owner model, citizens, as owners, are perceived as proprietors of the government enterprise. The state, by contrast, is organized hierarchically as a business to produce efficient services for its citizen-owners who supervise, control, and manage the delivery process. Unlike the customer model, citizens drive the relationship between government and themselves. Nevertheless, the model is characterized by its centralized, non-democratic, hierarchically structured processes (e.g., a traditional bureaucracy). Finally, under what Smith and Huntsman called a "value model," citizens are regarded as co-investors and equal shareholders of the public trust. Government, alternatively, is a trustee, steward and manager of public assets and services that delivers incremental value to citizen "shareholders" (p. 312). Driven by decentralized, democratic, flat organizational processes, government and citizens share responsibility for the wealth creation in the community, whether it is economic wealth or the production of social capital. Like Mintzberg (1996), Smith and Huntsman (1997) offered alternative conceptualizations of citizens in the context of public service delivery, notably citizens as owners and investors; however, unlike Mintzberg, Smith and Huntsman identified three models that rely upon commercially-oriented metaphors to characterize the roles of citizens.

Alternatively, in a typology that adds an additional dimension to the citizen-consumer debate, Barber (1999) believed that from three distinct conceptualizations of civil society, there emerges three forms of citizenship: consumers, clanspeople, and citizens. First, under a libertarian model, civil society is organized into two rival, and largely incompatible, sectors: public and private. The former pertains to government and its institutions, whereas the latter concerns almost everything else, including social organizations, corporations, and civic associations. Because the public sector is defined, in this context, by power and coercion, the private sector is defined by liberty and freedom. As such, the private sector becomes the venue for civil society and relations with government are characterized as "a series of deals that free individuals or free associations make in the name of their interests and goods and in defense of their liberties" (pp. 12-13). In short, the citizen-government relationship resembles a contract whereby consumers, as autonomous, egoistic individuals, venture into the public sector only to receive services from a "service-station state" whose role is limited exclusively to the delivery of public services (p. 13).

Under the second model in Barber's typology, civil society is regarded as a complex network of social relations that bands people together into families, clans, clubs, neighbourhoods, communities, and hierarchies. This communitarian perspective, like the libertarian model, divides society into two domains: public and private. Unlike the libertarian model, though, communitarians view the latter as a "zone of interaction, embeddedness, and bonding" (p. 14). The defining actor in this model is the clansperson who is tied to the community because it is the one in which he or she was born (e.g., race, religion, nationality). Citizenship, as a result, is cultural and defined by exclusion rather than inclusion because it involves "specifying anonymous 'others' and 'outsiders' whose foreigness helps define the

excluding (and thus exclusive) community" (p. 15). In short, inclusiveness is replaced by patriotism, and equality is traded away for a strong sense of belonging. As such, civil society becomes the community of all communities and the source of all moral and political authority, including state authority. The state and its institutions are subordinate to the larger community.

Finally, under the third model, civil society is regarded as the mediating domain between government and the market. That is, it supports a "civic sector" which serves as a public and open arena for public discourse (like the public sector), yet is voluntary and non-coercive (like the private sector). Further, its constituent member communities have an aspect of openness and inclusion. As such, it is decidedly a normative model of civil society:

> [It is] a domain of citizens who appear neither as consumers of government services and rights bearers against government intrusion, on one hand, nor as mere voters and passive watchdogs to whom representative governing elites retain some vestigial accountability, on the other. Rather, in the strong democratic perspective, citizens appear as members of civil society because they are active, responsible, engaged members of groups and communities devoted to exploring common ground and pursuing common relations (Barber, 1999, p. 20).

Civil society, in this version, supports the same role for citizens that is championed by the normative citizenship paradigm in the citizen-consumer dichotomy.

In sum, though additional roles are mentioned in the literature, as illustrated by Mintzberg (1996) (e.g., clients and subjects), Smith and Huntsman (1997) (e.g., owners and investors), and Barber (1999) (e.g., clanspeople), a citizen-consumer dichotomy continues to prevail. However, the emphasis of the citizen distinction in the dichotomy, described as the normative citizenship paradigm by Coalter (1998), is problematic because it is placed unapologetically upon the social and political dimensions of citizenship, particularly in leisure studies. In other words, it ignores the other facet of substantive citizenship, notably the civil

dimension. Further, the consumer paradigm is presented as something completely exclusive of citizenship. Citizenship, under the premise of the citizen-consumer dichotomy, is framed in a deliberately narrow way. A review of the literature reveals that citizenship is a multidimensional construct. In fact, Harrison (1991) believed it is possible, given a deeper understanding of citizenship, to posit that consumerism is an alternative expression of citizenship itself. To imply that citizenship is absent from the role of a consumer, in a public context, is misleading. There never exists a situation in which a citizen who engages in a public recreation activity ceases to retain his or her rights as a citizen. While he or she may be viewed differently by the provider, and may resemble a commercial consumer, a citizen exposed to such treatment does not relinquish the rights that make him or her a citizen. While it is possible that the civil, political or social orientations of the individual may be weakened by certain policy decisions, some semblance of those orientations remain intact.

## DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND MODELS OF SERVICE PRODUCTION

As citizens, individuals in most modern democracies are afforded certain rights and freedoms which are protected by the state. The very meaning of citizenship implies the existence of such rights. In what is regarded widely as its classic definition, citizenship was defined by Marshall (1992) as encompassing three dimensions of rights. The first, *civil citizenship*, refers to the rights necessary for individual liberty. These freedoms typically include personal liberty, freedom of speech, the right to justice, and the like. Among these freedoms, too, is the right to engage independently in economic transactions without government intervention, a right that is presumably asserted by so-called consumers of public services. In order to ensure civil rights, progressive societies establish justice systems (e.g., courts of law) to enforce laws and to

protect individual liberties. In the context of leisure, civil rights relate to the freedom to choose, a concept that is central to many social psychological definitions of leisure (Mannell & Kleiber, 1997).

The second dimension, *political citizenship*, refers to the right to participate in the exercise of political power, either as a member of a political community (e.g., a voter) or as an individual elected by the members of such a community (e.g., a politician). Political rights can extend beyond voting or public service to include participation in the development of public policy. In most Western industrialized societies, political participation of any sort is facilitated through a democratic system of governance. In the context of public recreation services, the process of developing and implementing leisure policy is often a means through which a citizen can express and affirm his or her democratic freedoms, particularly through membership in voluntary associations of citizens, advisory boards, and committees.

The third dimension, *social citizenship,* consists of the rights to: (1) a reasonable degree of economic welfare and security, (2) a share in the full social heritage of society, and (3) an opportunity to live a civilized existence according to the standards prevailing in society (Marshall, 1992). Social rights can include public access to health care, social insurance, urban parks, recreation programming, and the like. To ensure citizens of their social rights, a comprehensive social welfare system and its supporting infrastructure are established and maintained. Of the three dimensions, social citizenship is arguably the most relevant to leisure studies because public recreation services typically are arranged by the state with the intent to deliver social benefits to its citizens (Driver, Brown & Peterson, 1991). Indeed, Coalter (1998) suggested many leisure researchers have tended to view the public provision of recreation as

part of an evolutionary process of the development of social citizenship because notions of participation, equality, and quality of life are central to the concept of social rights.

In sum, each dimension in Marshall's conceptualization of citizenship affords individuals particular rights and expects of them certain obligations which are manifest in the relationship between the citizenry and the state (Bowie & Simon, 1986; Marshall, 1992; Smith & Huntsman, 1997). The way services are produced, in theory, relates to citizenship orientations (Hemingway, 1999). In particular, the adoption of a certain model of service production determines the role of the producer, in relation to the recipient of the service, and defines the nature of participation. In general, three types of producers can be found in the public recreation service delivery process. The first type of producer, *public*, refers to any government agency that is involved in the production of public recreation services (e.g., municipal parks and recreation department). The second type of producer, *private*, refers to any commercial (e.g., for-profit business) or private, not-for-profit agency (e.g., YMCA/YWCA) that is contracted to produce public recreation services. Finally, the third type of producer, *voluntary*, refers to any local association of citizens that is organized at the grass roots level to produce public recreation services for its community (e.g., Minor Hockey Associations).

Under a traditional model of direct provision, public recreation services are produced by the state with the intent to deliver social benefits to the wider community (Searle & Brayley, 1993). The role of the state producer, consequently, is largely paternalistic, so decision makers rely on the professional judgement of the producer to define the public good (Hemingway, 1999; Pedlar, 1996). Citizens, though granted the ability to offer token input into the policy development process (Arnstein, 1969), are limited in terms of their influence over service delivery (Glover, 1998). In general, they are restricted to using services without much of a role

in organizing or planning them. As such, in theory, direct provision fosters strong social citizenship orientations and weak political and civil citizenship orientations.

Under a contract model, pubic recreation services are produced by a private contractor with the intent to deliver services efficiently and cost-effectively (Glover, 1999a; Savas, 1987; Walsh, 1995). The private producer deliberately creates an arm's length relationship with the public in order to manufacture and distribute a sufficient number of services to see a return on its investment (Mintzberg, 1996). Decision making relies on consumer demand to determine which services are profitable enough to warrant delivery (Saunders, 1993). As consumers, citizens are encouraged to forsake the public good for their own self-interest (Self, 1993). Citizens, though influential in terms of their behaviour in the marketplace through the process of supply and demand, are limited in terms of their ability to shape policy or service delivery (Hemingway, 1999). As such, in theory, the model fosters strong civil citizenship orientations and weak political and social citizenship orientations.

Finally, under a co-production model, public recreation services are produced jointly by the state and its citizens with the intent to build social capital (Hemingway, 1999). Citizens as co-producers of services have a genuine role in the planning, organization, and implementation of service delivery, such that it resembles locality development (Rothman, 1995). Decision making relies upon community input to define and negotiate the public good (Kingwell, 1999). The state, although given some input into the policy development process, is limited to that of a facilitator that provides the necessary resources to assist citizens with the delivery of services (Murphy, 1989). In this regard, private initiative is encouraged as means of addressing social needs. Based on the roles of citizens and the state, in theory, the model fosters strong political, social and civil citizenship orientations.

## PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Exposure to a particular model of recreation service production appears to have some association with citizenship orientations. In other words, depending upon the way public recreation services are produced and by whom, different citizenship orientations will be fostered in the citizens exposed to them. Although theoretical and conceptual analyses of this issue have appeared in the leisure literature, among other bodies of literature, including sociology, public administration and political philosophy, there is a decided absence of any empirical research to confirm these theoretical assumptions. Indeed, both Hemingway (1999) and Coalter (1998) call for investigation into this question. The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to examine citizenship orientations and their relationship to the way public recreation services are produced, specifically by way of direct provision, contract, and co-production.

## CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS

The study was conducted in three applied settings and was intended to contribute to the leisure literature, as well as inform public park and recreation administrators, therefore:

1. The primary dependent variables in the study were measures of civil, political and social citizenship orientations;
2. The primary independent variables in the study were those that were expected to have some relationship to citizenship orientations. The variables included: exposure to different models of service production, producer biases, the type(s) of leisure activities in which respondents

participated and the frequency of that participation, perceived purposes of public recreation, and volunteer motivations; and

3. Additional empirically-based variables were examined in order to determine their relationship to citizenship. These background variables included age, sex, education, financial circumstances, employment status, and type of employer, if employed.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In order to examine citizenship orientations and their relationship with the way public recreation services are produced, the following research questions were posed:

1. What is the relationship between producer bias and the way public recreation services are produced?
2. What is the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and the citizenship orientations of the people exposed to them?
3. To what extent do producer biases and exposure to different models of public recreation service production help explain variations in social, civil and political citizenship orientations?
4. Are the ways leisure activities are produced and the types of activities in which individuals participate related to citizenship orientations?

By examining these and other questions, it was intended that the study would offer some empirical evidence regarding the relationship between citizenship and the way public recreation services are produced.

# CHAPTER TWO

# CITIZENSHIP AND THE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC RECREATION SERVICES

## INTRODUCTION

As noted in the introductory chapter. a citizen-consumer dichotomy is used metaphorically in the leisure studies literature to describe two distinct relationships between citizens and the state in the service delivery process. The dichotomy reflects an explicit bias in favour of social, and to a lesser extent, political citizenship orientations. In doing so, it excludes the possibility that citizenship can be fostered in a setting where exchange is the dominant form of interaction. "Consumer" is portrayed as a role that is categorically distinct from citizenship. Citizenship, therefore, is framed in a deliberately narrow way. However, if one accepts Marshall's (1992) definition of citizenship, that it is underpinned by social, political and civil rights and obligations, one must concede that the dichotomy is overly simplistic and misleading. That is, while it is possible that civil, political or social citizenship orientations may be weakened by certain policy decisions, or by one's exposure to a particular model of service production, some semblance of those orientations remains intact. As such, depending upon the way public recreation services are produced and by whom, recipients will differ in terms of their citizenship orientations. What follows, then, is a further examination of the citizen-consumer dichotomy, including a more detailed description of each distinction and an account of where the dichotomy originates. Next, the role of citizenship in the public recreation service delivery process will be explored to postulate the relationship between social, political and civil citizenship orientations and the way public recreation services are produced.

## THE NORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP PARADIGM

Under what Coalter (1998) described as the normative citizenship paradigm, the public is encouraged to use and participate actively in public goods and services i the greater good of the community is to be served. Non-participation, by contrast, is viewed as detrimental to such a goal because those who fail to participate also fail to contribute towards the type of community in which they wish to live. In short, public apathy permits public policies, whether they are just or not, to continue functioning unregulated by the citizenry (Saul, 1995). Moreover, non-participation excludes people from building the social networks necessary to produce social capital (Putnam, 1995, 1996). Further, the incentive to let others pay for a public good or service while enjoying its benefits introduces a "free-rider" problem in service delivery and undermines the state's ability to serve its constituents appropriately. As Kingwell (1999) explained:

> non-participants or free-riders, whether disaffected or distracted or just apathetic, are actively bad for the overall health of the public good. Like party-goers who won't join in the game, they bring the rest of us down: they reduce the goods in play; they don't just leave them neutral (p. 56).

In leisure studies, Coalter (1998) insisted the normative citizenship paradigm is endorsed in a similar way. That is, he contends that scholars view participation in public recreation services as much of an obligation as a right. Though social rights grant citizens access to public recreation services, responsible citizenship is presumed to involve the moral *duty* to participate in the services produced by the state. Public recreation provision, therefore, is believed to be a central component for securing the social welfare of citizens. Because social welfare such as recreation policy is intended to alleviate the inequalities of capitalism (Barbalet, 1988; Marshall, 1992;

Turner, 1986), non-participation in public recreation services is viewed as a threat to social stability (Coalter, 1998).

Irrespective of the recognition that it is simply impossible for all citizens to participate actively on all issues at all times, Lowery, DeHoog and Lyons (1992) believed that responsible citizens should attempt to participate actively on some issues, and preferably on many issues, to be fully engaged individuals. At present, however, Saul (1995) suggested that apathy on the part of the citizen has resulted in a society composed of individuals who are concerned about their own interests as opposed to the public good. Self (1993) believed that such apathy deprives democracy of citizen concern and participation, denies the political process of inputs of beliefs and opinion, and deteriorates the maintenance and improvement of political norms which lose their moral foundation if few citizens are interested or believe in them. To avoid such consequences, Saul (1999) declared "we need to reassert that slow, time-consuming, inefficient, boring process that requires our involvement; it is called being a citizen" (p. 49). In other words, individuals must involve themselves more in their communities, both socially and politically.

Given the preference for politically active, socially conscious citizens, a "good" citizen is viewed as an "active" participant in community (Coalter, 1998). Consequently, passivity and non-participation are vilified because, if adopted, the individual presumably fails to make a positive contribution towards his or her community, and therefore, his or her participation is not recognized as a virtuous expression of citizenship.

## THE CONSUMER PARADIGM: THE OTHER HALF OF THE DICHOTOMY

Under the consumer paradigm, in contrast to the normative citizenship paradigm, a recipient of public recreation services is perceived as an individual who simply pays for, then uses a particular service without having much (if any) involvement in the actual arrangement or production of the service. The service producer, regardless of whether it is a public or private organization, is active because it determines the terms of participation. The consumer asserts his or her preferences by purchasing the services which appeal to him or her most. In other words, in theory, the participant shapes the selection of services through consumer demand. Viewed in this manner, the consumer asserts his or her civil right to engage in economic transactions, unencumbered by government. Conversely, it represses social and political citizenship by concentrating on the needs (or wants) of the individual, without necessarily considering the needs of the community.

Saunders (1993) contended that the rise in household incomes among citizens has led many to regard themselves as consumers of government because they possess a certain amount of purchasing power in the marketplace. Whereas in the past many citizens relied upon government to provide goods and services that were unattainable without assistance, financial or otherwise, from government, at present, most can afford to provide for themselves without requiring such subsidy. People are less dependent upon government to achieve a sense of material equality (Saunders & Harris, 1990). Thus, collective choice, as determined by the state, is believed to yield outcomes that are less desirable than outcomes determined by private choices in the marketplace. Fundamental changes to the traditional structure of government and its service delivery process, such as the introduction of various forms of privatization, have enabled citizens to enter into market-like exchanges, with only limited government intervention

(Glover & Burton, 1998). Presumably, the intent of such changes is not to dismantle direct state provision, but rather to render the public sector more responsive to consumer preferences (Saunders, 1993; Saunders & Harris, 1990).

In this regard, individuals are viewed as consumers to whom the state attempts to encourage to consume, while maintaining an arm's length relationship which is controlled by the forces of supply and demand (Mintzberg, 1996). A consumer-oriented approach to service delivery, therefore, lacks the traditional intent to provide public services because they are believed to be socially desirable. Moreover, it is based upon exchange theory whereby recreation producers and consumers are encouraged to behave as rational egoists in the marketplace in order to facilitate mutually advantageous transactions. By asserting one's claim to enter into market relations without interference from government, one denies the less fortunate of social protection because all citizens are presumed to be equipped with the means to look after their own needs. The consumer orientation is directed at discouraging a "dependency culture" (Turner, 1986). By contrast, an "enterprise culture" is fostered with the expectation that citizens secure their own social welfare through their own efforts. The role of the state is limited to providing help to those who, for one reason or another, are unable to help themselves.

## THE KEY TO THE CONFUSION?

Upon closer examination of the citizenship literature, it is clear that the citizen-consumer dichotomy is analogous to the tension between civil and social rights. That is, both civil and social rights constrain government, albeit in different and often conflicting ways. Civil rights are rights *against* the state whereas social rights are claims for the benefits guaranteed *by* the state

(Macpherson, 1985). This distinction reveals the difference between civil and social rights in terms of government's obligations to its citizens. As Barbalet (1988) observes, "for people to act as citizens, the state must grant freedoms the state cannot invade and therefore actions which the state cannot perform; for persons to consume as citizens the state must provide, and is therefore obliged to perform specific actions" (p. 20, ). In other words, civil and social rights differ in terms of the expectations they place on government. In the classical liberal tradition, citizenship entails contracting the state to provide agreed upon public services and enforce the contractual arrangement. Under such an arrangement, citizenship does not necessarily require active participation; instead, it requires citizens to monitor their own individual rights in order to safeguard themselves from state corruption (Lowery, DeHoog, & Lyons, 1992). In this way, civil rights encourage self-interested individualism by encouraging citizens to make self-serving decisions that can be destructive or insensitive to the greater public good (Smith & Huntsman, 1997).

In contrast to the classical liberal perspective, proponents of a comprehensive welfare state recognize the social injustices the market can cause, so in response they advocate the direct delivery of certain public services to mitigate inequalities (Walsh, 1995). To justify such an endeavour, a distinction is made between opportunity and condition. While an individual is granted similar *opportunities* to his or her fellow citizens via civil rights, an individual does not necessarily achieve the same social *conditions* or outcomes without state intervention. Such inequalities of conditions arise because opportunities are distributed unevenly throughout the population (Barbalet, 1988). Thus, the essence of social citizenship is the right to welfare which requires the existence of a variety of public institutions to deliver social goods on an egalitarian basis, and a taxation system from which the state can acquire the financial means to deliver

social welfare (Turner, 1986). In short, there exists a conflict between the tendency of capitalism to produce greater inequality in society, as encouraged by civil citizenship, and the tendency and intent of the welfare state to create greater equality, as encouraged by social citizenship.

The conflict between civil and social rights manifests itself in the state's resolve to impose negative or positive obligations upon its citizens. *Negative rights* "impose obligations on others to refrain from interfering with the rights bearer in the protected area" (Bowie & Simon, 1986, p. 56). Under this premise, citizens are not obligated to provide for anyone else; rather, they are entitled to the fruits of their own labour or of possessions secured through the exchange of such possessions. Negative rights do not obligate citizens to provide essential goods and services, they obligate citizens to refrain from interfering with each other's attempt to obtain such goods and services. This perspective advocates a minimalist state approach wherein government acts as a referee, not as a provider of welfare. Its primary responsibility is to regulate economic competition to ensure that each competitor respects the rights of the others.

A major concern about negative rights is that they permit too unequal a distribution of the economic wealth that arises from the open competition on the free market. Even though all citizens have the right to acquire wealth, in reality, they are unequal in their actual power to amass it. Fair competition requires that the rules of the free market exchange are complemented by some form of income, property or power redistribution. The initial bargaining positions are not fair, however, if some citizens are so deprived of basic necessities that they are incapable of developing the necessary skills to compete with any real chance of success. Correspondingly, the entitlement of citizenship presumes at least a minimal welfare base which guarantees each

citizen access to services that are necessary to live according to the standards prevailing in contemporary society. Thus, the argument that re-distributive measures fail to respect the entitlements of property owners is open to the objection that entitlements can arise only when re-distributive measures guarantee fair access to the competition for possessions in the first place (Bowie & Simon, 1986).

Thus, citizens have *positive rights* claims to sufficient goods and services to make at least a minimally decent human existence possible. Positive rights are rights that "impose obligations to provide (or at least to support the sort of institutions that do provide) those goods and services necessary to secure at least a minimally decent level of human existence" (Bowie & Simon, 1986, p. 56). If positive rights are respected, citizens are obligated to contribute towards efforts such as income redistribution which are designed to satisfy the basic needs of others. In this regard, the state's concern is not with negative rights to liberty exclusively.

Positive rights are criticized because arguably they involve unjustified restrictions on liberty. Under such circumstances, the state limits the right of citizens to do with their earnings as they wish in order to distribute the resources necessary to honour positive rights claims. Because a citizen cannot spend the portion of his or her income that the government taxes, the implementation of positive rights is incompatible with the attainment of other important goods. In short, the argument against positive rights is that individuals should not be reduced to satisfying the positive rights of others.

Bowie and Simon (1986) believed that it is difficult to specify where positive rights claims become so extensive as to violate the liberty of others, but nevertheless they insist that such claims are often necessary to protect both positive *and* negative rights. Similarly, Shue

(1980) argued that the right to a minimum standard of well-being simply requires protection from the acts of others, precisely the same protection required to honour negative rights. As such, he posits there are no distinctions between positive and negative rights, rather all rights impose positive and negative obligations. In addition to the protection of negative freedoms from interference, claims to at least a minimal level of welfare warrant protection too. What this implies, then, is that each dimension of citizenship has a blend of positive and negative claims associated with it, and therefore, depending upon the particular circumstance, the dimensions of citizenship are either strengthened or weakened as opposed to being present or absent.

## FREEDOM: THE CONCEPTUAL LINK BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP AND LEISURE

Although Coalter (1998) questioned the assumption that the delivery of public recreation services is about the extension of citizenship, there is no question that the rights of citizenship are either enhanced or diminished by the way government delivers recreation to its citizens. Thus, the link between public services, such as recreation and parks, and citizenship is clear: Both reflect the relationship between citizens and the state. But how is leisure itself relevant to citizenship? The answer, put briefly, is freedom. Mannell and Kleiber (1997) insisted that freedom is a characteristic that distinguishes leisure from other human activities and experiences, yet freedom requires the existence of certain rights. More specifically, the rights of citizenship enable the freedom necessary to create or foster leisure experiences in the public sector. What follows is a description about how each dimension of citizenship, in the context of public recreation service delivery, is characterized by a distinct view of freedom and what service producers do to foster each dimension.

**Civil Citizenship, Perceived Freedom and Consumer Choice**

Several scholars have identified perceived freedom as the primary defining criterion of leisure (Gunter & Gunter, 1980; Kelly, 1972; Neulinger, 1981; Parker, 1971). Neulinger (1981) defined it as "a state in which the person feels that what she or he is doing is done by choice and because one wants to do it" (p. 15). In this definition, an emphasis is placed upon the individual to suggest that he or she defines his or her own experience subjectively. Civil rights are meant to serve a similar purpose -- citizens are enabled to live their lives as they so choose. The state supports such rights by either refraining from interfering in the lives of its citizens or by offering sufficient choice so that citizens can make decisions for themselves.

Under a traditional model of direct provision whereby the state arranges and produces services, this is not necessarily the case. Saunders and Harris (1990) believed that "the state represents a major source of producer power and consumer weakness in the sense that those who are employed to provide state services enjoy a captive consumer market" (p. 63). Because the traditional organization of the public sector fosters monopolies, public employees are not constrained (as private producers are) by the need to please the recipients of services (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Presumably, public sector employees know "these people effectively have nowhere else to go and enjoy no right to withdraw their patronage" (Saunders & Harris, 1990, p. 65). Citizens who are forced to use and pay for public services are incapacitated by their inability to exit and take their money elsewhere. Instead, they are expected to be passive because they are denied the opportunity to make decisions and resolve choices for themselves. If people are, indeed, limited in their choice of activities and are unable to exit the service, in effect, the provider fails to foster a genuine leisure experience because perceived freedom is absent.

Saunders (1993) questioned whether government should force its own values upon its citizens. "Social cohesion," he wrote, "is best fostered by leaving individuals and the groups they form to get on with their own lives" (p. 79). He insisted that social compassion is not something that can be demanded or granted; rather, it arises out of the experience of exercising autonomy and control in one's personal life. This sentiment has led to greater support for consumer choice in recreation service delivery, in particular the adoption of market oriented strategies (Burton & Glover, 1999; Glover, 1999a). Such strategies are designed specifically to introduce into the public sector the concepts of competition, consumer choice, and threat of exit. Competition introduces the public sector to the process of natural selection. The standardization of services is presumably eliminated by allowing citizens to choose among competing services so that if a public recreation service agency is unable to respond efficiently to the needs of its users, it will be replaced by suppliers that can respond as desired.

Whether consumer choice truly does exist or not under a privatization initiative is inconsequential because, as Neulinger (1981) revealed, in human behaviour illusions can have real consequences. Perceived freedom, as employed by Neulinger and other leisure researchers, is commensurate with free choice which suggests that an individual must believe a social setting provides at least more than one opportunity for action if he or she is to experience leisure. This type of freedom is called *decision freedom* (Steiner, 1970). Consumer choice gives citizens the feeling that they are in control of their own lives, and therefore, is capable of fostering leisure experiences. It follows, therefore, that weak civil citizenship is fostered by limited choice, whereas strong civil citizenship is fostered by the presence of consumer choice.

**Social Citizenship, Freedom to and Freedom from**

Through social citizenship, citizens lay claim to their right to live civilized lives according to the standards prevailing in society (Marshall, 1992). Presumably, leisure is among the types of services that falls under this claim. As a result, the state acts to support its citizens' freedom to leisure by providing recreation programs and infrastructure in a just manner. It is impossible, therefore, to discuss social citizenship without entering into debates about equality. Turner (1993) argued that "modern citizenship assumes an equal access to social resources and is defined by universal and equal participation in the socio-political community" (p. 117). In this context, citizenship provides a conceptual link between the concepts of equality and capitalism, for in a capitalist society, it provides the foundation of equality upon which the structure of inequality is built.

Citizenship is seen as "an aid, and not a menace, to capitalism and the free-market economy, because it is dominated by civil rights, which confer the legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to possess but do not guarantee the possession of any of them" (Marshall, 1992, p. 21). The dimensions of citizenship do not necessarily conflict with the inequalities of a capitalist society because they are necessary to maintain market inequality. Social citizenship, from this perspective, is conferred by the state, not to eliminate all social inequalities, but rather to serve as a form of class abatement (Turner, 1986). More specifically, "the potentially divisive and socially disruptive inequalities of material condition lose their significance in consequence of equal participation in the community of citizenship" (Barbalet, 1988, p. 87). The provision of universal public services, such as recreation, subjects the vast majority of citizens to the same process through which services are delivered and provides essentially the same benefit. The

common experience of the citizen, thus, reduces the social distance between citizens in a subjective way, not necessarily in an objective way .

By emphasizing the importance of people's subjective impressions, Goodale (1990) believed that researchers and recreation service providers tend to ignore the sometimes negative objective conditions in people's lives that may limit their ability to experience meaningful and rewarding leisure. In other words, providers fail to address structural constraints, or "such factors as the lack of opportunities or the cost of activities that result from external conditions in the environment" (Mannell & Kleiber, 1997, p. 332). According to Goodale (1999), though, *freedom from* structural constraints is prerequisite to *freedom to* leisure. Mannell and Kleiber (1997) define freedom to as a "willful choice and action on the part of the individual," similar to perceived freedom, and freedom from as "the absence of duress, coercion and interference" (p. 146). Goodale (1999) argued that public recreation service agencies have concentrated their attention on the freedom *to* leisure, instead of the freedom *from*. In explaining the significance of freedom from and its implications for the public good, he explained:

> Freedom from means a great deal more than passive practice of leaving each other alone. Actually, it imposes many duties upon us . . . We agree to limit our own and others' freedoms in order to realize greater freedoms in the future. That is why we have dog leash laws, no-smoking areas, social security and nuclear test ban treaties. These are collective actions designed to provide freedom from, usually by reducing freedom to" (Goodale, 1999, p.p. 1-2).

Unfortunately, insufficient attention is given to develop the strategies needed to correct such conditions. As Hemingway (1996) wrote, "abstracting to such supposedly neutral conceptions like perceptions, subjective experience, or spiritual condition ignores the fact that individuals are situated in specific contexts shaping both these mental experiences as well as their range of possible content" (p. 29). With the understanding that freedom from is a public good and the

principal function of government, Goodale (1999) contended that leisure itself (e.g., experience) is about freedom from and recreation (e.g., provision of programs) is about freedom to. Moreover, he believed that freedom to is a function of both government and the market, although the fairness of the market is largely and increasingly erroneous. What separates government from the commercial sector, he contended, is an emphasis on freedom from. It follows, therefore, that weak social citizenship orientations are fostered by a focus on freedom to, whereas strong social citizenship orientations are fostered by a focus on freedom from.

**Political Citizenship, Democracy and Emancipation**

In discussing freedom and leisure, Hemingway (1996) believed that researchers and recreation service providers have failed to address leisure's emancipatory potential. The focus, instead, has been on perceived freedom, or freedom to, and to a lesser extent, freedom from. Leisure, in either case, is viewed primarily as an outcome, notably the achievement of satisfaction or pleasure. In contrast to such conceptualizations of freedom, emancipation is "the process of exposing, and preparing the ground for the elimination of the often latent restrictions on the development of human capacities embedded in existing social practices" (Hemingway, 1996, p. 28). That is, it is intended to foster or facilitate the expansion of human capacities. As opposed to being an end in itself, leisure, in this context, serves as a instrument through which citizens can collectively reach their potential as human beings.

Contemporary public recreation services, however, are delivered in a manner which is intended to satisfy self-interest, not to build human capacities. By providing leisure experiences in this way, a profession has arguably emerged to supply goods and services aimed at satisfying

patrons. Consequently, Pedlar (1996) believed that public providers, as professionals, have developed into "experts" who are concerned primarily "with servicing the community, getting the program mounted, and the requisite numbers of 'clients' to warrant running the program" (p. 13). Moreover, the service provider "tends to objectify the client as the seeker of benefits, rather than accepting her/him as a participant in a communicatively grounded relationship" (p. 37). This professional approach to public recreation service delivery is decidedly an undemocratic one.

Hemingway (1996) believed that the recovery of leisure's emancipatory potential must begin with leisure activities that permit participants to discuss common purposes which extend beyond individual gain. In particular, he thought that participation in the public sphere of voluntary organizations, such as citizen groups, boards, and committees, have an emancipating effect because they enhance citizens' commitment to democracy. Because of its communicative potential, leisure offers citizens a democratic arena for the development of capacities. In this context, democracy resembles Saul's (1994) definition as a time-consuming, inefficient process designed to allow people to have a say in and contribute to their political community. More importantly, though, it is intended to safeguard people against the tyranny of the state. In this sense, citizens themselves have the responsibility to be active participants in government. "If the citizenry agree to exclude themselves from any given area," Saul (1995) contended that, "they are automatically excluding the possibility that in that domain the public good could have any role to play" (p. 78). Thus, Stormann (1996) suggested "the only way to strengthen and truly empower citizens politically is to allow them to once again be the policy makers regarding their neighbourhoods and communities" (p. 151). From Hemingway's (1996) standpoint, this is precisely the focus of citizenship. He contended that public recreation provision ought to

strengthen citizenship by encouraging discourse, "the communicative process of exchanging reasons and criticisms in the hope of establishing some basic understanding of and agreement on the societal context in which discourse occurs" (p. 35). He argued that it is only through discourse that leisure can fulfil its emancipatory potential.

Even though most public recreation service agencies allow for some form of public participation, genuine discourse is largely absent from contemporary public provision. Indeed, strategies to encourage civic engagement can differ remarkably from one to the next. Arnstein (1969) identified eight such strategies, each indicating the extent of influence citizens have in shaping the end result of public policy. The first, *manipulation*, involves placing citizens on a "rubberstamp" advisory committee or board in order to educate them or engineer their support. Instead of seeking genuine citizen participation, the provider distorts involvement so that, in reality, it becomes a public relations vehicle. The second strategy, *therapy*, subjects citizens to something analogous to a clinical group therapy session which functions under the pretence of involving citizens in policy development. Instead of attempting to overtly create support, providers allow citizens to engage in activities that are designed to show participants the error of their ways. In general, the first two strategies are contrived as substitutions for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to facilitate genuine public participation, but rather to enable public providers to "educate" or "cure" participants.

The third strategy, *informing*, is characterized by a unidirectional flow of information, from the provider to citizens, without opportunity for citizens to give feedback. In a slight variation, the fourth strategy, *consultation*, allows citizens to express their viewpoints, but it offers no assurance that their concerns and ideas will influence the final decision. Both strategies are characterized by "tokenism" because, on the one hand, they allow anyone, irrespective of

their status in society, to listen or have a voice, but on the other hand, they fail to give participants the power to influence the end product. When participation is restricted to these approaches, Arnstein (1969) believed that there is no assurance of changing the status quo. However, the fifth strategy, *placation*, involves the selection of a few citizens, usually purposively, to represent a particular group within the community. It is simply a higher level of tokenism, though, because the ground rules allow groups to advise, but it retains for the providers the continued right to make the final decision.

The next three approaches increase citizen power in terms of the degree to which citizens influence policy development. The sixth strategy, *partnership*, redistributes power through negotiation between citizens and providers. Both parties agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards, planning committees and mechanisms for resolving impasses. With the seventh strategy, *delegated power*, negotiations between citizens and providers result in citizens achieving foremost decision-making authority over a particular plan or program. In this approach, citizens obtain significant power which is intended to assure accountability of the program to them. To resolve differences, providers are proactive, as opposed to reactive to public pressure. Finally, the eighth strategy, *citizen control*, grants citizens the authority to govern a program or an institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under which others may change them. In sum, the strategies Arnstein identified progressively strengthen the power of citizens as they become more democratic in nature, which in turn, strengthens political citizenship.

To simplify Arnstein's model of civic engagement, it is perhaps more straightforward to view each strategy in terms of its position on a continuum wherein representative democracy is

located at the one end, while participatory democracy is found at the other. Hemingway (1999) described representative democracy as:

> rest[ing] on the premise that citizens themselves are unable or unwilling (a distinction of great importance) to participate directly in the selection of policy alternatives, whether for reasons of ability or logistics (again a distinction of great importance) to participate directly in the selection of policy alternatives, whether for reasons of ability or logistics (again distinction of great importance), and that the extent of their effective political involvement is restricted to the selection of representatives charged with the task of more or less looking after citizen interests" (pp. 151-152).

Participatory democracy, by contrast, engages citizens in public discourse with the understanding that their expression is meant to assist government in its decision making. Moreover, it "rests on the more or less direct involvement of citizens in the discussion, selection, and (possibly) the implementation of policy alternatives" (Hemingway, 1999, p. 152). For leisure to fulfil its emancipatory potential, providers must facilitate participatory democracy by encouraging public discourse. It follows, therefore, that weak political citizenship, as Hemingway (1999) argued, is fostered by a focus on representative democracy, and strong political citizenship orientations are fostered by a focus on participatory democracy.

## THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC RECREATION: A THEORETICAL MODEL

The dominance of one or more elements of substantive citizenship over another, as manifest within the conflict between positive and negative rights, has profound implications for the way public recreation services are presently arranged, produced, and consumed. Moreover, the way services are produced has implications for the strength of each dimension of citizenship, as illustrated in the previous sections. The following section illustrates this assertion by developing a theoretical model to explain how different conceptualizations of citizenship direct

contemporary service delivery. The model postulates that the service delivery process follows three sequential stages, all of which are related to different conceptualizations of the role of citizens (See Figure 2.1). The stages include, (1) service arrangement, (2) service production, and (3) service consumption. While in reality the public recreation service delivery process may deviate from what is presented, the model, albeit generalized, is intended to suggest that alternative forms of production have emerged with the recognition of alternative conceptualizations of citizenship. The model is not intended to reflect one broad strategy for an organization, but rather reflects the process used to determine how a particular service will be delivered (e.g., art classes, aerobics, teen leadership development). In other words, conceivably,





**Figure 2.1: A Theoretical Model of the Public Recreation Service Delivery**

a public recreation agency can adopt several approaches, not just one.

**Feedback**

Before examining the three main stages of service delivery, it is important to note that feedback about service arrangement, production, consumption, and their ensuing outcomes is provided consistently by groups of individuals throughout the public service delivery process. Because most public recreation services are delivered at the local level of government, each group will be discussed in that context. More specifically, Tindal and Tindal (1995) listed five sources of feedback in the politics of local government. The first source, *elected officials*, derives from those who govern a locality on behalf of constituents. In such a setting, it is difficult for a council of elected officials to exert a consistent influence over the policy output because, in Canada, its members are not formed into voting blocs (e.g., political parties). As such, voting patterns change from issue to issue and there is usually little cohesion and common purpose within a municipal council (Tindal & Tindal, 1995). Nonetheless, certain council members can carry through a policy agenda, if they have the personality and a leadership style which allows them to overcome a lack of formal powers attached to their positions.

The second source of feedback comes from the *administrative staff* who provide the technical expertise, research and analytical capacity, and policy advise. Most councillors, because they serve on only a part-time basis, come to rely on the recommendations of administrative staff. In fact, there is a well-documented concern that senior staff are too dominant in the policy process because elected officials tend to be reduced to rubber-stamping their decisions (Tindal & Tindal, 1995). Indeed, administrative staff are capable of controlling

the policy agenda themselves by determining what matters get attention and, equally important, what matters do *not* get addressed. Nevertheless, they tend to be as much or more aware of the public view about a variety of local issues concerning existing policies and programs than elected officials because they are on the front lines of service delivery.

The third source of feedback comes from the constituents within the locality; that is, the *electorate*. Citizens who use public recreation services are the most obvious group to give feedback about service delivery, yet feedback frequently/typically comes from non-participants too (e.g., complaints about litter in an urban park). Whether they use the services or not, most citizens finance the delivery of public recreation services by paying their local property taxes (Crompton, 1999; Havitz & Glover, 2000). As such, many non-participants and participants alike believe they have a say how their tax dollars are being used to support public services.

The fourth source of feedback, *special interests*, derives from local groups formed to provide continuous, direct feedback into government decision making. While these groups include voluntary associations and social movements, they also consist of business groups, social advocacy groups, and the like. Often, the latter groups work covertly by supporting like-minded political candidates, or by using their links with council to push for decisions consistent with their viewpoints (Tindal & Tindal, 1995).

The fifth source of feedback comes from the *mass media* which influences public policy by covering (or not covering) local government activities and issues. Higgins (1986) showed that the general public demonstrates an interest in local and regional news, including issues regarding recreation (e.g., facilities, festivals, activities). Clearly, local weekly newspapers devote considerable space to municipal coverage, but as with all news items, there is tendency to emphasize controversial or sensational matters. Tindal and Tindal (1995) contended that the

media contribute to the limited public participation in local government by their generally poor performance in providing information about, and promoting an understanding of, local government.

In sum, each of these five groups gives constant feedback about the service delivery process throughout each stage of the process. As such, if pressure is great enough, change may ensue and alternative strategies adopted in order to ease public concerns or serve changing mandates.

### Stage One: Service Arrangement

The first stage of the service delivery process, *service arrangement*, involves the development of public policy and goal setting (e.g., decision making). All decisions are the result of choices made by political authorities, either administrators or elected officials, which, in turn, are based upon premises which themselves are open to interpretation and debate (e.g., feedback). Nonetheless, these decisions involve, either explicitly or implicitly, determining the mandate for service provision, the role of citizens in the service delivery process, and the application of a service production model. In this regard, the service arranger is the unit of government that "assigns the producer to the [citizen], or vice-versa, or selects the producer that will serve the [citizen]" (Savas, 1987, p. 60). A public recreation service agency, for example, arranges art classes for older adults, determines the terms of participation, and decides who will produce (instruct) the classes. By selecting the producer, the service arranger exercises what is called the *enabling authority of the state* to ensure the service is indeed delivered (Burton & Glover, 1999). Stoker (1988) defined an enabling local government as one "which takes a broad

responsibility for the social and economic issues confronting its area and uses all the means at its disposal to meet the needs of those living in the area" (p. 167). In this regard, government acknowledges that it cannot, and should not, always act directly (Tindal & Tindal, 1995). As such, Barnett (1997) contended that the enabling authority of the state encompasses two key roles for government. The first requires that, in certain instances, the public sector work with and through other organizations (e.g., commercial, not-for-profit, civic or public agency) to enable the production of services for its citizens. The second role sees government facilitate competition among commercial, not-for-profit, and public agencies to produce those services that government itself wishes to arrange. Barnett insisted that the application of the enabling authority of the state requires that a clear distinction is made between service arrangement and service production. In other words, "service production is not seen as necessarily a government function" (Barnett, 1997, p. 68). The enabling authority, therefore, emphasizes governance rather than self-sufficiency. Tindal and Tindal (1995) indicated that "governance involves making decisions about what services and programs should be provided to the community - but it does not mean that the [government unit] will [necessarily] provide these services and programs" (p. 339). During the post-war era in North America, it was generally assumed the service arranger and the service producer should, of necessity, be one and the same. In other words, public agencies should not only *arrange* for recreation services to be provided, but should also *produce* them. Historically, however, Burton and Glover (1999) revealed that the production of public recreation services in North America has been much more eclectic. Indeed, many different combinations between arrangers and producers have been evident. As in the past, there are now a wide array of methods used to deliver public recreation services, many of which involve alternative service producers. In order to inform the decision to select an appropriate

producer, however, a mandate for service delivery must be articulated and the role of the citizen identified.

### *Roles of Public Recreation Service Agencies*

In terms of the public arranger's mandate for service delivery, Godbey (1978) contended that most public recreation service agencies fulfil one or more of six roles. The first role, *promoter of specific leisure activities and facilities*, seeks to convince citizens to participate in specific recreation and leisure activities with which they are not presently involved. This rationale is often adopted under the assumption that the leisure activity being promoted is "superior" to other choices of activity which the individual might make during his or her free time (Godbey, 1978, p. 15). A child who plays road hockey all summer in a lower-income housing development, for example, may not desire to go canoeing until exposed to a canoeing program, and therefore, may need to be introduced to such a program before he or she can judge if it is worth doing.

The second role, *culturally neutral provider*, seeks to provide or sponsor whatever leisure activities, facilities or services in which its citizens express interest. In this role, the agency assumes it would be inappropriate to impose its own values upon its citizens; instead, it attempts to cater to existing leisure interests rather than attempting to create new ones. The main objective of the agency is to identify in which leisure experiences its citizens wish to participate and subsequently supply them. The collection of information concerning desired programs may involve community surveys, citizen boards or councils, public hearings and the like.

The third role, *social change agent*, seeks to bring about change in citizen's behaviour or in societal conditions through the use of leisure activity. Such change involves social engineering which goes beyond creating interest in a given activity. In this role, leisure activity serves as a means to an end. It is a technique or tool to change and possibly improve individuals, groups or communities.

The fourth role, *co-ordinator of leisure opportunities*, seeks to maximize the citizen's opportunities to participate in a wide array of leisure activities. The public organization collaborates with commercial or not-for-profit agencies, or both, with the intention to share information, avoid duplication of service delivery, and/or plan ways to co-ordinate joint co-operative use of each agency's programs and facilities.

The fifth role, *provider for the recreationally dependent*, seeks to direct the agency's major effort toward providing services to those who are highly dependent upon government for meaningful leisure experiences or who have few alternatives but to use such services. The rationale for a public recreation service agency in this role is to be a "provider of last resort," responsible for helping to meet the leisure needs and desires of those for whom no one else can or will provide (Godbey, 1978, p. 17).

The sixth role, *enhancement of the physical environment*, seeks to protect and improve natural surroundings. Many types of leisure activities are dependent upon certain environmental features or conditions which most people cannot supply individually in urban or suburban areas. Moreover, the quality of the leisure experience may be highly dependent upon environmental conditions (e.g., cycling, hiking). To accommodate such activities, recreation service agencies maintain a variety of areas and facilities (e.g., paved pathways, trails). In addition, many recreation service agencies perform services that contribute to the quality of life of a community

(e.g., planting shade trees, preserving historical sites). In sum, the roles of public recreation service agencies are quite diverse and far-reaching. In order to simplify matters, each role mentioned by Godbey (1978) fits more broadly under one or more of three general mandates for public service delivery: (1) to serve the public good, (2) to generate revenue, and (3) to build social capital.

### *Mandate for Service Provision*

The first mandate, and perhaps the central rationale for the delivery of most public recreation services, is *to serve the public good*. Indeed, Drucker (1985) believed that the public sector functions exclusively to do good. In general terms, though, "the public good," which is also referred to as the "common good" (Daly & Cobb, 1989) or the "public interest" (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1987), is conceptualized as an organized capacity for social compassion (Rae, 1998) which contributes to the functional success of a society (Kingwell, 1999). In modern democracies, Self (1993) suggested the public good is defined as the normative standards and practices which guide the political and social life of the society. Under this premise, Searle and Brayley (1993) viewed the general mission that guides public park and recreation agencies as the enrichment of life and promotion of the well-being of the entire community. Irrespective of such an ambitious objective, there are, and always will be, competing visions of the public good. As such, Kingwell (1999) contended "we can no longer continue to speak of '*the* public good,' as if there were one, even a very complex one, which could embrace all the needs, desires, and wills of the people in society" (p. 54). Instead, he declared that there are a multiplicity of goods and no possibility of final agreement upon the nature of them. As such, an attempt to determine the public good is done in one of two ways. First, it can be negotiated through the ongoing and

endless discussion among citizens engaged in public discourse (Hemingway, 1996). In order to accommodate this approach, though, government must commit to a system of participatory democracy by providing an arena in which citizens can debate and discuss such matters (Hemingway, 1999). Alternatively, the public good can be determined by the elected officials who represent a group of constituents. Under this approach, government maintains a system of representative democracy whereby citizens are given some say, though more often than not, it resembles a form of tokenism (Arnstein, 1969). Irrespective of which approach is utilized, the best interests of society presumably drive the decision making.

Because he believed it is impossible to identify an objective public good, Kingwell (1999) contended it is more useful to think of the public good in terms of *public goods*. Put briefly, public goods or services, such as parks and recreation, are those activities produced intentionally to provide benefit to a community (Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby, & Smith, 1999). In their purest form, public services are non-rival in consumption. That is, the fact that one person benefits from a public good does not prevent another person from doing the same simultaneously. An urban park illustrates the non-rival criterion well because one person's use of the park (e.g., flying a kite), for the most part, does not diminish another person's ability to use it at the same time for another purpose (e.g., walking a dog) with each delivering a satisfying experience. As such, the service is distributed in a manner that places an emphasis upon inclusion and the provision of equal opportunities for consumption. For this reason, Gaster (1995) argued that equitable service provision is what distinguishes the public sector from the commercial and not-for-profit sectors. Efficiency, albeit desirable, is not crucial to this particular mandate, and is perceived to be tertiary to equity and effectiveness (Crompton &

Lamb, 1986). In fact, Goodale (1991) believed any emphasis on efficiency is actually counterproductive to this particular aim of public recreation service agencies.

The second mandate for public recreation service arrangers is *revenue generation.* Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby and Smith (1999) noted that private goods are not necessarily provided by the commercial sector exclusively. In fact, they insist there are many publicly provided private goods produced by governments. To illustrate, Tindal and Tindal (1995) maintained that municipal public services can be divided into two categories--those that do not (or should not) generate revenue and those that do (or can). They further divided the latter category into those that partially subsidize themselves, those that operate at break-even, and those that generate a profit (subject to governmental limitations or restrictions). Certain recreation services are cited as examples of services often delivered to generate a profit for public agencies (e.g., golf courses, marinas, tennis courts). In general, these services tend to be arranged by public recreation service agencies: (1) to generate additional revenue for the production of other services, (2) to compensate for a lack of producers in the area, or (3) to provide an indirect benefit to the wider community (e.g., a marina may beautify an area). User fees are commonly applied to generate revenue from publicly provided private services. In this regard, private goods, unlike public goods, are rival; once the good is provided, there is an additional resource cost if another person wishes to consume the same good. To maintain its commitment to equality, however, public agencies will often waive user fees for those unable to pay (Tindal & Tindal, 1995).

The third mandate for public recreation service arrangers is *to build social capital.* Coleman (1990) defined social capital as the aspects of a social structure that facilitate action. In other words, for Coleman, social capital is found in any sort of social relation that provides a

resource for action. Hence, it is not an attribute of individuals, but rather is inherent in the structure of relations between and among citizens (Foley & Edwards, 1998). To describe the concept further, Newton (1997) conceptualized social capital in three ways. First, he suggested social capital denotes *norms and values* that influence or determine how citizens relate to each other. In this respect, Newton believed,

> social capital is important because it constitutes a force that helps to bind society together by transforming individuals from self-seeking and egocentric calculators, with little social conscience or sense of mutual obligation, into members of a community with shared interests, shared assumptions about social relations, and a sense of the common good (p. 576).

These attitudes are typically conducive to civic engagement (Foley & Edwards, 1997) and public civicness (Stolle & Rochon, 1998). In particular, attitudes and values relating to trust and reciprocity are central to the concept of social capital because, as Newton (1997) posited, these are crucial for social and political stability and co-operation. Trust is equated with the understanding that citizens are interdependent. It is an acknowledgement which "forms the foundations of a cooperative and stable social and political order that encourages voluntary collective behaviour, and it generates the goodwill and understanding that enables citizens to resolve their conflicts peacefully" (Newton, 1997, p. 576). Stolle and Rochon (1998) refered to such behaviour as public capital, a collective form of social capital, which includes values such as tolerance and co-operation toward citizens in general (e.g., a community festival). Trust leads to reciprocity because individuals demonstrate compassion to their fellow citizens with the expectation that, in doing so, others will do the same for them.

Second, Newton conceptualized social capital in terms of *networks* which Stolle and Rochon (1998) believed "link citizens to each other and that enable them to pursue their common objectives more effectively" (p. 47). In this context, networks often take the form of

voluntary and civic associations whose members are bound together by a common interest or goal (e.g., local theatre friends). Foley and Edwards (1997) noted that such voluntary associations emerge to meet both public and private needs. Conceptualized in this manner, social capital exists to varying degrees in social relations of all sorts, albeit only insofar as such relations provide resources for some action, any action (Foley & Edwards, 1998). Memberships in civic associations in a given society tend to be regarded as the primary indicator for examining social capital (Stolle & Rochon, 1998). Foley and Edwards (1998) believed that voluntary networks are necessary to train citizens in participation and the virtues of citizenship.

Third, Netwon (1997) conceptualized social capital in terms of *voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources*. In the context of recreation service delivery, social capital is found in social activities. Whittington (1998) believed such activities are important in a civil society because they teach people both the limits of their capabilities and their interdependence with their fellow citizens. Moreover, he insisted that, through social activities, citizens grow aware of their social interests and learn to rely upon others to help them pursue those interests. As such, Godbey (1997) contended that recreation services play multiple roles which can help build social capital. For instance, he noted that many local government recreation and park departments help organize their community to plan community-wide celebration, festivals that celebrate the heritage of a community or ethnic group within a community. Hemingway (1999), however, indicated that for leisure to contribute to the formation of the social capital necessary for strong citizenship, it must include the attributes of strong democratic citizenship, namely participation, communication, autonomy, and development.

Even though all decisions should, in theory, be determined according to one of the three identified mandates for service provision, it should be noted that, in reality, decisions in some

municipalities are driven more by bottom-line fiscal restraints than by idealistic notions of serving the public good or building social capital. Nevertheless, once the role of the service agency is articulated for the service it wishes to provide, the agency should then ascribe the role of citizens in the process based upon the mandate for service delivery.

### *Citizen Role Identification*

The rationale for distinguishing the role of the citizen is to assist the service arranger (e.g., government agency that arranges the service), first, to define the terms of consumption, and second, to guide the selection of a complementary production model. In the context of public recreation service delivery, the citizen is a "participant" in every circumstance because public recreation services always entail some form of "participation," irrespective of the activity in which the citizen engages. Each identity is conceptualized in terms of the citizen's relationship to the service arranger and service producer, and it supports the dominance of certain dimensions of citizenship (e.g., civil, political, social) over others.

The first role, *citizen-as-beneficiary*, should emerge if the mandate for service provision is to serve the public good. The citizen is treated paternally by the service arranger and service producer and the producer itself is seen as an "expert" that prescribes the appropriate quantity and quality of services to community members with the intent to make the community a better place in which to reside (Pedlar, 1996). As such, the producer is perceived as the central figure in the service delivery process by virtue of its monopoly over the service and its role in determining what it deems "best" for the citizen and the public good (Dower, Rapoport, Strolitz & Kew, 1981). The citizen-as-beneficiary, therefore, is passive because he or she simply uses the services the producer chooses to offer without having much (if any) involvement in the

development of policy or the production of the service. Further, the citizen-as-beneficiary has only a marginal role influencing the selection of services offered because he or she does not have alternatives from which to choose. There are instances, though, where the citizen may have some say in the service delivery process through such vehicles as voluntary boards, but even under these circumstances, the producer ultimately determines the nature of the service the citizen will receive (Arnstein, 1969; Graham & Phillips, 1997; Searle & Brayley, 1993). In short, the citizen-as-beneficiary identity elevates the social dimension of citizenship, but represses the civil and political dimensions by supporting the social rights of citizens through the proliferation of state-determined and welfare-oriented services.

The second identity, *citizen-as-consumer*, should be selected if the mandate for service provision is to generate revenue. The citizen is identified as someone who simply pays for and then uses a particular public service without having much (if any) involvement in the actual arrangement or production of the service. The service arranger and service producer, however, are active because they determine the terms of participation (e.g., the nature of the service). The citizen-as-consumer asserts his or her purchasing power by supporting (through payment) the services which appeal to him or her most. In other words, the citizen shapes the selection of services through consumer demand. Viewed in this manner, the citizen-as-consumer identity supports the citizen's negative right to engage in economic transactions, unencumbered by others. Thus, it fosters civil citizenship orientations, but represses the social and political orientations, by concentrating on the needs (or more likely wants) of the individual without necessarily considering the needs of the community.

By contrast, the third identity, *citizen-as-collaborator*, is selected, in theory, if the mandate for service provision is to build social capital. Conceptualized as a collaborator, the

citizen is viewed as an active member of his or her community and is encouraged to contribute towards the development of policy and the production of services as a voluntary member of a civic association. In this role, citizens recognize themselves as stakeholders in their community and enter into an informal, albeit active, partnership with the service arranger and service producer to deliver public recreation services. The arranger and producer, by contrast, act as stewards of the resources necessary to foster both political and social citizenship orientations (Smith & Huntsman, 1997). As facilitators, they empower citizens to remain engaged actively in the service delivery process and thereby support the political dimensions of citizenship.

**Stage Two: Service Production**

Upon identifying the role of the citizen in the delivery process, the service arranger then uses its enabling authority to select an appropriate service producer which best complements the service mandate and its associated identity for the citizen. Thus, the second stage of the public recreation service delivery process, *service production*, involves the actual distribution of the service. As mentioned, the service producer can include a public recreation service agency itself, a commercial firm, a not-for-profit organization, or even a civic association. In general, though, there are three types of production models from which the service arranger can select: (1) a traditional model of direct provision, (2) a contract model, or (3) a co-production model.

The traditional model of *direct provision* should be selected if the mandate for service provision is to promote the public good and if the role of the citizen is identified as a beneficiary (see Table 2.1). It has been, and continues to be, the most common production model among the three models (Burton & Glover, 1999). Put briefly, the traditional model involves a public

| Table 2.1<br>The Traditional Model of Direct Provision | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Mandate for Service Provision** | | *Serve the Public Good.* The service is produced to enrich the life and promote the well-being of the entire community. |
| **Citizen/Participant Role** | | *Citizen-as-Beneficiary.* A passive role whereby the citizen simply uses the services the producer chooses to supply without having much (if any) involvement in the development of policy or the production of the service. |
| **Producer of Service** | | *A Government Agency.* A federal/central, state/provincial, regional, or municipal/local dedicated to the delivery of park and recreation services. |
| **Role of Producer** | ***Method of Management*** | *Public Administration.* The traditional method for administering public services whereby the political and administrative aspects of government collaborate to determine public policy. |
| | ***Organizational Structure*** | *Government-as-machine.* A traditional public bureaucracy whereby both the super-structure and micro-structure of government are dominated by rules, regulations and standards. Whereas the model offers consistent policies and deliberate execution, it lacks flexibility and responsiveness to individual initiative. |
| | ***Political Underpinnings*** | *Keynesian Economic Principles.* Policies supportive of the progressive expansion of state services. |
| **Type of Good** | | *Merit Good.* A good that benefits all of society, but which is delivered even in those instances where residents show no interest in having such services available. |
| **Model of Equity** | | *Equal Opportunity.* Services are distributed equally to all citizens irrespective of need or the amount of taxes paid. |

agency, either federal, provincial, regional, or municipal, which arranges *and* produces recreation services. As producer, the public agency utilizes a method of management described traditionally as public administration. The method involves collaboration between the political (e.g., elected officials) and administrative (e.g., public administrators) aspects of government to determine public policy in a process referred to as the *policy-administration dichotomy* (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1987). Mintzberg (1996) referred to the organizational structure of such a model as *government-as-machine.* He described it as a traditional public bureaucracy which is dominated by rules, regulations, and standards. Even though this particular structure offers consistent policies and deliberate execution, it lacks flexibility and responsiveness to individual

initiative (Mintzberg, 1996) which explains its tendency to regard the producer as an "expert" (Hemingway, 1999; Pedlar, 1996). This tendency is grounded in the paternalistic notion that the public good should be promoted to recreation participants (Coalter, 1998). Politically, the model is underpinned by Keynesian economic principles which are supportive of the progressive expansion of state welfare. The public recreation services it delivers, therefore, are regarded as *merit goods*, or goods that benefit all of society, but which citizens are likely to under-use, if left to themselves to consume (Coalter, 1998). Given this distinction, the public agency feels compelled to offer such services for the good of the community. Under this premise, services are distributed equally to all citizens irrespective of need or the amount of taxes paid and such decisions are justified on the basis that everyone should be treated the same (Crompton & Lamb, 1986).

Alternatively, the *contract model*, should be selected if the mandate for service provision is profit, which is contracted to produce a public recreation service. As producer, the private agency utilizes a method of management described as the *new public management*. The method advocates the application of business-like (commercial sector management) principles and practices within the public sector (Borins, 1995). The contract model, therefore, supports one of three distinct organizational structures, all of which are identified by Mintzberg (1996). The first structure, *performance-control*, involves the decentralization of government into distinct "businesses" which are guided by performance targets and accountability standards to make the public sector resemble the commercial sector. The second structure, *government-as-network*, is an intertwined system whereby a complex network of temporary relationships are fashioned to work out problems as they arise and are linked by information channels of communication. The

| Table 2.2<br>The Contract Model of Service Production | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Mandate for Service Provision** | | *Generate Revenue.* A mandate (1) to generate additional revenue for the production of other recreation services; (2) to compensate for a lack of producers in a given area; or (3) to provide an indirect benefit to the wider community. |
| **Citizen/Participant Role** | | *Citizen-as-Consumer.* Passive identity whereby the citizen simply pays for and then uses a service without much (if any) involvement in the actual arrangement or production of the service. As a consumer, the citizen presumably shapes the selection of services through consumer demand. |
| **Producer of Service** | | *Private Producer.* A commercial or private, not-for-profit agency. |
| **Role of Producer** | ***Method of Management*** | *The New Public Management.* A model that advocates the application of business-like (commercial sector management) practices within the public sector. |
| | ***Organizational Structure*** | *Performance-Control.* Government is decentralized into distinct "businesses" which are guided by performance targets and accountability standards to make the public sector resemble the commercial sector.<br><br>*Government-as-network.* An intertwined system in which a complex network of temporary relationships are fashioned to work out problems as they arise and are linked by information channels of communication.<br><br>*Virtual Government.* This model resembles the notion that the best government is no government. |
| | ***Political Underpinnings*** | *Neo-conservative.* A political movement that advocates the dismantling of the welfare state and supports reduced state intervention into the workings of the market economy |
| **Type of Good** | | *Private Good.* Only individuals who can afford and are willing to pay for services are permitted to engage in consumption. |
| **Model of Equity** | | *Market Equity.* The service is distributed to people who are willing (and able) to afford for service delivery. By committing to this approach, the state accepts that citizens are not entitled to equal access to certain goods and services and that citizens' needs are only relevant if they can afford to consume. |

third structure, *virtual government*, resembles the notion that the best government is no government; in other words, all public services are produced exclusively by non-governmental agencies. Politically, the contract model is rooted in the rhetoric of the neo-conservatism which advocates the dismantling of the welfare state and supports reduced state intervention into the workings of the market economy (Pierson, 1991). As such, the public recreation services

produced are, for all intents and purposes, *private goods* which are rival in consumption. Rivalness of consumption refers to a situation in which one person benefiting from consumption of a specific service prevents another person from doing so simultaneously (Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby & Smith, 1999). The service remains a type of public good, albeit an impure one, because even under the contract model, state subsidies are often available to those who wish to access services, but are financially unable to pay for them. Given its distinction as a private good, the availability of services is based solely upon supply and demand. Leisure as a public service, in this context, is regarded as a commodity that can be exchanged in a commercial transaction. The service, therefore, is distributed to individuals, groups or neighbourhoods based upon the fee revenues they pay (Crompton & Lamb, 1986). In other words, the amount of money or tax dollars people are willing (and able) to afford for service delivery determines the quantity and quality of services they receive. By committing to this approach, the state accepts that citizens are not entitled to equal access to certain goods and services and that citizens' needs are only relevant if they can afford to consume

Finally, the *co-production model* should be selected if the mandate for the service provision is to build social capital and if the role of the citizen is identified as a collaborator (see Table 2.3). The model involves civic-minded individuals or community groups that participate jointly with a public agency to produce public recreation services of which they, their families or their community are primary beneficiaries (Crompton, 1999). As co-producers, the public agency facilitates production by serving as an enabling agent that takes on the task of co-ordination, referral, and technical assistance (Backman, Wicks & Silverberg, 1997). Further, the public agency attempts to empower citizens by giving them the necessary authority and power to determine the course of actions for their particular communities (Murphy, 1989). Co-

| Table 2.3<br>The Co-production Model of Service Production | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Mandate for Service Provision** | | *Build Social Capital.* A mandate to facilitate the production of the (1) norms and values that influence or determine how citizens relate to each other; (2) networks of citizens who are bound together by a common interest or goal; and (3) voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources. |
| **Citizen Identity** | | *Citizen-as-Collaborator.* An active identity whereby the citizen contributes toward the development of policy and the production of services as stakeholders in their community. |
| **Producer of Service** | | *Civic Association and a Public Agency.* Grass roots organizations participate jointly with a public agency in the production of park and recreation services of which they, their families or their community are primary beneficiaries. |
| **Role of Producer** | ***Method of Management*** | *Facilitation.* The Park and Recreation Agency serves as an enabling agent and takes on the tasks of co-ordination, referral, and technical assistance.<br><br>*Empowerment.* Participants are given authority and power to determine the course of actions for their particular communities. |
| | ***Organizational Structure*** | *Flat.* The organization is structured such that the participants are placed on an equal footing with the public agency in terms of their influence on the activities. |
| | ***Political Underpinnings*** | *Social Democratic.* A political movement which champions social justice, pluralism and the public good |
| **Type of Good** | | *Local Public Goods.* A goods that benefit a particular community or locality. |
| **Model of Equity** | | *Compensatory Equity.* Services are distributed so that disadvantaged groups, individuals, or areas receive extra increments of resources. Under this premise, those with less may receive more, depending upon their particular circumstances. |

production, in this regard, resembles an approach to community intervention called *locality development* (Rothman, 1995). In short, civic minded individuals from a common geographical area are brought together to address collective interests or reconcilable differences with the intention to better their community. Politically, the co-production model is rooted in the rhetoric of social democracy which champions social justice, pluralism, and the public good (Veal, 1998). As such, the public recreation services produced are regarded as *local public goods*, or goods that benefit only the members of a particular community (Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby, &

Smith, 1999). Leisure, in this context, provides a forum that encourages citizens to redefine themselves and their community through the creation of activities that focus upon self-development or community betterment (Smale & Reid, In Press). The co-production model, thus, supports attitudes and habits (or "values") conducive to civic engagement and the emergence of civic associations. Services are distributed by using a compensatory equity approach to address disparity amongst community groups by allocating services "so that disadvantaged groups, individuals, or areas receive extra increments of resources" (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p. 157). Under this premise, those with less may receive more, depending upon their particular circumstances.

**Stage Three: Service Consumption**

In theory, once the service is arranged and produced, *service consumption* follows; though, in reality, production and consumption occur simultaneously (Schiffman & Kanuk, 1997). The third stage of the public recreation service delivery process, therefore, involves indirect payment (e.g., taxes) or direct payment (e.g., user fees) or both, depending upon which the selection of a production model, and receipt, and use of the service rendered. Farquhar (1993) identified three categories of direct recipients of public services. The first category, *voluntary recipients*, includes people who use services at their own discretion. Such recipients include citizens who visit museums, obtain fishing licenses, or request brochures about local recreation programs. The second category, *entitled recipients*, includes people who receive services directed at the general population. Users of public parks are examples of such recipients because the service is produced with the intent to extend its benefits to the entire community. The third category,

*compelled recipients*, includes people who must comply with laws and regulations that are in the public interest. They entail fines for inappropriate behaviour and taxation to finance public services. For example, in Vancouver, British Columbia, in-line skaters at Stanley Park are fined $25 if they skate faster than 20 kilometres an hour. The law is enforced to prevent in-line skaters from inadvertently injuring pedestrians who walk along the paved pathways in the park.

## Service Outcomes: A Critical Examination

In the following section, each model of service production will be discussed in terms of its intended outcomes, notably its alleged strengths, followed by a critical examination of the legitimacy of such claims. Because each model, in theory, follows a particular mandate for service provision, criticisms about its ability or inability to achieve aims of efficiency, effectiveness, equity or the like, although mentioned, may be judged inappropriate if they are counter to the intended mission of the service producer.

### *The Traditional Model of Direct Provision*

The basic argument for the traditional model of direct provision is that, in certain situations, the market fails, thus state intervention is necessary. Direct public provision, in such instances, is believed to be more effective in forwarding certain social purposes (e.g., to serve the public good) than the processes of individual exchange. Moreover, there are certain activities that are of such moral significance that they should not be provided by the market, even if they could be, otherwise they will be tainted by the association with financial exchange and profit (Walsh, 1995).

Externalities are one such example of market failure. They refer to production decisions made by a commercial organization that give rise to costs (negative externalities) or benefits (positive externalities) which are not taken into account by the producer or the consumers (Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby & Smith, 1999). Presumably, action by government ensures that all costs and benefits involved in service production are given their due consideration because the public producer is not motivated by economics or efficiency. Similarly, state intervention can be justified on the basis of information asymmetries between the producer and users. That is, commercial producers often create individual needs which citizens cannot assess for themselves to determine whether or not such a judgement is acceptable. In such cases, the commercial producers may over-supply such goods and services to profit from the user's ignorance. By contrast, the direct public producer is believed capable of correcting such information imbalances by reducing the incentive for the producer to over-produce or the user to under-demand. In sum, there is believed to be a need for political authority and public planning to replace price and exchange (e.g., the free market) as the bases for determining what should be produced and how it should be distributed (Walsh, 1995).

*Implications for Democracy and the Public Good*

The concerns mentioned culminate into a common argument in support the use of the traditional model: the market will not provide adequately for public goods; that is, goods that are inherently available to all and for which one person's use does not preclude their availability to another. A public agency, acting on behalf of all citizens, can, at least in theory, determine the true level of need or demand and produce the welfare-maximizing level of output of public goods. In practice, however, it is difficult to justify the action of the state solely on the grounds

that it produces public goods because it is debatable whether pure public goods exist. Indeed, Malkin and Wildavsky (1991) argued that there is no such thing as a public good in an objective sense, and that it is purely a cultural construct. Kingwell (1999) expressed similar sentiments. As such, Walsh (1995) believed that, "it would be difficult to justify the whole of government activity on the basis of the production of public goods, especially if they are only secondary effects of what are essentially private goods" (p. 7). Although he contended that a great deal of what government does, in direct terms, is concerned primarily with the delivery of benefits to individuals, Walsh believed it is typical to find services that have public aspects, but are also partly private. He concluded, therefore, that the state is not the only institutional alternative to the free market, even for the provision of public goods (e.g., policing).

Even if public goods are non-existent, government is still regarded as an important producer of merit goods (Coalter, 1998). As mentioned, merit goods are goods or services in which it is beneficial to society that all partake adequately, but that individuals are likely to under-use, if left to themselves (Rosen, Boothe, Dahlby & Smith, 1999). To some extent, merit goods can be seen as a special case of public goods. Arguably, recreation services are examples of such goods, particularly if regarded in terms of the agency's role as a promoter of specific leisure activities and facilities. If delivered by the private sector access to such goods may be restricted. By contrast, government, it is argued, can produce and distribute merit goods in such a way that ensures that all have appropriate levels of access to them. It follows, therefore, that government needs to act to deliver merit goods because individuals are not necessarily the best judges of what is in their own or the public good. From the perspective of the state, Coalter (1998) suggested "individual choices are regarded as distorted and the general, societal as well as personal, welfare is maximized by changing people's behaviour by overriding their ignorance,

or negative view, of particular goods, services or activities" (p. 25). He contended that policy and provision, under this premise, represent an attempt to mould civil society and, by implication, citizenship orientations. In essence, the state plays a socializing role which is purposive and seeks to shape the citizenry (Whittington, 1998). The traditional model of direct provision, therefore, supports what Hemingway (1999) referred to as representative democracy. Democracy, in this sense, "requires the direct intervention of political institutions into the development of individual character to instill citizens with a proper sense of social purpose and to serve as a corrective to defects in democratic society" (Whittington, 1998, p. 28). In short, the state sees itself, not simply as a mechanism for the distribution or production of services, but instead, as having its own purposes in expressing and affecting the public good (Walsh, 1995). As such, Hemingway (1999) contended that, as users, citizens "receive benefits and entitlements dispensed by an administrative or professional hierarchy. It is too easy to allow claims of expertise to degenerate into claims of authority [in such circumstances]" (p. 162).

Saunders (1993) questioned whether government should force its own values upon its citizens. "Social cohesion," he wrote, "is best fostered by leaving individuals and the groups they form to get on with their own lives" (Saunders, 1993, p. 79). He insisted social compassion is not something that can be demanded or granted. Instead, Saunders believed compassion arises out of the experience of exercising autonomy and control in one's personal life. Ignatieff (1989) argued that active citizenship or a moral social order cannot be enforced; rather, government can only ensure that the appropriate conditions are present through which such things can develop. Public producers take this to mean that they, as representatives of the citizenry, can only ensure that the appropriate conditions exist that foster social compassion.

But many question whether public producers can truly determine what is in the best interests of society (Hemingway, 1999; Kingwell, 1999; Self, 1993). Niskanen (1971) argued that public administrators under a traditional model expand the production of public services beyond a socially acceptable level because they are rational, self-interested, utility maximizers. Rewards such as status, power, and income are related directly to the size of the department's budget--they are not related to its output. As a result, the traditional organization of government encourages bureaucrats to enlarge their departments and subsequently oversupply public services (Self, 1993). Under such circumstances, innovation is stifled since there is no incentive for public employees to improve, or even change, service delivery.

*Implications for Efficiency*

The expansion of public organizations is regarded as a detriment to efficiency because it leads to increased expense. Under the traditional model, public bureaucracies employ those who produce the services for which they are responsible instead of purchasing them from private suppliers. For every function a government performs, it employs the necessary staff to deliver the service "in-house." The traditional model, therefore, is characterized by its self-sufficiency, and arguably, its waste (Self, 1993). The drive to be self-sufficient, however, has resulted in large public bureaucracies which reinforce the need for the horizontal division of labour and an increasing hierarchy of authority (Walsh, 1995). Thus, inefficiency and waste in the public sector are often linked to the traditional organization of government, namely large-scale bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1996; Self, 1993). Where costs are not weighed against benefits and where the utility maximization of public administrators is dependent upon the maximization of

their budgets, there will be a tendency for the public bureaucracy to oversupply services (Pierson, 1991).

Complaints about the inefficiency of the traditional model are perhaps inappropriate, however, if one considers that the mandate for service provision should be to serve the public good. As mentioned, efficiency, albeit desirable, is not used to measure an agency's success in serving the public good. In fact, some even consider efficiency to be detrimental to the public good (see Glover, 1999a; Goodale, 1991). While Saul (1994) believed that efficiency is "a skill of tertiary importance which can be useful if kept to its proper level and closely controlled" (p. 117), he cautioned that "in places where the primary function is reflection, the intent being to search for solutions . . . efficiency is quite literally the enemy of the public weal" (p. 118).

### *The Contract Model*

Saunders and Harris (1990) insisted the key dimensions of the contract model are its infusion of competition into the public sector, and more importantly, its introduction of consumer choice and the threat of exit. In contrast to the monopoly that characterizes the traditional model, competition presumably introduces to the public sector the process of natural selection which is intended to result in the elimination of standardization of services by allowing citizens to choose among competing services. Under this premise, if a public recreation service agency is unable to respond efficiently to the needs of its consumers, it will be replaced by suppliers that can. An important detail to consider is, however, that alternative producers must be present for competition to exist. Kitchen (1993) suggested that there is no specific number of competitors required to ensure competition, but rather that others do exist.

In many communities across North America, especially in communities with relatively small populations, public recreation agencies are the sole producers of community recreation services (Crompton, 1999). Although this can often be attributed to the fact that certain services are too costly to deliver commercially (e.g., swimming pools, playgrounds, ice rinks), the government maintains a monopoly over service delivery in such instances nonetheless. With the exception of non-participation, citizens in such a scenario have no other alternative than to participate in the programs which are arranged and produced by government. Under such circumstances, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) contended the public producer tends to be unresponsive and inefficient because it lacks sufficient competition from alternative service producers. The introduction of competition presumably forces the producer of a service to respond to consumer demands and improve service delivery or face extinction. In reality, though, a public agency can do little to ensure that it has *any* competitors, never mind a *sufficient number*, without financing such ventures with government grants to stimulate such businesses, a strategy which would be counter to the principles of the free market. Instead, more often than not, competition takes another form. It requires that a number of competing agents are available with whom government may contract to produce a service.

Where there is competition among producers/contractors, Osborne and Gaebler (1992), among others (See: Crompton, 1999; Walsh, 1995), argued that services will be produced less expensively. Cost reduction can be manipulated, though, if prospective bidders co-ordinate their bids to keep their prices high. Savas (1987) believed that municipal agencies can avoid such collusion amongst bidders by dividing their municipalities into sections and seeking competitive bids for each section from both private contractors and in-house producers. He further insisted that, although collusion cannot be condoned or excused, private producers will continue to

deliver services at a more cost-effective rate, even if collusion exists. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that where private producers of public services do not have to compete (e.g., regulated monopolies such as concession stands), they can be just as inefficient as public monopolies (Walsh, 1995). Often, this can be remedied by having several different contractors provide similar services for the public agency, but this rarely happens. Younger (1995) did, however, provide a successful example of such a strategy in Indianapolis, Indiana, with the operation of public golf courses. A lack of a sufficient number of bidders can lead to inefficiencies, too. Indeed, Nichols (1995) revealed that during the tendering process for public recreation service delivery in the United Kingdom under Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), a form of privatization, few bids were submitted during the first round because commercial agencies believed they were too constrained by the expectations of the public agency that organized the bidding process to make a profit. In sum, competition, if employed successfully in the public sector, requires: (1) the absence of collusion, (2) the absence of private monopoly, (3) a sufficient number of competitors to bid for contracts, and (4) minimal constraints.

Apart from competition, Saunders and Harris (1990) advocated exit as a means to enhance the identity of the citizen. "Potentially," Saunders and Harris wrote, "the state represents a major source of producer power and consumer weakness in the sense that those who are employed to provide state services enjoy a captive consumer market" (p. 63). As mentioned, in public monopolies, public producers are not constrained (as private producers are) by the need to please their customers since public sector employees know "these people effectively have nowhere else to go and enjoy no right to withdraw their patronage" (Saunders & Harris, 1990, p. 65). Saunders and Harris argued that citizens who are forced to use and pay

for public services are incapacitated by their inability to exit and take their money elsewhere. Instead, they insisted that citizens are expected to be passive because they are denied the opportunity to make decisions and resolve choices for themselves. In short, "privatization would seem to offer the prospect of a potential shift in power between producers and consumers insofar as the former lose certain rights of control over goods or services while the latter gain them" (Saunders & Harris, 1990, pp. 65-66) By adopting a consumer-oriented approach to the delivery of public services, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argued that government puts the citizen in the "driver's seat."

Clearly, the ability of contract model to render the public sector more responsive to consumer preferences is open to much skepticism. Saunders and Harris (1990) revealed that certain privatization initiatives are designed specifically to change the conditions of consumption, while others are designed to change the conditions and organization of production. Although the former has greater implications for the citizen/participant than the latter, it is the latter form of privatization that is more common. Saunders and Harris acknowledged that the position of citizens remains virtually unchanged under most privatization strategies because the strategy resembles the latter, not the former. They conceded that a contract model that changes the organization of government does have some effect on citizens, but it does not change the essential status of citizens as clients of a publicly funded service. In other words, citizens continue to pay taxes to their local government to organize such services as recreation, and they continue to be exposed to user fees which are also quite common under the traditional model of direct provision.

Nevertheless, Harrison (1991) argued that the emergence of the contract model can enhance rather than diminish citizenship. He proposed that privatized forms of social services

and the introduction of consumer choice amount to an alternative form of modern citizenship. By uniting the concepts of citizenship and negative rights, Imrie, Pinch and Boyle (1996) posited that "the contemporary vision of citizenship is that of an 'active consumer;' a purposeful individual who takes responsibility for his or her own life, providing for him or herself, and exercising choice through his or her purchasing power" (p. 1258). Hemingway (1999) reminded us, though, that "consumers do not participate in the design and manufacture of the products they purchase, and their interactions with sellers are largely cursory and instrumentally motivated" (p. 153). As such, he labeled the consumer role as a weak form of citizenship. Indeed, under the contract model, participants of public recreation services become consumers who view government strictly as a purveyor of services (Mintzberg, 1996). In this regard, the citizen's role in the service delivery process is to make self-interested purchase decisions and to provide feedback to public managers about their satisfaction with the quality of services (Smith & Huntsman, 1997).

*Implications for Service Quality*

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) insisted that such a role benefits citizens because service users are treated to improved service quality. That is, first, government is forced to be more accountable to its citizens by seeking and responding to consumer feedback, to avoid losing business to its competitors. Second, consumer demand ensures that inferior service providers cannot be protected by government as they have been traditionally. In other words, services are eliminated if they do not meet the needs of consumers or if there is not sufficient demand to justify their delivery. Third, a consumer-driven system fosters greater commitment from its citizens. Users

are empowered to make choices which affect the delivery of services thereby becoming true stakeholders in government.

But greater accountability, the elimination of services that fail to attract a sufficient number of "clients," and greater commitment from citizens are all subject to much criticism. First, the type of accountability to which Osborne and Gaebler (1992) referred is anti-democratic. That is, similar to the traditional model, the private producer still determines the nature of the service. Because consumers are unreliable, the producer simply decides what citizens want, then tells them they need it, then sells it to them (Saul, 1994). This process, if perceived to be an accurate portrayal of reality, is by no means accountable to citizens. Second, Crompton and Lamb (1986) believed attendance measures, while important to consider, often fail to recognize the significant contribution of programs that appeal to smaller, yet equally important, groups of citizens. They insisted that the social welfare benefits of such services may justify their existence, irrespective of low attendance rates. It would be contrary to the principles of the free market, however, to retain such services. Third, improved commitment by citizens assumes drastic improvements in service quality which, although presumed to occur, have not been demonstrated empirically. Moreover, after analyzing adult recreational fitness participants' perceptions about similarities and differences among the services produced by a public, commercial, or not-for-profit agency, Bogle, Havitz and Dimanche (1992) found significant sector biases favourable towards the participants' sector choices. Despite revealing short-term and long-term behavioural loyalty to a particular producer, sector bias ranked lowest in importance among ten purchase decision criteria by respondents from all three sectors. Instead, location and price were ranked as the most important variables. These data cannot necessarily be generalized to privatized services, but nonetheless, they suggest that it may be

difficult to determine whether a private producer will have a positive or negative effect on the participation decisions of recreation services. It is reasonable to suspect that locations of recreation services will remain the same, while prices may change after privatization. Thus, it is fair to assume that price will influence whether people purchase privatized services.

*Implications for Equity*

Saunders (1993) believed a shift from beneficiary to consumer represents an opportunity to citizens. He contended that the general populace does not suffer from the ill effects of the contract model; rather, only a marginalized minority which is unable to participate in effective market transactions will endure such problems. Thus, Saunders argued that the general sentiment in modern society is that "there is no obvious economic reason why the state should provide for all in order to support the needs of a minority" (pp. 64-65). In other words, the negative (civil) right to engage independently in economic transactions without interference justifies the denial of social protection because citizens are presumably equipped with the means to look after their own needs. Under this premise, hostility is often directed at the direct provision of social welfare because a comprehensive welfare state is believed to foster a "dependency culture" (Turner, 1986). Instead, fiscal conservatives favour an "enterprise culture" in which individuals secure their own welfare through their own efforts and the role of the state is limited to providing help to those who, for one reason or another, are unable to help themselves. Bottomore (1992) believed the dominance of this perception, which he suspected now embodies many contemporary social policies, has gradually undermined social rights as an attribute of citizenship and placed an emphasis on the contract model. Given this perspective,

negative rights are asserted over positive rights and social citizenship is relegated to a secondary role (Rees, 1995).

The contract model, therefore, changes, or perhaps abandons, the traditional government notion of equity, or equal opportunity. Irrespective of the particular model of equity used to determine distribution decisions, Crompton and Lamb (1986) believed there will always be some opposition to the way services are allocated. As such, Savas (1987) insisted "many who oppose privatization on the grounds that it is unfair to the poor assume mistakenly that privatization requires a pure market arrangement . . . This is not the case at all" (p. 101). Indeed, public recreation service delivery, even if produced by a private producer, still involves government intervention to some extent (Glover & Burton, 1998). Thus, the contract model, with the exception of sale (outright privatization), is not necessarily a pure market approach.

The tendency to charge citizens a fee to access public services is one of the biggest concerns about the contract model because there is a fear that it will marginalize groups that cannot afford to pay for services, thereby creating, or perhaps exacerbating, a society of "haves" and "have-nots." In the context of public recreation services, Ravenscroft (1993) suggested that the most significant distributional effect associated with CCT is the division of society into "leisure gainers," predominantly employed middle class white males and those able to emulate them, and "leisure losers," the remainder of society. He noted that, with the introduction of a contract model, the emphasis of public support shifts from social welfare to social control whereby the fundamental outcome is the reinforcement of an already socially demarcated pluralist society. In other words, the leisure gainers can choose from a wider range of services and opportunities offered at market prices while the leisure losers are left with a minimum of public services, retained mainly via legal commitment or social expediency.

To illustrate, Aitchison (1997) showed that CCT has resulted in local authorities seeking to provide for girls' and women's sport and leisure needs through Youth and Community services and youth and community groups, instead of mainstream recreation services. Not-for-profit organizations have been afforded greater responsibility to meet the needs of women, while commercial contractors have attempted to meet the needs of those who can afford such services. There has been, however, an increase in leisure provision for women, but it has usually been in the form of mass participation which includes revenue generating activities such as aerobics, step aerobics, and general fitness classes. Most of these classes have attracted many more women than men, yet very few of the classes are for women exclusively. Aitchison also noted that it appears that the contractors have been concerned primarily about increasing user numbers rather than widening the range of users or providing facilities for all sections of the community. This approach to service delivery is often referred to as *creaming*. In other words, "contractors are most interested in services that are easy to deliver to users who are easy to serve, and they tend to ignore services that are more difficult to deliver or customers who are difficult to serve" (Crompton, 1999, p. 240).

Given Aitchison's example, it seems evident the contract model, in general, brings about a dramatic shift from equal opportunity and compensatory equity to market equity. Kitchen (1993) reconfirmed this observation by stating: "Clearly, the largest portion of the benefits [of park and recreation services] accrue directly to the users and as such, it seems appropriate [to me] to price the services so as to extract sufficient revenues to cover the costs" (p. 43). The assumption here is that park and recreation services do not benefit the wider community, but rather tend to benefit those who participate in such activities exclusively; as such, only those who participate should pay for service delivery. This strategy, which is driven by the mandate to

generate revenue, is arguably appropriate for those services that are consumed predominantly by the more affluent in society (e.g., public marinas, golf courses).

*Meeting the Needs of Participants*

The contract model, for those who do receive services, arguably meets needs better than the traditional model because a private producer can take advantage of marketing techniques that the public sector chooses not to use or is pressured not to use. The use of marketing techniques by government to deliver public recreation services is often perceived as inappropriate and unethical. Marketing is often chastised for being a euphemism for hucksterism, for its concern about selling programs, for its aim at generating revenues, and for ignoring traditional notions of equity (Crompton, 1991). As a result, practitioners usually adopt an undifferentiated approach to service delivery. In contrast, private producers are able to market services and target specific "customers" to increase their capacity to make a profit. Crompton (1991) defined marketing as "a philosophy which states that the social and economic justification for an agency's existence is the satisfaction of customer wants" (p. 214). Wants, though, are often created through marketing. Coalter (1998) cautioned, however, that "the profit-oriented and supposedly exploitive nature of commercial leisure provision does not automatically mean that it does not provide satisfying forms of social membership and identity" (p. 24). Unquestionably, many people enjoy consuming the leisure opportunities produced by commercial producers. Based upon this premise, marketing can assist with the effective production of public services.

*Implications for Efficiency*

The fundamental argument for adopting a contract model, however, is its contribution towards increased efficiency. Indeed, the contract model is typically adopted over other models of service production when priority is given to improvements in efficiency over improvements to effectiveness and equity. As such, the mandate for service provision is typically (although, not always) associated with revenue generation, as opposed to serving the public good or building social capital. The shift to a contract model has emerged because governments are interested in identifying alternative sources to finance service delivery (Glover & Burton, 1998; Saunders, 1993).

Walsh (1997) noted that, "the purpose of the market is, precisely, that the inefficient shall fail, and the efficient expand" (p. 34). As such, the contract model, which is rooted in market principles, is believed to foster efficiency more so than direct government intervention. In public administration, efficiency is defined as "the use of administrative methods and resources that will achieve the greatest results for a specific objective at the least cost" (Kernaghan & Siegel, 1987, p. 620). Referring to the evaluation of marketing efforts in government and social services, Crompton and Lamb (1986, p. 84) added that "[efficiency] is the answer to the question 'To what degree does the agency produce the output as inexpensively as it could'?" Central to both definitions is the reference to cost savings. Savas (1987) insisted that, "in a world of finite resources, efficiency is an important societal goal" (p. 7). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) declared that a consumer-driven system is more fiscally "responsible" because it matches supply with demand thereby limiting waste taxpayers' money by providing under-used services. Such cost savings have been confirmed, both in the United

States and Canada (International City/County Management Association, 1988; McDavid, 1987; McDavid & Clemens, 1993).

Irrespective of its potential cost savings, Prager (1994) suggested the contract model will only be more cost-effective than other production models if the government itself is unable to take advantage of economies of scale and scope; otherwise, it is no more efficient than the other models. If, for example, a municipality chooses to provide its citizens with a swimming pool, but its population is too small to support such a facility, higher costs will be incurred because scale economies cannot be realized. Under this circumstance, the municipality must decide whether to exit entirely from this area of service provision, arrange for a commercial or not-for-profit organization to deliver the service, or undertake complementary activities to achieve economies of scope whereby services that use similar resources are combined (Prager, 1994). Economies of scope may also involve privatizing specific activities that cut across a number of departments, such as park, trail and horticultural services. Thus, given the argument for economies of scale and scope, if the agency's intention is to reduce the cost of delivery, certain services could be privatized under appropriate circumstances.

Finally, efficiency is argued to follow from a clearer statement of what is to be provided. Under the traditional model of direct provision, municipalities typically either do not know or cannot report accurately the extent of their true costs of producing a service. If asked to identify the true costs of delivering a particular service, city officials will commonly mention the direct operating costs, which may not include all of their indirect costs. This estimate tends to exclude such costs as proportionate share of city overhead, employee fringe benefits, retirement program costs, and capital costs (Poole, 1987). In other words, municipalities are often unaware of the real costs of the services they deliver. This problem extends to program objectives. Very

few parks and recreation departments, for example, determine specific objectives for delivering a particular service and, as a result, are unable to evaluate the program efficiency adequately. This is not surprising, though, considering the aims of such departments are often more focused on serving the public good than on achieving efficiency. Efficiency is simply not the priority.

By contrast, the contract model is argued to stimulate greater measurement of service delivery than other models of service production. With the private production of services, government is forced to be specific and precise about the service standard it wants delivered and clear about the relationship between cost and quality. Further, the contract model forces government to examine existing practice so that it knows the actual cost of the services it delivers (Walsh, 1995). Coalter (1995) confirmed these assertions by reporting that CCT has contributed positively to the clarification of management objectives and a greater emphasis on marketing and promotion. In sum, the contract model is likely the most efficient of the production models based exclusively upon the criterion of cost savings. As such, if the mandate for service provision is revenue generation, the contract model appears to be the most appropriate choice.

### *The Co-production Model*

Tindal and Tindal (1995) indicated that municipal government was designed historically to serve two important functions: (1) service delivery, and (2) politics. Of these two functions, they insisted that the latter one must be paramount because it incorporates the notion that municipal government represents the views and concerns of its citizens and takes action to deal with such concerns. By contrast, the service delivery role is, or at least should be, subservient to the political role so that public services are provided in accordance with the needs and wishes of the

citizenry. For this reason, Kingwell (1999) contended that "the state, if it is legitimate, serves the public good; it never determines it" (p. 56). Such is the premise upon which the co-production model is based. Through a facilitative approach, government uses the co-production model to encourage greater citizen participation with the intent to increase citizen power (Arnstein, 1969). This, in essence, is the ambition of a participatory democracy--it engages citizens in public discourse with the understanding that their expression is meant to assist government in its decision making (Hemingway, 1999). Further, the co-production model helps to affirm one's political citizenship and express one's membership in a political community. Under the democratic conditions of the co-production model, individuals protect citizenship by checking sources of tyranny and the abuse of power (Saul, 1994; Self, 1993). The co-production model, particularly when used in leisure settings (Godbey, 1997; Hemingway, 1999), assists civil society in performing such a function by facilitating the production of social capital. In this regard, civil society has the ability to realize public ends that are autonomous from state power and direction. Whether the emphasis is on "the volunteer spirit" or "social autonomy," the co-production model presumes that citizen initiative and organization enjoy certain advantages over state action and prevent the abuses and failures of state power.

*Implications for Civic Engagement*

Irrespective of the merits of the co-production model, many contemporary public policies suppress political citizenship (Saul, 1995). In place of democratic sources of participation, the state continues to foster what Saul (1994) referred to as corporatism, a system of governance whereby the state is organized according to its ongoing negotiations between itself and its

corporate interests (e.g., economy and efficiency) as opposed to its citizens' social and political interests (Saul, 1995).

Graham and Phillips (1997) posited that the decline of democratic participation and the emergence of corporatism in contemporary Canadian society are the corollary of three developments. First, citizens have developed a lack of trust in political institutions. Graham and Phillips attributed this development to the general public perception that political leaders are opportunistic. In short, elected officials are believed to make decisions based upon what they perceive to be politically (or economically) attractive without consulting the general public. Citizens are often excluded from policy-making process because political representatives deem them incapable of making appropriate decisions or simply because their participation makes the process less efficient. Second, Graham and Phillips documented the decline of traditional forms of public participation such as public hearings, public meetings, and open houses where government officials come face-to-face with citizens to engage them in dialogue (presumably before policies and priorities are set). The financial cost of such processes and the tendency for government to "tell and sell" its policies have led traditional public participation to consequently fall into disrepute by government. Third, government reform has assisted in silencing critics of government. That is, "the need to grapple with the fiscal deficit [during the nineties] has overshadowed concerns about a democratic deficit and, indeed, has often been used as a rationale for circumventing consultative processes completely" (Graham & Phillips, 1997. p. 261). Similarly, McQuaig (1996) chronicled the fear mongering in which the Canadian Federal government participated in order to scare the general public into accepting harsh government cutbacks and the dismantling of the Canadian welfare state. In sum, through the various changes

mentioned, democratic participation has come to be perceived as inefficient, ineffective, and irrational.

But as Saul (1994) indicated,

> democracy is not intended to be efficient, linear, logical, cheap, the source of absolute truth, manned [sic] by angels, saints or virgins, profitable, the justification for any particular economic system, a simple matter of majorities. Nor is it an administrative procedure, patriotic, a reflection of tribalism, a passive servant of either law or regulation, elegant or particularly charming (p. 94).

In short, it is a time-consuming process designed to allow people to have a say in and contribute to their political community. Moreover, it is intended to safeguard people against the tyranny of the state. In this regard, citizens themselves have the responsibility to be active participants in government, otherwise they exclude themselves from shaping public policy (Saul, 1995). Stormann (1993, 1996) believed citizens can only be empowered politically if they become the policy makers for their communities. Such an approach is central to the co-production model of service production.

It is impossible for citizens to participate actively on all issues at all times, but Lowery, DeHoog and Lyons (1992) contended that responsible citizenship involves an attempt to participate actively on some issues, and preferably on many issues. Presently, however, Saul (1995) suggested political apathy on the part of the citizen has resulted in what he referred to as an "unconscious civilization"; that is, a society composed of individuals who are concerned with their own interests, not the public good. Self (1993) believed such apathy will eventually destroy democracy. To avoid such consequences, Saul (1999) suggested that people must get involved in their communities and practice being citizens.

Nevertheless, Saunders and Harris (1990) identified three problems with the use of

democratic processes as safeguards for the individual consumers of public services. First, they contended the capacity for exerting effective control through democratic participatory systems is distributed unequally in society. By and large, those who have the most time, money, education, and personal contacts tend to come out on top while others remain apathetic. Crompton (1999) expressed similar sentiments in regard to public recreation service delivery. In fact, Hemingway (1999) conceded that those at the higher end of the economic scale engage in significantly more political activities, such as contacting and meeting with public officials, engaging in political communication, and taking part in political or governmental meetings, than those at the lower end. Moreover, he acknowledged that

> the more well off are also of course able to use money as a means of participation with greater frequency . . . The ability to combine money with time-based modes of participation appears to increase the utility of that participation; the ability to contribute only time to participation appears to restrict the efficacy of participation. The undemocratic potential of this development is clear" (p. 160)

If empowered, though, citizens should be capable of reconciling such inequities. Arai (1996) argued that "empowerment is a process or a framework that describes changes that occur as an individual, group, or community mobilizes themselves toward increased citizen power" (p. 28). The co-production model deliberately utilizes facilitative methods to empower all interested parties to assist in the development and implementation of public policy. The public agency, in this scenario, actively seeks out and assists its citizens by providing the resources necessary for increased civic engagement.

Second, Saunders and Harris (1990) insisted democratic decision-making is an instrument for delivering resources to different people who want different things. The principle of majority rule often disables minorities who also are entitled to be supplied with what they

want even if the majority does not share their preferences. In addressing this criticism about democracy, it is important, first, to mention the irony of Saunders and Harris' argument because the market itself is designed precisely so that sufficient demand is necessary to supply goods. Nonetheless, Whittington (1998) did concede that civic associations can foster resentment that can lead to political turbulence and distrust. Moreover, he believed that in such a circumstance political conflict arises, not from competing interests per se, but from competing visions of the public good. In contrast to Saunders and Harris, however, Whittington, among others (see Berman, 1997; Greenley, 1997), contended that political institutions are necessary to reconcile such competing interests, for politics involves not only the implementation of policy, but also the determination of which policies to pursue and whether certain kinds of policies should be pursued at all. "Social goals do not emerge innocently from a harmonious civil society but must be constructed through political conflict" (Whittington, 1998, p. 27). Lowery, DeHoog, and Lyons (1992) insisted that democratic citizenship can only develop if citizens engage in active struggle and debate. Moreover, Trudeau (1998) suggested that citizens are more likely to abide by the rules of government if they have a say in what the rules will be. He commented:

> if [government] is to establish an order that citizens will agree to support, the state must go further than merely investigating their needs; it must also encourage them to demand what they consider just. In this way democracy becomes a system in which all citizens participate in government (Trudeau, 1998, p. 64).

Similarly, Ellison (1997) believed debate is vital to social provision because once citizens have "had their say," the process of democracy leads to collectively agreed upon decisions. In the context of public park and recreation service delivery, Hemingway (1996) argued the focus of citizenship, and thus public recreation service delivery, should be discourse. He believed a healthy participatory democracy naturally emerges from this approach.

Third, Saunders and Harris (1990) contended there is an inherent tension in democratic systems between consumer demands and the judgement of "experts." In this regard, their contention rests upon a limited notion of democracy. That is, they equate democracy in its representative form as opposed to its participatory form. Indeed, Saunders and Harris were correct to point out that elected officials, in a representative democracy, do not necessarily represent the views of their constituents. By contrast, a participatory democracy "rests on the more or less direct involvement of citizens in the discussion, selection, and (possibly) the implementation of policy alternatives" (Hemingway, 1999, p. 152). In this regard, the citizen is central to policy development. Moreover, Bowie and Simon (1986) argued that a feature of a true democracy is its provision of civil liberties essential to an election process itself. That is, in contrast to a majoritarian state, a democratic state contains built-in safeguards for individual rights (e.g., Public forums, Charter of Rights and Freedoms) which protect individuals against the dictatorship of the majority. As such, from a service delivery standpoint, Saunders and Harris' observation about democracy fails to recognize the significant role democratic processes play in regard to policy development.

Irrespective of the merits of a participatory democracy, contemporary public recreation service delivery is more representative than participatory, more commercial-like than publicly-oriented (Glover, 1998; Pedlar, 1996). Similar to a commercial business, government attempts to sell its citizens as much as possible while maintaining an arm's length relationship. Mintzberg (1996), however, scorned the public sector for adopting such a relationship. "I am not a mere customer of my government," he wrote, "I expect something more than arm's length trading and something less than the encouragement to consume" (p. 77). Saul (1994) insisted the notion

of government as "they," instead of "we," is a consequence of self-interest asserting itself over the public good. That is,

> every act is an interested act between interested groups. Every act is a contractual act. So there is no way of standing back and saying, 'What are we doing in this society? In what direction are we going? Why do we want to do these things?' Everyone is speaking on behalf of an interest. Because the disinterest of the citizen is eliminated, the interest of the whole is impossible (Saul, 1994, p. 828).

Instead, he advocated disinterest on the part of the citizen; that is, a greater appreciation for the wider community and its state of affairs. Barbalet (1988) believed the looser the notion of community shared by citizens, the more likely it is that citizenship will be a successful source or support of social integration; by contrast, the vaguer the idea of community, the greater the range and diversity of interests and values to be accommodated by it. Community, in this regard, comes logically before the individual and the main responsibility of each citizen is to sustain the community itself. While individuals require resources to enable social and political citizenship, these resources are not regarded as rights, but rather as conditions necessary for the adequate performance of citizen duties (Ellison, 1997). In this way, the co-production model of service production is an attempt to encourage greater participation in community life and to build social capital.

*Implications for Civil Society and Social Capital*

Based upon Hegel's notion of civil society, Foley and Edwards (1998) defined it, first, as "the expression of alienation, of the separation of individuals from one another into competing firms, religious sects, clubs, and institutions," and second, "it is where the mores and morals of a society are grounded, where the interests and views of individuals take shape and gain

expression, and where, individuals are socialized as citizens" (pp. 6-7). More specifically, though, they argued that civil society performs three broad functions through its civic associations. First, through its *socialization function*, voluntary associations play a significant role building citizenship skills and the attitudes crucial for motivating citizens to use their skills. Second, through its *public and quasi-public function*, voluntary associations aid efforts or directly act to provide many of the necessities and adornments of a modern society (e.g., park and recreation services). Third, through its *representative function*, civil society gives identity and voice to the distinct interests and diverse points of view characteristic of a modern society. It stimulates public debate and presses government for action on matters of public interest. In short, the co-production model of service production is designed to facilitate the production of social capital and assist civil society in achieving its intended functions.

Much of the discussion about social capital, however, casts the construct only in a favourable light, and in the context of leisure studies, tends to focus upon the beneficial development of social networks. As Greenley (1997) stated, though, "where [social capital] is present it facilitates the goals of actors, whether the goals be morally and socially desirable or not. It is, therefore, not always a 'good thing,' as much of the current fuzzy-minded discussion about the decline of social capital would seem to suggest" (p. 589). Whereas Whittington (1998) contended that social networks foster social capital which can be converted to social stability and success, he conceded they can foster resentment that leads to political turbulence and distrust too. Political conflict, he believed, arises, not from competing interests, but from competing visions of the public good which are derived and reinforced by unrelated voluntary associations. Social capital, in his opinion,

> is an important instrument for achieving social goals, but concentrating on the formation of social capital begs the question of the ends to which those assets are to be directed. Without equal attention to political institutions, social capital may well be directed against other members of society. Without attention to the constitutional order, social groups may well place demands on state institutions that are undesirable or unsustainable. Given the possibility of social conflict, distrust of government and of others can be a reasonable political choice and not simply the product of a weak society (Whittington, 1998, p. 30).

Foley and Edwards (1997) believed as long as interests differ and competing conceptions of the public good are allowed to express themselves, social capital will inevitability manifest itself in the service of one or another faction. Further, they insisted conflict springs from such competition, and "when it reaches intractable proportions or touches on public resources and the public interest, it must be dealt with politically . . . Politics is the arena where such conflicts must ultimately be confronted, negotiated, mediated, and perhaps, resolved" (Foley & Edwards, 1997, p. 557).

Like Foley and Edwards, Whittington (1998) saw an important role for politics in reconciling such conflict. Politics, he described, involves not only the implementation of policy, but also the determination of which policies to pursue and whether certain kinds of policies should be pursued at all. Indeed, political structures are designed specifically to address conflicting claims by structuring the ways such claims can be advanced, heard, and resolved (Foley & Edwards, 1997). Berman (1997) believed the most important difference between a civil and uncivil polity and a well-functioning and problematic democracy is found in an examination of its political institutions. She wrote: "the more complex and diverse a society, the greater the need for strong political institutions capable of bringing together people with a wide variety of interests and associational affiliations and mobilizing them in the service of societal, rather than individual, goals" (Berman, 1997, p. 568). Further, she contended that if the level of

conflict and the problems confronting civil society grow, but its political institutions do not evolve in such a way as to be able to deal with these changes, political frustration and even instability may follow. In this situation, strengthening civil society may exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem.

Whether the civic associations that form via the co-production model produce social or anti-social capital depends firmly upon the political context. If, on the one hand, political institutions are strong, Berman (1997) believed associations are likely to support political stability and democracy by placing its resources and beneficial effects in the service of the status quo. On the other hand, if political institutions are weak, she insisted that membership in associations may become an alternative to politics for dissatisfied citizens by increasingly absorbing their energies and satisfying their basic needs. In such situations, associations will likely undermine political stability and have negative consequences for democracy by "deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil for oppositional movements" (Berman, 1997, p. 570). A flourishing civil society under such circumstances signals governmental and institutional failure thereby hindering political stability.

Thus, the co-production model, if intended to facilitate the production of "good" social capital, must be supported by a strong public agency which is committed to facilitation *and* mediation among voluntary groups. In other words, the model must not be totally devoid of government intervention. Political meditation is vital to the achievement of successful service outcomes.

## SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This chapter presented in detail the theoretical implications of each model for public recreation service production in order to offer potential explanations why individuals who are exposed to specific models might possess certain citizenship orientations. Based upon the theoretical framework, several research questions emerged. First, are people who are exposed to a particular model of service production, whether it is contract, direct provision, or co-production, more biased in favour of it? This is an important question with which to begin because one cannot infer that attendance at a community centre is, in and of itself, indicative of bias in favour of the way public recreation services are produced at that particular facility. In short, if it is discovered that people were indeed biased in favour of the model to which they were exposed, it suggests the possibility that they may have chosen to participate at that facility of their own volition.

Second, do civil, social and political citizenship orientations differ among people who are exposed to direct provision, contract and co-production? This is clearly the main question in the study. If the way public recreation services are produced does indeed foster certain citizenship orientations, it should be evident in the responses of the participants at each community centre. As noted above, direct provision, co-production and the contract model, theoretically, determine the distinct nature of an individual's participation in the delivery of the service. Consequently, the relationship between the producer and the citizen presumably has implications for citizenship.

Third, do producer biases relative to one's exposure to different models service production contribute to citizenship orientations? In other words, are citizenship orientations

reflective of one's bias in favour of a model of service production, or is exposure to a particular model weighted more in terms of its relative importance to them.

Finally, are the models of service production to which one is exposed and the type of leisure activities in which one participates related to citizenship orientations? Presumably, if public recreation services are delivered in order to mould the individual into the ideal citizen, then perhaps the type of activity in which the individual participates is influential in terms of shaping his or her citizenship orientations. In addition, this study is rooted in the belief that exposure to each model of service production fosters different citizenship orientations, so it is conceivable that differences among the respondents will be present.

# CHAPTER THREE

# METHODS

## INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

The purpose of the study was to examine citizenship orientations and their relationship with the way public recreation services are produced. Four primary research questions emerged from this purpose statement: First, what is the relationship between producer bias and the way public recreation services are produced? Second, do citizenship orientations differ among those exposed to distinct models of service production? Third, to what extent do producer biases and exposure to different models of public recreation service production predict social, civil, and political citizenship orientations? Fourth, are the ways public recreation services are produced and the types of activities in which individuals participate related to citizenship orientations? To answer these questions, the following methods were employed. First, the Citizenship Profile (CP) scale was constructed to measure citizenship orientations. At the time of this study, no scale had been designed with such a purpose in mind, and because social, civil, and political citizenship orientations were the defining variables in the study, scale development was deemed a necessary procedure to measure the construct adequately. Second, a survey design was employed to apply the scale and to test empirically whether exposure to models of service production fostered certain citizenship orientations. The sections that follow in this chapter describe each phase in greater detail.

## PHASE ONE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITIZENSHIP PROFILE SCALE

The most important variables in the study were social, civil, and political citizenship orientations. Because a scale designed for such a purpose was absent from the literature, the development of a reliable and valid scale was necessary. Although there were several people from whom one can draw information about the steps involved in scale development (see, for example, Churchill, 1979; Dawis, 1987; Miller, 1991), the development of the Citizenship Profile Scale adhered, for the most part, to the procedures suggested by DeVellis (1991).

### Step One: Articulation of Purpose

During the first step, the researcher articulated clearly what it was that the scale would measure. The need for scale development to be preceded by, and rooted in, a sound conceptual specification of the construct being measured was emphasized by other scholars such as Churchill (1979) and Peter (1981). Relevant social science theories pertaining to citizenship were consulted prior to the development of a set of items. In doing so, the dimensions of citizenship as conceptualized by Marshall (1992) were chosen as three distinct dimensions (civil, social, and political) upon which the Citizenship Profile (CP) scale was constructed. In addition, the purpose of the CP was articulated to ensure that the scale had a clear frame of reference in order to determine the most appropriate level of specificity based upon its intended function. In short, the scale was designed to elicit views about the role and responsibilities of the government, the community, and the individual from which a citizenship orientation was inferred.

### Step Two: Generation of An Item Pool

Item generation followed two strategies: (1) a thorough review of the literature pertaining to citizenship, and (2) interviews with key informants. The former involved identifying key words and phrases from the literature and adjusting or reconfiguring them to form usable items; the latter strategy was included to assist in the development of items so as to make sure they were grounded in the terms potential research participants would understand. Data collected from interviews informed the generation of items for a standardized scale. Further, the findings illuminated the researcher's understanding of the phenomenon of citizenship and allowed fresh perspectives to emerge that were articulated differently in the literature. For these reasons, combined methods were regarded as an appropriate methodological framework with which to define and operationalize citizenship. The next section will provide a more thorough description of the qualitative interview techniques that were used to generate items.

#### *Using Interviews to Inform the Development of Items*

Qualitative data collection consisted of seven semi-structured interviews with recreation participants from three community centres that supported one of three models of public recreation service production. Four subjects were participants at a facility that co-produced its services with members of the community (e.g., co-production model); two subjects were strictly users at a community centre that was operated exclusively by the local government (e.g., direct provision); and one subject was a user and volunteer at a privatized facility. Due to time constraints and scheduling problems, the number of participants remained unequal. Regardless,

this approach helped capture different views about citizenship from individuals whose participation in the production of public recreation services differed subjectively.

Participants were chosen to participate in this phase of the study because they were identified by an official at their local community centre (e.g., facility manager; executive director) as individuals who were familiar with the services provided, either as volunteers or users or both. Each person was contacted, first by letter, then by phone, informed about the study, and asked to participate in an interview. The interview, it was explained, was intended to assist the researcher in gaining a greater understanding about the meaning of citizenship, and how it was expressed as conceptualized and communicated by actual recreation participants. Each participant agreed to have his or her interview, which ranged from approximately 45 to 90 minutes in length, audio-recorded.

Prior to conducting interviews, a common list of questions was prepared to ensure the data obtained were comparable (see Appendix A). It was important that the information extended the researcher's understanding of citizenship and produced information that would lead to a list of potential items for a standardized scale. In general, questions were designed to assist the participants in articulating their own meanings of citizenship. Concepts that emerged from the data were sought to help explain the dimensions of citizenship more effectively and to subsequently improve the face validity of items. Although the interviews were not transcribed, the audio-tapes were reviewed entirely, and those remarks that offered insight into the development of potential items for the proposed scale were recorded on paper. Ultimately, these comments that were recorded were adjusted or reconfigured to form usable items.

*Item Development*

After interviews were conducted and a thorough review of the literature was undertaken, 68 items were developed. All of the items were selected or created with a specific measurement in mind and reflected the dimension underlying them. In short, each item was viewed as a "test" of the strength of the citizenship construct. Multiple items constituted a more reliable measure than individual items, but each was still intended to be sensitive to the true score of citizenship.

The possibilities for types of items were exhausted within the bounds of the defining construct. Put briefly, the interviews and the review of literature were both employed to determine alternative ways to word an item so as to "get at the construct" (DeVellis, 1991, p. 54). The pool of items that served as the basis of a multi-dimensional scale did not merely share a focus on citizenship, but rather on *specific* dimensions of citizenship, notably its civil, social or political dimension.

At this stage, it was important to be "over-inclusive" while generating a set of items. By using multiple and seemingly redundant items, the content that was common to the items were aggregated across items while their irrelevant idiosyncrasies were cancelled out. Without redundancy, this would have been impossible. Redundancy, however, was tolerated considerably more during the generation of an item pool than in the final scale, even though some redundancy was desirable even in the latter. Because internal consistency reliability was a function of how strongly the items correlate with one another as well as the number of items in the scale, having many items during the item generation stage served as a form of insurance against poor internal consistency. Nevertheless, some items were eliminated based upon *a priori* criteria, notably lack of clarity, questionable relevance, or undesirable similarity to other items.

**Step Three: Review by Experts**

Once an item pool was generated, it was reviewed by four scholars, two of whom were familiar with the citizenship literature and two of whom were intimate with standardized scale development processes, and therefore, understood the necessity of reviewing the items critically. Each individual was asked to confirm or refute the definition of the phenomenon by determining how relevant he or she believed each item was to what was intended to be measured. More specifically, each reviewer was asked to address (1) issues of face validity by evaluating the clarity and conciseness of the items, and (2) issues of content validity by suggesting ways of uncovering the phenomena that were missing from the scale. Because it was presumed that the principal investigator was most intimate with the subject and the purpose for developing the scale, the final decision to accept or reject an item was his responsibility, irrespective of the opinions expressed.

Following the review by experts, the list was distributed to eight graduate students who were unfamiliar with the citizenship literature. The students were asked to comment on the clarity of items, particularly in terms of their ability to understand what was written and their impression of the language used. It was assumed that their lack of familiarity with the literature would assist them in being sufficiently critical of the items. Based upon feedback from the reviewers and students, some items were rewritten to improve their comprehension and readability.

**Step Four: Formatting the Questionnaire**

After the set of items was reviewed and modified accordingly, a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from "very strongly agree" (7) to "very strongly disagree" (1) was attached to each item. When developing items, each one was presented as a declarative sentence, followed by mutually exclusive response options that indicated varying degrees of agreement with or endorsement of the statement. Response options were worded in such a manner so as to imply roughly equal intervals with respect to agreement. Also, an odd number of response options accompanied each statement in order to offer respondents a neutral midpoint to express apathetic disinterest, ambivalence, or "pure" neutrality.

**Step Five: Administration of Questionnaire to Development Sample**

Once the pool of items, in a questionnaire format, was finalized, it was administered to a development sample. For the purposes of conducting factor analysis, Stevens (1986) suggested that the size of a sample was only sufficient if it included at least five subjects per item included in the questionnaire. If a sufficiently large sample was not attained, there were two potential risks to the findings. First, the patterns of co-variation among the items potentially would not be stable. That is, an item that would have appeared to increase the internal consistency would likely have failed to achieve similar results when used on a separate sample. In short, a small developmental sample would have "painted an inaccurately rosy picture of internal consistency" (DeVellis, 1991, p. 78). Second, the development sample would have risked not being representative of the population for which the scale was intended because a small sample was likely to exclude certain types of individuals. Under such a scenario, there were at least two

different types of nonrepresentativeness that could have emerged. With respect to the first type, the level of attribute presented in the development sample may have differed from the intended population. Under this premise, those who comprised the development sample may have differed significantly from the population from which it was meant to be drawn so that the mean score obtained on the scale for the former was appreciably higher or lower than expected for the latter. A mean value of the attribute that was not representative, though, would not necessarily disqualify the sample for purposes of scale development because it may still have provided an accurate picture of the internal consistency the scale possessed, which is the goal of scale development. With respect to the second type, the development sample may have differed qualitatively from the intended population. If it was quite unusual, items would have a different meaning than for people in general. Factor analysis would reveal groupings of interrelated items that would be atypical. The consequences of this type of nonrepresentativeness would harm scale development by portraying inaccurately the underlying structure that emerged. In sum, for the purposes of scale development, it was important that a sizable and representative development sample was selected to which the items could be administered.

**Step Six: Evaluation of Items**

For the initial examination of an item's performance, the relationship of individual items to the true score from the correlations among items was determined. The higher the correlations among items, the higher the individual item reliabilities. The more reliable the individual items, the more reliable the scale they comprised, assuming of course they shared a common latent

variable, in this case citizenship. In short, the first quality sought in the set of scale items was highly inter-correlated items.

Other valuable attributes for a scale included relatively high variance and a mean that was close to the centre of the range of possible scores. If the development sample was truly diverse, the range of scores obtained for an item should have been diverse as well. Generally, items with means too near to an extreme of the response range will have low variances, and those that vary over a narrow range will correlate poorly with other items. In short, an item that did not vary would not co-vary. As such, DeVellis (1991) suggests the pattern of correlations among items can serve as a gauge of their potential value.

Perhaps the most important indicator of the scale's quality, however, was the reliability coefficient, alpha (Cronbach, 1951). Coefficient alpha helped to determine the success of the decision to retain or discard an item. In short, alpha indicated the proportion of variance in the scale scores that was attributable to the true score. Alpha takes on values from 0.0 to 1.0, although it was unlikely that it would attain either of these extreme values. Items were discarded or retained based upon their alpha value. DeVellis (1991) identified his personal preferences for groupings of alpha values: below .60, unacceptable; between .60 and .65, undesirable; between .65 and .70, minimally acceptable; between .70 and .80, respectable; between .80 and .90, very good; much above .90, one should consider shortening the length of the scale. Irrespective of such guidelines, he suggested that researchers should strive for alpha values that are slightly higher than desired because some co-variation among items may result by chance.

**Step Seven: Optimization of Scale Length**

Decidedly, the length of the scale had implications for reliability. The scale's alpha was influenced by two characteristics: the extent of co-variation among the items and the number of items in the scale. Longer scales tend to be more reliable, but shorter scales place less of a burden on respondents. DeVellis (1991) insisted "the issue of trading off reliability for brevity should be confined to situations when the researcher has 'reliability to spare.' When this is, in fact, the case, it may be appropriate to buy a shorter scale at the price of a bit less reliability" (p. 87).

Items that contributed least to the overall internal consistency were the first to be considered for exclusion. These were identified by using the SPSS reliability procedure which showed what effect the omission of each item had on the overall alpha. The items whose omissions had the most positive impact on the overall alpha level were the first to be dropped. The item-scale correlations also were used as the measure to determine the items that were most expendable. Those with the lowest item-to-scale correlations were eliminated first. SPSS also provided a square multiple correlation for each item which was obtained by regressing the item on all of the remaining items. This provides an estimate of communality which identified the extent to which the item shared variance with the other items. Like the item-to-scale correlations, items with the lowest squared multiple correlations were candidates for exclusion. As DeVellis mentioned, these tests of item quality converge. That is, "a poor item-scale correlation tends to be accompanied by a low squared multiple correlation and a small loss, or even a gain, in alpha when the item is eliminated" (DeVellis, 1991, p. 88). As noted, however, scale length affects the precision of alpha. In practice, a computed alpha is an estimate of reliability that depends upon the appropriateness of the measurement assumptions to the actual

data. DeVellis indicated that the "reliability of alpha as an estimate of alpha increases with the number of items" (p. 88). In other words, alpha computed for a lengthier scale has a narrower confidence interval around it than alpha computed for a shorter one. Nonetheless, a longer scale will result in more similar alpha values than will a shorter scale.

## PHASE TWO: SURVEY RESEARCH

After the Citizenship Profile (CP) scale was developed, it was included in a questionnaire to test empirically the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and citizenship orientations. A survey design was selected because of its strengths as a data collection procedure (Creswell, 1994), in that it is economical and large amounts of data can be collected by asking several questions in a relatively short amount of space. Second, the design facilitated rapid turn-around in data collection. Although data collection is often precarious in terms of the actual time it takes to complete, the techniques used resulted in a relatively quick participant response. Third, the survey design was used to identify attributes of a population from small group of individuals. In general, the purpose of the study was to generalize from a sample of public recreation participants to a larger population so that inferences could be made about the extent to which exposure to a model of service production has on participants' social, civil, and political citizenship orientations. In this regard, Babbie (1995) contended that survey research is the best method available to social scientists who are interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly. He further insisted that surveys are excellent vehicles for measuring attitudes and orientations in a large population. Given the intent of this phase of the study, Babbie's observation reflected the underlying purpose for this research.

**Sample**

In order to determine whether exposure to particular models of service production was related to citizenship orientations, responses were gathered from individuals at community centres which supported primarily either a direct provision, contract, or co-production model. The three community centres were: (1) the Waterloo Recreation Complex (WRC) in Waterloo, Ontario; (2) the Tavistock and District Recreation Centre (TDRC) in Tavistock, Ontario; and (3) the Langs Farm Village Association (LFVA) in Cambridge, Ontario. Data were gathered at each site with the expectation that respondents would be familiar with at least one of the models being studied, presumably the one at which they were approached to complete the questionnaire. This procedure ensured that the final sample would include similar numbers of individuals who had been exposed to each form of production model – something not guaranteed in a general population survey.

Services at the WRC were produced using a traditional model of direct provision. That is, the Recreation and Leisure Services Department in the City of Waterloo both arranged *and* produced public recreation services, notably swimming, skating, and running/walking, at the complex. The needs of the WRC users and how they would be met were determined in accordance with the professional judgement of the centre's employees.

The TDRC, by contrast, utilized a contract model. The Township of East Zorra-Tavistock hired a private contractor (a local resident) to operate its recreation centre, which consisted primarily of an indoor ice rink, in addition to a shuffleboard surface, curling rink, and meeting rooms. Ownership of the facility was maintained by the Township. Although the centre

was governed by an arm's length citizens board (each member of the board was appointed by the Town Council), day-to-day operating decisions were made by the contractor who received monetary incentives for keeping the arena schedule booked solidly.

Finally, the LFVA supported a co-production model. Funding for services was received, in part, from provincial and municipal granting agencies, but services were produced in large part by residents in the immediate neighbourhood. Outreach programs and voluntary committees were organized to facilitate active community involvement in the delivery of recreation-related services. The activities delivered by the LFVA were different than the WRC and TDRC in the sense that sport, though resent, was not a major focus. More commonly, the Village Association provided drop-in programs such as "Take a Break," a two hour program available to people who wished to drop off their children and chat with other community members over a cup of coffee. This program, among others, reflected a willingness to provide services that resonated with community members' needs and requests. The delivery of unconventional recreation services -- that is, unconventional in comparison to the services delivered at other community centres -- was expected given the tenets of co-production.

The three facilities were selected deliberately because of the models they represented. It should be noted, however, that none of the three community centres embodied a "pure" example of each model. In certain instances, each displayed attributes that were characteristic of another model. For instance, at each community centre, user fees were charged (not just at the TDRC) and volunteerism was encouraged (it was not exclusive to the LFVA). Moreover, the TDRC, like the LFVA, had a citizen board that overlooked the operation of its facility. A citizen board is not a typical feature of the contract model. Given the impurity of the models, some respondents may have found it challenging to distinguish among the models themselves.

Nevertheless, the selection of the sites was deemed sufficient for the purposes of this study because the present models were reasonably distinct and because it was unlikely that pure models existed in practice.

Each community centre had at least a four-year history of supporting its particular production model. This criterion was desirable in order to improve the possibility that respondents were familiar with the production model at the community centre at which their surveys were collected. The possibility remained, despite this criterion, that some respondents were still unaware of the actual model used to produce services at their community centre, but presumably it enhanced the possibility of familiarity.

In addition to providing recreation services that were produced with a particular model of service production, the communities in which the facility was located provided distinct contextual backdrops for respondents. The City of Waterloo is an urban centre with a population of approximately 80,000 residents. Technology is its leading industry and characterizes Waterloo as a community of white-collar workers. In general, Waterloo residents is largely middle-class, socially moderate individuals whose political preferences are primarily for the Provincial Progressive Conservative Party and the Federal Liberal Party. The WRC is one recreation centre, albeit the largest, among many (including not-for-profit and commercial competitors) from which residents can choose.

The Township of East Zorra-Tavistock, by contrast, is a rural community with a relatively small population within a large geographical area. Most of its residents are employed in the agricultural and farming industry. In general, the population is relatively socially conservative, and it includes few visible minorities. The TDRC is a common meeting place for

residents to gather (e.g., to watch a minor hockey game), and it is the *only* arena of its kind within close proximity to downtown Tavistock.

Langs Farm is an "at-risk" community within a moderately-sized urban centre, Cambridge, population approximately 100,000. Its population is spread out among six or seven neighbourhoods in a well-defined catchment area. The area is characterized by a higher than average unemployment rate, single parent households, and minority groups. In general, many residents are financially dependent upon government for assistance. The LFVA is an important resource from which residents receive social support.

In sum, the mix of respondents from each community was intended to reflect and capture different citizenship orientations. A diverse sample was expected given that the production models and services to which respondents were exposed, and the communities in which respondents lived were so eclectic.

**Instrumentation**

In addition to the inclusion of the CP scale, several additional scales or indices were included in the questionnaire in order to measure the type of activities in which respondents participated and the frequency of their participation, bias in favour of a particular producer, volunteer motivations, and perceived purposes for delivering public recreation. What follows is a more specific description of each one.

*Assessing the Nature and Frequency of Participation*

The type of activities in which respondents participated and the frequency of their participation were measured by using a table divided into four rows and two columns (see Appendix B, Part 1). The four rows were organized by activity type, specifically social, physical, educational, and volunteer activities. Examples of each type of activity were listed under the title of each row to give respondents a more specific idea of the types of activities that fell under each category. For example, under educational activities, workshops, lectures and clinics were mentioned. By contrast, clubs, social gatherings and spectating were listed under social activities. The two columns in the table included, first, the name of the activity, and second, the number of times in a typical month in which the respondent had participated in the activity. The latter column allowed for the collection of ratio data in order to facilitate more advanced statistical analyses, if such analyses were desired.

In addition to the table, two items were included to get a sense of the respondents' indirect involvement at each facility. The first item asked respondents to specify the people in their immediate household who participated in activities at the community centre at which the study was being conducted (e.g., the WRC, TDRC, or LFVA). Seven response options were provided to assist the respondent with his or her answer. The options were: (1) none, (2) child, (3) parent, (4) brother or sister, (5) spouse or partner, (6) roommate, and (7) other. A line was provided for the "other" option on which the respondent could specify the person to whom he or she was referring. Respondents were instructed to check all response options that applied to them.

The second item asked respondents to specify the type of support, if any, that they provided for household member(s) who participated at the community centre at which the study was being conducted. Five nominal response options were provided to assist respondents with their answer. The options were: (1) I don't provide any support, (2) I assist with their instruction, (3) I pay for their enrolment, (4) I provide transportation, and (5) other. Again, a line was provided for the "other" option on which respondents could specify the type of support to which they were referring. Respondents were instructed to check all response options that applied to them. In sum, the inclusion of the table, and in particular, the two items in the questionnaire was an acknowledgement that familiarity with the facilities was not limited exclusively to people who participate. People whose household members participated at a facility, particularly parents of children who participated, were assumed to be concerned about safety issues, program variety, and cost, so their opinions were sought too.

### *Assessing Volunteer Motivation*

The volunteer motivations of respondents who indicated they had volunteered were measured using eight items developed by Statistics Canada for the 1997 National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating (see Appendix B, Part 2). The inclusion of the items was justified as a means to compare respondents who volunteered at each facility. In other words, because volunteer opportunities were available at the WRC, TDRC, and LFVA, a sub-question for research emerged to determine whether the motivations among the three groups of volunteers differed. The items pertaining to volunteer motivations were: "I volunteer because . . ." (1) "it is a cause in which I personally believe"; (2) "I have been personally affected by the cause the organization supports"; (3) "I know someone who has been personally affected by the

cause the organization supports"; (4) "my friends volunteer for the same activities"; (5) "to fulfil religious obligations or beliefs"; (6) "to explore my own strengths"; and (7) "to use my skills and experiences". Also, after consulting with the contacts at each facility before the survey was distributed, the executive director at LFVA suggested the addition of two items for a total of ten. The items were: "I volunteer . . ." (1) "to give something back to my community," and (2) "to get to know the people who live in my community". Respondents were asked to check the response option on a seven point Likert-type scale from "very strongly agree" (7) to "very strongly disagree" (1) that best indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement.

### *Assessing the Purpose of Providing Public Recreation*

Based upon the review of literature, ten items were developed to determine what respondents' perceived were the purposes of providing public recreation at the community centre with which they were familiar (e.g., WRC, TDRC, or LFVA) (see Appendix B, Part 4). The model of contemporary public recreation service delivery was developed under the assumption that the mandate for service provision determined the particular model of service production. The inclusion of the items helped to determine whether perceived purposes for public recreation differed among respondents from each facility.

The first mandate mentioned in the model was to serve the public good. Three items were developed to operationalize this mandate. The items were: "The [City of Waterloo, Township of East Zorra-Tavistock, or the LFVA] provides recreation related services in order to . . ." (1) "promote the well-being of the entire community," (2) "contribute towards the overall success of the community," and (3) "encourage people to participate in activities in which they would otherwise not take part." The third item was developed as an attempt to get

at the idea of the public provision of merit goods. The second mandate for service provision, as mentioned in the model, was to generate revenue. The following two items were developed to operationalize this mandate: (1) "to generate additional money so as to afford to provide other services," and (2) "to make a profit." The model includes a third mandate for service provision: to build social capital. The three items that were developed to operationalize this mandate were: "The [City of Waterloo, Township of East Zorra-Tavistock, or the LFVA] provides recreation related services in order to . . ." (1) "promote healthy norms and values within the community," (2) "create opportunities for people to get to know their fellow community members," and (3) "encourage residents to help each other so as to better their community." Each item relating to social capital attempted to reflect, in layperson's terms, Newton's (1997) three conceptualizations of social capital: values and norms, social networks, and the facilitation of voluntary resources and facilities. Finally, two additional items were included which, arguably, though important, fail to fall under a specific mandate. They were: (1) "to improve the community, whether the services are used directly or not," and (2) "to compensate for a lack of other services in the area." The first item related to urban reform wherein recreation facilities and services were perceived to make a community a more desirable place in which to live simply because they were there. The second item was assumed to be a rationale for delivering public goods, in addition to private goods. In responding to each item, the research participants were asked to check the response option on a seven point Likert scale from "very strongly agree" (7) to "very strongly disagree" (1) that best indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement.

*Assessing Producer Biases*

In order to study respondents' preferences for a particular producer (e.g., commercial contractor, public agency, or voluntary association), a modified version of Havitz's (1989a) Sector Bias Instrument (SBI) was included in the questionnaire (see Appendix B, Part 5). The instrument was included in order to determine whether social, political, and civil citizenship orientations were related to bias in favour of a particular model of production. Though the SBI was intended originally to measure participants' perceptions of government agencies and commercial businesses exclusively (Havitz, 1989a), the instrument has been used to measure perceptions of not-for-profit agencies as well (Bogle, Havitz, & Dimanche, 1992).

The SBI was analyzed originally in three different contexts (Bogle, Havitz, & Dimanche, 1992; Havitz, 1989a; 1989b). In the 1989 study, factor analysis revealed two dimensions: professionalism and empathy. Items comprising the empathy dimension were later found to describe two distinct dimensions in the latter two studies: empathy and creativity. The professionalism dimension remained unchanged in each analysis.

Reliability for the SBI has been high. Havitz (1991), for instance, reported that alpha coefficients for the total scale were .93 in the public sector context and .94 in the commercial sector context. These coefficients suggested the items that comprised the SBI were internally consistent, and that the items were equally reliable in both the public and commercial sector contexts. The three sub-scales scores also were acceptable (empathy = .88; professionalism = .88; and creativity = .83), indicating that items within the various sub-scales were measuring the same facets of sector bias.

Certain modifications were made to the SBI to make it more relevant to the present study (see Appendix B). First, the names of the sectors were replaced with the names of

producers. That is, instead of mentioning the public, commercial, and not-for-profit sectors, descriptions of three service production arrangements were mentioned. The first scenario read: "if recreation activities were arranged and produced by the municipality and its staff;" the second read: "If recreation activities were arranged by the municipality, but produced by a for-profit contractor;" and the third scenario read: "If recreation activities were arranged by the municipality, but produced by a group of volunteers." The changes were made to adjust the scale to reflect the nature of the study. Second, as Bogle, Havitz and Dimanche (1992) suggested, the same set of items was used simultaneously to analyze more than one producer. That is, the three producers were scored simultaneously for each item with the type of arrangement being listed vertically as a variable for each item. By doing so, respondents were able to visually relate their scores for each producer on the same line. This meant that respondents were able to make comparisons between arrangement in addition to within each arrangement.

**Procedures**

The contacts at each community centre -- the facility manager, private contractor, and executive director at the WRC, TDRC, and LFVA respectively -- were shown the instrument before data collection commenced. Each managerial contact provided feedback on the questionnaire and mutually agreed upon the inclusion of items. The final draft was pilot tested with eight graduate students. Changes to the survey were made based upon their feedback. In particular, revisions were made to part five of the survey, the Sector Bias Instrument, in order to word the

instructions and scenarios more clearly. The final version of the survey is provided in Appendix B.

Strategies for data collection were devised to reflect various degrees of familiarity with the production models. In order to gather responses from a wide array of people who represented broadly participants at each community centre, each contact from the three community centres was asked to provide a comprehensive list of appropriate times and places that certain individuals and groups could be reached. The community centres were visited at the recommended times and places, and questionnaires were distributed to groups scheduled to meet at those times. Groups were selected based upon the recommendation of the contacts who indicated that they were frequent users of the facility and contributed to its overall character. During group meetings, the researcher described the nature of the study and appealed to the group members to complete a questionnaire. The number of questionnaires distributed was equal to the number of people present at the meetings.

For those individuals who visited the centres on their own (e.g., not part of a scheduled group meeting), an attempt was made to introduce a degree of randomness to the selection process. Relatively small groups of individuals typically could be found at the LFVA and TDRC at any one time, so it was possible to approach and ask all individuals to complete a questionnaire. At the WRC, which is a much larger facility with several possible access points, the researcher rotated from the front entrance, to the entrance to the ice rink, to the concession stand, and to the swimming gallery, spending approximately 20 minutes at each spot. At each location, all passersby were approached and asked to complete a questionnaire.

Incentives were offered to motivate respondents to complete a questionnaire. At the WRC, respondents were eligible to win a pass for 25 free visits to the centre, a prize valued at

$40.00. Upon submitting a completed questionnaire, each respondent was given a ballot to fill out for the draw. At the completion of data collection, a ballot was drawn from those submitted, and a winner contacted. Similarly, at the LFVA, the executive director donated two "good food boxes" that respondents were eligible to win if they submitted a completed survey. The boxes were part of the association's campaign to promote good nutrition among families in the community. The donation of the boxes was intended to bring further attention and publicity to the association's campaign. By contrast, using an altogether different strategy, the private contractor at the TDRC donated a free can of pop to each person who submitted a completed questionnaire. The strategy was quite effective because users and spectators typically purchased food at the arena's concession stand, so many were willing to take ten to fifteen minutes to complete a survey. A table was set up in close proximity to the pop machines in order to entice people to take advantage of the incentive. The relatively small number of people at the facility at one time enabled the researcher to keep track of people in order to avoid having any individual fill out more than one questionnaire.

In general, respondents were asked to complete questions themselves, but to those who requested it, help was available. For some, the format of certain questions was difficult to understand, so assistance and clarification were necessary. Moreover, because some respondents had reading difficulties, in certain cases, the survey was completed by the investigator who read the questions aloud to participants and recorded their responses. The clear advantage of distributing the surveys in-person was that the researcher could ensure that each respondent completed the entire questionnaire, thereby improving the number of useable surveys collected.

Given the strategies used for data collection, the actual representativeness was undetermined, however. The time of year that the study was performed (perhaps a poor reflection of the participants who use the facility) and the methods used for selecting respondents introduced an indeterminate amount of sampling error, and hence, gave no assurances that the sample would be representative of the desired population. Indeed, the desired population presumably included citizens residing within geographically community-defined boundaries, but participation at the three centres was not limited on such a basis. Therefore, the actual population served was relatively nebulous. Instead, a conscious trade-off was made to ensure that questionnaires were collected from individuals who were familiar with at least one of the three production models under investigation. The procedures that were followed were expected to capture various insights into the citizenship orientations of diverse groups of people, thus the findings were not intended to imply any "truisms" about the models and their influence on citizenship. Rather, they were intended to provide some insights into the relationship, if any, between citizenship and service production. The results served as a point of departure from which further research might be conducted.

**Data Analysis**

A series of parametric statistical analyses were conducted to examine the relationships between citizenship orientations and the way recreation services are produced. The dependent and independent variables used in the study, their relevance to the research questions of interest, and the corresponding study questionnaire items are outlined in Table 3.1.

## Table 3.1
## Variables, Research Questions and Questionnaire Items

| Variable Names | Research Questions | Items on Questionnaire* |
|---|---|---|
| *Independent Variable 1:* Exposure to Co-production, direct provision and the contract model (Respondents from the LFVA, WRC, and TDRC).<br><br>*Dependent Variable 1:* Biases in favour of direct provision, co-production and the contract model. | *Question 1:* Are respondents biased in favour of the model of public recreation service production to which they are exposed?<br><br>*Sub-Question 1a:* Are LFVA respondents biased in favour of co-production?<br><br>*Sub-Question 1b:* Are WRC respondents biased in favour of direct provision?<br><br>*Sub-question 1c:* Are TDRC respondents biased in favour of a contract model? | *Independent Variable:* categories were determined by distinguishing among survey identification numbers which indicated the community centre from which the survey was collected.<br><br>*Dependent Variables:* a combined mean score from each 15 item sub-scale derived from the modified Sector Bias Instrument in Part 5 of the questionnaire. |
| *Independent Variable 2:* Exposure to Co-production, direct provision and the contract model (Respondents from the LFVA, WRC, and TDRC).<br><br>*Dependent Variable 2:* Civil, social and political citizenship orientations | *Questions 2a:* Do individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and the contract model differ in terms of their civil citizenship orientations?<br><br>*Questions 2b:* Do individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and the contract model differ in terms of their social citizenship orientations?<br><br>*Questions 2c:* Do individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and the contract model differ in terms of their political citizenship orientations? | *Independent Variable 2:* categories were determined by distinguishing among survey identification numbers which indicated the community centre from which the survey was collected.<br><br>*Dependent Variable 2:* A combined mean score of each six item sub-scale derived from the Citizenship Profile scale in Part 3. |

* A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B

## Table 3.1
## Continued

| Variable Name | Research Question | Item on Questionnaire* |
|---|---|---|
| *Predictor Variables 3a:* Biases in favour of direct provision, the contract model, and co-production.. | *Question 3a:* To what extent do biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production, and the contract model explain the variations in civil citizenship orientations? | *Predictor Variable 3a: A* combined mean score from each 15 item sub-scale derived from the modified Sector Bias Instrument in Part 5 of the questionnaire. |
| *Predictor Variables 3b:* Exposure to Co-production, direct provision, and the contract model (Respondents from the LFVA, WRC, and TDRC). | *Question 3b:* To what extent do biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production, and a contract model explain the variations in social citizenship orientations? | *Predictor Variable 3b:* Dummy variables created to distinguish between those from the LFVA and those who were not; and those from the WRC and those who were not. |
| *Criterion Variables 3:* Civil, social and political citizenship orientations. | *Question 3c:* To what extent do biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production, and a contract model explain the variations in political citizenship orientations? | *Criterion Variable 3:* A combined mean score of each six item sub-scale derived from the Citizenship Profile scale in Part 3. |
| *Independent Variable 4a:* Exposure to Co-production, direct provision, and the contract model (Respondents from the LFVA, WRC, and TDRC). | *Question 4a:* Are the ways public recreation services are produced and the types of activities in which respondents participate related to civil citizenship orientations? | *Independent Variable 4a:* categories determined by distinguishing among survey identification numbers which indicated the community centre from which the surveys were collected. |
| *Independent Variable 4b:* Participation in social, physical, educational and volunteer activities. | *Question 4b:* Are the ways public recreation services are produced and the types of activities in which respondents participate related to social citizenship orientations | *Predictor Variable 2b:* Dummy variables were created for each activity to distinguish between those who participated in social, physical, educational and volunteer activities and those who did not participate. |
| *Dependent Variable 4:* Civil, social and political citizenship orientations. | *Question 4c:* Are the ways public recreation services are produced and the types of activities in which respondents participate related to civil citizenship orientations? | *Criterion Variable 2:* Sub-scales derived from the Citizenship Profile in Part 3. |

* A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B

# CHAPTER FOUR

# RESULTS

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the findings from: (1) the development of the Citizenship Profile (CP) scale and (2) analyses of survey data from the main study which was conducted to determine the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and citizenship. The first section includes the results of scale development, including an analysis of the reliability and factor structure of the CP scale. In short, the scale was designed to elicit views about the role and responsibilities of government, community, and individuals from which a citizenship orientation was inferred. The second section includes a summary of the findings from the analyses of the survey data conducted to investigate the following questions: First, what is the relationship between producer bias and the way public recreation services are produced? Second, what is the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and citizenship? Third, to what extent do producer biases and exposure to different models of public recreation service production predict social, civil and political citizenship orientations? Fourth, are the ways leisure activities are produced and the types of activities in which individuals participate related to citizenship orientations? The findings for each question are addressed in the analyses that follow in the second section of the chapter.

## SCALE DEVELOPMENT

The following section focuses on scale development. It includes a description of the techniques used to condense the instrument, an examination of the dimensionality of the scale, and a report

on the reliabilities of its components. Information about data collection and scale purification are provided.

**Data Collection**

The 68-item instrument was administered to a convenience sample of 280 undergraduate students. The students who comprised the sample were enrolled at the University of Waterloo during the 1999 Fall semester. Classes were selected purposively in order to represent a wide array of thoughts and opinions about government and its role in the delivery of public services. Admittedly, there was a danger in assuming that the views of university students were representative of the general public; however, a mean value of the attribute that is not representative does not necessarily disqualify the sample for purposes of scale development. While it may yield inaccurate expectations for scale means, it still provides an accurate picture of the internal consistency the scale possesses (DeVellis, 1991). It was conceivable, however, that the development sample differed qualitatively from the intended population. Nevertheless, for practical reasons, the sample consisted of groups that were easily accessible.

For the purposes of conducting a factor analysis, the size of the sample was important. In scale development, the patterns of co-variation among the items are stable only if the sample size is sufficiently high. If the sample had been too small, an item that appeared to increase internal consistency may have failed to achieve similar results when used on a separate sample. In short, a small developmental sample can produce an inaccurate picture of internal consistency. Thus, for greater reliability, Gorsuch (1983) suggested that "a present suggested absolute minimum ratio is five individuals per variable, but not less than 100 for any analysis"

(p. 332). By Gorsuch's estimate, then, a minimum of 340 participants were required for a 68 item scale. Based upon cumulative total of item non-response, however, and as per instructions that appeared on the questionnaire which directed participants to: (1) circle the number that corresponded to questions that confused them, and (2) underline words they did not understand, 15 items were eliminated before any statistical analysis was done. The evidence provided by participants suggested face validity problems with all 15 of the items, and therefore, justified their removal. With the elimination of these items, 53 items remained thereby requiring a minimum sample size of 270 participants.

**Scale Purification**

Based upon strong support within the literature for the mutli-dimensional nature of the citizenship construct, the number of factors underlying the set of items was determined, *a priori*, at three (Marshall, 1992). Initially, the civil dimension included 17 items, the social dimension included 16 items and the political dimension included 20 items. In order to offset the items-to-case ratio quandary reported earlier, factor analysis was performed separately for each dimension so that three unidimensional scales were developed. One factor was forced for each scale. It was assumed that such a strategy would sort out the items that best represented each dimension before subjecting the remaining items to a factor rotation.

Coefficient alpha was computed separately for each of the three dimensions to ascertain the extent to which items shared a common core. The criteria used to decide whether an item was dropped from the scale included the item's corrected item-to-total correlation and whether its elimination improved the corresponding alpha values. For a sample size of 280, Stevens

(1986) suggested .315 as the approximate critical value for evaluating the significance of a loading. Irrespective of his suggestion, and in order to be more conservative, all items that fell below the .500 were dropped. This decision was consistent with procedures used by Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel (1989) and Zaichkowsky (1985) to purify psychometric multiple-item scales. In short, during the first round of the scale purification, items were removed from each unidimensional scale until ten items remained (see *round one* in Table 4.1 for the civil dimension; Table 4.2 for the social dimension; and Table 4.3 for the political dimension). The practicality of reducing the large list of items to develop a more parsimonious scale required such a strategy.

During the second round of scale purification (see *round two* in Table 4.1 for the civil dimension; Table 4.2 for the social dimension; and Table 4.3 for the political dimension), the sub-scales were further reduced to six items each in order to place less of a burden on respondents in forthcoming field studies. Although a reduction from six items to ten for each sub-scale may not appear to be onerous for research participants at first glance, readers should consider that each sub-scale combined to form a larger scale on the questionnaire. In other words, if left intact, the CP would have included 30 items; if reduced, though, it would include only 18. The decision to trade off reliability for brevity was made because there was reliability to spare.

Similar criteria were adopted to determine which items would be retained, with the exception that one item was kept based upon its theoretical relationship to the dimension, as articulated in the literature. For the social dimension (see Table 4.2), item 50, "I have an obligation to support the sort of institutions that provide local government services," was retained over item 44, "Government has an obligation to eliminate the inequality between the

poor and wealthy in society," even though the latter achieved a more impressive factor loading. It was believed, however, that item 44 was similar to another item that was included already, notably item 54, "I expect government to provide subsidies to those in need." Therefore, because item 50 included a concept that would have otherwise been excluded from the final version, it was deemed worth retaining. Such a strategy was believed to be permissible because all items at this stage had exceeded the minimum criteria for retention and, for all intents and purposes, could justifiably be retained to create a 10 item sub-scale. Although six items were retained for each sub-scale, the last four items that were dropped from each sub-scale can, and should, be used in future studies where additional reliability is desirable. In other words, for all intents and purposes, the CP is composed of 30 items, but for the sake of more brevity, only 18 items were used in the main study.

The six items that survived the reliability analyses for each sub-scale were subjected collectively to exploratory factor analysis, forcing a three factor solution with a varimax rotation. Because a simple factor structure had been determined, varimax rotation, the most common rotation method, was selected. As reported in Table 4.4, the test yielded meaningful item groupings and strong unambiguous loadings. Those with high loadings on each factor were grouped together. By referring to the content of the factor on which the items loaded most heavily, one can discern the nature of the construct that each factor represented.

As expected, all of the items loading strongly on Factor 1 concerned the social dimension of citizenship; those loading on Factor 2 concerned the political dimension; and items loading on Factor 3 concerned the civil dimension. There were three mixed loadings. The first, "I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live,"

**Table 4.1**
**Results from Civil CP Sub-Scale Purification**

| Item | Factor Loading | |
|---|---|---|
| | Round One | Round Two |
| Item 2: People should pay the full cost of the government services they wish to use. | .398* | - |
| Item 9: I should have the freedom to buy things I want without any interference from government. | .576 | .614** |
| Item 10: The government should not impose obligations upon me. | .581 | .607 |
| Item 11: I have a right to take advantage of my economic success without losing a large portion of it to support others. | .702 | .693 |
| Item 13: As a working person, I have a right to economic well-being. | .381* | - |
| Item 14: If I wish to use any of the services provided by my local government, I should pay for them out of my own pocket. | .444* | - |
| Item 22: I have the right to make moral choices as I see them, not how the government sees them. | .586 | .626 |
| Item 23: I believe government should not interfere with my individual rights. | .650 | .677 |
| Item 32: There is no reason why the government should re-distribute to the rest of society the money I earn. | .616 | .598** |
| Item 41: My individual rights are more important than the rights of my community. | .146* | - |
| Item 43: I have a responsibility to be in control of my own life, without intrusion from government. | .736 | .739 |
| Item 53: Other than myself, no one has a responsibility to be accountable for my life. | .466* | - |
| Item 55: I have the right to focus on my own private concerns, not the concerns of my community. | .479* | - |
| Item 57: I should not be required to share with the rest of my community the money I earn. | .670 | .641 |
| Item 58: I do not see myself adhering to the rules of government, I am my own person. | .464* | - |
| Item 59: I have the right to pursue my own version of the good life, not the government's version. | .610 | .604** |
| Item 64: i should be able to use the money I earn as I see fit, without government intervention. | .775 | .801 |

* Indicates items that were dropped from scale after round 1. ** Indicates items excluded from main study following round 2

loaded more strongly on the political dimension (.596), but showed some connection to the social dimension (.415). In addition to its implied participatory democratic approach to policy development, the item, conceivably, relates to the development of social networks and social trust, two concepts central to a social citizenship orientation. The second mixed loading, "I have

## Table 4.2
## Results from Social CP Sub-Scale Purification

| Item | Factor Loading | |
|---|---|---|
| | Round One | Round Two |
| Item 6: Government has a responsibility to provide services that will enhance my community. | .598 | .577** |
| Item 7: I trust in my local government to distribute its services fairly to each member of my community. | .311* | - |
| Item 20: Government has a responsibility to provide services that will improve the inequalities in my community | .583 | .586** |
| Item 29: If I wish to live in a good society, I have a responsibility to share my wealth with others. | .614 | .699 |
| Item 30: I have a duty to pay the taxes that are needed to finance adequately the local government services in my community. | .612 | .645 |
| Item 33: That which is good for my community, is also good for me. | .446* | - |
| Item 34: I have a right to a share in the social heritage of my society. | .554* | - |
| Item 44: Government has an obligation to eliminate the inequality between the poor and wealthy in society. | .594 | .647** |
| Item 48: I trust in my local government to distribute its services equally to each member of my community. | .474* | - |
| Item 49: I am entitled to access any local government service in my community, if I so choose. | .569* | - |
| Item 50: I have an obligation to support the sort of institutions that provide local government services. | .606 | .595 |
| Item 52: I have a duty to contribute at least the minimum taxes necessary so that others can live an independent life. | .636 | .671 |
| Item 54: I expect government to provide subsidies to those in need. | .741 | .788 |
| Item 56: Government has a responsibility to ensure that I attain a degree of economic security. | .538* | - |
| Item 60: I am entitled, as a resident of my community, to participate in any tax supported services. | .577 | .517** |
| Item 66: Government has a responsibility to provide services that will alleviate the inequalities in my community. | .731 | .770 |

* Indicates items were dropped from sub-scale following round 1. ** Indicates items excluded from main study following round 2

a right to take advantage of my economic success without losing a large portion of it to support others," fell strongly on the civil dimension (.549), but it also fell under the social dimension (.494). Likewise, the third, "I should not be required to share with the rest of my community the

## Table 4.3
## Results from Political CP Sub-Scale Purification

| Item | Factor Loading | |
|---|---|---|
| | Round One | Round Two |
| Item 3: I should have some say in the way my community is organized politically. | .514* | - |
| Item 4: Within reason, I have a democratic responsibility to make political activity a priority in my life. | .469* | - |
| Item 16: I refuse to be a passive spectator who watches elected officials make decisions for me. | .534* | - |
| Item 17: I have a duty to inform myself about what is going on in my community. | .503* | - |
| Item 18: My local government should rely on its residents for the information it needs to make decisions. | .531* | - |
| Item 24: In my community, local government decision making should involve any citizen who wishes to participate in such a process. | .527* | - |
| Item 26: If I wish to influence local government decision making in some way, I have a responsibility to join a voluntary board. | .490* | - |
| Item 28: My opinions should influence the services local government provides in my community. | .534* | - |
| Item 36: I have a responsibility to connect and talk with my fellow citizens about community issues and decisions. | .646 | .676 |
| Item 37: I should have a say in the local government services that are provided in my community. | .783 | .797 |
| Item 38: I have a right to participate in my community in more substantial ways than by merely choosing political leaders. | .730 | .745 |
| Item 39: I have a right to be involved in discussions about the local government services provided in my community. | .779 | .803 |
| Item 40: My local government should base its decisions largely upon the feedback it receives from its residents. | .671 | .666** |
| Item 45: In my opinion, democracy goes beyond simply voting in an election. | .586* | - |
| Item 46: The exercise of my democratic freedoms requires a great deal of effort and commitment on my part. | .450* | - |
| Item 51: I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live. | .620 | .676 |
| Item 61: In my community, local government decision making should involve any resident who wishes to participate in such a process. | .675 | .673** |
| Item 62: I have a duty to share my views about local issues with my fellow community members. | .635 | .657** |
| Item 65: I have a right to attend public meetings to discuss issues of importance to my community. | .663 | .693 |
| Item 67: My political involvement should go beyond simply electing representatives to represent my views. | .666 | .667** |

* Indicates items dropped from the scale following round 1. ** Indicates items excluded from main study following round 2

## Table 4.4
## Summary Results from CP Scale Purification

| Item | $\bar{x}$ | Factor 1 (SD) | Factor 2 (PD) | Factor 3 (CD) | Comm unality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| If I wish to live in a good society, I have a responsibility to share my wealth with others. | 4.41 | **.773** | .102 | .199 | .647 |
| I have a duty to contribute at least the minimum taxes necessary so that others can live an independent life. | 5.00 | **.738** | .130 | .063 | .566 |
| I expect government to provide subsidies to those in need. | 5.28 | **.720** | .263 | .027 | .588 |
| I have a duty to pay the taxes that are needed to finance adequately the local government services in my community. | 5.27 | **.695** | .180 | .075 | .521 |
| Government has a responsibility to provide services that will alleviate the inequalities in my community. | 5.24 | **.594** | .296 | .083 | .448 |
| I have an obligation to support the sort of institutions that provide local government services. | 4.75 | **.585** | .224 | .025 | .393 |
| I have a right to be involved in discussions about the local government services provided in my community. | 5.96 | .130 | **.837** | .099 | .728 |
| I have a right to participate in my community in more substantial ways than by merely choosing political leaders. | 5.90 | .033 | **.802** | .109 | .657 |
| I should have a say in the local government services that are provided in my community. | 5.73 | .182 | **.777** | .122 | .652 |
| I have a right to attend public meetings to discuss issues of importance to my community. | 6.21 | .202 | **.664** | .152 | .505 |
| I have a responsibility to connect and talk with my fellow citizens about community issues and decisions. | 5.28 | .230 | **.647** | .035 | .473 |
| I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live. | 5.45 | .415 | **.596** | .062 | .532 |
| I believe government should not interfere with my individual rights. | 5.28 | .098 | .057 | **.805** | .662 |
| I have a responsibility to be in control of my own life, without intrusion from government. | 4.62 | .90 | .039 | **.785** | .626 |
| I should be able to use the money I earn as I see fit, without government intervention. | 4.93 | .254 | .145 | **.769** | .678 |
| I have the right to make moral choices as I see them, not how the government sees them. | 5.29 | .090 | .023 | **.733** | .545 |
| I have a right to take advantage of my economic success without losing a large portion of it to support others. | 4.94 | .494 | .273 | **.549** | .619 |
| I should not be required to share with the rest of my community the money I earn. | 3.96 | .479 | .019 | **.501** | .482 |
| Eigenvalues | | 5.073 | 3.716 | 1.532 | |
| % Variance Explained | | 28.186 | 20.642 | 8.509 | |
| % Cumulative Variance | | 28.186 | 48.828 | 57.337 | |
| Alpha | | .82 | .83 | .81 | |

Note: Higher mean scores indicate higher agreement with statement

money I earn," loaded more strongly on the civil dimension (.501), but it also fell under the social dimension (.479). It is not immediately clear why these items loaded on the social

dimension as well as the civil dimension, especially because the two factors are based upon theoretically conflicting notions of citizenship -- one supports self interest, the other supports public interests. The data suggested the possibility of face validity problems with both items.

Nevertheless, the three factor solution accounted for 57.3% of the total variation in the data. A good factor solution is one that explains the most variance with the fewest factors. Diekoff (1992) indicated that, "in practice, we are usually happy with a factor solution that explains 50-75% of the variance in the original variables with one quarter to one-third as many factors as there are variables" (p. 338). Because the items-to-factors ratio was 18 to 3, the three factor solution explained a sufficient amount of the original variance to be deemed an acceptable set of dimensions related to citizenship.

## MAIN STUDY, SURVEY RESEARCH

The rationale for developing a scale to measure civil, social and political citizenship orientations was that citizenship was the defining variable in the study, and at the time, no scale had been designed with such a purpose in mind. Scale development was deemed a necessary procedure to measure the construct adequately. Subsequently, survey research was conducted to apply the scale and to test empirically the relationship between exposure to models of service production and social, political and civil citizenship orientations. The remainder of this chapter summarizes the results of this research. The findings are organized into three sections: a demographic profile, a leisure behaviour profile, and a citizenship orientation profile.

## A Demographic Profile

The first section provides a demographic profile of the three samples from the main study. In particular, respondents' sex, age, education level, financial circumstances, employment status, and volunteer activity are presented. In addition, because awareness of the community centres was not limited to direct participation, data regarding the presence of members in the respondents' immediate households who participated in leisure activities, and the support that respondents provided to these individuals, are also included.

### *Data Collection: Narrative and Numbers*

In total, 304 respondents completed questionnaires. Of that total, 69 were collected from individuals attending on-site group meetings and 235 were collected from individuals visiting on an individual basis. The former approach accounted for a 40% return rate as 171 surveys were actually distributed to group members. By contrast, the latter approach accounted for a 92% return rate as 255 surveys were distributed to individuals. The success of the latter strategy was not surprising because it was expected that personal one-on-one contact between the participant and the researcher would entice individual participants and spectators to complete and return surveys. It should be noted, however, that some people who were approached individually to complete surveys declined to do so. The most common excuses included not being a member of the particular community in which the community centre was located, not having sufficient time to complete the survey on-site (even though participants were instructed that they could take the survey home and return it during their next visit to the centre), not wanting to interrupt their present activity, and not having sufficient interest in the study to complete the questionnaire.

Individuals who declined to fill out a survey were not included in the calculation of the response rate because they did not receive a questionnaire. As such, 8% of individuals who were actually handed a survey failed to return it.

Of the 304 surveys that were gathered, 103 (33.9%) were collected from the Waterloo Recreation Complex (WRC), 100 (32.9%) were collected from the Langs Farm Village Association (LFVA), and 101 (33.2%) were collected from the Tavistock District Recreation Centre (TDRC). A summary of the demographic information of the respondent from each community centre is presented in Table 4.5. In sum, the respondents from the WRC were generally young, well-educated (reported at least some community college), and employed. Their perceived financial circumstances were satisfactory to quite comfortable. Likewise, the respondents from the TDRC also were young, well-educated, and employed and their perceived financial circumstances could be described as satisfactory to comfortable too. In general, the respondents from the TDRC were remarkably similar to the ones at the WRC. The respondents from the LFVA, however, were generally younger, less well educated, fewer of them were employed, and their perceived financial circumstances were slightly less optimistic than the respondents from the WRC and TDRC. Also, it is important to note that there were more women who responded to the questionnaire from the LFVA than from the other two community centres.

***Participation in Immediate Household and Support***

Because familiarity with the community centres and the way they were operated was not limited to direct participation, respondents were asked to specify the people within their immediate

## Table 4.5
## Comparison of Demographic Information Among Respondents

| Characteristic/Category | | Community Centres[a] | | | | | | Overall | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | WRC* | | LFVA* | | TDRC* | | | |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| SEX | Males | 55 | 53.9 | 29 | 29.0 | 50 | 49.5 | 134 | 44.2 |
| | Females | 47 | 46.1 | 71 | 71.0 | 51 | 50.5 | 169 | 55.8 |
| AGE | < 24 | 7 | 6.7 | 14 | 14.0 | 6 | 6.0 | 27 | 9.0 |
| | 25 to 34 | 20 | 19.5 | 31 | 31.0 | 21 | 20.0 | 72 | 23.9 |
| | 35 to 44 | 46 | 45.5 | 30 | 30.0 | 50 | 50.0 | 126 | 41.9 |
| | 45 to 54 | 21 | 20.8 | 11 | 11.0 | 11 | 11.0 | 43 | 14.3 |
| | 55 to 64 | 5 | 4.9 | 11 | 11.0 | 2 | 2.0 | 17 | 5.6 |
| | 65+ | 2 | 2.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 11 | 11.0 | 16 | 5.3 |
| EDUCATION | | | | | | | | | |
| Elementary School | | 1 | 1.0 | 2 | 2.0 | 5 | 5.0 | 8 | 2.7 |
| Some High School | | 5 | 5.0 | 19 | 19.0 | 9 | 9.0 | 33 | 11.0 |
| High School Diploma | | 10 | 9.9 | 30 | 30.0 | 20 | 20.0 | 60 | 19.9 |
| Some Community College | | 13 | 12.9 | 15 | 15.0 | 8 | 8.0 | 36 | 12.0 |
| Completed College | | 21 | 20.8 | 12 | 12.0 | 23 | 23.0 | 56 | 18.6 |
| Some University | | 12 | 11.9 | 12 | 12.0 | 10 | 10.0 | 34 | 11.3 |
| Bachelor's Degree | | 22 | 21.8 | 5 | 5.0 | 18 | 18.0 | 45 | 15.0 |
| Graduate Degree | | 17 | 16.8 | 5 | 5.0 | 7 | 7.0 | 29 | 9.6 |
| FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES | | | | | | | | | |
| "I just can't seem to make ends meet." | | 1 | 1.0 | 10 | 10.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 11 | 3.7 |
| "I have just enough to make ends meet." | | 11 | 11.0 | 24 | 24.2 | 11 | 11.5 | 46 | 15.6 |
| "Once all my responsibilities are met, I have just a little left to play with." | | 41 | 41.0 | 34 | 34.3 | 28 | 29.2 | 103 | 34.9 |
| "My present circumstances are quite comfortable." | | 41 | 41.0 | 28 | 28.3 | 52 | 54.2 | 121 | 41.0 |
| "I have all that I need and more." | | 6 | 6.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 5 | 5.2 | 14 | 4.7 |
| EMPLOYMENT STATUS | | | | | | | | | |
| Employed full-time | | 76 | 75.2 | 35 | 35.0 | 63 | 64.3 | 174 | 58.2 |
| Employed part-time | | 17 | 16.8 | 23 | 23.0 | 16 | 16.3 | 56 | 18.7 |
| Unemployed | | 5 | 5.0 | 22 | 22.0 | 7 | 7.1 | 34 | 11.4 |
| At home, retired or students | | 3 | 3.0 | 20 | 20.0 | 12 | 12.3 | 35 | 11.7 |
| ORGANIZATION TYPE | | | | | | | | | |
| Public | | 16 | 17.4 | 7 | 12.9 | 18 | 23.3 | 41 | 18.4 |
| Commercial | | 62 | 67.4 | 35 | 64.9 | 52 | 67.7 | 149 | 66.9 |
| Not-for-profit | | 14 | 15.2 | 12 | 22.2 | 7 | 9.0 | 33 | 14.7 |
| VOLUNTEER ACTIVITY | | | | | | | | | |
| Volunteered | | 18 | 17.5 | 50 | 50.0 | 33 | 32.7 | 101 | 33.2 |
| Did not volunteer | | 85 | 82.5 | 50 | 50.0 | 68 | 67.3 | 203 | 66.8 |
| OVERALL | | 103 | 33.7 | 100 | 32.0 | 101 | 33.3 | 304 | 100.0 |

[a] WRC = Waterloo Recreation Complex; LFVA = Langs Farm Village Association; TDRC = Tavistock District Recreation Centre

household who participated in activities at their community centre (see Appendix B, Part 1 for the specific item). In doing so, it was assumed that some respondents were only familiar with the centre to the extent that their child, sibling, spouse, parent or roommate participated. Table 4.6 provides a summary of the percentage of respondents from each community centre that identified such individuals. Excluded from the table is a description of the "other" category. In sum, respondents from the WRC reported the following "other" individuals: children with special needs (2%), friends (2%), grandchildren (2%), and grandparents (1%); respondents from the TDRC reported grandchildren (1%), and nephews (1%); and respondents from the LFVA reported friends (1%), foster children (1%), and nieces (1%). In short, besides the provision of adult and senior programs at each facility, children's programs were also offered. The emphasis on such programs, though, was less at the LFVA than it was at the other two community centres. Perhaps this explains why fewer LFVA respondents reported having children who participated at the centre. Other than children, and spouses or partners, respondents reported having few of the other household members participating.

**Table 4.6**
**Percentage of Respondents who reported Immediate Household Members who Participate in Activities**

| | WRC | | LFVA | | TDRC | | Overall | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | % | n | % | n | % | n | % |
| Child | 81 | 78.6 | 42 | 42.0 | 75 | 74.3 | 198 | 65.1 |
| Parent | 22 | 21.4 | 13 | 13.0 | 18 | 17.8 | 53 | 17.4 |
| Sibling | 5 | 4.9 | 3 | 3.0 | 5 | 5.0 | 13 | 4.3 |
| Spouse or Partner | 32 | 31.1 | 22 | 22.0 | 35 | 34.7 | 89 | 29.3 |
| Roommate | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 2.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.6 |
| Other | 7 | 7.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 2 | 2.0 | 12 | 3.9 |

In addition to specifying the people in their immediate household who participated at their community centre, respondents were asked to indicate the ways in which they supported

those individuals, if at all. Response categories included assisting with instruction, paying for enrolment, providing transportation, and an "other" category where respondents could list support they provided that was absent from the list. Table 4.7 provides a summary of the percentage of respondents from each setting that indicated providing support. The results from the "other" category included the following: WRC respondents reported giving encouragement (3%), watching (6%), discussing activities (2%), coaching (1%), and providing equipment (1%); TDRC respondents reported providing encouragement (4%), home instruction (1%), fundraising (2%), coaching (1%), participating with their child (1%), special promotions (1%), sitting on board (1%), and volunteering if needed (1%); and LFVA respondents reported providing encouragement (2%), self-esteem building (1%), and participating in similar activities (1%). Again, in sum, respondents from the LFVA appeared to differ from the respondents from the other two community centres in terms of the support they provided to their immediate household members. This was likely reflective of the lower socio-economic conditions in Langs Farm (Davidson, 1996), which conceivably meant that LFVA respondents had fewer resources (e.g., financial, automobile) with which to support the leisure activities in which members of their immediate household participated.

**Table 4.7**
**Percentage of Respondents who Provided Support for people in their Immediate Household**

| | WRC | | LFVA | | TDRC | | Overall | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | % | n | % | n | % | n | % |
| Assisted with Instruction | 21 | 20.4 | 9 | 9.0 | 18 | 17.8 | 48 | 15.8 |
| Paid for Enrolment | 78 | 75.7 | 28 | 28.0 | 71 | 70.3 | 177 | 58.2 |
| Provided Transportation | 84 | 81.6 | 24 | 24.0 | 74 | 73.3 | 182 | 59.9 |
| Other | 14 | 13.9 | 4 | 4.0 | 13 | 12.0 | 31 | 10.2 |

*Summary*

In sum, the respondents from the WRC and TDRC were similar in terms of their demographic profile. They were relatively young, well-educated (reported at least some community college), and employed. Their perceived financial circumstances were satisfactory to quite comfortable. LFVA respondents, by contrast, were generally younger, less well educated, fewer of them were employed, and their perceived financial circumstances were slightly less optimistic than the respondents from the WRC and TDRC. Also, a greater number of women responded to the questionnaire from the LFVA than from the other two community centres. Finally, a lower percentage of LFVA respondents, in comparison to those from the WRC and TDRC, reported immediate household members who used the services at the LFVA, and a lower percentage of them reported providing support for their immediate household members who did participate. The profile of these communities is not uncharacteristic of the communities in general.

**A Leisure Behaviour Profile**

The following section provides a leisure profile of the respondents at the three sites. In particular, the total number and frequency of social, educational, volunteer, and physical activities in which respondents participated are reported. In addition, a comparison of volunteer motivations and the perceived purposes of public recreation at the community centres are presented.

### *Comparing Participation Type and Frequency Levels*

Respondents from each community centre reported the number of social, physical, educational, and volunteer activities in which they participated, in addition to the frequency of their participation in each activity during a typical month. Table 4.8 reports the results from a comparison of the total number of educational activities in which respondents from the LFVA and the WRC participated. Respondents from the TDRC were excluded from the test because they reported participating in no on-site educational activities, which in itself is a notable difference. Respondents from the LFVA participated in more educational activities, such as workshops, lectures and clinics, than did respondents from the WRC. Further, they participated in educational activities more often than respondents from the WRC. This finding was not surprising because the LFVA offered several educational outreach programs to assist residents within their community. This finding likely reflects the lack of opportunities available at the WRC.

**Table 4.8**
**Comparison of Participation in Educational Activities at the LFVA and WRC**

| Item | Site | n | Mean | SD | t | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Number of Educational Activities in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | .81 | .66 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | .16 | .36 | -8.764 | 201 | <.001 |
| Frequency* of participation in educational activities in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | 1.39 | 2.11 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | .37 | 2.02 | -3.521 | 201 | .001 |

* Frequency refers to the total number of times that respondents participated in an activity

Comparisons of the total number of physical, social, and volunteer activities in which respondents participated and the frequency of their participation are reported in Table 4.9. While there were no differences among respondents in terms of the total number of social activities in which they participated, respondents from the LFVA and TDRC participated more frequently in social activities than those from the WRC. The low scores reported by respondents

**Table 4.9**
**A Comparison of Participation in Social, Physical and Volunteer Activities Among Respondents**

| Item | Site | n | Mean | SD | F | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical Activities | | | | | | | |
| Total Number in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | .11 [a] | .31 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | .92 [b] | .86 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | .94 [b] | .72 | 49.82 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| Frequency* of Participation in a typical month | LFVA | 100 | .50 [a] | 1.70 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | 4.45 [b] | 6.12 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | 5.02 [b] | 8.18 | 16.99 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| Social Activities | | | | | | | |
| Total Number in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | .57 | .69 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | .50 | .64 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | .66 | .72 | 1.38 | 2, 301 | .253 |
| Frequency* of Participation in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | 2.09 [a,b] | 3.52 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | 1.12 [b] | 1.77 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | 3.52 [a] | 6.15 | 8.45 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| Volunteer Activities | | | | | | | |
| Total Number in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | 5.73 [a] | 1.65 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | 3.91 [b] | 1.62 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | 4.49 [b] | 1.78 | 15.27 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| Frequency* of Participation in a Typical Month | LFVA | 100 | .77 [a] | 1.01 | | | |
| | WRC | 103 | .19 [b] | .44 | | | |
| | TDRC | 101 | .42 [b] | .68 | 13.54 | 2, 301 | <.001 |

* Frequency refers to the total number of times that respondents participated in an activity
[a b c] Superscripts accompanying mean scores indicate groups significantly different from one another using Scheffe post-hoc test.

from the WRC, though, were likely due to the lack of social events held at the complex on a weekly or monthly. More commonly, the WRC tended to program annual social gatherings, such as Octoberfest celebrations, New Year's Eve Parties and Dances. By contrast, the LFVA respondents routinely gathered on a weekly basis in programs such as "Take a Break," and TDRC respondents regarded the recreation centre as a common gathering spot.

In terms of the total number of physical activities in which respondents participated, such as sports, fitness and strength training, those from the LFVA participated in fewer than did those from TDRC and WRC. Further, they participated less frequently than did respondents from the TDRC and WRC. The low mean score reported by respondents from the LFVA likely resulted from the fact that there were few physical activity programs in which LFVA participants could enroll, unlike at the other two community centres where physical activities, such as hockey and figure skating, were decidedly the dominant program offering.

As regards volunteering, respondents from the LFVA volunteered for more activities than did those from TDRC and WRC. Further, they volunteered more frequently than did respondents from the TDRC and WRC. The difference between respondents from the LFVA and the other community centres was not surprising, however, considering that the LFVA supported a co-production model which encouraged volunteerism. The differences may have been as much a reflection of the differences in available opportunities as behavioural differences, though.

### *Comparison of Volunteer Motivations*

Volunteers, for the most part, shared similar motivations. Comparisons of the volunteers at the TDRC, WRC, and LFVA revealed few significant differences in terms of their motivations for volunteering (see Table 4.10). Only three of the ten items measuring volunteer motivations yielded significant differences. For two of the three, however, post hoc analyses failed to report any significant differences among the groups of volunteers. The two items were, "I volunteer to get to know the people in my community", and "I volunteer to improve my job opportunities." Ostensibly, the variation among responses was sufficient enough to be significant at the .05 level

overall, but it was not enough to result in significant differences between specific pairs of groups. On the third item where differences were significant, LFVA volunteers were found to be more likely than those from the TDRC to volunteer to explore their own strengths. The data

**Table 4.10**
**Volunteer Motivations Among Respondents**

| Item | Site | n | Mean | SD | F | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I volunteer because it is a cause in which I personally believe | LFVA | 50 | 6.12 | 1.04 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 6.54 | 1.13 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 6.09 | 1.46 | .70 | 2, 103 | .501 |
| I volunteer because I have been personally affected by the cause the organization supports | LFVA | 48 | 5.00 | 1.92 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 5.15 | 1.68 | | | |
| | TDRC | 42 | 5.60 | 1.64 | 1.28 | 2, 100 | .284 |
| I volunteer because I know someone who has been personally affected by the cause the organization supports | LFVA | 48 | 4.58 | 1.99 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 3.77 | 2.17 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 4.93 | 1.99 | 1.68 | 2, 101 | .191 |
| I volunteer because my friends volunteer for the same activities | LFVA | 48 | 3.38 | 2.18 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 3.08 | 1.66 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 2.84 | 1.94 | .80 | 2, 101 | .451 |
| I volunteer to improve my job opportunities | LFVA | 48 | 3.90[a] | 2.20 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 2.38[a] | 1.80 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 3.19[a] | 2.03 | 3.13 | 2, 101 | .048 |
| I volunteer to fulfill religious obligations or beliefs | LFVA | 48 | 2.35 | 1.92 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 1.92 | 1.26 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 2.65 | 2.05 | .79 | 2, 101 | .459 |
| I volunteer to explore my own strengths | LFVA | 49 | 5.08[a] | 1.92 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 4.69[a, b] | 1.70 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 4.00[b] | 1.99 | 3.63 | 2, 102 | .030 |
| I volunteer to use my skills and experiences | LFVA | 48 | 5.54 | 1.49 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 5.77 | 1.74 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 5.14 | 1.88 | .99 | 2, 101 | .377 |
| I volunteer to give something back to my community | LFVA | 48 | 6.17 | 2.01 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 5.77 | 1.00 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 5.86 | 1.54 | .74 | 2, 101 | .479 |
| I volunteer to get to know the people who live in my community | LFVA | 48 | 5.75[a] | 1.38 | | | |
| | WRC | 13 | 4.54[a] | 1.98 | | | |
| | TDRC | 43 | 4.88[a] | 2.05 | 3.93 | 2, 101 | .023 |

Note: Higher scores indicate higher agreement with statement
[a b] Superscripts accompanying mean scores indicate groups significantly different from one another using Scheffe post-hoc test.

indicate that LFVA respondents viewed their volunteering as a way to foster their own individual development. By contrast, because the activities for which TDRC respondents volunteered were primarily sport-related, such as coaching and sitting on athletic boards, they may have perceived their volunteer involvement to be less about individual growth and more about helping others (e.g., their children). Apart from this finding, it appears that volunteer motivations, for the most part, do not differ at the three community centres. It should be noted, though, that the sample size of volunteers at the WRC (n=13) was small relative to the sizes of the volunteer samples at the LFVA (n=48) and TDRC (n=43). The low sample size may have influenced the outcomes of the tests and led to a Type II error.

### *Comparing Perceptions About the Purposes of Public Recreation*

Comparisons of respondents from the WRC, TDRC, and LFVA revealed statistically significant differences among the three groups for nine of the ten items developed to assess the perceived purposes of public recreation (see Table 4.11). Most of the differences were between LFVA respondents and the respondents from the WRC and TDRC. That is, respondents from the LFVA agreed more strongly that the purpose of public recreation at their community centre was: (1) to promote the well-being of the entire community, (2) to encourage residents to help each other so as to better their community, (3) to encourage people to participate in activities in which they would otherwise not take part, (4) to compensate for a lack of other services in the area, (5) to promote healthy norms and values within the community, and (6) to create opportunities for people to get to know their fellow community members. These differences reflected a strong community focus at the LFVA.

Moreover, LFVA respondents were significantly more likely than respondents from the WRC to agree that the purpose of providing public recreation at their community centre was (1) to contribute to the overall success of the community, and (2) to improve the community, whether the services were used directly or not. This difference illustrated a greater willingness,

**Table 4.11**
**Perceived Purposes of Public Recreation**

| Item | Site | Mean | SD | F | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| To promote the well-being of the entire community | LFVA | 6.57[a] | .81 | | | |
| | WRC | 6.10[b] | 1.03 | | | |
| | TDRC | 6.10[b] | 1.27 | 6.72 | 2, 301 | .001 |
| To encourage residents to help each other so as to better their community | LFVA | 6.34[a] | 1.10 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.29[b] | 1.28 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.47[b] | 1.40 | 19.86 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| To contribute to the overall success of the community | LFVA | 6.35[a] | .93 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.70[b] | 1.25 | | | |
| | TDRC | 6.00[a,b] | 1.25 | 8.08 | 2, 299 | <.001 |
| To encourage people to participate in activities in which they would otherwise not take part | LFVA | 6.07[a] | 1.25 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.38[b] | 1.34 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.55[b] | 1.40 | 7.36 | 2, 301 | .001 |
| To compensate for a lack of other services in the area | LFVA | 5.73[a] | 1.65 | | | |
| | WRC | 3.91[b] | 1.62 | | | |
| | TDRC | 4.49[b] | 1.78 | 30.10 | 2, 296 | <.001 |
| To improve the community, whether the services were used directly or not | LFVA | 5.55[a] | 1.79 | | | |
| | WRC | 4.81[b] | 1.48 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.24[a,b] | 1.27 | 5.88 | 2, 296 | .003 |
| To promote healthy norms and values within the community | LFVA | 6.24[a] | 1.27 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.79[b] | 1.07 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.44[b] | 1.38 | 10.52 | 2, 300 | <.001 |
| To create opportunities for people to get to know their fellow community members | LFVA | 6.22[a] | 1.19 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.24[b] | 1.22 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.55[b] | 1.28 | 16.60 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| To make a profit | LFVA | 2.61[a] | 1.81 | | | |
| | WRC | 3.38[b] | 1.78 | | | |
| | TDRC | 4.03[c] | 1.98 | 14.70 | 2, 301 | <.001 |
| To generate revenue in order to provide other programs and services | LFVA | 5.09 | 1.91 | | | |
| | WRC | 4.55 | 1.56 | | | |
| | TDRC | 4.97 | 1.59 | 2.86 | 2, 299 | .059 |

Note: Higher scores indicate higher agreement with statement
[a b c] Superscripts accompanying mean scores indicate groups significantly different from one another using Scheffe post-hoc test.

on the part of LFVA respondents, than WRC respondents to support the provision of services that benefit the broader community. Further, LFVA respondents were less likely than other respondents to agree that the purpose of public recreation at their community centre was to make a profit. This finding also was not surprising given that individuals exposed to a co-production model of service production are presumably less interested in profiting from the services delivered at their community centre.

Respondents from the WRC and TDRC responded similarly on most of the items. These results lend support to the notion that direct provision and the contract model foster similar attitudes towards recreation services. Despite their similarities, however, respondents from the WRC did differ statistically from respondents at the TDRC in one category. As expected, they were significantly less likely to agree that the purpose of public recreation at their community centre was to make a profit. Respondents from the TDRC, in general, agreed that this purpose was consistent with the mandate at their community centre, whereas respondents from the WRC did not.

Finally, respondents from each community centre agreed that one of the purposes of public recreation at their community centre was to generate revenue in order to provide other programs and services. While the mean differences were not statistically significant, they were certainly very close to being so ($p<.06$), and therefore, were worth noting. Perhaps surprisingly, LFVA respondents recorded the strongest level of agreement, followed by respondents from the TDRC and WRC respectively. In other words, the residents at Langs appeared somewhat more willing to support other community services with the funds generated by recreation services. Perhaps this was a further reflection of their concern for community.

*Summary*

With respect to their leisure participation, LFVA respondents participated significantly more often and in significantly more volunteer activities than did respondents from the TDRC and WRC. Moreover, they participated more often and in more educational activities than did respondents from the WRC (TDRC respondents failed to report participating in such activities). By contrast, respondents from the LFVA participated significantly less often and in significantly fewer physical activities than did respondents from the other two community centres. However, there were no differences in terms of the number of social activities in which respondents participated, although the WRC respondents did participate less frequently than did the others.

In terms of volunteer motivations, the respondents from the three community centres were not significantly different from each other, with the exception that LFVA respondents were more likely to explore their own strengths through their volunteer activities. In regard to the perceived purposes of public recreation, WRC and TDRC respondents provided relatively similar responses to most of the items, with the exception that TDRC respondents agreed more strongly that one of the purposes for delivering recreation at their community centre was to make a profit. In contrast to the WRC and TDRC respondents, LFVA responses reflected a stronger community focus at the LFVA.

**A Citizenship Orientation Profile**

The following section provides a profile of the civil, social and political citizenship orientations of the respondents who comprised the three sites in the study. First, an assessment of the

Citizenship Profile (CP) scale is presented, including information about the factor structure and reliabilities of the sub-scales. Second, a summary of the findings related to the following questions are reported: what is the relationship between producer bias and citizenship? What is the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and citizenship? To what extent do producer biases and exposure to different models of public recreation service production predict social, civil and political citizenship orientations? Are the ways leisure activities are produced and the types of activities in which individuals participate related to citizenship orientations?

***Examining the CP scale***

Principal components analysis was performed to assess whether the three dimensions identified in the scale development process could be verified (see Table 4.12). The three factor solution accounted for 55.2% of the total variation in the data. The explained variance reported for the CP was reflective of a good factor solution because it was between 50 and 75% of the variance in the original variables with one sixth as many factors as there were variables (Diekoff, 1992). The rotated component matrix (varimax) showed that every item belonging to the civil dimension (CD), social dimension (SD), and political dimension loaded on the factors to which they were assigned originally. For the most part, it appeared that the CD, SD, PD were stable and strong factors. One item out of six in the political dimension (PD) was a mixed loading, however. As was the case in the development sample, the item, "I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live," loaded more strongly on the political dimension (.488), but it also fell under the social dimension (.465). As noted earlier, in addition to its implied participatory democratic approach to policy development, the item

## Table 4.12
## Factor Structure of the Citizenship Profile Scale

| Item | $\bar{x}$ | Factor 1 (PD) | Factor 2 (CD) | Factor 3 (SD) | Comm unality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I should have a say in the local government services that are provided in my community. | 5.98 | **.829** | .008 | .125 | .709 |
| I have a right to participate in my community in more substantial ways than by merely choosing political leaders. | 5.75 | **.812** | .005 | .157 | .686 |
| I have a right to attend public meetings to discuss issues of importance to my community. | 6.21 | **.796** | .109 | .160 | .672 |
| I have a right to be involved in discussions about the local government services provided in my community. | 5.97 | **.788** | .005 | .210 | .668 |
| I have a responsibility to connect and talk with my fellow citizens about community issues and decisions. | 5.40 | **.646** | -.009 | .245 | .487 |
| I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live. | 5.57 | **.488** | -.005 | .465 | .457 |
| I have a responsibility to be in control of my own life, without intrusion from government. | 5.76 | .007 | **.828** | .005 | .693 |
| I believe government should not interfere with my individual rights. | 5.41 | .006 | **.881** | .008 | .670 |
| I should be able to use the money I earn as I see fit, without government intervention. | 5.38 | -.004 | **.796** | .005 | .639 |
| I have the right to make moral choices as I see them, not how the government sees them. | 5.71 | .206 | **.682** | .003 | .509 |
| I have a right to take advantage of my economic success without losing a large portion of it to support others. | 4.97 | -.003 | **.595** | -.251 | .418 |
| I should not be required to share with the rest of my community the money I earn. | 4.40 | -.142 | **.531** | -.285 | .383 |
| Government has a responsibility to provide services that will alleviate the inequalities in my community. | 5.10 | .119 | .177 | **.749** | .606 |
| I have a duty to contribute at least the minimum taxes necessary so that others can live a decent life. | 5.31 | .243 | -.004 | **.690** | .537 |
| I expect government to provide subsidies to those in need. | 5.25 | .006 | .004 | **.670** | .455 |
| I have an obligation to support the sort of institutions that provide local government services. | 4.86 | .170 | -.002 | **.648** | .449 |
| If I wish to live in a good society, I have a responsibility to share my wealth with others. | 4.53 | .187 | -.240 | **.617** | .474 |
| I have a duty to pay the taxes that are needed to finance adequately the local government services in my community. | 5.33 | .357 | -.168 | **.526** | .433 |
| Eigenvalues | | 5.059 | 3.293 | 1.593 | |
| % Variance Explained | | 28.103 | 18.293 | 8.852 | |
| % Cumulative Variance | | 28.103 | 46.396 | 55.248 | |
| Alpha | | .86 | .81 | .77 | |

conceivably relates to the development of social networks and social trust, two concepts central to a social citizenship orientation. The data indicated that additional scale validation may need

to be done to further confirm the dimensionality of the scale. The results from a reliability analysis revealed that the civil dimension ($\alpha$=.81) and political dimension ($\alpha$=.86) were internally consistent at or above the levels reported during scale development. The reliability of the social dimension, by contrast, fell slightly ($\alpha$=.77), but was still satisfactory.

Table 4.13 reports the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for the dimensions of citizenship. Overall, mean scores indicated higher agreement with a political citizenship orientation, followed by a civil citizenship orientation, then a social citizenship orientation. In each case, the scores reflected relatively high agreement. The table also reveals that social citizenship was positively correlated with political citizenship, and negatively correlated with civil citizenship. In both instances, the correlations were statistically significant. These results were not surprising given the tension between social and civil rights. Moreover, it was conceivable that political and social citizenship were positively correlated because political involvement in the shaping of public policy regarding local government services, many of which are social in nature (e.g., recreation) implies some sense of support for the provision of such services.

**Table 4.13**
**Correlation Matrix for the Citizenship Dimensions**

| | | | | Correlations | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\bar{x}$ | SD | n | Political Citizenship | Social Citizenship | Civil Citizenship |
| Political Citizenship | 5.81 | .96 | 304 | - | | |
| Social Citizenship | 5.06 | 1.11 | 304 | .504** | - | |
| Civil Citizenship | 5.27 | 1.19 | 304 | .023 | -.139* | - |

** Correlation significant at the .01 level
* Correlation significant at the .05 level
Note: Higher mean scores indicate higher level of agreement

## Table 4.14
## Correlation Matrices for the Citizenship Dimensions Among Respondents

| Location/Variable | | $\bar{x}$ | SD | n | Correlations: Political Citizenship | Correlations: Social Citizenship | Correlations: Civil Citizenship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Waterloo Recreation Complex | Political Citizenship | 5.81 | .70 | 103 | - | | |
| | Social Citizenship | 5.08 | 1.07 | 103 | .516** | - | |
| | Civil Citizenship | 5.17 | 1.11 | 103 | .032 | -.297** | - |
| Langs Farm Village Association | Political Citizenship | 6.03 | 1.04 | 100 | - | | |
| | Social Citizenship | 5.36 | .94 | 100 | .324** | - | |
| | Civil Citizenship | 5.27 | 1.40 | 100 | -.150 | .001 | - |
| Tavistock District Recreation Centre | Political Citizenship | 5.60 | 1.06 | 101 | - | | |
| | Social Citizenship | 4.74 | 1.23 | 101 | .604** | - | |
| | Civil Citizenship | 5.37 | 1.03 | 101 | .265** | -.130 | - |

** Correlation significant at the .01 level
* Correlation significant at the .05 level
Note: Higher mean scores indicate higher level of agreement

Table 4.14 reports separately the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for the dimensions of citizenship among respondents from the WRC, LFVA, and TDRC. Respondents from each community centre showed their strongest agreement with the political dimension, possibly because it was the most neutral among the three dimensions of citizenship. Neutral, that is, in that agreement with the items related to political citizenship did not necessarily imply an obvious ideological perspective, whereas agreement with the items related to social or civil citizenship revealed distinct ideologies in terms of their willingness to accept or reject a direct role for government in citizens' lives.

Following relatively strong political citizenship orientations, respondents from the TDRC and WRC also reported strong mean scores on civil citizenship, whereas LFVA respondents reported strong social citizenship. The differences between the TDRC and WRC

respondents, on the one hand, and the LFVA respondents, on the other, suggested divergent priorities in terms of how their tax dollars should be allocated. The former appeared to be more individually-oriented; the latter appeared more community-minded.

Collectively, at each community centre, political citizenship was positively correlated with social citizenship. Separately, however, civil citizenship was negatively correlated with social citizenship at the WRC, and positively correlated with political citizenship at the TDRC. That political citizenship was positively correlated with social citizenship, and civil citizenship was negatively correlated with civil citizenship was expected given the reasons mentioned above; however, that civil citizenship was positively correlated with political citizenship at the TDRC was rather unexpected, albeit understandable. That is, involvement in the political arena may be regarded as an important way for individuals to ensure that the state does not intrude in the lives of its citizens. Thus, it may be viewed as an important function to preserve liberty.

### *Testing Bias in Favour of Models of Service Production*

In order to answer the first research question, analyses of variance were conducted to evaluate the relationship between exposure to models of service production and bias in favour of a co-production model, a contract model, and a traditional model of direct provision respectively. In each test, the independent variable was organized into three groups: those exposed to a co-production model at the LFVA, those exposed to a contract model at the TDRC, and those exposed to a traditional model of direct provision at the WRC. The dependent variable was a combined mean score of 15 items from a modified version of the Sector Bias Instrument (SBI) which gave an overall measure of bias for each of the models of public recreation service production.

The instrument provided three sets of scores for each producer arrangement. Each set was factor analyzed separately using principal components analysis with the expectation that three dimensions would emerge: empathy, professionalism, and creativity. However, the analysis revealed that its factor structure was not consistent with previous research (Bogle, Havitz & Dimanche, 1992; Havitz, 1989a; 1989b). Instead of uncovering three dimensions, as expected, only one factor was extracted for each scale. Therefore, the three 15 item sub-scales for each scenario/arrangement (e.g., direct provision, co-production, and the contract model) served as an indication of producer bias for a particular model of recreation service production. The one factor solution for the direct provision bias model accounted for 70.3% of the total variation in the data; the one factor solution for the co-production bias model accounted for 63.1%; and the one factor solution for the contract bias model accounted for 63.9%. This extraction of three one factor solutions suggests that either producer bias elicits different reactions from research participants than does sector bias, or the format used to ask the questions influenced responses. That is, in regard to the latter, instead of posing the set of items for each type of producer arrangement on separate pages (as was done in past research), respondents could visually compare them directly in the present study. The comparison may have led to a comparison between producer arrangements as opposed to a comparison within. Nevertheless, the results from a reliability analysis revealed that the measure for bias in favour of direct provision ($\alpha$=.97), co-production ($\alpha$=.96) and the contract model ($\alpha$=.95) were internally consistent above the levels reported in previous studies, which was not surprising given that more items inflate the overall reliability.

Table 4.15 reports the mean scores and standard deviations for each measure of producer bias among all respondents in addition to the respondents from the three community

**Table 4.15**
**Descriptive Statistics for Producer Biases**

| Community Centre | | N | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Waterloo Recreation Complex | Bias in favour of co-production | 101 | 3.52 | .76 |
| | Bias in favour of a contract model | 99 | 3.52 | .90 |
| | Bias in favour of direct provision | 101 | 3.73 | .77 |
| Langs Farm Village Association | Bias in favour of co-production | 100 | 4.11 | .73 |
| | Bias in favour of a contract model | 100 | 3.14 | .92 |
| | Bias in favour of direct provision | 100 | 2.71 | .92 |
| Tavistock District Recreation Centre | Bias in favour of co-production | 101 | 3.52 | .78 |
| | Bias in favour of a contract model | 101 | 3.84 | .76 |
| | Bias in favour of direct provision | 101 | 3.26 | .90 |
| Overall | Bias in favour of co-production | 302 | 3.72 | .81 |
| | Bias in favour of a contract model | 300 | 3.50 | .91 |
| | Bias in favour of direct provision | 302 | 3.23 | .96 |

Note: higher mean scores indicate higher agreement

centres. The overall scores reflected generally positive responses to each model. Similar findings were evident among the respondents from each community centre, with the exception of those from the LFVA who reported a relatively less favourable perception about the contract model. A comparison of respondents from the WRC, LFVA and TDRC (see Table 4.16) revealed that those exposed to a co-production model at the LFVA were significantly more biased in favour of co-production than were those exposed to a direct provision model at the WRC and those exposed to a contract model at the TDRC. Similarly, those exposed to a contract model at the TDRC were significantly more in favour of the contract model than those exposed to direct provision and those exposed to co-production. By contrast, LFVA respondents were significantly less in favour of the contract model than were WRC respondents. Finally, those

**Table 4.16**
**Biases in Favour of Different Production Models**

| Item | Site | Mean | SD | F | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bias in Favour of Co-production | LFVA | 4.11[a] | .72 | | | |
| | WRC | 3.52[b] | .76 | | | |
| | TDRC | 3.52[b] | .78 | 20.04 | 2, 299 | <.001 |
| Bias in Favour of Direct Provision | LFVA | 2.70[a] | .92 | | | |
| | WRC | 3.73[b] | .77 | | | |
| | TDRC | 3.25[c] | .90 | 35.27 | 2, 299 | <.001 |
| Bias in Favour of a contract model | LFVA | 3.14[a] | .92 | | | |
| | WRC | 3.52[b] | .90 | | | |
| | TDRC | 3.84[c] | .76 | 16.83 | 2, 297 | <.001 |

Note: Higher scores indicate higher agreement with statement (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree)
[a b c] Superscripts accompanying mean scores indicate groups significantly different from one another using Scheffe post-hoc test.

exposed to direct provision at the WRC were significantly more in favour of a direct provision model than were those from the LFVA and TRDC. Again, LFVA were significantly less partial to a model other than their own. In sum, respondents were more biased in favour of the model to which they were exposed, and those exposed to the model at the LFVA were the least partial to the contract and traditional models. The respondents appeared to prefer the model with which they were most familiar, a conclusion that should not be confused with knowing the model they preferred, because their choice and knowledge of each option may have been limited.

### *A Comparison of Citizenship Orientations*

In this section, the relationship between exposure to models of service production (independent variable) and the three dimensions of citizenship (dependent variables) is examined, thus addressing the second research question in the study (see Table 4.17). In each test, the independent variable was defined by three groups: those exposed to a co-production model at

**Table 4.17**
**A Comparison of Citizenship Orientations Among Respondents**

| Item | Site | Mean | SD | F | df | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civil Citizenship | LFVA | 5.27 | 1.40 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.16 | 1.11 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.37 | 1.03 | .74 | 2, 301 | .476 |
| Political Citizenship | LFVA | 6.02[a] | 1.04 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.81[a, b] | .70 | | | |
| | TDRC | 5.60[b] | 1.07 | 4.98 | 2, 301 | .007 |
| Social Citizenship | LFVA | 5.36[a] | .94 | | | |
| | WRC | 5.09 | 1.07 | | | |
| | TDRC | 4.74[b] | 1.23 | 8.13 | 2, 301 | <.001 |

Note: Higher scores indicate higher agreement with statement
[a b c] Superscripts accompanying mean scores indicate groups significantly different from one another using Scheffe post-hoc test.

the LFVA, those exposed to a contract model at the TDRC, and those exposed to a traditional model of direct provision at the WRC. Also in each case, the dependent variable was the mean score on each dimension of the Citizenship Profile (CP) scale. Orientations regarding the civil dimension of citizenship did not differ as respondents from the various community centres perceived their civil rights and responsibilities similarly. This perhaps illustrates the notion of individualism that pervades in society. Orientations regarding the political and social dimensions, however, were significantly different. In short, LFVA respondents had stronger political and social citizenship orientations than did those exposed to a contract model at the TDRC. WRC responses fell in the middle range on both tests. These results were not unexpected given that opportunities to shape policy at the recreation centre in Tavistock were relatively unavailable to users, unlike at the LFVA where citzens were encouraged to participate in such processes. Political citizenship orientations were presumed to be strongest among LFVA respondents and weakest among TDRC respondents for these reasons. Moreover, because the TDRC was operated by a private contractor, users at the TDRC may have regarded the services

as being private, whereas the services at the LFVA were clearly provided in order to service the community and meet its social needs. In this sense, it was not surprising that social citizenship orientations were strongest among LFVA respondents, and weakest among TDRC respondents.

### *Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Citizenship*

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to help explain variations in citizenship orientations based upon producer biases and exposure to different models of service production. This question was posed in order to determine the relative contribution that producer biases and exposure have on citizenship orientations. The procedure involved entering separately two groups of variables in order to analyze how much each contributed to the explanation of each of the dependent variables, the social, political, and civil dimensions of citizenship. The variables in the first group entered were: (1) bias in favour of a co-production model, (2) bias in favour of a contract model, (3) bias in favour of a traditional model of direct provision; the variables in the second group entered were: (1) exposure to co-production, and (2) exposure to direct provision. The latter two were dummy variables which identified whether respondents were from the LFVA or not, or the WRC or not. A dummy variable was not created for exposure to a contract model because it could be completely predicted from the first $k - 1$ dummy variables.

### *Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Social Citizenship*

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to help explain variations in the social citizenship orientations based upon producer bias and exposure to different models of service production. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are summarized in Table 4.18. The table

reveals that exposure to and bias in favour of co-production were positively correlated with social citizenship orientations. Further, it shows that bias in favour of direct provision also was positively correlated with social citizenship. Given that the co-production and direct provision models are rooted in a firm commitment to address the social needs of a community, at least in a recreation context, these results were predictable.

The results of the regression analysis indicated that producer biases explained 9.9% of the variance in social citizenship ($F_{3, 296}$=10.89, p<.001)(see Table 4.19). Exposure to models of service production contributed an additional 2.9% of explained variance ($F_{2, 294}$=4.91, p<.008). A closer examination of the beta values revealed that bias in favour of direct provision ($\beta$ = .255, p<.001) and exposure to co-production ($\beta$=.228, p=.002) were weighted more heavily than the other predictor variables. Biases in favour of co-production ($\beta$=.153, p=.012) and the contract model ($\beta$=-.145, p=.021) were also significant predictors, albeit weighted less than the aforementioned predictors. Finally, exposure to direct provision had no relationship with social citizenship orientations ($\beta$ = .085, p=.198).

In sum, producer biases appeared to be better predictors of social citizenship than exposure, although exposure to co-production was relatively important, too. These results were not surprising given that biases imply some level of agreement with the philosophical underpinnings of each model. Because each model determines the nature of the relationship between government and its citizens, it is conceivable that bias in favour of a particular model would be associated with social citizenship orientations. Strong social citizenship advocates an active role for the state, whereas weak social citizenship advocates a limited role. That exposure to co-production was related, too, is not surprising either if one considers that those who were

**Table 4.18**
**Correlation Matrix the for Social Citizenship, Exposure and Producer Biases**

| Factor | $\bar{x}$ | SD | Correlations: Social citizenship | Bias in favour of co-production | Bias in favour of a contract model | Bias in favour of direct provision | Exposure to Direct Provision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social citizenship | 5.08 | 1.10 | - | | | | |
| Bias in favour of co-production | 3.72 | .80 | .210* | - | | | |
| Bias in favour of a contract model | 3.50 | .91 | -.092 | .143* | - | | |
| Bias in favour of direct provision | 3.23 | .96 | .152* | .051 | .373* | - | |
| Exposure to Direct Provision | - | - | .038 | -.160* | .015 | .363* | - |
| Exposure to Co-production | - | - | .181* | .342* | -.284* | -.385* | -.496* |

* Correlation significant at the .01 level

exposed to the co-production model reported relatively strong social citizenship orientations. The provision of social welfare was an important role for the LFVA, so it is conceivable that the individuals who patronized the LFVA advocated a significant role for government in terms of meeting citizens social needs.

**Table 4.19**
**Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Social Citizenship**

| Variables entered | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | F | p | Standardized β | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Co-production Bias | | | | | | .153 | 2.52 | .012 |
| Contract Model Bias | | | | | | -.145 | -2.31 | .021 |
| Direct provision Bias | .315 | .099 | .090 | 10.89 | <.001 | .255 | 3.93 | <.001 |
| Direct Provision Exposure | | | | | | .085 | 1.30 | .198 |
| Co-production Exposure | .359 | .029 | .024 | 4.91 | <.001 | .228 | 3.13 | .002 |
| (Constant) | | | | | | | 9.87 | <.001 |
| Overall | | .129 | .114 | 8.67 | <.001 | | | |

*Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Political Citizenship*

A second multiple regression analysis was conducted to help explain variations in the political citizenship orientations. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are summarized in Table 4.20. Similar to the first test, exposure to and bias in favour of co-production were positively correlated with political citizenship orientations. Further, bias in favour of direct provision also was positively correlated with political citizenship. Not surprisingly, those exposed to and in favour of co-production are conceivably more likely to view citizen participation as a function of the public policy development process, and therefore, more likely to support their political right to enter into the public debate and shape policy. The correlation between bias in favour of direct provision and political citizenship, however, is more difficult to interpret because direct provision has been criticized for relying on professional judgement to determine the public good (Hemingway, 1996, 1999; Pedlar, 1996). Perhaps state delivered services, at least in the minds of respondents, permit some sort of political outlet for citizens to provide feedback. If an individual is an advocate of the state's role in the delivery of leisure, then he or she is presumably a supporter of the his or her *right* to engage in the public debate, even if he or she does not take advantage of this right.

The results of the multiple regression indicated that producer biases explained 11.6% of the variance in political citizenship ($F_{3, 296} = p<.001$), whereas exposure to models of service production contributed a combined, and non-significant, 1.2% of explained variance ($p=.134$). A closer examination of the beta values revealed that biases in favour of co-production ($\beta = .232$, $p<.001$) and direct provision ($\beta = .237$, $p<.001$) were weighted more heavily than the

## Table 4.20
## Correlation Matrix the for Political Citizenship, Exposure and Producer Biases

| | $\bar{x}$ | SD | Correlations | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Political citizenship | Bias in favour of co-production | Bias in favour of a contract model | Bias in favour of direct provision | Exposure to direct provision |
| Social citizenship | 5.08 | 1.10 | - | | | | |
| Bias in favour of co-production | 3.72 | .80 | .270* | - | | | |
| Bias in favour of a contract model | 3.50 | .91 | -.047 | .143* | - | | |
| Bias in favour of direct provision | 3.23 | .96 | .156* | .051 | .373* | - | |
| Exposure to Direct Provision | - | - | .004 | -.160* | .015 | .363* | - |
| Exposure to Co-production | - | - | .154* | .342* | -.284* | -.385* | -.496* |

* Correlation significant at the .01 level

## Table 4.21
## Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Political Citizenship

| Variables entered | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | F | p | Standardized β | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Co-production Bias | | | | | | .232 | 3.82 | <.001 |
| Contract Model Bias | | | | | | -.128 | -2.04 | .042 |
| Direct provision Bias | .340 | .116 | .107 | 12.92 | <.001 | .237 | 3.64 | <.001 |
| Direct Provision Exposure | | | | | | .028 | .43 | .669 |
| Co-production Exposure | | .012 | .006 | 2.02 | .134 | .143 | 1.96 | .051 |
| (Constant) | | | | | | | 13.85 | <.001 |
| Overall | .357 | .128 | .113 | 8.61 | <.001 | | | |

other predictor variables. Biases in favour of the contract model (β=-.128, p=.042) was also a significant predictor, albeit weighted less than the other two predictors, and inversely related to political citizenship. That is, each unit increase in bias in favour of the contract model, decreases political citizenship. The exposure variables, by contrast, had no significant relationship with political citizenship, particularly in terms of exposure to direct provision (β = .028, p=.669)

which added almost nothing to the regression equation. Exposure to co-production was not quite statistically significant ($\beta = .143$, $p=.051$), yet it was close enough to consider because the LFVA recognized citizen participation as part of the process pf planning and implementing public policy on recreation. Nevertheless, producer biases appear to be better predictors of political citizenship than exposure. As stated earlier, biases imply some level of agreement with the philosophical underpinnings of each model, so the fact that they were better predictors of political citizenship was an expected finding.

*Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Civil Citizenship*

A third multiple regression analysis was conducted to help explain variations in the civil citizenship orientations. Table 4.22 shows that only bias in favour of the contract model was significantly correlated with civil citizenship orientations. More specifically, the relationship was positively correlated. This was not surprising, given that people with strong civil citizenship presumably advocate limited government and favour private sector solutions to problems in the

**Table 4.22**
**Correlation Matrix the for Civil Citizenship, Exposure and Producer Biases**

| | | | Correlations | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $\bar{x}$ | SD | Civil citizenship | Bias in favour of co-production | Bias in favour of direct provision | Bias in favour of a contract model | Exposure to Direct Provision |
| Social citizenship | 5.08 | 1.10 | - | | | | |
| Bias in favour of co-production | 3.72 | .80 | .008 | - | | | |
| Bias in favour of a contract model | 3.50 | .91 | .108* | .143** | - | | |
| Bias in favour of direct provision | 3.23 | .96 | -.023 | .051 | .373** | - | |
| Exposure to Direct Provision | - | - | -.065 | -.160** | .015 | .363** | - |
| Exposure to Co-production | - | - | .002 | .342** | -.284** | -.385** | -.496** |

* Correlation significant at the .05 level * Correlation significant at the .01 level

**Table 4.23**
**Producer Biases and Exposure as Predictors of Civil Citizenship**

| Variables entered | R | $R^2$ | Adjusted $R^2$ | F | p | Standardized β | t | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Co-production Bias | | | | | | -.016 | -.25 | .807 |
| Contract Model Bias | | | | | | .131 | 1.97 | .050 |
| Direct provision Bias | .128 | .016 | .006 | 1.65 | .178 | -.053 | -.76 | .439 |
| Direct Provision Exposure | | | | | | -.050 | -.72 | .472 |
| Co-production Exposure | | .002 | <.001 | .31 | .735 | -.001 | -.02 | .987 |
| (Constant) | | | | | | | 11.50 | <.001 |
| Overall | .136 | .019 | .002 | 1.11 | .356 | | | |

public sector. Clearly, proponents of the contract model would maintain similar perspectives in regard to government.

Nevertheless, the multiple regression results indicated that producer biases ($F_{3, 296}$=1.650, p=.178) and exposure variables ($F_{5, 294}$=1.109, p=.356) variables did not explain a significant amount of the variance in civil citizenship (see Table 4.23). More specifically, producer biases explained a combined 1.6% of the variation in civil citizenship, and the exposure variables explained 0.2%. Bias in favour of the contract model, though, had a significant beta value. Therefore, each unit increase in bias in favour of the contract model increased civil citizenship. Again, this is not surprising given that privatization strategies are conducive with civil citizenship.

***Relationship with Exposure, Volunteer Behaviour, and Activity Type***

In this section, the separate and combined effects of activity type and exposure to models of service production on citizenship orientations are examined. Exposure to models of service

production, as mentioned, included respondents from the WRC, TDRC, and LFVA. Neither the total number of activities in which respondents participated nor the frequency of their participation was included in the analysis because the test was designed specifically to investigate Hemingway's (1999) assertion that the type of activity and the way a service is produced are associated with citizenship orientations. As such, the participation in an activity type was deemed a more appropriate variable, despite it being a lower level of specificity. Activity type was organized into four categories: (1) social activities, such as clubs, gatherings and watching activities; (2) physical activities, such as sports and fitness; (3) educational activities, such as workshops, lectures, and clinics; and (4) volunteer activities, such as boards, committees, and unpaid instruction. Dummy variables were created for each activity such that respondents were recorded as either having participated in a type of activity or not.

*Activity Type and Exposure as Related to Social Citizenship*

The first set of tests was performed to determine the separate and combined effects of exposure and activity types on a social citizenship orientation (see Table 4.24). First, the main effects of exposure on social citizenship were significant in all but one case, educational activities ($F_{2, 302}$=2.343, p=.069). The data revealed that those exposed to the contract model had lower social citizenship mean scores. The contract model utilizes a market equity approach whereby it advocates the discrimination of individuals based on their ability to pay, so it makes sense that exposure to such a model would be related to an individual's social citizenship orientations. The control of the educational activities variable likely caused the main effects of the exposure variable to slip past the .05 significance level. In other words, in the face of participation in educational activities, the effect of exposure was no longer statistically significant, but it was

likely practically significant given the exposure variable's performance in the face of other activities.

Second, with the exception of one activity type, participation had no discernable effect on social citizenship orientations. Significant main effects were uncovered only for volunteer participation ($F_{1, 303}$=4.505, p=.035). The data showed that a participation was associated with stronger social citizenship orientations. Respondents who volunteered may have done so without regarding the reduction of the inequalities among community members as a motivation for their participation, even though volunteering is a community-oriented activity. This also may have been attributable to measurement error, given that other variables such as intrinsic motivation were not controlled for. As a result, those who volunteered may not have been as committed to its ideals.

Third, significant interaction effects were found to exist between exposure and social activities ($F_{2, 302}$=3.95, p=.020). Those who did not participate in social activities at the LFVA had the greatest association with social citizenship orientations. This finding was surprising given that the social interaction involved in such activities presumably reveal to people the social benefits of public recreation services and encourage them to support the maintenance of such services in their communities. Perhaps the LFVA respondents who did not participate in social activities were themselves understanding of the need to do so for others in their community. Given the "at-risk" nature of the Langs Farm community, those who did not participate may have not done so because they were not in need of such services (e.g., had their own social group), yet they appreciated the need to address the social inequalities in their community.

**Table 4.24**
**Exposure and Activity Type as Related to Social Citizenship**

| Source | SS | df | Mean Square | F | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exposure | 10.943 | 2 | 5.472 | 4.572 | .011 |
| Physical Activity | .002 | 1 | .002 | .018 | .893 |
| Exposure X Physical Activity | .009 | 2 | .004 | .038 | .963 |
| Exposure | 5.525 | 2 | 2.762 | 2.343 | .069 |
| Educational Activity | 3.878 | 1 | 3.878 | 3.289 | .098 |
| Exposure X Educational Activity | .002 | 2 | .002 | .020 | .888 |
| Exposure | 23.250 | 2 | 11.625 | 9.917 | < .001 |
| Volunteer Activity | 5.281 | 1 | 5.281 | 4.505 | .035 |
| Exposure X Volunteer Activity | 1.218 | 2 | .609 | .519 | .595 |
| Exposure | 18.117 | 2 | 9.058 | 7.825 | < .001 |
| Social Activity | 2.733 | 1 | 2.733 | 2.361 | .125 |
| Exposure X Social Activity | 9.155 | 2 | 4.577 | 3.95 | .020 |

*Activity Type and Exposure as Related to Political Citizenship*

The second set of tests was performed to determine the separate and combined effects of exposure to models of service production and activity type on a political citizenship orientation (see Table 4.25). As in the previous section on social citizenship, the main effects of exposure to models of service production were found to be significant in all but one case, educational activities ($F_{2, 302}$=1.150, p=.318). Again, the exposure variable's failure to reveal main effects, in the face of educational activities, may have been due to measurement error. The contract model, however, demonstrated the greatest association with political citizenship in comparison to exposure to co-production and direct provision. That is, those exposed to the contract model at the TDRC had the weakest political citizenship orientations. Theoretically, the contract model

advocates corporatism which is an anti-democratic approach to service delivery. Thus, it makes sense that exposure to such a model would be associated with an individual's social citizenship orientations. In terms of activity type, however, its main effects on political citizenship orientations were not significant in any case. Further, no significant interaction effects were uncovered.

**Table 4.25**
**Exposure and Activity Type as Related to Political Citizenship**

| Source | SS | df | Mean Square | F | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exposure | 6.652 | 2 | 3.326 | 3.663 | .027 |
| Physical Activity | .330 | 1 | .330 | .363 | .547 |
| Exposure X Physical Activity | .309 | 2 | .154 | .170 | .844 |
| Exposure | 2.066 | 2 | 1.033 | 1.150 | .318 |
| Educational Activity | 2.615 | 1 | 2.615 | 2.911 | .089 |
| Exposure X Educational Activity | .000 | 2 | .000 | .003 | .955 |
| Exposure | 9.980 | 2 | 4.990 | 5.505 | .004 |
| Volunteer Activity | .665 | 1 | .665 | .734 | .392 |
| Exposure X Volunteer Activity | .496 | 2 | .248 | .274 | .761 |
| Exposure | 8.601 | 2 | 4.300 | 4.767 | .009 |
| Social Activity | .392 | 1 | .392 | .435 | .510 |
| Exposure X Social Activity | 2.071 | 2 | 1.036 | 1.148 | .319 |

*Activity Type and Exposure as Related to Civil Citizenship*

Finally, the third set of tests was performed to determine the separate and combined effects of exposure to models of service production and activity type on a civil citizenship orientation (see Table 4.26). Unlike findings for social and political citizenship orientations, the

**Table 4.26**
**The Effects of Exposure and Activity Type on Civil Citizenship**

| Source | SS | df | Mean Square | F | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exposure | 1.670 | 2 | .835 | .584 | .559 |
| Physical Activity | .491 | 1 | .491 | .343 | .558 |
| Exposure X Physical Activity | .958 | 2 | .479 | .335 | .716 |
| Exposure | 5.721 | 2 | 2.860 | 2.041 | .132 |
| Educational Activity | 7.336 | 1 | 7.336 | 5.235 | .023 |
| Exposure X Educational Activity | 3.013 | 2 | 3.013 | 2.150 | .144 |
| Exposure | 7.417 | 2 | 3.708 | 2.743 | .066 |
| Volunteer Activity | 20.619 | 1 | 20.619 | 15.251 | < .001 |
| Exposure X Volunteer Activity | 4.520 | 2 | 2.260 | 1.672 | .190 |
| Exposure | 2.173 | 2 | 1.086 | .764 | .467 |
| Social Activity | .001 | 1 | .001 | .013 | .909 |
| Exposure X Social Activity | 3.817 | 2 | 1.908 | 1.342 | .263 |

main effects of exposure on civil citizenship were not significant. Also, no interaction effects were uncovered. The main effects of educational activities ($F_{1, 303}$=5.235, p=.023) and volunteer activities ($F_{1, 303}$=15.251, p<.001) were significant, however. With respect to the former, those who participated in educational activities had the greatest association with civil citizenship. Participation was associated with weaker civil citizenship orientations. Respondents who participated in educational activities appear to have been less individually oriented, and conceivably, were more community-minded. Education perhaps teaches people awareness about the inter-dependency of communities and the narrow-mindedness of extreme libertarian perspectives.

In regard to the significant main effects of volunteer activities, not volunteering had the greatest association with civil citizenship. In other words, the absence of such participation was

related to stronger civil citizenship orientations. More specifically, those who did not volunteer appeared to have been more individually oriented and less willing to accept a major role for government in their lives. Perhaps not having necessarily had the experience of volunteering, they had not experienced the feeling of making a difference in the lives of their fellow community members and therefore failed to appreciate the impact that public services can have in their communities. This perspective, however, contradicts the main effects non-volunteers had on social citizenship. It is not immediately clear why not volunteering would have a strong relationship with both social and civil citizenship given that such orientations are in constant tension. This contradiction perhaps suggests the presence of a measurement problem.

***Summary***

Each group of respondents was more biased in favour of the model of recreation service production to which they were exposed than they were to the other models of service production. In general, LFVA respondents had stronger social and political citizenship orientations than did WRC and TDRC respondents. Respondents' biases, however, proved to be better predictors of social and political citizenship orientations than their exposure to particular models of service production, although exposure to co-production was relatively important too. Nevertheless, exposure to and bias in favour of models of did not explain a significant amount of the variation in civil citizenship orientations. Civil citizenship orientations did not differ among respondents from the different community centres.

With respect to political citizenship orientations, the main effects of exposure were significant in all but one case. Activity type did not result in any main effects, though, nor were any interactions found. In terms of social citizenship, the main effects of exposure were again

significant in all but one case. By contrast, only the main effects of volunteer activity were significant. Moreover, the only significant interaction effects were between exposure and social activities. Finally, in regard to civil citizenship orientations, the main effects of exposure were not significant, whereas the main effects of educational and volunteer activities were significant. No interaction effects were discovered, however.

## CONCLUSION

A summary of the results are found in Table 4.27.

**Table 4.27**
**Summary of Results**

| Research Questions | | Results |
|---|---|---|
| *Question 1:* Were respondents biased in favour of the model of public recreation service production to which they are exposed? | *Sub-Question 1a:* Were LFVA respondents biased in favour of co-production? | Yes. LFVA respondents were more biased in favour of co-production than in the other two models. |
| | *Sub-Question 1b:* Were WRC respondents biased in favour of direct provision? | Yes. WRC respondents were more biased in favour of direct provision than in the other two models. |
| | *Sub-question 1c:* Are TDRC respondents biased in favour of a contract model? | Yes. TDRC respondents were more biased in favour of a contract model than in the other two models. |
| *Question 2:* Did individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and a contract model differ in terms of their citizenship orientations? | *Questions 2a:* Did individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and a contract model differ in terms of their civil citizenship orientations? | No. Respondents from the LFVA, WRC, and TDRC did not differ in terms of their civil citizenship orientations. |
| | *Questions 2b:* Did individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and a contract model differ in terms of their social citizenship orientations? | Yes. Respondents from the LFVA had significantly stronger social citizenship orientations than did TDRC respondents. WRC respondents did not differ. |
| | *Questions 2c:* Did individuals exposed to direct provision, co-production and a contract model differ in terms of their political citizenship orientations? | Yes. Respondents from the LFVA had significantly stronger political citizenship orientations than did TDRC respondents. WRC respondents did not differ. |

## Table 4.27
## Summary of Results, Continued

| Research Questions | | Results |
|---|---|---|
| *Question 3.* To what extent did biases in favour of and exposure to models of service production explain the variations in citizenship orientations? | *Question 3a:* To what extent did biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production and a contract model explain the variations in civil citizenship orientations? | Only Biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production and a contract model *did not* explain a significant amount of the variation in civil citizenship orientations. |
| | *Question 3b:* To what extent did biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production and a contract model explain the variations in social citizenship orientations? | Biases in favour of the models of service production, as well as exposure to co-production, explained a significant amount of the variation in social citizenship orientations. |
| | *Question 3c:* To what extent did biases in favour of and exposure to direct provision, co-production and a contract model explain the variations in political citizenship orientations? | Biases in favour of the models of service production explained a significant amount of the variation in social citizenship orientations, whereas exposure did not. |
| *Question 4:* Were the ways public recreation services were produced and the types of activities in which respondents participated related to citizenship orientations? | *Question 4a:* Were the ways public recreation services were produced and the types of activities in which respondents participated related to civil citizenship orientations? | The main effects of exposure were not significant, whereas the main effects of educational and volunteer activities were. No interaction effects were discovered. |
| | *Question 4b:* Were the ways public recreation services were produced and the types of activities in which respondents participated related to social citizenship orientations | The main effects of exposure were significant in all but one case, whereas only the main effects of volunteer activity were significant. The only significant interaction effects were between exposure and social activities. |
| | *Question 4c:* Were the ways public recreation services were produced and the types of activities in which respondents participated related to political citizenship orientations? | The main effects of exposure were significant in all but one case. Activity type did not result in any main effects. No interaction effects were discovered. |

# CHAPTER FIVE

# DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

## Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of results regarding the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and the civil, political, and social citizenship orientations of people exposed to different models of service production. It was discovered, first, that respondents from the Waterloo Recreation Complex (WRC), Langs Farm Village Association (LFVA), and Tavistock District Recreation Centre (TDRC) were more biased in favour of the model of public recreation service production to which they were exposed. Second, the results indicated that civil citizenship orientations did not differ among respondents from the WRC, TDRC and LFVA, whereas political and social dimensions did. LFVA respondents had stronger political and social citizenship orientations than did TDRC respondents. Third, producer biases proved to be better predictors of social and political citizenship than overt exposure, though exposure to co-production also was relatively important in regard to the former. Neither producer biases nor exposure explained variations in civil citizenship orientations, however. Fourth, the way public recreation services were produced appeared to have a greater association with social and political citizenship than did the activities in which respondents participated. In terms of social citizenship, only volunteering was significant among the types of activities that were examined. Moreover, the only significant interaction effects were between exposure and social activities. In terms of political citizenship, however, the main effects of activity type were not significant nor were significant interaction effects uncovered. Finally,

unlike with social and political citizenship, civil citizenship orientations were not affected by the way services were produced. The main effects of educational and volunteer activities, however, were significant. These and other results are addressed in this chapter. At the conclusion, implications of the study for practice and future research are shared.

## Perceived Purposes of Public Recreation

Though not derived from one of the primary research questions in the study, the findings regarding the perceived purposes of public recreation among respondents from the three community centres are worth discussing first because they confirmed some widely-held notions about each model of service production. In short, three general themes emerged from the data. First, LFVA respondents indicated that a strong community focus underpinned the delivery of recreation services at their community centre; second, respondents from the WRC and TDRC provided remarkably similar responses in terms of their perceptions about the purposes of public recreation at their community centres; and third, each group of respondents had differing perceptions about the presence, or lack thereof, of a drive for profit at their community centre. Each theme will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

### *Co-production and Its Community Focus*

The presence of a stronger community focus at the LFVA was an expected finding, particularly because the LFVA was a neighbourhood organization that viewed community development as the organizing principle upon which it was founded (Davidson, 1996). Christenson, Fendley and Robinson (1989) noted that community development involves three goals: (1) the

encouragement of civic engagement and local initiative in order to facilitate positive community change, (2) the promotion of solidarity among community members through the creation of communication networks, and (3) the improvement of community well-being. Each goal was consistent with the policies that underpinned the LFVA. Evidence of local initiative at the association dated as far back as 1978 when a group of neighbourhood residents and service providers founded the LFVA because it was concerned about the lack of accessible services in the community (Davidson, 1996). Since its inception, the LFVA has sought to provide services produced by and for residents. Initiative from the grassroots has led to the development of several community-focused programs and initiatives. This, perhaps, explains why LFVA respondents agreed more strongly than other respondents that recreation and recreation services were provided at their community centre in order to compensate for a lack of such services in the area. Group accomplishment and the ability to influence change were similar themes uncovered by Arai and Pedlar (1997) in a qualitative exploration of a comparable community centre which adopted a community development approach as its model of service delivery.

The creation of solidarity also was evident at the LFVA. Social supports, such as home visits, childcare, transportation and material aid were provided within the Langs Farm community by volunteers at the centre in order to "restore a sense of belonging in the community and facilitate a return to the traditional helping networks of friends, families and neighbours" (Davidson, 1996, p. 25). These initiatives provided insight regarding why LFVA respondents may have agreed more strongly that recreation was provided in order to create opportunities for people to get to know their fellow community members and to encourage residents to help each other so as to better their community. Arai and Pedlar (1997) discovered similar themes in their research. They identified the development of community, the growth of

camaraderie, the feeling of connectedness to the community, and opportunity to contribute to community as outcomes of the citizen participation facilitated by community development/co-production.

Finally, social support, leadership development, and the provision of accessible resources were regarded at the LFVA as vehicles that provided positive social, emotional, cognitive, and practical supports and reduced the impact of living in an at risk community. Davidson (1996) reported that Langs Farm was characterized by high family distress, in addition to above average number of youth, multicultural residents, social assistance recipients, single parents, residents without a secondary school education, and families living in assisted housing. Moreover, he reveals that family income in the neighbourhood was 20% lower than the city average. As such, resident well-being and community improvement were important goals of the LFVA. Educational programs, often developed in a recreation and leisure context, were used to improve the lifestyles of residents by alleviating stress and providing social support networks within the community. Outreach programs, such as drop-in basketball and senior programs, were provided in order to reach unresponsive groups. Awareness of these approaches to service delivery likely led to the perception amongst residents that one of the purposes of public recreation at the LFVA was to promote the well-being of the entire community. In a similar context, Reid and Van Drunen (1996) demonstrated how leisure acted as a positive force in the social transformation of the Karen Walk neighbourhood in Waterloo, Ontario, a community whose residents, similar to those at Langs, felt marginalized because of their economic and social circumstances. In short, there appeared to be a relationship between co-production and the way LFVA respondents regarded the purposes for recreation at their community centre.

### *The Contract Model and Direct Provision: Similar Perceived Purposes?*

As noted, respondents from the WRC and TDRC responded similarly on most of the items regarding the purposes of public recreation. These results offered empirical evidence that direct provision and the contract model foster similar attitudes to each other about recreation services. Conceptually, Glover (1998) argued that,

> Direct provision, like a business [or a privatized] model, encourages leisure practitioners to adopt a prescriptive role and participants to act as passive recipients of services. That is not to suggest that a business model is better suited to the delivery of public recreation services; rather, it is meant to suggest that the traditional model of direct provision is, in some respects, not all that different from the business model (p. 362).

Similarly, Slack (1999) noted that, in contemporary recreation service organizations, the lines of demarcation between the private and public sectors have been blurred with the introduction of user fees and other market mechanisms in the public sector. As such, Hemingway (1999) suggested the terminology that distinguishes among the sectors is not entirely satisfactory. "'Private' and 'public,'" he writes, "should not be taken to denote locations, but rather the mode of providing leisure" (p. 163). He differentiates between "public" and "private" by regarding the former as leisure produced by the participants themselves, and the latter as leisure that is purchased or centres around consumption of purchased services and products (e.g., entrance fees, equipment or lodging). Clearly, the community centres investigated in this study were not pure models. Nevertheless, Hemingway believed it would be difficult to find one. Given his definitions and given the characteristics of the cases representing the direct provision and contract models respectively, it can be argued that leisure in both settings was private.

### *The Contract Model and the Drive for Profit*

Perhaps the most contentious issue about alternative models of service delivery, and particularly the contract model, is the presence of a drive for profit by the producing agency. The employment of business techniques and market mechanisms to deliver leisure in the public sector has been criticized by some scholars for commercializing leisure (Hemingway, 1999; Schultz, McAvoy & Dustin, 1988; Smale & Reid, In Press). Schultz et al. (1988) contended that such approaches are incompatible with the aims of the field because

> the nature of commercial recreation is to consider the recreation experience as another commodity to be packaged, processed, and sold for one's private benefit alone, with satisfying desires as the sole objective. The strategy of business is to convince customers that their desires are really needs and that they must have what is for sale. Businesses create a dependency mindset disguised as customer loyalty. It is a strategy dictated by the bottom line. Is that the type of mentality that will serve the [North] American public in the years ahead? (p. 54).

Such are the presumed outcomes of a privatized model of service delivery. By contrast, the state provision of recreation services is believed to be more benign because of its traditional intent to pursue the public good (Coalter, 1998; Johnson & McLean, 1994). Co-production, in a community development context, too, is regarded as being a more virtuous form of service delivery because of its emphasis on *process* and its endorsement of participatory democracy (Pedlar, 1996; Reid & van Dreuen, 1996). With these biases in mind, respondents exposed to the co-production and direct provision models were expected to indicate their disagreement that the purpose at their community centre was to make a profit, whereas respondents exposed to a contract model were expected to indicate their agreement.

As anticipated, LFVA respondents were the least likely of the three groups to believe that a purpose of public recreation at their community centre was to make a profit; WRC

respondents were less likely than TDRC respondents to believe that the purpose of public recreation at their community centre was to make a profit; and only respondents from the TDRC agreed that it was part of the purpose of providing recreation services at their community centre. The findings supported the notion that the contract model, at least as perceived by the citizens exposed to it, places an emphasis on the profitability of leisure opportunities (Smale & Reid, In Press). Whether it does so at the expense of accessibility, though, as some scholars have contended about privatization (Aitchison, 1997; Ravenscroft, 1993; Smale & Reid, In Press), remains a question for further research.

Intuitively, because they differed in terms of their belief about whether or not profit was a motive at their community centres, it might seem contradictory, then, that the respondents at all sites agreed that one of the purposes of public recreation at their community centres was to generate revenue in order to provide other programs and services. Generating *revenue*, however, is decidedly different from generating *profit*. Revenue refers to a source of income, whereas profit, by contrast, refers to pecuniary gain. As such, each group may have believed that its community centre was willing to support programs that were unable to sustain themselves financially by generating revenue from programs capable of producing greater income. The literature provides some support for this viewpoint. For example, upon conducting an experiment to investigate ways in which expected or reference price for a public recreation service might be altered, McCarville, Crompton and Sell (1993) discovered that subjects were particularly responsive to the message suggesting that other participants would suffer if the subjects failed to generate sufficient revenues from fees to meet their own program costs. The mean reference price reported by this group was 41% greater than that reported by the control group. Results of this research may explain, in part, responses in the present study. That is,

respondents likely regarded recreation services as a means through which other community services could be funded, and in doing so, perceived them as a means through which the public good could be served.

**Producer Biases**

Havitz (1989a) posited that, irrespective of the present overlap in recreation services delivery, many participants retain distinct perceptions about the type and quality of services offered by the public and commercial sectors. Later, he added to his assertion the presence of distinct perceptions about the not-for-profit sector, too (Havitz, 1989b; Bogle, Havitz & Dimanche, 1992). Perceptions about each sector, he suggests, often lead to sector bias. A sector bias is defined as an individual's propensity to purchase a service from one sector rather than another (Havitz & Crompton, 1990). Sector bias occurs when sector issues are important in an individual's choice process and they affect his or her willingness to supplant similar experiences from the other sector. Havitz (1989b) argued that sector biases often contain attitudes about the levels of professionalism and empathy demonstrated by employees of government agencies and of commercial businesses. With the emergence of alternative forms of service delivery in the public sector, though, the distinction between the public, commercial, and not-for-profit sectors as producers of public recreation is blurred even further (Slack, 1999). Thus, there remains a question about whether *producer* bias, as it were, will be evident under such circumstances. The following section addresses this question.

### *Bias in Favour of the Model to Which Respondents Were Exposed*

Data from the present study provided evidence to suggest that biases in favour of certain producer arrangements were indeed apparent. Respondents reported greater bias in favour of the model to which they were exposed than to the models to which they had no confirmed exposure. Similar results were reported by Bogle, Havitz and Dimanche (1992), albeit in terms of sector bias. Respondents, it was revealed, had more positive attitudes regarding the level of services provided by "their" producer than they did regarding the perceived level of services provided by other producers. As such, the findings from this study can be interpreted similarly to Bogle, Havitz and Dimanche in that it was not clear whether such attitudes were formed before respondents' selected the community centre with which they were familiar or whether their attitudes were formed before they selected the centre. Most likely, however, respondents' attitudes were formed based on a combination of their experience at the community centres and prior perceptions regarding such a producer arrangement. Whether the finding was accurate or not, producer biases do appear to be connected closely to exposure to a particular model of service production.

### *Validity of the Exposure Variable*

One of the concerns about the exposure variable in the study was that it was not necessarily indicative of bias in favour of direct provision, co-production, or the contract model. There were three reasons to suspect that respondents were not partial towards the model employed by the community centre at which they were surveyed. First, limited choices in terms of service delivery elsewhere in the community may have forced respondents to patronize the facilities or

otherwise not participate. In other words, the only choice other than participation may have been to exit from the service entirely. This was certainly a legitimate concern given that the TDRC, for instance, was likely the only arena in the area at which residents of the Township of East Zorra-Tavistock could play hockey. That is, it was the only arena within a reasonably accessible distance for most residents in the catchment area. Conceivably, limited choice may have influenced respondents' patronage.

Second, it was possible that respondents were unable to distinguish among the three models. In particular, the contractor at the TDRC was a local resident who was well-known to community members. As a result, the frontline services at the arena may have appeared to be no different from other facilities that support different models of service production, despite its different organizational structure. Likewise, volunteer opportunities were available at each community centre, not just at the LFVA. As such, it was possible to confuse the presence of volunteers at the WRC, for example, with a co-production model, even though the model at the WRC did not share the same philosophical underpinnings as the LFVA. It is interesting to note, for example, that a comparison of volunteer motivations revealed few differences among the volunteers at each community centre. The models were not pure representatives of the ones theorized in the conceptual model.

Third, it was possible that respondents had been exposed to other models of service production, in recreation contexts, besides the one at the community centre from which their surveys were collected. Indeed, most respondents were likely exposed to a variety of public and commercial services throughout their daily life experiences. Moreover, leisure settings are one of the few where people do have a choice (volition) among services with regard to sector and service delivery model. For example, if an individual wishes to purchase a car or toothpaste, he

or she can only do so from a commercial business (e.g., Ford, Shopper's Drugmart). By contrast, recreation services are available from public, commercial, and not-for-profit service providers. This may have contributed an additional layer of informational complexity to the formation of bias.

For these three reasons, the findings regarding producer bias were important because they revealed that the model to which respondents were exposed was regarded more positively than the models to which they were not exposed. In short, this finding lends credibility to the results which depended upon the exposure variable as a meaningful measurement. Potentially, if respondents were biased towards the specific model to which they were exposed, it was conceivable that they may have consciously selected it. A questions still remains, however, about whether respondents' awareness of the model truly existed. Therefore, future research on this topic may be more suited to an experimental setting or a more detailed field study in which exposure to various models in various contexts are more clearly delineated.

**The Relationship between Exposure and Citizenship Orientations**

An intriguing discussion emerges from the comparison of the respondents who were exposed to different models of public recreation service production in terms of their citizenship orientations. Respondents from the LFVA showed stronger orientations for social and political citizenship than did respondents from the TDRC, yet the respondents from each community centre were similar in terms of their civil citizenship orientations. A more detailed discussion of these findings follows.

### *Exposure and Political Citizenship*

Because it employs a participatory approach to democracy and public policy development, co-production presumably fosters in its participants a stronger political citizenship orientation than does the contract model (Hemingway, 1999). Co-production favours mediated consensus (Arai, 1996; Arai & Pedlar, 1997; Smale & Reid, In Press) whereas the contract model, by contrast, supports other ways of making collective decisions, namely by means of markets (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Ravenscroft, 1993; Savas, 1987). In essence, the premise that underpins the co-production model in a leisure context is the notion that the administration of public recreation services is the responsibility of the community and its neighbourhoods (Stormann, 1993). This was an approach adopted by the LFVA. Davidson (1996) confirmed that the LFVA, as an organization was participant-directed as opposed to being professionally prescribed. In fact, any potential initiative or partnership had to be proposed to and approved by the organization's program committee before it was implemented by the association.

This approach was much different than the one employed by the TDRC where professional judgement invariably subverted genuine forms of citizen participation. Though it offered outlets for citizens to provide feedback regarding their program and activities, including an arena board that oversaw the contractor's performance, the TDRC supported a form of citizen participation resembling what Arnstein (1969) described as manipulation. It involved placing citizens on a "rubberstamp" advisory committee or board in order to educate them or engineer their support. A select few, including the contractor, maintained the authority to determine the final decisions about all matters concerning policy. Instead of seeking genuine citizen participation, the provider distorted involvement so that, in reality, it became a public relations vehicle. By contrast, the co-production model at the LFVA was adopted to encourage

citizens to engage in a meaningful public discourse about policy in order to determine and fashion the community in which they wished to live (Davidson, 1996). The model aimed to give community members a voice (Arai, 1996) by involving all citizens in community matters (Hutchison & Nogradi, 1996). By encouraging civic engagement, a term Putnam (1996) defined as people's connections with the life of their communities, the LFVA likely produced strong political citizenship orientations in local residents, its participants and volunteers. Alternatively, by engineering citizen feedback, the TDRC maintained the status quo and discouraged true civic engagement.

### *Exposure and Social Citizenship*

Theoretically, social citizenship orientations should be strongest amongst those exposed to direct provision by virtue of the fact that the provision of recreation services is a form of social welfare. Indeed, Coalter (1998) suggested that there is a clear implication in the leisure literature "that the sense of freedom and self-fulfillment associated with social citizenship are to be found only in [direct] public provision" (p. 24). Barbalet (1988), however, questioned whether social rights and the welfare state are analogous because he contends that social policy in the public sector is not necessarily an expression of social rights. That is, he argued that social rights no longer assist in the development and function of social services, such as leisure.

Similarly, Johnson and McLean (1994) noted that only public recreation services thought to enhance public values were delivered by the public sector in the past. However, they insisted that, presently, there is no agreement about what constitutes these values. As a consequence of attempting to serve an increasingly multicultural and pluralist society, leisure programming in the public sector has been reduced to responding to individual leisure

preferences as opposed to being guided by an ideal. Perhaps, then, the traditional model of direct provision is in a state of tension between serving two distinct mandates: the public interest and individual self interest. Public recreation services are still delivered in order to benefit the wider community; however, they are exchanged as a commodity in order to satisfy individual wants, too (Reid, 1995). As a result, it is unclear whether the social citizenship orientations of WRC respondents failed to differ from the other respondents because the public sector is truly "in-between" these two extremes or because of the absence of a clear philosophical direction.

The fact that respondents from the LFVA revealed stronger social citizenship orientations than respondents from the TDRC was not a surprise. Central to the idea of social citizenship is its emphasis on the rights of all citizens to claim material support from their fellow members in situations where they cannot for some reason sustain life according to the standards prevailing in society (Marshall, 1992). The LFVA was located within a community that required much social support, which suggests that the demographic profile of the community also may have contributed to stronger social citizenship orientations as compared to the other two communities. However, the LFVA was founded upon the principles of bringing people together to alleviate social, political, and economic differences. Davidson (1996) indicated that the process of service delivery at Langs Farm "helped eliminate the perception of services for the rich and the poor and reduce negative stigma associated with the targeted area" (p. 24). In short, the co-production model fostered a sense of equality among residents. In doing so, this achievement affirms Putnum's (1995) contention that "networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust" (p. 67). Prior to the establishment of the LFVA, there was an absence of any sense of community

(Davidson, 1996). Foley and Edwards (1997) insisted that civic associations emerge for this very reason. In Saunders' (1993) words, "social cohesion is best fostered by leaving individuals and the groups they form to get on with their own lives" (p. 79). Perhaps this explains why the municipality (the City of Cambridge) forged an arm's length relationship with the LFVA. In other words, it gave the association its independence to address the needs of the community. It was reasonable, therefore, to believe that the model of service production to which respondents at the LFVA were exposed was associated with their social citizenship orientation.

### *Exposure and Civil Citizenship*

As noted earlier, civil rights and obligations place an emphasis exclusively upon the individual (Marshall, 1992). In order to accommodate such rights, the state either refrains from interfering in the lives of its citizens or it offers sufficient choice so that citizens can make decisions for themselves (Bowie & Simon, 1986). In the context of public recreation service delivery, the former involves a co-production arrangement with grassroots organizations; the latter involves the privatization of the conditions of consumption. In both instances, the state relegates itself to the periphery in order to accommodate and support private initiative. In this regard, Saunders (1993) insisted that proponents of the political Right and Left agree alike about the need to hold government at arm's length, while encouraging "mediating institutions" to address individual and collective needs (p. 80). The difference, however, is that the Right, under the contract model, champions a commercial agency as the mediating institution, whereas the Left, under a co-production arrangement, advocates a voluntary one.

It was not surprising, then, that respondents exposed to the contract model demonstrated a strong civil citizenship orientation. In general, the contract model invites self-

interested individualism by encouraging citizens to make self-serving decisions that can potentially be destructive or insensitive to the greater public good (Smith & Huntsman, 1997). However, under the contract model, individualism is analogous to rational egoism, as in the case of public choice theory (Self, 1993), whereas under co-production, it is regarded as self-interest properly understood (Tocqueville, 1969). That is, individualism, in the context of a participatory approach to democracy which the co-production model supports, involves a recognition of interdependency on the part of the participant. In this regard, "autonomy implies some measure of responsibility, simply because autonomy means that one has the capacity to relate intention to behaviour and thus to give reasons for behaviours to others" (Warren, 1993, p. 216). However, the civil sub-scale of the CP did not measure these attitudes. Nevertheless, the important commonality to note between those exposed to co-production and the contract model is the fundamental belief that one's individual rights must be protected against the infringement of the state and of political power (Allison, 1996). In this regard, it was conceivable that respondents exposed to both co-production and the contract model would hold such strong civil citizenship orientations.

By supporting a traditional public facility, however, respondents from the WRC were expected to demonstrate a weaker civil citizenship orientation. That is, they were expected to be more willing to support the state provision of public services. Because the public sector has traditionally delivered a variety of services, including leisure, for the expressed purpose of providing social welfare, it would make intuitive sense that those who support this model would be more willing to accept an active role for government in their lives. As noted, however, there has been a transition in recent years to deliver services that satisfy and appeal specifically to individual preferences, as opposed to building human capacities (Hemingway, 1996; Johnson &

McLean, 1994; Reid, 1995; Schultz, McAvoy & Dustin, 1988; Smale & Reid, In Press). Indeed, market mechanisms have emerged in the public sector not only because of their potential for revenue generation through user fees (Savas, 1987; Walsh, 1995), but also because they allow producers to transfer to the recipient the burden of deciding which services are good (Johnson & McLean, 1994; Saunder & Harris, 1990). This contemporary approach to direct provision resembles the "demand and supply model" which is characteristic of the contract model (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987). Moreover, Reid (1995) contended that, at present, the public sector "views recreation as a commodity rather than as a means to some more fundamental goal like individual or community development" (p. 25). Thus, the state often employs an entrepreneurial method of service delivery. Exposure to this method perhaps explains why the responses of the individuals from WRC reflected a strong civil citizenship orientation.

In general, though, responses from all of the research participants were perhaps indicative of the declining trust in government and its institutions (Bliss, 1997; Graham & Phillips, 1997; Putnam, 1995). Certainly, some of the items that composed the civil sub-scale of the CP referred to the protection of individual rights against the state. Bliss (1997) observed that "we are beginning to realize that the thrust to strengthen individual opportunities and freedoms, to create the truly autonomous individual, has been accompanied, perhaps necessarily, by the strengthening of the individual's distrust of most of the organizations that traditionally claimed a right to help organize his or her life" (p. 32). Distrust in government, and by extension, the strengthening of individualism may have been the dominant undercurrent in most participants' responses to the civil sub-scale of the CP.

**Producer Biases and Exposure: Associated with Citizenship Orientations?**

Data from the study indicated that biases in favour of certain models of service production were associated with social and political citizenship orientations. They did not appear, however, to be related civil citizenship. By contrast, only exposure to co-production was significant in terms of its relative importance to social citizenship orientations. These and other related results are discussed in the following section.

***Producer Biases and Exposure and their Relationship with Citizenship Orientations***

Biases in favour of co-production and direct provision were positively correlated with strong social citizenship and political orientations. In terms of social citizenship, co-production and direct provision are models of public recreation service production that theoretically support the delivery of social goods, albeit by different producers. Moreover, both models are often employed to address social inequalities, whereas the contract model is arguably more likely to address consumer needs, or perhaps more accurately, consumer wants (Coalter, 1990; Ravenscroft, 1993; Schultz, McAvoy & Dustin, 1988). It makes intuitive sense, then, that respondents who demonstrated a bias in favour of co-production or direct provision also demonstrated stronger social citizenship orientations.

In terms of political citizenship, those in favour of and exposed to co-production were also more likely to see citizen participation as a function of the public policy development process, and therefore, more likely to support their political right to enter into the public debate and shape policy (Putnam, 1995, 1996). The data regarding direct provision and its positive correlation with political citizenship, however, were more difficult to interpret. Direct provision has been criticized in the literature for catering to individual wants and being rooted in

professional judgement (Hemingway, 1996, 1999; Pedlar, 1996). Presumably, though, state delivered services, at least in the minds of respondents, may permit some sort of political outlet for citizens to provide feedback if they so choose. For one to be an advocate of the state's role in the delivery of leisure, perhaps it is also possible for one to be a supporter of the *right* to engage in the public debate, even if one does not take advantage of this right. As noted above, respondents may have indicated their level of agreement with the presence of political rights and obligation as opposed to their actual political behaviour.

In terms of the third dimension of citizenship, bias in favour of the contract model was positively correlated with stronger civil citizenship orientations. The data lend support to the notion that there is indeed a relationship between support for the contract model and strong civil citizenship dispositions. It is conceivable that respondents who were biased in favour of the contract model distrusted government and were more in favour of private initiative as a means of addressing their own concerns. Decidedly, one of the foundations upon which the idea of the contract model is built is that individuals should be self-directing rather than controlled by the state (Saunders, 1993). Under this premise, government intervention is unlikely to be something proponents of the contract model are willing to support.

Bias in favour of and exposure to co-production, as well as biases in favour of direct provision helped explain variation in social citizenship orientations. More specifically, though, exposure to a co-production model and bias in favour of direct provision were weighted more strongly than the other predictor variables. It was not surprising that co-production was relatively important because it was adopted at Langs Farm in order to enable members of the community to collectively address social inequalities in the locality (Davidson, 1996). Bias in favour of such a production arrangement indicates, in essence, one's willingness to accept a role

for government as a facilitator of recreation services and supporter of the endeavours of private individuals in their attempt to address social issues and the public good. Support for direct provision differs from support for co-production in that it indicates one's willingness to endorse government intervention and social welfare as a means of addressing social entitlements, yet it also is intended to serve the public good. In other words, the state's role in the direct provision of recreation services is perceived as central to achieving a fair and equitable system of service delivery (Barbalet, 1988).

In addition, biases in favour of the contract, direct provision, and co-production models were better predictors of political citizenship orientations than exposure. The latter of the three models was not surprising because co-production recognizes citizen participation as part of the process of planning and implementing public policy on leisure. Support in favour of such a production arrangement, therefore, indicates one's willingness to accept participatory forms of democracy, the concept that underpinned the political sub-scale of the CP. As such, it makes sense that bias in favour of co-production was so important. Moreover, that the contract model was negatively association with political citizenship also was expected insofar as it encourages corporatism, the antithesis to democracy. It was unexpected, however, that bias in favour of direct provision was an important predictor of political citizenship too. Perhaps, as noted earlier, respondents who were more partial to the direct provision model were also advocates of democracy and their right to have a say in their community, even if they did not act upon that right.

In sum, producer biases proved to be more important than exposure to different models of service production in terms of predicting social and political orientations. Nevertheless, both sets of variables combined to explain only 12.8% of the variations in social and political

citizenship respectively. While this figure may appear to be low at first glance, it really is quite remarkable that of all the variables that explain variation in citizenship orientations, producer biases, and to a much lesser extent exposure, on their own were such significant influences.

Unlike their contribution to explaining the variations in social and political orientations, biases in favour of and exposure to co-production, the contract model, and direct provision failed to explain a significant amount of the variation in civil citizenship orientations. In regard to exposure, this makes sense if one recognizes that one's individual (civil) rights in Canada are guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, not the model of service production to which one is exposed. In effect, the Charter transcends service delivery in terms of its affirmation of civil citizenship. Whereas political and social citizenship can be expressed through one's participation in public recreation services, civil citizenship presumably cannot, regardless of the model used to produce services. In terms of bias, however, the reason it failed to predict civil citizenship orientations is less clear. Perhaps the relationship occurs in the opposite direction to the one that was proposed. That is, perhaps civil citizenship orientations inform producer biases. That is, maybe the extent to which an individual is biased in favour of a particular model of service production is associated with his or her civil citizenship orientations. Individual freedoms and obligations appear to be fostered by sources other than models of service production and producer biases, although the beta value for bias in favour of the contract model was significant thereby suggesting the presence of some sort of relationship. Indeed, it was expected that bias in favour of the contract model would explain some of the variation in civil citizenship orientations because strong civil citizenship is conducive with strong support for limited government (Saunders, 1993). Further research to clarify this relationship

and to identify other determinants of a strong civil citizenship orientation seems like an especially worthwhile endeavour.

## The Comparative Strength of Exposure and Activity Type's Association with Citizenship

Hemingway (1999) proposed that "how leisure activities are provided might be equally important as what the activities are" (p. 162) in terms of their association with citizenship orientations, particularly political citizenship. Indeed, data from the present study indicated that the type of service production model to which respondents were exposed had perhaps a greater association with social and political citizenship orientations than did the type of activities in which they participated. Alternatively, exposure had no discernable relationship with civil citizenship, in contrast to educational and volunteer activities. These and other related results are discussed in the following section.

### *Exposure and its Relationship with Social, Political, and Civil Citizenship*

The findings reveal that there is a relationship between the exposure variable and social and political citizenship orientations. This is perhaps not surprising given that the relationship between government and its citizens is manifest in the way the state produces its services (Smith & Huntsman, 1997), and therefore, has implications for the way citizenship is experienced. In terms of social citizenship, the state acts to support its citizens' freedom to leisure by distributing programs and infrastructure equitably (Crompton & Lamb, 1986; Goodale, 1985). The market equity approach with which the contract model replaces the traditional distribution method of equal opportunity limits these freedoms to those who can afford to participate in

public recreation activities. In doing so, it is not unexpected that exposure to such a model has the greatest relationship to individuals' social citizenship orientations. That is, it diminishes them.

In terms of political citizenship, government can adopt one of several methods to facilitate citizen participation. Arnstein (1969) identified eight such methods ranging from manipulation to citizen control. It is more straightforward, though, to view each one on a continuum on which representative democracy is located at one end and participatory democracy is found at the other (Hemingway, 1999). In essence, the three models used to produce public recreation services presumably adopt distinct approaches which either limit citizen participation in favour of professional judgement and expertise, or place the decision making in the hands of the users themselves. The contract model resembles the former approach. Indeed, it arguably goes one step further because it attempts to foster corporatism. In doing so, the contract model attempts to foster apathy and general acceptance in its users so as to avoid the inefficiency that corresponds with a more democratic approach to feedback (Saul, 1995). For this reason, it makes sense that exposure to the contract model had the strongest association with political citizenship orientations.

Unlike its association with social and political citizenship, however, exposure did not appear to be related to civil citizenship. As reported, data regarding the relative importance of exposure and producer biases in predicting civil citizenship orientations, in addition to a comparison of civil citizenship orientations among respondents from the WRC, TDRC, and LFVA, uncovered similar results. Decidedly, a pattern has emerged to suggest there is no relationship between civil citizenship orientations and exposure to models of service production. Perhaps civil citizenship orientations are more resistant to change, regardless of one's exposure

to various production models. Earlier in this dissertation, though, it was argued that strong civil citizenship is fostered by consumer choice, which is a strategy of the contract model. Saunders and Harris (1990) contended, and Glover (1999c) reiterated it in a leisure context, that the privatization of the organization of government is unlikely to cultivate consumer choice because the conditions of consumption remain the same. In other words, unless the conditions of consumption are privatized too, the role of the recipient of services remains virtually unchanged. As such, the fact that civil citizenship was not affected by exposure may have been the consequence of the type of community centres that were selected for this study, particularly because the contract model involved the privatization of the organization, not the conditions of consumption, at the TDRC. Future research regarding the latter model of privatization and its implications for civil citizenship is necessary to determine if civil citizenship can be fostered in a public setting.

### *Activity Type and its Relationship with Social, Political, and Civil Citizenship*

For the most part, the type of activity in which respondents participated was not associated with citizenship orientations. In fact, the social, educational, physical, and volunteers activities that respondents reported appeared to have no relationship with political citizenship. Volunteer activities were related to social and civil citizenship orientations, however, in that non-volunteers had stronger social citizenship orientations and stronger civil citizenship orientations. That non-volunteers revealed stronger social and civil citizenship orientations than volunteers was decidedly a surprising finding. Indeed, Janoski, Musick and Wilson (1998) stated that volunteering socializes individuals into pro-social attitudes and fosters social obligations conducive to productive citizenship. Portney and Berry (1997) insisted that "if people talk to

each other and work with each other to solve problems, this will lead to a community where people care about each other. Individuals will discover common purposes and develop stronger ties to their neighbourhoods and cities" (p. 642). In this regard, Saunders (1993) believed the state should allow individuals and the social networks they create to form naturally without government intervention. In other words, he thought individual initiative is necessary in order to create social solidarity. This was one area where social and civil citizenship were thought to be connected. Despite such theoretical understandings of volunteerism, non-volunteers revealed stronger social and civil citizenship orientations than did volunteers.

Perhaps non-volunteers had stronger civil citizenship orientations because, by not volunteering at the community centre at which their surveys were collected, they were not in touch with their other regarding tendencies which focuses on altruistic behaviour (Story, 1992). Without such experiences, non-volunteers might be more individually-oriented and not necessarily appreciate the role of government in their community. But to subscribe to such a perspective would contradict the presence of a strong social citizenship orientation, which they in fact indicated. This leads one to speculate how these respondents could have strong association with both social *and* civil citizenship.

Unexpectedly, non-volunteer respondents demonstrated that they were capable of holding strong social and civil citizenship orientations, irrespective of the tension that presumably exists between the two dimensions, as well as between positive and negative rights (Bowie & Simon, 1986; Macpherson, 1985; Marshall, 1992). On the one hand, positive rights theoretically impose obligations on the state to provide services necessary to secure at least a minimally decent level of human existence; on the other hand, negative rights impose obligations on others to refrain from interfering with the rights of their fellow citizens. Consequently, there

are reasonable explanations why respondents may have provided such responses. First, non-volunteer respondents may have believed that each dimension of citizenship protected their positive *and* negative rights. Bowie and Simon (1986) discussed this concept in great detail, In other words, positive rights can protect liberty and liberty, in turn, can protect positive rights. By providing social assistance, for example, the state arguably pacifies citizens who might otherwise turn to crime in order to support their families. The provision of this form of social welfare, therefore, protects individuals from harm. If such an interpretation of the findings is accurate, it confirms Shue's (1980) contention that, in reality, there are no distinctions between positive and negative rights because all rights impose positive and negative obligations. More likely than not, however, respondents revealed strong social and civil citizenship orientations because, ideally, they wanted independence from state authority (e.g., less taxation), while at the same time, they expected social support from government (e.g., adequate services). In short, to use an old adage, "they wanted their cake and to eat it too."

Clearly, it was possible that the respondents who did not volunteered at the community centre at which they were surveyed may have volunteered elsewhere. Therefore, their responses may have reflected their experiences elsewhere. Citizenship orientations are not fostered exclusively through one's exposure models of public recreation services production, so it is conceivable that individuals would derive such orientations from other contexts. In this regard, the findings may have been a reflection of measurement error.

Also somewhat surprising was the discovery that volunteering did not affect political citizenship, particularly because volunteer participation is rooted in a commitment to democratic political values (Hougland & Christenson, 1982) and feelings of political competency (Florin, Jones & Wandersman, 1986). Nevertheless, in a more recent analysis of the relationship

between volunteering and attitudes regarding the role and responsibility of government, Sundeen (1992) found that

> questions remain about the personal values that motivate citizen participation and normative citizenship. At least on the aggregate level, those citizens who participate in volunteer activities are not more committed than non-volunteers to political values than might be expected of active citizens, given the republican traditions of civic participation (p. 286).

Perhaps this result reflects a less politically oriented ethic of volunteer participation, notably in sport and leisure contexts. Certainly, this was conceivable under the direct provision and contract models where the relationship between the producer and its volunteers was top-down. It was somewhat more of a surprise, however, for volunteers exposed to co-production because previous research has suggested that they are typically empowered by their experiences and become more vocal in their communities as catalysts of change (Arai, 1996; Arai & Pedlar, 1997).

Educational programs were the only other type of activities that revealed a relationship with civil citizenship orientations. That is, a lack of participation in educational activities revealed stronger civil citizenship orientations. Traditionally, the education process, along with leisure, has been viewed as one of the most effective ways to socialize individuals into the types of citizens that are conducive with the vision of a community (Johnson & McLean, 1994). Indeed, it was under the guidance of educators and recreation professionals that the individual was to be moulded into the ideal citizen. In this regard, Putnam (1995, 1996) believed that educational activities create awareness in individuals about the inter-dependency of society. In other words, it is conceivable that an educated individual would understand the limitations of individualism and embrace the notion that a one's quality of life is, to some extent, dependent

upon a society. For these reasons, it comes as no surprise that diminished civil citizenship was associated with participation in educational activities.

### *Interaction Effects*

The only interaction effects identified in the study were of exposure to different models of service production and social activities on social citizenship. More specifically, LFVA respondents who did not participate in social activities demonstrated stronger social citizenship orientations. While this finding may seem contradictory at first, there appears to be reasonable explanation. Co-production attempts to address social needs of a community by *facilitating* the production of social capital. In doing so, it fosters positive norms and values that influence or determine how citizens relate to each other. In particular, the development of social networks produce attitudes and values that relate to trust and reciprocity. These values are crucial to social stability and co-operation. That is, trust "forms the foundations of a cooperative and stable social and political order that encourages voluntary collective behaviour, and it generates the goodwill and understanding that enables citizens to resolve their conflicts peacefully" (Newton, 1997, p. 576). It leads to reciprocity because individuals demonstrate compassion to their fellow citizens with the expectation that, in doing so, others will do the same for them. Indeed, Davidson (1996) indicated that Langs Farm fulfils its prevention mandate by enabling social networks to form in a leisure context so as to reduce stress and the likelihood that greater problems will develop in the community. In other words, leisure programs are used to avert social issues in the Langs Farm community. The association, in effect, fulfils its socialization function in that it builds social citizenship skills and the attitudes crucial for motivating citizens to use them.

Although this description of the rationale for using a co-production model to deliver public recreation services may appear to contradict the results, it does, nonetheless, offer insight into the reason way the LFVA respondents who did not participate in social activities may have reported stronger social citizenship orientations. That is, given the particular community in which the LFVA is located (consider its demographic profile), respondents may have been cognizant that the social stability in the community was dependent upon the services provided at the LFVA. Perhaps these respondents had their own social networks and did not have as great a need for the social activities at the Village Association, yet they may have understood that the well-being of their community, including their own, depended upon all residents having access to necessary social supports. In essence, such an explanation is consistent with Shue (1980) and Bowie and Simon (1986) who contended that positive and negative rights are falsely dichotomized such that true rights are a blend of both. In this regard, the LFVA respondents who did not participate in social activities possibly understood that their well-being was dependent upon the well-being of others, too.

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

In general, there were perhaps four important limitations of this study. First, as noted, the WRC, LFVA and TDRC were not pure examples of the models of service production that they were purported to represent. For instance, volunteers were present at each community centre so that, in essence, some participants were involved in the co-production of services even though the centre itself incorporated a direct provision or contract model. Moreover, a voluntary board of citizens oversaw the operation of the arena at the TDRC. As such, citizen participation was evident even though a pure market approach to service delivery, in theory, would not permit

such an arrangement. Further, the frontline services at the TDRC made the producer arrangement less obvious to the users of the facility, especially because the contractor was one of the "local boys" who people knew personally. In other words, he was probably regarded as "Ken," not as the "contractor." Thus, future research on this topic may be more suited to an experimental setting or a more detailed field study in which exposure to various models in various contexts are delineated.

Second, the organization at the TDRC was privatized, whereas the conditions of consumption were not. Saunders and Harris (1993) insisted that the implications of both are vastly different for citizenship. In particular, the privatization of the conditions of consumption provides citizens with real consumer choice through the distribution of vouchers. The absence of this distribution method meant that the model at the TDRC was not that unlike the one at the WRC. Indeed, both community centres offered a similar selection of services and both charged user fees. As such, the lines of demarcation between the two producer arrangements, direct provision and the contract model, were not necessarily that clear to respondents.

Third, the services delivered at the LFVA were vastly different from the ones at the TDRC and WRC. Whereas the latter two were traditional Canadian public recreation facilities (e.g., ice rink, swimming pool, community hall), the former included a family resource centre, a community health centre, a teen drop-in centre, and a job bank. Nonetheless, the types of services provided at each community centre were presumably distinctive of each model of service production based upon its philosophical underpinnings. Indeed, because a co-production model at LFVA was rooted in participatory democracy, community residents were the ones who determined the type(s) of services available at the centre. As such, community wellness

programs, for example, were perceived to be more important than swimming lessons. However, the differences in service offerings made it difficult to make comparisons among the centres.

Fourth, no comparisons were reported between men and women in terms of their citizenship orientations or their biases in favour of particular models of service production. This was particularly important because the sample from the LFVA included more females than it did males. It is possible, therefore, that the differences reported among the respondents from the three community centres reflected a gender bias as opposed to the respondents' exposure to a particular model. For that matter, the differences could have been a reflection of any other sample characteristic from the data collected (e.g., socio-economic status, education, employment status). Further examination seems necessary in order to determine whether citizenship orientations are indeed gendered or related to other demographic characteristics.

## FINAL REMARKS

In terms of theoretical implications, this study made four potential contributions to the leisure literature. First, it attempted to persuade leisure researchers that the citizen-consumer dichotomy was a false one, and in doing so, postulated that citizenship was a multidimensional construct and that the strength of each dimension was dependent upon the way public recreation services were produced and by whom. This observation will, perhaps, alter the framework with which some scholars view the citizen and consumer roles. Second, drawing upon the first intended contribution, a standardized scale was developed to measure respondents' civil, social and political citizenship orientations. It was the first of its kind and was intended to be a tool with which researchers could conduct further empirical research on citizenship. In short, the scale produced relatively strong and unambiguous factor loadings, with the exception of one

mixed loading, and each sub-scale proved to be both reasonably reliable, with alpha levels at or greater than .77. The full 30-item CP scale should be utilized in future research to assess its utility, reliability, and validity. Third, a theoretical model was developed to describe the contemporary process of public recreation services delivery. Arguably, the last model to describe such a process was published by Murphy, Niepoth, Jamieson, and Williams (1991), and recent developments in the literature suggest a more contemporary perspective is due. The model was intended to assist instructors of park and recreation administration by addressing the current issues with which leisure practitioners are now faced (e.g., privatization, nontraditional mandates). In short, it was hoped the model would serve as a useful teaching tool. Fourth, empirical evidence was uncovered which examined the relationship between the way public recreation services are produced and citizenship orientations. Moreover, additional research questions were developed from the results in order to guide future research on the topic. In particular, there appears to be some sort of relationship between an individual's citizenship orientations and his or her exposure to different models of service production. Perhaps instead of comparing respondents according to their exposure to a particular model of public recreation service production, the citizenship data can be used to identify relatively discrete, homogeneous groups based upon the strength of their citizenship orientations. This approach would provide a profile of respondents and give insight into their characteristics.

In terms of the practical implications of the study, the findings were intended to make a contribution to the practice of park and recreation administration. In particular, it was hoped that the findings of the study would give policy makers, elected officials, and public administrators insight into the potential implications of adopting a distinct model of service production for citizenship. In short, it appears that exposure to particular models of service

production has implications for the social and political citizenship orientations of the people who patronize recreation centres. Moreover, the model to which citizens are exposed appears to be more strongly related to social and political citizenship orientations than is participation in various activities. If they wish to enhance civil citizenship, however, the provision of volunteer opportunities and educational activities are seemingly the best way to do so. In sum, practitioners who wish to adopt a particular model of service production must consider its implications for citizenship orientations, if their mandate for service provision is to foster citizenship through the delivery of recreation services.

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# APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Interview Guide

### The Meaning of Citizenship

What does the word "citizenship" mean to you, other than the fact that you're a citizen of Canada and you hold a Canadian passport?

Do you believe that as a citizen you have some sort of relationship with government? How does government interact with your sense of citizenship?

Thinking about your response [to the previous question], how do you express yourself as a citizen? What activities reinforce your feeling of citizenship? What activities detract from your feelings of citizenship?

Often in a country like ours, when we talk about citizenship, we're talking about individual freedoms. What sort of things does government need to do to ensure your individual freedom? Your democratic freedom?

What do you understand the role of government to be in serving the public good? By "the Public Good," I mean serving the good of the whole community or the wider society?

Given our discussion about citizenship, do you think it's necessary or important to give something back to society? To government?

### Citizenship and Its Relevance to Participation in Public Recreation

As a participant at [name of community centre], do you think you have any kind of relationship with the people who run the [community centre] or the municipality?

Do you feel detached from the decision making process?

Do you think access to recreation like this is your right as a citizen, as we discussed? Why? Why not?

Do you feel this right is enjoyed or experienced by everyone?

In your opinion, what is the connection between participation in public recreation and citizenship? How does participation in public recreation help you express yourself as a citizen?

Given the relationship you've described with government, does it increase your sense of citizenship? Could it be improved? How would it be better for you?

## Exploring Civil Citizenship

How appropriate is it to refer to a citizen as a customer of government?
If it's appropriate, what makes it so? If it's inappropriate, what makes it so?

Beyond paying for a service, is it necessary (or important) to have any further involvement with government when you participate in public recreation?

When providing recreation programs, is it important for government to acknowledge your rights as a consumer?

Are those rights different from your rights as a citizen, do you think? Do consumer rights conflict with rights of citizenship? Which ones are more important?

Do you think you would be treated differently, if recreation services were privatised? If so, how? If not, why not?

## Exploring Political Citizenship

How involved in a service does your community centre/association want you to be, do you think? How does that happen?

Are you a stakeholder in government?

Do you have a stake in your community centre/association? In what way? What's happening here that makes you feel like a stakeholder?

## Exploring Social Citizenship

Do you feel or believe you are part of a community? What does your community look like? How do you picture your community?

How important is the concept of community to the provision of public recreation?

Does participation in public recreation allow you to share in a sense of history, connection and relation with your fellow community members?

Do you think the provision of these services allow people to live a fuller, richer life? Yes or no? Can you explain?

It has been suggested that government needs to distribute recreation services fairly across the community, do you agree with that? What, in your mind, constitutes "fair?"

Ideally, then, what would you say is the mandate for a public recreation department?

## Appendix B: Final Version of Questionnaire

### Waterloo Recreation Complex Participant Survey

**PART 1:** Please help us know more about the extent of your involvement at the Waterloo Recreation Complex by filling out the following table:

1. Please list by name all of the activities at the Waterloo Recreation Complex in which you have participated and include the number of times in a typical month that you engage in each activity.

| | **Name of Activity** | **# of Times in a Typical Month** e.g., 5 times per month |
|---|---|---|
| **Social Activities** (e.g., clubs, social gatherings, spectator.) | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| **Physical Activities** (e.g., sport, athletics.) | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| **Educational Activities** (e.g., workshops, lectures.) | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| **Volunteer Activities** (e.g., boards, committees, unpaid instruction, coaching.) | | |
| | | |
| | | |

1. Please specify the people in your immediate household who participate in activities at the Waterloo Recreation Complex. (Check all that apply.)
   ❑ None. (Go to Part 2.) ❑ Child. ❑ Parent. ❑ Brother or Sister. ❑ Roommate.
   ❑ Spouse or partner. ❑ Other. (please specify.) _____

3. What support do you provide for household member(s) who participate in those activities? (Check all that apply.)
   ❑ I don't provide any support. ❑ I assist with their instruction. ❑ I pay for their enrolment.

❑ I provide transportation. ❑ Other. (please specify.) _____

**PART 2:** If you volunteer at the Waterloo Recreation Complex, please check the box that indicates the extent to which you "very strongly agree" (VSA) to "very strongly disagree" (VSD) with each of the following statements. (If you do not volunteer, please skip ahead to Part 3.)

| | VSA | | | | | | VSD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I volunteer because it is a cause in which I personally believe. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 2. I volunteer because I have been personally affected by the cause the organization supports. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 3. I volunteer because I know someone who has been personally affected by the cause the organization supports. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 4. I volunteer because my friends volunteer for the same activities. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 5. I volunteer to improve my job opportunities. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 6. I volunteer to fulfil religious obligations or beliefs. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 7. I volunteer to explore my own strengths. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 8. I volunteer to use my skills and experiences. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 9. I volunteer to give something back to my community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 10. I volunteer to get to know the people who live in my community | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |

**PART 3:** In general, the following questions refer to your views about *the rights and responsibilities you have as a citizen*, as well as *your expectations of government.* Please check the box that indicates the extent to which you "very strongly agree" (VSA) to "very strongly disagree" (VSD) with each statement.

| | VSA | | | | | | VSD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I have a right to take advantage of my income without losing a large portion of it to support others. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 2. If I wish to live in a good society, I have a responsibility to share my wealth with others. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 3. I have a responsibility to connect and talk with my fellow citizens about community issues and decisions. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 4. I have the right to make moral choices as I see them, not how the government sees them. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 5. I have a duty to pay the taxes that are needed to finance adequately the local government services in my community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 6. I should have a say in the local government services that are provided in my community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 7. I believe government should not interfere with my individual rights. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 8. I have an obligation to support the sort of institutions that provide local government services. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 9. I have a right to participate in my community in more substantial ways than by merely choosing political leaders. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |

10. I have a responsibility to be in control of my own life, without intrusion from government. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

11. I have a duty to contribute at least the minimum taxes necessary so that others can live a decent life. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

12. I have a right to be involved in discussions about the local government services provided in my community. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

13. I should not be required to share with the rest of my community the money I earn. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

14. I expect government to provide subsidies to those in need. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

15. I have a duty to contribute actively towards creating the community in which I wish to live. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

16. I should be able to use the money I earn as I see fit, without government intervention. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

17. Government has a responsibility to provide services that will alleviate the inequalities in my community. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

18. I have a right to attend public meetings to discuss issues of importance to my community. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

**PART 4:** The following questions refer to your thoughts about the purpose of providing public recreation. Please check the box that indicates the extent to which you "very strongly agree" (VSA) to "very strongly disagree" (VSD) with each statement.

In my opinion, the City of Waterloo provides recreation related services in order to . . .

| | VSA | | | | | | VSD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Promote the well-being of the entire community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 2. Contribute towards the overall success of the community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 3. Encourage people to participate in activities in which they would otherwise not take part. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 4. Generate additional money so as to afford to provide other services. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 5. Compensate for a lack of other services in the area. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 6. Make a profit. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 7. Improve the community, whether the services are used directly or not. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 8. Promote healthy norms and values within the community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 9. Create opportunities for people to get to know their fellow community members. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |
| 10. Encourage residents to help each other so as to better their community. | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ | ❑ |

**PART 5**: Please indicate how the following characteristics describe the providers identified on the chart below. Use the descriptors listed below to fill in a response for each box.

| Strongly Disagree = 1 | Somewhat Disagree = 2 | Neither agree nor disagree = 3 |
|---|---|---|
| Somewhat Agree = 4 | Strongly Agree = 5 | |

| **Generally speaking, I would expect that the staff in these three scenarios ...** | **If recreation activities were arranged and produced by the City of Waterloo and its staff.** | **If recreation activities were arranged by the City, but produced by a for-profit contractor.** | **If recreation activities were arranged by the City, but produced by volunteers.** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Example:** Are hard working | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| Are creative | | | |
| Have many ideas | | | |
| Are open to suggestion | | | |
| Are concerned about quality | | | |
| Are progressive | | | |
| Are dependable | | | |
| Deliver what is promised | | | |
| Are well trained | | | |
| Are effective | | | |
| Are energetic | | | |
| Are compassionate | | | |
| Are helpful | | | |
| Are alert | | | |
| Give individual attention to you | | | |
| Have a social conscience | | | |

**PART 6:** We would like to gather an accurate profile of the people being surveyed, so please answer the following questions with the understanding that your identity is kept confidential If you think a question is too sensitive, please ignore it and move onto the next one.

1. Please state your age: I am _____ years of age.

2. Are you male or female? ❑ Male. ❑ Female.

3. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed. (Check one.)
   ❑ Elementary School. ❑ Some Community College. ❑ Bachelor's Degree.
   ❑ Some High School. ❑ Completed College. ❑ Graduate Degree.
   ❑ High School Diploma. ❑ Some University.

4. Which one of the following statements best describes your financial circumstances? (Check one.)
   ❑ I just cannot seem to make ends meet.
   ❑ I have just enough to make ends meet.
   ❑ Once all my responsibilities are met, I have just a little left to play with.
   ❑ My present circumstances are quite comfortable.
   ❑ I have all that I need and more.

5. Which one of the following statements best describes your employment status? (Check one.)
   ❑ Employed Part-time. ❑ Employed Full-time. ❑ Unemployed.

6. If employed, for which type of organization do you work? (Check one.)
   ❑ A government agency.
   ❑ A not-for profit organization.
   ❑ A for-profit business.

**THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY.**
**YOUR PARTICIPATION IS GREATLY APPRECIATED**