

Sovereignty Sensitivity and Diaspora Discontent:
Domestic Influences on Canadian Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Kosovo War

by

Krenare Recaj

A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
History

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2021

© Krenare Recaj 2021

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Abstract

In 1999, Canada participated in NATO's Operation Allied Force, a 78-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia meant to end the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. Officially, Canada's interests in developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were humanitarian and regional stability considerations. These were shared with rest of its NATO allies. As such, on the surface, it would seem that Canada and its NATO allies had similar concerns during the decision-making process around Kosovo. Digging deeper, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada did, in fact, have a set of additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, namely national unity and diaspora discontent. This analysis, in turn, amply illustrates how interconnected domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy are. During the Kosovo War, Canada had to balance the interconnected domestic pressures of diaspora relations and national unity with their humanitarian concerns. Understanding Canada's unique internal pressures, makes their international actions all the more impressive.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“Nothing of me is original. I am the combined effort of everyone I've ever known.” — Chuck Palahniuk, *Invisible Monsters*

I am indebted to Dr. Ryan Touhey for his tireless supervision, editing, and support of my research. I would not have been in graduate school if not for his words of encouragement and belief in my abilities, not to mention his tireless letter writing and question answering. During my short time in academics I have learned that not everyone is blessed with a supervisor who is supportive, patient, understanding and motivational. In many ways, we are an unlikely match for mentor and mentee. This unlikely match has meant I have learned all the more in my time in graduate school. A simple thank you does not suffice but it is worth saying anyways: Thank you, Dr. Touhey.

I would also like to thank Dr. Ian Milligan for his continued guidance, advice and support. Your dedication to students and the discipline of history is exceptional. Professors like you make academia more accessible and less intimidating while still making it something to aspire to. Thank you.

To Dr. Susan Roy, for being eager to help and for supporting my travel to present my research at conferences.

To Dr. Thirstan Falconer, thank you for your ongoing support, encouragement and advice.

To Jane Forgay, thank you for your help finding sources and your interest in my project.

I am grateful to Dr. John English who although we have never met offered his support and helped connect me to individuals to interview.

Thank you to those who offered their insights through interviews with me: Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, and Robert C. Austin. It astounds me how receptive and supportive all of those interviewed were. Their willingness to share their insights with a junior academic is a great source of encouragement. It proves that their service and commitment to their country and its history spans past their careers and into their retirement.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends. Mr. and Mrs. Winter, I can always count on you for sage advice and friendship. Thank you for always reminding me that I am enough. Gabby Bui, thank you for encouraging me in everything I do. Jeremy Vander Hoek, thank you for your friendship and considerate commenting on my research. Lisa, Era, and Emma, thank you for being the perfect distraction.

Mr. and Mrs. Goose, the list of ways you have contributed to this thesis is endless. My gratitude is endless as well.

Finally, to my Mami and Babi, Nexhmije and Istref Recaj, faleminderit. I can never repay you for everything you sacrificed. Let all my accomplishments be yours.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of abbreviations	vi
A Note on Identity and Terminology	vii
Chapter I: Introduction & Historiography	1
Historiography	3
The State of the Field	4
Literature Review: Within History	7
Literature Review: Outside of History	15
Similarities within the Literature	17
Conclusion & Contribution	23
Chapter II: Historical Context	26
<u>Part 1: The History of Kosovo</u>	27
The Battle of Kosovo	27
Congress of Berlin to the Paris Peace Conference	28
The Second World War	30
Socialist Yugoslavia	30
Slobodan Milošević	31
Distraction & Western Reaction	33
From Passive to Armed Resistance	35
<u>Part 2: Canada's Involvement</u>	38
Contact Group	38
Coercion & Diplomacy	39
Kosovo Verification Mission	41
Rambouillet Conference	42
The Kosovo War	45
UN Security Resolution 1244	47
Chapter III: Diaspora Discontent	49
Canada & The U.S.: Contrasting Demographics	51
Easily Forgotten: Albanian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999	56
Foreign Policy Potential: Consensus Among Experts	59
Different this time around: Serbian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999	65
Convicted: Canadian Government Response	71
Petitions, Protests and Personal Pleas: Serbian-Canadian Reaction	73
Public Reaction	82
Policy Impact	89
Conclusion	91
Chapter IV: Sovereignty Sensitivity	93
Separatism & The Mulroney Years	94
Kosovo & The Mulroney Years	97
Separatism & The Chrétien Years	101
Kosovo & The Chrétien Years	103
Public Opinion & Quebec Comparisons	110
Reflections	113
Conclusion	115
Chapter V: Conclusion	117
Works Cited	122

List of Abbreviations

DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

FRY: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

KFOR: Kosovo Force

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KOF: Kosovo Family Reunification Program

KVM: Kosovo Verification Mission

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SCFAIT: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

UN: United Nations

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

A Note on Identity and Terminology

Two acknowledgments are necessary in this thesis. The first is an acknowledgment of my background. The second is an acknowledgment of the terminology that will be used. Integral to the practice of history is the interrogation of how individuals and organizations make both conscious and subconscious decisions. Similarly, the interrogation of the conscious and subconscious motivations of a historian is also integral to the practice of history. This interrogation includes an analysis of prejudices, assumptions, and worldviews as it pertains to vocational training, gender, age, political ideology, amongst a host of other considerations. Therefore, it would be prudent of me to be transparent about my own background. I am a Kosovar Albanian who left Kosovo ten days after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing began on 24 March, 1999.¹ I spent time living in a refugee camp in Macedonia, and then came to Canada as a refugee. Upon arriving in Canada, I lived at the Canadian Forces Base Borden for one month before being settled in Thunder Bay. Although I was too young to remember much before immigrating to Canada, memories of the war, appreciation for the Canadian and NATO soldiers, and debating politics were integral to my upbringing. In addition to my identity as a Kosovar Albanian, I also believe in a pacifist theology. Though I am cautious about these aspects of my identity as an author, I caution against too much emphasis being placed on them. As a historian, I am aware of the need to be discerning when studying the past.

The second acknowledgment is an explanatory note on the use of terminology in this essay. The majority of books and articles written on the history of Kosovo include explanations for their choice of terminology. The name 'Kosovo' is the Serbian spelling of the country which

¹ I refer to myself as a 'Kosovar Albanian' as opposed to the term 'Kosovo Albanian' used in the rest of the essay. This affirms the practice of self-identification and expression as opposed to academic terminology.

Albanians refer to as ‘Kosova.’ In this essay, except for direct quotations using an alternative form, I use the name ‘Kosovo.’ I have chosen to use this spelling as it is the most common spelling used in English language publications and is how the Canadian government officially references the country in official documents and in Parliament. When referring to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), I use simply ‘Yugoslavia’ or the FRY. When referring to other place names I will use the Albanian and the Serbian with a stroke in between. For example, Prishtina / Priština. The Albanian is first alphabetically and therefore will come first in the writing as well. Whereas, some may see this as pedantic, others like Tim Judah, the author of *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*, recognize the necessity of clarifying the nomenclature. On the topic of using both languages in writing he explains “[t]his is ungainly, but unless you are careful, conspiracy theorists will *always* sniff out a bias where there is none.”² If only one place name is given, as in the case for Prizren, the spelling is the same in both languages. When referring to the inhabitants of Kosovo, I use the terms ‘Kosovo Albanians’ and ‘Kosovo Serbians’ as opposed to the many other ways these groups are referenced, such as ‘Albanians,’ ‘Kosovars,’ and ‘Serbs in Kosovo.’ This is an attempt to both recognize distinct ethnic identities while affirming that both are rightful citizens of Kosovo. When referring to individuals, such as Milošević, I use the spelling of their names in their native language unless quoting a source directly which does not. Judah warns, “[a]nyone who tries to work out a failsafe system on names, except if they use just one language or the other, is wasting their time.”³ Despite Judah’s warning, I have endeavoured to create a system of names and place names that is fair to all sides while also reflecting the literature accurately.

² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), x.

³ *Ibid.*, xi.

When referring to the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I use the term ‘Kosovo War.’ When referring to the escalating problems in Kosovo as a whole, I use the term ‘Kosovo crisis.’ Canadian historian and author of *Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship during the Kosovo War* Bob Bergen points out that the Canadian government, the American government, and NATO largely refused to use the term ‘war’ in 1999. All preferred to use other terms, such as “humanitarian mission,” “air campaign,” “bombing campaign,” “conflict,” “military act,” and “intervention.” Alternatively, in the House of Commons, opposition parties called it a “war” and pressed the Liberal government on the issue.⁴ It was not until one year after the NATO bombing campaign ended that any official Liberal government document used the term “war.”⁵

In this thesis, I use the term ‘genocide’ as opposed to ‘ethnic cleansing’ when discussing the Kosovo War. The choice between using the term ‘genocide’ or the less severe term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was similarly contested by politicians at the time, and by historians who have since written about the Kosovo War. The importance of the terminology and how the words ‘genocide’ and ‘war’ are related is best illustrated in an exchange in the House of Commons on 12 April, 1999, between Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament André Bachand. While explaining the official Canadian position on the criminal prosecution of Slobodan Milošević, the President of Serbia and the President of the FRY, Prime Minister Chrétien referred to the events in Kosovo as “genocide.”⁶ Bachand saw this change in terminology as an opportunity to press the government on whether Canada was at war: “We often hear the Prime Minister talk about ethnic cleansing. It is now official, what is going on in

⁴ Bob Bergen, *Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship during the Kosovo War* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019), 8.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol.3 (1997-99): 13565.

Kosovo is genocide. We should no longer call it ethnic cleansing, but genocide. Often, the solution to genocide is war. In the Prime Minister's opinion, in view of the genocide taking place in Kosovo—his very own words—is Canada at war?” Chrétien responded by withdrawing his use of the word genocide: “We are still talking about ethnic cleansing even though I used the other expression earlier. I should have said ethnic cleansing.” Chrétien was trying to avoid answering whether Canada was at war. Chrétien goes on to explain that “it is all a matter of terminology—and those responsible must face the consequences of their crimes against humanity.”⁷

Sean Maloney, Canadian historian and author of *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*, provides the rationale for the use of ‘genocide’ instead of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ In the late 1990s, out of a total of two million Kosovo Albanians, eight hundred fifty thousand of them were forcefully expelled from Kosovo into neighbouring countries, four hundred thousand of them were internally displaced, and ten thousand of them were murdered.⁸ Additionally, there was deliberate destruction of archives, libraries, land ownership documentation, personal documentation, and cultural artifacts. Maloney contends that, “...the combined effects of these events constituted genocide in its original 1948 definition...”⁹ I agree with Maloney's rationale for the use of the term genocide and have therefore chosen to use it. Discussion of terminology was integral to the decision-making during the Kosovo War and has been integral to the historiography written since, thereby making an acknowledgment of nomenclature integral to any writing on the topic.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sean M. Maloney, *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2018), xxii.

⁹ Ibid.

In 1999, British historian Noel Malcolm published the seminal work on the history of Kosovo. In his opening chapter, “A note on names and pronunciations,” he states that “[u]nfortunately it is not possible to devise any system that will not cause some offense to some or other (or all) of the local inhabitants.”¹⁰ Twenty years later, a perfect system is yet to be found.

¹⁰ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), x.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION & HISTORIOGRAPHY

The last fifteen years have seen the revitalisation of the field of Canadian international history. Whereas there was once a handful of scholars in the field focussing largely on the North Atlantic Triangle, it is now a growing field. Recent trends in scholarship in Canadian international history emphasize the role of race, culture, aid, and migration in Canadian foreign policy and politics.¹¹ In addition, the expansion of the field is due to scholars diversifying the countries deemed worthy of inclusion in the study of Canada's role in the world. An excellent example of this new direction in Canadian international history is *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*. This edited collection was written with the intent to "explore Canada's relations with places long regarded as marginal, including the Caribbean, China, Congo, France, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea."¹² This thesis adds Kosovo, another place long regarded as marginal, to the study of Canadian international history. This is done by analyzing the influences on Canada's decision-making process during the Kosovo War, focusing specifically on the domestic considerations – national unity and diaspora relations – which made Canada unique amongst the NATO countries.

This research stems from the understanding that domestic considerations are integral to the creation of foreign policy. In his book, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*, Lloyd Axworthy reflects on how he came to understand how closely related domestic and international issues were during his time as Minister of Employment and Immigration. This is

¹¹ See for example: Greg Donaghy and David Webster, *A Samaritan State Revisited: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Aid* (University of Calgary Press, 2019) or Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford. *Canada and the Third World : Overlapping Histories* Toronto (Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

¹² Laura Madokoro and Francine McKenzie, *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*. *Dominion of Race* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 6.

clear when he states, “I was beginning to realize the global interconnectedness” in relation to Canada, domestic issues and the world.¹³ This realization led him to being “ready and willing” when asked to move to the foreign affairs portfolio.¹⁴ Similar reflections are found in the book, *The Call of the World: A Political Memoir*, written by Bill Graham, Liberal member of Parliament and Chair of the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Law (SCFAIT). In his chapter titled “All Geopolitics are Local,” he argues that domestic concerns and Canadian foreign policy are inextricably connected by stating: “I never failed to be struck by how directly connected the interests of my constituents were with my international work.”¹⁵ The close connection between foreign policy and domestic issues was not only obvious to politicians such as Axworthy and Graham; it was also obvious to policy experts and diplomats. In his book, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada*, retired Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker includes two opening quotations. The first, by Lester B. Pearson reads, “Foreign policy is, after all, merely domestic policy with its hat on.”¹⁶ The second, from a review of foreign policy done by Pierre Trudeau's government in 1970, reads, "In essence, foreign policy is the product of the government's progressive definition of and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment. It is the extension abroad of national policies."¹⁷ These quotations, and Heinbecker’s inclusion of them, illustrate that the interwovenness of domestic concerns and foreign policy has long been understood. A study of Canadian domestic issues and foreign policy during the Kosovo War demonstrates the extent to which this is true.

¹³ Axworthy, 42.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁵ Bill Graham, *The Call of the World: A Political Memoir* (Vancouver: On Point Press/UBC Press, 2016), 193.

¹⁶ Heinbecker, 192

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 192.

Historiography

“I’m a Balkans expert but nobody ever calls anymore,” laments Dr. Robert C. Austin.¹⁸ Austin, now a professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, was a leading expert on Albanian issues in the 1990s. He has advised the Canadian and American governments on issues pertaining to Kosovo and Albania. After the Kosovo War was over and the media attention had moved on, Dr. Austin dedicated an incredible amount of effort to bringing Canadian’s attention back to Kosovo by hosting speakers and politicians at the University of Toronto, including Kosovo’s President Ibrahim Rugova. He explains the larger purpose of these public lectures: “what we were doing was trying to introduce to Canada the notion that Kosovo needed to be talked about. So that was kind of an agenda.”¹⁹ Having become disillusioned with the lack of response from the government and scholars, Dr. Austin has largely given up on this agenda, but he continues to believe Kosovo is integral to Canada and is worth scholarly attention. He states, “the Balkans is like Hotel California, you can check out any time you like... but you can never leave! Kosovo is no exception.”²⁰

Similar frustration with the lack of attention Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has received is evident in other interviews conducted for this thesis. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Kosovo War, explained the reason he was keen to discuss Kosovo was because of the lack of attention it has received.²¹ Commenting on the paucity of scholarship Axworthy said, “it’s incredible, but I think it’s part of a larger problem with Canadian academics [...] generally they’re not very good at looking at Canadian ventures, which is why I was

¹⁸ Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

interested in responding to you.”²² Austin and Axworthy are correct about both the limited attention that the relationship between Kosovo and Canada has received and the ongoing importance of Kosovo.

The State of the Field

The historical literature on Canada’s relationship with Kosovo has been extremely limited. It has focused on Canada’s role in the Kosovo War or on the years immediately prior to the war beginning in 1996, and following the war ending in 2001. The history is largely written from the subfields of either military history or diplomatic history. This lack of coverage can be attributed to four factors: the distraction caused by 9/11, emphasis on multilateral institutions, Kosovo being a part of Yugoslavia and limited sources.

The first explanation for the limited amount of attention paid to Canada’s relationship with Kosovo, and to the Kosovo War more generally, is the distraction caused by the events of 11 September, 2001. Both American and Canadian academics have specifically addressed how the events of 9/11 drew attention away from the history of the Kosovo War. Immediately following the Kosovo War, a three-year rush of scholarship began. American books in this post-Kosovo War rush include *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* written by Noam Chomsky,²³ *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields* by David Fromkin,²⁴ and *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* edited by Andrew J.

²² Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

²³ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999).

²⁴ David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999).

Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen.²⁵ In Canada, historians, with exception of those within the military profession publishing in the *Canadian Military Journal*, were largely absent from that rush. Sean M. Maloney's experience trying to publish his book, *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*, speaks directly to the effect that 9/11 had on historians. He explains, "the events of 11 September 2001 and the war that followed overshadowed my efforts and unfortunately ensured Operation Kinetic did not see the light of day at the time. The Balkans had seemingly become irrelevant, and publishers made that point clear."²⁶

The second reason that Canada's relationship with Kosovo has received such scant attention is that historians have written with a focus on the United Nations (UN) or NATO instead of focusing specifically on Canada or an individual country (with the exception of the United States). It is telling that even in the Canadian Forces' military journal the focus is not on Canada. Since its creation in 1999, the *Canadian Military Journal* has included eleven articles about the Kosovo War, written by both academic historians and Canadian service members. Of these eleven articles, only three focus specifically on Canada's contribution in the Kosovo War.²⁷ Of the other eight articles about the Kosovo War, four mention Canada's role in passing, and four contain no reference to Canada whatsoever.²⁸

²⁵ A.J. Bacevich and Andrew J. Cohen, *War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* (New York: Columbia University, 2001).

²⁶ Maloney, xvi.

²⁷ The articles on Canada's contribution are: Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign," and Michael Ward et al., "Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment," in *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000); and Doug Delaney, "CIMIC Operations During Operations 'KINETIC'," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 4 (2000).

²⁸ The articles that mention Canada are: The Lord Robertson, "NATO Operations in the Balkans," J.R. Michel Maisonneuve, "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission," and Albert Legault, "NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context," in *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000); and Alain Boyer, "Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign," in *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 3 (2002). The articles that contain no mention are: Lenard J. Cohen, "Living an Illusion: Political Transition in Kosovo" *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000); Klaus Naumann, "The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Military Force," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (2004); Pitzul et al., "The Responsibility to Protect: A Military Legal Comment," *Canadian*

The third reason that Kosovo has received such scant attention is due to its history as a former province within Yugoslavia. The majority of scholarly publications that mention Kosovo analyze it as part of relations with Yugoslavia. Kosovo was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until the Kosovo War in 1999 and did not gain independence until 2008. Therefore, Canada did not have formal diplomatic relations with Kosovo until recently. This thesis will argue that despite this, Canada's relationship and actions toward Kosovo are worthy of singular attention.

Finally, Canada's relationship with Kosovo has received such scant attention due to the recentness of the event. It has only been twenty years since Canada participated in the NATO intervention in Kosovo. This means that many of the relevant documents are still restricted by the government and can only be obtained through *Access to Information Act* requests. Memoirs of those Canadians who played important roles in the handling of the Kosovo issue are either written recently or remain unwritten. Thus, the types of sources that serve as the bread and butter of the history profession are still limited. Due to these limitations, historians who have chosen to write on the topic rely heavily on interviews, media, and *Access to Information* requests. These reasons explain the limited amount of historical scholarship on Canada's relationship with Kosovo and Canada's foreign policy toward Kosovo. Nonetheless, singular attention to Canada's relationship with Kosovo is worthwhile because it illuminates the unique considerations Canada had when determining its foreign policy.

Therefore, the state of the literature on Canada's relationship with Kosovo can be attributed to distraction caused by 9/11, emphasis on multilateral institutions, Kosovo's role

Military Journal, 5, no. 4 (2005); and Louis Henault, "The Kosovo Crisis: Toward a New Conception of Aerial War Fare," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 2 (2010).

within Yugoslavia and limited availability of sources. Yet, as emphasized by Axworthy and Austin, understanding Canada's actions towards Kosovo is a worthwhile pursuit. Canada's relationship with Kosovo may be short, as far as relations between countries go, but it has been eventful. The Canadian side of the relationship has included diplomacy, participation in the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), participation in a seventy-eight day NATO led bombing of Serbia, participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR) after the bombing ended, participation in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), sending Canadian police officers, investigators, and corrections officers to aid in the stabilization of Kosovo, financial aid, settling refugees, and eventually recognizing Kosovo's independence.

Literature Review: Within History

The first contributions to the historiography of Canada's involvement with Kosovo from within the discipline of history are found in the *Canadian Military Journal*. The majority of the first volume is dedicated to the Kosovo War and its aftermath. Of the six articles, only one contains no mention of Canada's role. Three of the articles are not written about Canada specifically, but include brief mentions. In "NATO Operations in the Balkans," the Right Honourable, Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, focuses on other countries, and NATO in general, pausing occasionally to comment, "Canada should be very proud of its role" and to commend Canada for "punching well above its weight."²⁹ The article, "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission," by Brigadier-General J.R. Michel Maisonneuve, is not about Canada, but includes a short one paragraph section titled "The Canadian Contribution," in which he commends that the Canadians' contribution "was, as has come to be expected, greater than

²⁹ The Lord Robertson, "NATO Operations in the Balkans," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 8.

their size.”³⁰ In “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context,” Professor Albert Legault does not mention Canada until the last two sentences of the article when he explores the implications for Canada.³¹ Hence, of the six articles in the *Canadian Military Journal*, one does not mention Canada at all, and three vaguely commend Canada for “punching above its weight” but do not specifically examine Canada’s role.

It is in this context that the remaining two articles, specifically written on Canada’s contribution, are found. The first, “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” was co-authored by eight men, three of whom had a background in history, including Captain James Pickett who was Chief Air Force Historian at the time.³² “Mission Ready” assesses the Canadian air operations over Kosovo in 1999, as well as the lessons learned for future operations. The authors specifically discuss the challenges Canadians faced in Kosovo, and how aptly they overcame them. The thesis is that Canada’s performance was commendable, and at times “super human.”³³ The article goes to great lengths to distinguish Canada’s contribution from that of other countries. For example, when discussing participation in high-risk missions the authors are careful to point out that Canada had “a higher percentage of these perilous missions than any of the other NATO nations.”³⁴ Extra attention is paid distinguishing Canada from the Americans. For example, the article gives the example of Canadian Sergeant Neal who realized Americans were incorrectly burning laser codes, rendering bombs unusable and then taught the United States Air Force armament technicians the proper way. According to the

³⁰ J.R. Michel Maisonneuve, “The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 50.

³¹ Albert Legault, “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 66.

³² Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., “Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2001).

³³ Lt. Col. David L. Bashow et al., 60.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 59

article, this enabled Americans to use over 90 percent of the bombs previously considered unserviceable, saving tens of millions of dollars.³⁵ The article goes on to state, “[o]f greater important, Sergeant Neal’s initiative and ingenuity saved the bombing campaign from suffering critical shortages.”³⁶ Emphasis on Canadian performance, especially in comparison to that of Americans, is an ongoing theme. For example, when Canada’s success rate of 70 percent is described as “close to that of Canada’s most proficient allies,” and the fact Canada led over half of the strike packages they participated in, is proof of Canadian professionalism and expertise “in this massively American-dominated air campaign.”³⁷ The crux of this article is that the Canadian contribution was commendable, and the fact that Kosovo will be one of the most instructive wars in the future, more instructive even than the Gulf War.³⁸

The second article, “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” was written by four authors including historian Major Doug Delaney, two of which held BA’s in history from the Royal Military College of Canada. This article explores important impressions and lessons learned from KFOR, the NATO operation in Kosovo when the bombing was finished. It explores the challenges that the Canadian military faced, and how they overcame those challenges. It especially criticizes the lack of Canadian intra-agency cooperation and blames the lack of cooperation for Canada’s lack of profile saying, “Canada receives no collective credit for their achievements. As far as boosting Canada’s profile within the KFOR coalition, UNMIK or even the North Atlantic Council is concerned, they are barely visible.”³⁹ The article argues that Kosovo proves that Canada had the qualifications necessary to

³⁵ Ibid., 58.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 61.

³⁹ Michael Ward et al., “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 71.

lead coalition operations and should have done so. The authors stress that intra-agency cooperation should become a priority in order to “boost our national profile, proving that we can be front runners in the planning and conduct of peace support operations. Then, perhaps, Canadians would receive the sort of credit and policy influence we justly deserve.”⁴⁰ As illustrated above, the *Canadian Military Journal* articles that mention Canada have a few threads in common. First, they are written by authors who have first-hand experience in either the Kosovo War or in the subsequent KFOR stabilization efforts. Most importantly, the publications are tied together by the need to illuminate Canada’s role in the Kosovo War. Particularly through emphasizing the difference and importance of Canada’s contributions compared to other NATO countries, especially the United States.

There are two books, also written by military historians, that specifically focus on Canada and Kosovo. Bob Bergen, who completed his PhD in History after retiring from a twenty-five-year career in journalism, wrote one of these books called *Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship During the Kosovo War*. *Scattering Chaff* illustrates how the Canadian Forces severely restricted, if not fully censored, the Canadian news media by invoking operational security concerns during the Kosovo War in 1999. Bergen is highly critical of Prime Minister Chrétien’s government’s media policy and lack of military spending, though he does not criticize its foreign policy. Bergen explains that Canada was involved in the Kosovo War in order to “halt the violence and avert an even bigger humanitarian disaster.”⁴¹ Like the other authors, Bergen writes with the goal of bringing attention to the Kosovo War. It is his position that as a result of the Canadian Forces’ media policy, the service men and women were denied the recognition they

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Bergen, 6.

deserved. Despite being critical of how Chrétien's government's handled domestic media policy, Bergen praises Canada's role in the Kosovo War itself. According to Bergen, the restrictive media policy has kept Canadians from knowing "the incredible success stories; and the absolute skill, dedication, and bravery of the aircrews."⁴² This lack of public knowledge motivated Bergen to write the book. Like authors in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Bergen highlights Canada's ability to "punch above its weight," especially compared to the United States.

The other book that focuses on Canada and Kosovo is written by Canadian historian Sean Maloney and is called *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*. Maloney aims to tell the story of Canada's contribution to the NATO led KFOR and the overall stabilization of the country following the Kosovo War and NATO led bombing campaign. Like Austin, Axworthy, and the authors mentioned thus far, Maloney is motivated to tell the story of Kosovo because he believes it has wrongly been ignored saying, "[t]he intervention was the first time in the 1990s that ethnic cleansing was arrested while it was in progress and the effects reversed. That alone should merit historical recognition if not praise for those who conceived and carried out those operations."⁴³ Maloney is highly critical of diplomats, bureaucrats, politicians, and the media and argues that those involved in the military and humanitarian achievement in Kosovo "should no longer be subjected to one-sided excoriation by those critics in the comfortable and safe surroundings of the human rights industry, academia, the legal profession, the internet, and the diplomatic cocktail party."⁴⁴ Like the other authors, Maloney emphasizes the size and quality of Canada's contribution to maintaining peace in Kosovo: providing Michel Maisonneuve as one of five regional commanders in 1998, leading over half of the air combat missions assigned to them, and

⁴² Ibid., 2.

⁴³ Maloney, xxi.

⁴⁴ Ibid., xxii.

performing extraordinarily within KFOR. Like the other authors, Maloney likewise asserts Canadian exceptionalism in Kosovo. He argues that the civilians especially loved the Canadians, with Albanians known to cry out: “thank God for Canadians!”⁴⁵ Maloney stresses Canadian performance in comparison to that of the United States. Maloney credits Canada, namely Chief of Defence Art Eggleton, for convincing a wavering Clinton administration to commit to using ground forces to stabilize Kosovo, essentially crediting Canada for the creation of KFOR. In the words of Maloney, pressure from Canadians was “a significant factor in the American decision-making process.”⁴⁶ Maloney’s book is concerned with the credit Canada receives on the international stage. He argues that Canada needs to deploy forces that are large and useful enough that they are not merely symbolism because as he explains, “symbolism does not permit Canada to wield political influence in NATO circles.”⁴⁷ Thus, Maloney engages in the same quest to boost Canada’s national profile as other authors such as Delaney et al. do.

The only two academic publications written on Canada’s diplomatic history with Kosovo are by Michael Manulak. Although Manulak is a political scientist, he includes notes of thanks to his Masters supervisor Norman Hillmer in all of his works. This illustrates the prominent Canadian foreign relations historian, Norman Hillmer’s continued influence on Manulak’s work. In a comment on the field of Canadian international history prominent Canadian historian John English explained “[h]istory departments [...] paid a large price when students who wanted to study international affairs turned to other disciplines.”⁴⁸ Although Manulak is not technically a historian, his work is the only diplomatic history of Canada and Kosovo written thus far. In the

⁴⁵ Ibid., 344.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 92.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 80.

⁴⁸ John English, “The Tragedies of Canadian International History: A Comment,” *The Canadian Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (2015): 574.

article, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy?”, Manulak argues that Canada “did not simply offer troops in a fainthearted or half-hearted gesture to NATO, but effectively employed its resources to play an important part in the diplomacy that led to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, in the maintenance of allied unity, and in Operation Allied Force.”⁴⁹ He concentrates on the intensification of diplomatic attention to the Kosovo issue, the decision to intervene, the conduct of the campaign, the consideration of ground options, and the diplomatic process that brought resolution. Like the authors published in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Manulak was motivated by a desire to prove the value and scope of Canada’s contribution, but with a focus on diplomacy not the military. According to Manulak, who relies on public source documents and extensive interviews, the Kosovo issue was characterized by a high degree of domestic consensus, an effective communications strategy, and an effective and depoliticised decision making process.⁵⁰ It is worth noting that on the topic of Canada’s role in military planning and conduct during the air operations, Manulak asserts Canada “had a limited role.”⁵¹ Just as the diplomats’ role is either absent or underemphasized in the military histories, the military’s role is underemphasized in the diplomatic history. Manulak concludes the article by stating, “[c]ontrary to the period's popular discourse, during the Kosovo crisis, Canadian foreign policy leaders advanced Canada's interests [...]”⁵² This sentence contrasts the military historians who lament that the Kosovo War and the crisis surrounding it represent a missed opportunity to raise Canada’s profile in the world. What this article has in

⁴⁹ Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy?,” 566.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 581.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 573.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 581.

common with the military historians' articles is the motivation to distinguish Canada's contributions on the world stage.

In 2011, Manulak published *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention* as a part of Queen's University's Centre for International Relations *Martello Papers*. This monograph is very similar to Manulak's 2009 article which argues that Canada had an important and underappreciated diplomatic role in the Kosovo War. The major difference is the format. Instead of simply presenting the history of Canada's contribution in the Kosovo War, Manulak applies John W. Kingdon's multiple-streams model, outlined in the book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*.⁵³ Manulak's most recent publication on the topic of Kosovo and Canada is an article titled, "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: Looking back, 20 years on." This opinion piece is from the website OpenCanada by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, which aims to create content to explain and unite the fields of public policy, academic scholarship, and journalism.⁵⁴ This opinion piece aims to briefly tell the history of Canada's involvement in Kosovo and to revisit where the relations are twenty years later. Like his first two publications, Manulak reasserts that "Canada played a central role in the end of the 1999 Kosovo conflict" to illustrate the power of diplomacy backed by military power.⁵⁵ Though opinion piece includes a photo of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy at the opening of the Canadian office in Kosovo's capital in 2009, a year after Kosovo declared independence, web source does not mention Canada / Kosovo relations following the 1999 military conflict. It also does not mention that the Canadian office in Prishtina/Priština closed before 2019. This opinion piece illustrates

⁵³ Manulak, *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, 1.

⁵⁴ Manulak, "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: Looking back, 20 years on." *Open Canada, Centre for International Governance Innovation*, last modified June 6, 2019, <https://www.opencanada.org/features/canada-and-kosovo-crisis-looking-back-20-years/>

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

that although historians are publishing on the topic, their analysis of Canada's involvement in the 1999 Kosovo War does not extend beyond the military conflict and the immediate aftermath. Although Manulak has a continued interest in international organizations, multilateral diplomacy, Canadian foreign policy, and non-proliferation, he no longer actively researches or publishes on the Kosovo War, except for the referenced web source.

Literature Review: Outside of History

The following are brief descriptions of literature that has been written on Canada's relationship with Kosovo outside of the discipline of history.

Much of the writings on Canada and Kosovo's diplomatic history are found in the memoirs of retired diplomats and politicians. Examples of retired diplomats and politicians and diplomats who have written about Kosovo are Lloyd Axworthy in his memoir *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*, Bill Graham in his memoir *The Call of the World: A Political Memoir*, and Paul Heinbecker in his book *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada*. This fits English's assessment that Canadian international history is being written by former diplomats and politicians.⁵⁶ However, It is important to acknowledge the limitation of history written by diplomats and politicians. When discussing writing a memoir, Bill Graham regretted that a lengthy career and page limitations meant he could not dedicate as much space in his book to topics like Kosovo as he would have liked.⁵⁷ Axworthy expressed frustration at academia's lack of attention to Kosovo and to Canadian international history.⁵⁸ These

⁵⁶ English, 564.

⁵⁷ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

⁵⁸ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

frustrations expressed by Axworthy and Graham advocate for the important role Canadian historians have in writing international history.

The next relevant publication is “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower” in the edited volume *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*⁵⁹ This chapter is authored by political scientists Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel. Unlike Manulak, whose education merged the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, Nossal and Roussel are situated firmly in the discipline of political science. In this chapter, Nossal and Roussel argue that Canada contributed only minimally to the Kosovo War both militarily and diplomatically. They assert that the negotiations and the NATO bombing were a “hegemonic operation cloaked in multilateralism” and that all important and trivial decisions were made in Washington.⁶⁰ They assert that this does not mean Canada was forced into the war, in fact, quite the opposite. According to Nossal and Roussel, Canada was a “happy follower.”⁶¹ It is important to include the perspective of political scientists on the subject because those who lament the decline in Canada’s international history are most worried about the field being taken over by scholars of political science and international relations. In his article “The Tragedies of Canadian International History,” Canadian international historian David Meren asserts that “political scientists and former diplomats were responsible for an increasingly large share of the literature on Canada's diplomatic history.” Despite being wary of history being written by scholars in other disciplines Meren concedes that political scientists offer invaluable insight into Canadian diplomatic history; however, he believes that their applicability to the

⁵⁹ Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 183.

historic profession is limited by their use of “different epistemologies and methodologies.”⁶² In the case of “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,” Meren is right. As previously mentioned Manulak, is a political scientist who trained under and was deeply influenced by esteemed Canadian international historian Norman Hillmer. His research led him to a drastically different conclusion than that of Nossal and Roussel. Manulak argues Canada was a diplomatic leader during the Kosovo War, yet Nossal and Roussel argue Canada was merely a “happy follower.” Manulak directly addresses his disagreement with Nossal and Roussel’s assessment in his work.⁶³ This is just one example that illustrates how political scientists assessing Canada’s role in Kosovo and its relationship with the United States can differ drastically in their conclusions compared to those made by historians.

Similarities within the Literature

An analysis of the historical writings on Kosovo and Canada reveals that the assessment of the field made by Meren and English is correct. First, all the authors except for Manulak are or were directly involved to some capacity in the Kosovo War. Unsurprisingly, the authors in the *Canadian Military Journal* were personally involved in the Kosovo War. The *Canadian Military Journal* is the professional journal of the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence, meant to serve as a forum for members of the academic community with a special interest in security and defence matters, and to inform Canadians in general about Canada’s military. Bergen is a former journalist who specialized in reporting on the Canadian Forces for twenty-five years before finishing his doctorate in military history. He covered Canada’s role in the Kosovo War. Maloney, now a professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada, was

⁶² Meren, 553.

⁶³ Manulak, *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, 5.

the historian in the Balkans for the 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade. Thus, although not solely done by retired politicians or diplomats, the fact that the majority of the writing on Canada and Kosovo is by authors who were personally involved fits English's description of the field of Canadian international history. One could argue that this thesis being written by a former refugee of the Kosovo War falls into this trend.

In addition, an analysis of the historiography illustrates that because of the recent nature of the events, the authors writing on Kosovo rely heavily on interviews or information accessed through *Access to Information Act* requests. For *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, Manulak relied on *Access to Information Act* requests and conducted twenty-four interviews. Nine of the interviews were with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) officials, three with Department of National Defence officials, two with Members of Cabinet, five with members of the Canadian Forces, one with the Privy Council Office, one with a Prime Minister's Office official, one with an International Fora Official, and two within Civil Society. Manulak specifies that the interviews were held confidentially in order to enable more candid conversations and as a result are not cited in the paper. He notes that “on the whole, the interviewees were extremely accommodating and forth-coming” and that “the timing of the interviews, approximately ten years after the 1998-1999 crisis in Kosovo, was fortuitous because the interview subjects were able to recall their activities in detail, while feeling sufficiently free to speak in a frank matter.”⁶⁴

Similarly, the strength of *Scattering Chaff* is the quality and quantity of primary research that Bergen undertook. The Chrétien Government, Department of National Defence, and

⁶⁴ Ibid., 8.

Canadian Forces' documents obtained through the federal *Access to Information Act* provide unique insight into the policies and disinformation that surrounded the Kosovo War. In cases where Bergen was denied access to requested documents, he is careful to explain why based on the *Access to Information Act*.⁶⁵ As the old adage goes, sometimes you can learn more from what is left unsaid than what is said. In *Scattering Chaff*, Bergen makes sure the reader learns from what is left unreleased, as well as what has been released. Bergen also performs in-depth analysis of multiple Canadian and American newspapers to illustrate the type of coverage, and lack of coverage received by Canadians in the Kosovo War. *Scattering Chaff* includes oral testimony from interviews with some of Canada's most prominent journalists including Paul Workman, Neil Macdonald, Geoffrey York, and Joy Malbon. In addition, for the writing of *Scattering Chaff*, Bergen was given unprecedented permission to interview military service men and women. He conducted numerous interviews of service members of all ranks including, to his surprise, Chief of Defence Staff General Ray Henault, the highest-ranking officer in the Canadian Forces.

Like Manulak and Bergen, Maloney relies heavily on documents obtained through the *Access to Information Act* and interviews with service members. Of course, each of the works have their limitations. For example, the authors limited their sources to primary sources and to interviews from within their own professions. Military historians largely ignored the role of diplomacy, and diplomatic historians largely ignored the role of the military. Neither the military nor the diplomatic historians included any facets of social or cultural history in their analysis. Regardless of these limitations, the ability of these historians to write on Kosovo and Canada indicates that the hindrance caused by the recent nature of the events can be successfully

⁶⁵ Bergen, 7.

overcome. Much like in these publications, this thesis overcomes this hindrance through analyzing primary sources such as media, Hansards, and interviews.

Each of the authors who have written on Kosovo focus on narrow topics. Manulak focuses on the diplomacy, Maloney focuses on KFOR's ground operations, and Bergen focuses on the air campaign. Therefore, there is substantial disagreement between the authors on aspects of Canada's involvement in Kosovo. For example, in *Operation Kinetic* Maloney comes down hard on a variety of groups including diplomats and the media. If Maloney had taken into consideration the writings of other historians, such as Manulak, his assessment of diplomats may have been more balanced. Maloney and Bergen agree that the quality and quantity of media coverage of Canada's contributions in the Kosovo War was insufficient. However, they disagree on the cause. Maloney squarely blames the media, where the entire crux of Bergen's *Scattering Chaff* is an explanation of how the government's lack of transparency is to blame. In sharp contrast to both Bergen and Maloney, Manulak praises both the media's attentiveness and the government's transparency when he states, "the media received high-level commentary and maintained an interest in the briefings throughout the campaign [...] The communications strategy remains unique among Canadian deployments and was a vital means of informing public interest in the mission."⁶⁶ The central argument of *Scattering Chaff* is that the communications strategy, which Manulak praises, declined in relevance and in transparency throughout the campaign and was directly against the public interest. Political scientists Nossal and Roussel disagree with all the authors and argue that Canada only minimally contributed to the Kosovo War both militarily and diplomatically.

⁶⁶ Manulak, "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A "Golden Moment" in Canadian Foreign Policy?," 575.

It is therefore all the more telling when each of the authors agree on a crucial point: what motivated Canada's involvement in Kosovo. All authors agree that Canada's involvement was motivated by a mix of humanitarian concerns, concerns over regional stability in the Balkans, and alliance obligation in NATO. It is also telling that even Nossal and Roussel agree on this point. Although they argue Canada followed what the United States decided, they argue they did so happily because they were motivated by humanitarian concerns and alliance obligations. This agreement is all the more significant in light of the fact that what amounts to a non-existent debate among the historiography of Canada and the Kosovo War is the most heated debate in the broader historiography of NATO and the Kosovo War. For example, in the broader historiography of the Kosovo War when reviewing the diplomatic record, American historian and philosopher Noam Chomsky dismisses the American efforts to get Yugoslavia to accept the Rambouillet Agreement and calls it the "take-it-or-get-bombed approach."⁶⁷ He speculates that the wording of the agreement was purposely designed to fail and says that perhaps someday the truth will come out and it may be asked whether the "diplomatic failure" was the "rationally chosen course that led to a predictable victory [military] for the values that mattered."⁶⁸ It should be noted that when Chomsky refers to the "values that mattered" he does so in a pejorative sense, mocking the morality of the United States. Chomsky is not the only author who makes this argument based on the diplomatic record at Rambouillet. American political scientist James Kurth, in his chapter "First War of A Global Era" in *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, analyzes the Rambouillet Agreement and argues that although there was nothing diplomatically unusual in the text of the agreement itself, the inclusion of Appendix B was outside standard diplomatic negotiating practice. Appendix B would have given NATO forces

⁶⁷ Chomsky, 106.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 108.

the right to conduct military operation anywhere within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kurth states simply, “the actions of the U.S. diplomats in the Rambouillet negotiations in February and March 1999 strongly indicate that the United States wanted Serbia to reject a political solution to the problem posed by Kosovo. This rejection would then be used to justify a NATO war against Serbia.”⁶⁹ Chomsky and Kurth illustrate the opinions of a contingent of authors within the historiography of the Kosovo War that believe the U.S. did not negotiate in good faith. Other American authors such as retired diplomat David L. Phillips strongly reject this notion and argue that negotiations were conducted earnestly to try and prevent a humanitarian tragedy comparable to Rwanda. In the words of Phillips, “[t]hough war always represents the failure of diplomacy, the Clinton administration had done everything possible to negotiate a peaceful outcome.”⁷⁰ Thus, a brief comparison between American and Canadian historiography of the event shows that what Canadian historians take as a given, American scholars think of as anything but.

As analyzed above, all the Canadian historians were motivated by the need to distinguish Canada’s contribution in Kosovo. This could be considered an example of what Meren criticizes as “romanticized notions of Canada's international action.”⁷¹ A particular emphasis is placed on highlighting Canada’s successes and contributions in comparison to that of other NATO countries, especially to that of the United States. This could be considered an example of Canada’s kid-sibling complex and need to prove itself on the world stage. This kid-sibling complex was solidified by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at a state dinner with U.S. President Barack Obama when Trudeau said, “We’re actually closer than friends. We’re more like siblings,

⁶⁹ James Kurth, “First War of the Global Era: Kosovo and the U.S. Grand Strategy,” in *War Over Kosovo*, 78.

⁷⁰ Phillips, 106.

⁷¹ Meren, 538.

really. We have shared parentage, though we took different paths in our later years. We became the stay-at-home type. You grew to be a little more rebellious.”⁷² The emphasis on Canada’s contribution in comparison to that of the United States could be proof of a kid-sibling complex amongst historians. However, more likely this emphasis is a perfectly legitimate response. In this case, the elder Trudeau’s appraisal of the relationship is more accurate. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s description of Canada / U.S. relations when meeting U.S. President Richard Nixon exemplifies the reasonableness of this response. Pierre Elliot Trudeau exclaimed, “Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.”⁷³ Historians must honestly balance acknowledging the effect the elephant has on Canada, and the ways Canada remains unmoved by the beast. Highlighting Canada’s contribution is especially important in light of the ignorance of American scholars towards Canada’s contributions. An example can be found in David L. Phillips book *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*. David L. Phillips worked as a diplomat on the Kosovo file for over twenty years, and was close friends with important Balkan diplomats, such as Richard Holbrooke, who the book is dedicated to. In *Liberating Kosovo*, Phillips references the contributions of many of the NATO allied countries and makes not a single reference to Canada.

Conclusion & Contribution

“Canada deserves answers.” These three words were emphasized by Progressive Conservative member of Parliament Peter MacKay in a heated House of Commons discussion

⁷² Meagan Fitzpatrick, “Justin Trudeau tells White House state dinner Canada and U.S. ‘closer than friends’,” *CBC News Online*, March 10, 2016.

⁷³ Michael Enright, “Sleeping with a very cranky elephant: The history of Canada-U.S. tensions,” *CBC The Sunday Magazine*, June 15, 2018.

about Kosovo on 12 April, 1999. MacKay, like other parliamentarians at the time, wanted Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the Liberal government in power to clarify what the Canadian position on the Kosovo issue was. “This is the American view. What is the Canadian government’s view?”, MacKay asked.⁷⁴ Despite confrontations, such as this one, all the parties in the House of Commons supported Canada’s involvement in Kosovo and believed the involvement was necessary because of Canada’s humanitarian and regional stability interests. From the first time Kosovo was mentioned in Parliament on 18 November, 1991, to this heated exchange in 1999, Canadian parliamentarians attempted to distinguish what Canada’s views on Kosovo were. As evidenced above, historians who have written about Canada and Kosovo have likewise been occupied with the same task. Historians since and politicians at the time have tried to distinguish the Canadian contribution and position in comparison to the United States. Another similarity is like the historians, none of the parliamentarians at the time questioned what motivated Canada’s policy in Kosovo. Therefore, there was consensus at the time, and has been consensus since, about what motivated Canada’s policy towards Kosovo: humanitarian concerns, regional stability concerns, and obligation to the NATO alliance.

The historiography on Canada’s role in Kosovo is pre-occupied with distinguishing Canada’s contributions in comparison to those of the United States while simultaneously not engaging in the debate integral to the American historiography about what motivated NATO’s involvement in Kosovo. However, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada had additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, those being national unity and cultural communities. Yes, Canada was motivated by concerns regarding humanitarian need, regional stability, and alliance obligation. However, Canada also had a unique set of domestic

⁷⁴ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 3 (1997-99): 13591.

considerations when deciding how to react to issues in Kosovo. Therefore, by studying the domestic factors Canada dealt with during the Kosovo War, it is possible to both distinguish Canada's contribution, and to participate in the debate Canadian historians have not been present in. Many of the sources written on Canada and Kosovo jump straight into an analysis of the Kosovo War, giving little to no historical context. The ones that do provide historical context fall into the trap of vilifying or mythologizing the Balkans. As such, before providing an analysis of domestic considerations Canada had during the Kosovo War, it is important to answer the question "how did Canada come to be involved in Kosovo in the first place?"

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

“The little shop of horrors called the Balkans.” – Sean Maloney, *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*

“There are no easy or straightforward explanations to anything that happens in the Balkans.”
– Sean Maloney, *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*

“To the outside world, the Balkan peninsula often has been pictured as a land that time forgot: of peasant villages from the Middle Ages; of feuds and clans, of conspiracies and assassinations. And Europe, in particular, remembers it – with reason – as a political labyrinth in which great powers, if imprudent enough to enter it, can end up losing their way, or their lives.” – David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing: The Reality of American Intervention in the Balkans*

“According to the cliché, in the Balkans there is too much history in too small a space.” – Robert Austin, *Making and Remaking the Balkans: Nations and States since 1878*

“The Balkans produce more history than they can consume.” – Winston Churchill, in David L. Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*

The type of mythologizing illustrated in these quotations is commonplace in the historiography of the Balkans. Despite its prevalence, this type of description is neither useful nor accurate. If anything, it is counterproductive to the academic pursuit. This type of rhetoric suggests a false equivalency between Balkan conflicts, ignoring the individual factors which make each unique. Such mythologizing of the Balkans was also prevalent among politicians. When discussing Kosovo, Prime Minister Chrétien referred to “ancient hates and grievances,”⁷⁵ New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Peter Mancini referred to “ancient grudges and ancient hatreds,”⁷⁶ and Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Charlie Power commented, “the history of the whole Balkan area and the nature of the many hundreds of years of conflict and hatred which have existed in that area and have flourished for some strange

⁷⁵ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13575.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 14405.

reason.”⁷⁷ References to “ancient hatreds” that have prevailed for “some strange reason” obfuscate the responsibility of politicians and policies in creating conflict. Scholars such as journalist Tim Judah, the author of *Kosovo: War and Revenge* and *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* and historian Noel Malcolm, the author of *Kosovo: A Short History*, have taken on the task of explaining the Balkans and Kosovo without the mythologizing or vilifying that is so prevalent. Malcolm explains that the prevailing western view of Balkan conflicts “was always that these were ‘ethnic conflicts’ created by the bubbling up of obscure but virulent ethnic hatreds among the local populations. This whole approach to the subject was essentially false: it ignored the primary role of politicians [...] in creating conflict at the political level.”⁷⁸

This thesis is neither a history of Kosovo nor a history of the Balkans. It is a study of what domestic factors were unique to Canada during the decision making surrounding the Kosovo War. However, one cannot understand Canada’s involvement in Kosovo without some understanding of why Canada was involved in the first place. This preface aims to provide a short overview of the history of Kosovo and of Canada’s involvement with the Balkans.⁷⁹

Part 1: The History of Kosovo

The Battle of Kosovo

In his book *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Tim Judah states that “Serbs have argued that Kosovo is the heart of Serbia. If that is the case, retort Albanians, then the Serbian heart beats in a foreign body.”⁸⁰ At the heart of this statement is the uncomfortable truth that both

⁷⁷ Ibid., 14411.

⁷⁸ Malcolm, xliii.

⁷⁹ The chronology of events in this section is based off of four books on the history of Kosovo and the Balkans: *Making and Remaking the Balkans: Nations and States since 1878* by Robert C. Austin, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* by Tim Judah, *Kosovo: A Short History* by Noel Malcolm and *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S Intervention* by David L. Phillips.

⁸⁰ Judah, xix.

Albanians and Serbians believe that Kosovo rightfully belongs to them. When politicians refer to “ancient ethnic hatreds” they are most likely referring to The Battle of Kosovo, whether they know so or not is a different question. The Battle of Kosovo took place on 28 June, 1389. In this battle, Serbian Prince Lazar and his forces were defeated by the Ottoman army at Fushë Kosovë / Kosovo Polje, on the outskirts of Prishtina / Priština. This defeat initiated five hundred years of Ottoman rule. Tim Judah comments that “[s]urprisingly little is known about this famous battle.”⁸¹ The reason for this is because The Battle of Kosovo not only initiated five hundred years of Ottoman rule, it also initiated six hundred years of nationalist myth-making by both Albanians and Serbians. In the Canadian House of Commons in 1988, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Andrew Witer invited all Canadians to join in celebrating Serbian Day and to “commemorate an important event in Serbian history, the Battle of Kosovo.”⁸² What is important to understand for the purpose of this thesis is that Kosovo has been a contested territory for hundreds of years, and the relevant “ancient” events are obscured by national myths on both sides.

Congress of Berlin to the Paris Peace Conference

By the second half of 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had weakened and started to lose control of their territories. After Russia’s proposal for re-drawing the Balkans – following their victory in the Russian-Ottoman War in 1877 – was rejected, German chancellor Otto Von Bismarck organized the Congress of Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin, Albanians asked for autonomy, not independence, but were denied. After the Congress of Berlin, Albanian lands

⁸¹ Judah, 20.

⁸² Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 33rd Parl., 2nd sess., vol. 13 (1986-88): 16859.

were given to Serbia and Montenegro. In response, the Albanians created the League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation.

The next twenty-five years would be marked by unrest in the Balkans and the nationalizing of Albanians. By August 1912, the nationalizing campaigns and constant revolts of Albanians led the Ottoman Empire to agree to a unified Albanian state. However, by October 1912, the First Balkan War started when Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war on the Ottomans. During all of this, on 28 November 1912, Albania declared independence with the support of Austria-Hungary. In the following year, the Great Powers, accepted Albania's independence with Russia's agreement. Importantly, at this same meeting Serbia was given Kosovo, whose land it had taken over during the fighting in previous years. Albanians were then split between two countries: Albania and Kosovo, which was now part of Serbia. In the words of Balkan specialist Robert C. Austin: "Making Kosovo Serbian launched decades of Belgrade-imposed misery."⁸³

During the next four years, the world, including the Balkans, was distracted by the First World War. In 1915, Serbia was forced to retreat, and Austria-Hungary gained control of Kosovo. This was short-lived. In October 1918, Serbia regained control of Kosovo and in the words of Judah: "[t]he reconquest was brutal."⁸⁴ Two months later, on 1 December, 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was declared, and was informally called Yugoslavia. The Kingdom included Croatia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, but was dominated by Serbia. In the years following,

⁸³ Robert Austin, *Making and Remaking the Balkans: Nations and States since 1878* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), 13-14.

⁸⁴ Judah, 42.

there was armed resistance by Albanians, as well as a continued effort by Albanians to retain their national identity and culture.

The Second World War

During the Second World War in 1939, Albania was invaded by Italy. In 1941, Serbia was invaded by Nazi Germany. During this time Kosovo was divided between Bulgaria, Germany, and Albania (under the control of Italy). Under the occupation of Nazi Germany, Albanians were allowed to have an autonomous regime, set up Albanian schools, and to carry on other nationalist activities. During this time, Serbians were the victim of attacks by Albanians and were used as labour by Italy and Nazi Germany. Albanians in Albania and Albanians in Kosovo reacted differently to their occupiers. Albanians in Albania resisted the Italians; however, Albanians in Kosovo, for the most part, did not resist the Nazis. As Judah explains, “[t]he real enemy, as far as Albanians were concerned, were the Serbs, and the Allies were making no promises about not returning Kosovo to Yugoslav control after the war.”⁸⁵ The Albanians of Kosovo were correct, after the Allied victory in 1945, Kosovo and its inhabitants were returned to the control of the newly created Socialist Yugoslavia.

Socialist Yugoslavia

Socialist Yugoslavia was formed in 1946 by Josip Broz Tito, who along with his communist-led Partisans, ousted the Nazis in 1944 to 1945. In 1948, after a power struggle between Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Yugoslavia was kicked out of the Soviet Bloc and took Kosovo with them. The communist leader of Albania, Enver Hoxha, sided with Stalin. What is significant to understand is that Albanians in Albania

⁸⁵ Judah, 48.

and Albanians in Kosovo, although separated by country and politics, largely retained their identity of being one people.

The new Yugoslav federation had six republics: Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia. Despite having an overwhelming majority of Albanians, Kosovo was never made a republic. In 1963, Yugoslavia declared two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. This was solidified in 1974 with the new Yugoslav constitution. Autonomous provinces were not the same as republics. The main difference is that autonomous provinces lacked the right to secede. Even with Kosovo being granted the status of an autonomous province, the issue of Kosovo not being given the status of a republic never went away. Kosovo Albanians argued that Albanians were the majority within Kosovo. Serbians argued that Albanians in Kosovo were the minority within Serbia. After Josip Broz Tito died on 4 May 1980, the system began to fall apart. Judah contends that Tito was what was holding Yugoslavia together when he states that “[h]e was the ultimate arbitrator and boss.”⁸⁶ After his death, the system began to fall apart. The 1980s were marked by renewed resistance and protests by Albanians in Kosovo.

Slobodan Milošević

In 1987, Ivan Stambolić was the president of Serbia and Slobodan Milošević was a mid-level official in Serbia’s Communist Party. This was the year Milošević was sent to Kosovo to listen to the complaints of Kosovo Serbs. Capitalizing on the ethnic tensions present between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbians, Milošević made a speech in which he told Kosovo Serbians that, “no one should dare beat you.”⁸⁷ The nationalist fervour that resulted from

⁸⁶ Judah, 57.

⁸⁷ The exact translation varies slightly between sources. However, the sentiment is the same.

Milošević's visit led to his rise to power. Robert Austin exclaims that "[a]nyone who wants to see a man transformed in a moment need only watch the footage of Milosevic in Kosovo."⁸⁸ Milošević continued to capitalize on tensions in Kosovo in order to consolidate his power. Milošević secured the resignation of Ivan Stambolić in 1987, priming himself for power. In 1988, he exhumed the bones of Prince Lazar, who was killed at The Battle of Kosovo, and toured them throughout Kosovo. With Milošević's instruction, the Serb National Assembly revoked Kosovo and Vojvodina's autonomous status. To do so they needed the support of the provincial assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Milošević secured this support through a combination of jailing opponents and holding provincial assembly votes under duress. On 26 March, 1989, the Kosovo assembly, surrounded by tanks, ratified a new constitution. Kosovo was no longer an autonomous province. On 28 June, 1989, the 600th anniversary of The Battle of Kosovo, Milošević celebrated his political ascendancy with a charged speech in which he challenged political opponents in Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo. The importance of these events in Kosovo to the whole history of Yugoslavia cannot be over-stated. According to Malcolm, "[t]he Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo."⁸⁹ Similarly, Austin states, "[w]hat happened in Kosovo sent Yugoslavia into a series of unending crises, and there is no doubt that Kosovo caused Yugoslavia's disintegrations."⁹⁰ Judah concurs and explains that "by stripping Kosovo of its autonomy and using tanks to do so, he [Milošević] instilled fear else-where, which in turn fueled the rise of nationalism in other parts of the country. In that sense, those who argue that the end of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo are right."⁹¹

⁸⁸ Austin, xiii.

⁸⁹ Malcolm, xliii.

⁹⁰ Austin, 49.

⁹¹ Judah, 65.

Distraction & Western Reaction

Western countries were too distracted by events in other parts of the world to give much attention to what was happening in Kosovo. As retired U.S. diplomat David L. Phillips says in his book *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention*, “The United States was alarmed by Milosevic's speech but distracted by events elsewhere in the world. In September 1989, East Germans overthrew their dictatorial government. The Berlin Wall was torn down two months later.”⁹² James Bartleman who served as the Canadian ambassador to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO between 1990 and 1994 comments “the burgeoning crisis in Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990 had initially been overshadowed by events occurring elsewhere in Europe [...] Milosevic's suppression of the rights of the two largest minority populations in Serbia, the Hungarians of Vojvodina and the Albanians of Kosovo, passed almost unnoticed.”⁹³ Soon, the distraction was coming from within the Balkans itself. In the spring of 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. In Slovenia there was a ten-day war between separatists and the Yugoslavia before the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army. The war in response to Croatia’s declaration of independence lasted significantly longer; it did not end until 1995. Bosnia declared independence in 1992, which initiated a bloody war with the Yugoslav army. Balkan historians suggest the wars throughout Yugoslavia kept Western countries from focusing on Kosovo. Judah explains this in stating, “[t]he collapse of Yugoslavia and the bloody events else-where simply eclipsed Kosovo. For years, little news filtered out of the province, not

⁹² David L. Phillips, *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012), 11.

⁹³ James Bartleman, *Seasons of Hope: Memoirs of Ontario's First Aboriginal Lieutenant Governor* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016), 143.

because it was not accessible, but because what happened here simply could not compete in terms of news with what was happening elsewhere.”⁹⁴

On 15 January, 1992, Canada recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, and then recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April, 1992. The first mention of Kosovo in the House of Commons was on 18 November, 1991, during a discussion on Croatia’s potential independence from Yugoslavia. Svend J. Robinson, a New Democratic Party Member of Parliament, mentioned the suffering of Kosovo Albanians: “We know that the Albanian majority in Kosovo has been brutally repressed for too long.”⁹⁵ On 24 December, 1992, U.S. President George Bush issued his “Christmas Warning” to Serbia. The “Christmas Warning” was a memo sent to Milošević which read, “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper.”⁹⁶ Robinson’s comment to Parliament and Bush’s Christmas Warning may suggest that Kosovo was not as eclipsed as Judah suggests.

Unfortunately, these were only brief moments in which Kosovo was on the radar and overall, Judah’s assessment is still accurate. In the years between 1989 and 1995, Kosovo was rarely mentioned in Canadian media and was only mentioned a handful of times in the House of Commons. As the situation continued to escalate in Kosovo, the international community’s attention was occupied with Bosnia, while Canada’s attention was occupied with Quebec. Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000, comments in his memoir that, “Kosovo was ignored” in order to “keep Milošević on side” and to find a resolution for the

⁹⁴ Judah, 68-70.

⁹⁵ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 34th Parl., 3rd sess., vol. 3 (1991-93): 4954.

⁹⁶ David L. Phillips, x.

conflict in Bosnia.⁹⁷ When brought up in the House of Commons, it was always as a part of a larger comment on the state of Slovenia, Croatia, or Bosnia. The plight of Kosovo Albanians was largely ignored. This is illustrated in comments made by two Members of Parliament on 25 January, 1994. While discussing Bosnia, Liberal Member of Parliament David Berger praised “[t]he international effort [that] has also successfully prevented the conflict from spilling over into the neighbouring republics of Macedonia and Kosovo.”⁹⁸ Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Jean Charest commented, “[w]e should recognize that some of the successes we have had that have been quite significant. The strategic objective of preventing the spillover of hostilities into other regions, such as Kosovo, has so far been achieved.”⁹⁹ These statements aptly illustrate how growing tensions in Kosovo were overlooked in discussions that surrounded other issues in Yugoslavia.

From Passive to Armed Resistance

In response to the loss of their rights and many of their freedoms, Kosovo Albanians went “underground.” This meant that they created a parallel government within Kosovo and ran services and institutions like doctors’ offices, elections, schools, and tax collection out of peoples’ homes. The Albanians opted for passive resistance to Serbian rule. The parallel government was led by the elected leader Ibrahim Rugova who was a pacifist and feared that any violence on the part of Kosovo Albanians would bring stronger reprisals from the Serbian regime. In 1991, this underground government held a secret referendum on independence. When

⁹⁷ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future* (Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2003), 177.

⁹⁸ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 35th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 133 (1994-97): 369.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 359.

89 percent of the vote came out in favour, they declared independence. This first declaration of independence was only ever recognized by Albania.

In 1995, twenty-one days of talks between the leaders of Yugoslavia took place in Dayton, Ohio. Despite lobbying and protests, there was no Albanian representation. The resulting Dayton Peace Accord made no mention of Kosovo. On the subject, retired U.S. State department official Morton I. Abramowitz recalls, “[l]eaving Kosovo off the agenda was a very practical decision. People are very practical, especially in democracies. In the end, we had to fight again because we didn't solve Kosovo.”¹⁰⁰ Despite being assured that the time for Kosovo would come, Kosovo Albanians responded passionately to being left out of Dayton. Ibrahim Rugova, the ‘Gandhi of the Balkans,’ and his policies of passive resistance became increasingly less popular with Kosovo Albanians.¹⁰¹ Austin explains, “[i]n 1988, the Albanians opted for passive resistance to Serbia, Gandhi-style. This worked only until 1995, when the Dayton Peace for Bosnia failed to even mention Kosovo.”¹⁰² After Dayton, many Kosovo Albanians turned their hopes to armed resistance. Thus, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. In his memoir, Axworthy laments that the message this sent to Kosovo Albanians was that they were being abandoned by the international community.¹⁰³ Axworthy’s assessment is correct. This message was driven home when Jakup Krasniqi, a founding member of the KLA, was interviewed by David L. Phillips for his book *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U. S. Intervention*, during which Krasniqi confirms the role Dayton played in the call to arms by Kosovo Albanians. Krasniqi explains that “leaving Kosovo in Yugoslavia was a compromise to

¹⁰⁰ Phillips, 61-62.

¹⁰¹ Judah, 71.

¹⁰² Austin, xvii.

¹⁰³ Axworthy, 178.

get Serbia's cooperation on Bosnia.”¹⁰⁴ According to Krasniqi, the lesson from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia was “if you do not fight for your country no one will care about you.”¹⁰⁵ Canadian historian Michael Manulak plainly states that the Dayton accords “implicitly reinforced Serb sovereignty over Kosovo as a quid pro quo for Milosevic’s support of the Balkan peace process.”¹⁰⁶

The second factor that dramatically changed the situation was the economic collapse of Albania. In 1996, Albania saw the collapse of a large-scale financial pyramid scheme which led to the breakdown of the government. During this crisis in Albania, armouries went unguarded and large amounts of small-arms and anti-tank weapons made their way into the hands of the KLA. Thus, the feeling of abandonment by the West, combined with access to arms, led to a dramatic change in Kosovo; from passive to armed resistance. Consequently, the attention of both the international community and Canada had no choice but to return to Kosovo.

Ibrahim Rugova’s prediction that passive resistance would bring rights to Kosovo Albanians proved to be incorrect. However, his prediction that violent resistance by Kosovo Albanians would be met with an even more violent reaction by Serbia was correct. The four years following the Dayton talks were marked by increased resistance by Kosovo Albanians and increased activity by the KLA. In the words of Austin, “...Albanians realized that Mao was a better role model than Gandhi.”¹⁰⁷ The increased resistance was subsequently met with brutal

¹⁰⁴ Phillips, 64.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Michael W. Manulak, “Forceful persuasion or half-hearted diplomacy?: Lessons from the Kosovo crisis,” *International Journal* 66, no 2 (2011): 355.

¹⁰⁷ Austin, 51.

and violent actions by Serbia. Such escalation brought the attention of the world, including that of Canada, back to the place where it all began: Kosovo.

Part 2: Canada's Involvement

Contact Group

As the crisis in Bosnia began to cool down and the crisis in Kosovo began to heat up, attention turned towards Kosovo. It was during this time that the Contact Group was revived. The Contact Group, which was originally formed during the War in Bosnia, consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Despite being a member of the G7 from which the Contact Group was formed, Canada was not included. Canada's absence from the Contact Group was a source of contention. In response to the criticisms of opposition Members of Parliament over Canada's absence from the Contact Group, Prime Minister Chrétien defensively stated, "[t]his Contact Group has existed for a long time. It was mainly made up of people from Europe. We cannot have a Contact Group of 19. We are kept informed of every element of the proceedings. We play the role that Canada is able to play."¹⁰⁸ A different story is told by Paul Heinbecker, Canada's ambassador to Germany during the Kosovo War. In *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada*, Heinbecker argues that Canada had to fight for influence and that much of his diplomatic career was spent pushing himself into rooms Canada was not welcome in.¹⁰⁹ Heinbecker uses Kosovo as an example of when Canada lacked international influence when he reminisces:

For example, when a "contact group," comprising the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Russia, was established to run the diplomacy of the Kosovo War, all G8

¹⁰⁸ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 3 (1997-99): 14594.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 50.

members except Canada and Japan were included (the Japanese were expected just to help pay the bills as they had done in the Gulf War). We were the only two excluded. The first meeting was held in Germany, and, as ambassador there at the time, I insisted on a place for Canada on the grounds that we had been part of the defence of Germany for the previous forty years at a very substantial cost, and our dedication to European security was evident in the cemeteries across Europe where Canadian soldiers lay buried.¹¹⁰

Eventually, Heinbecker's pleas were enough to 'embarrass' the Germans into inviting Canada to attend the Contact Group's first meeting, however not enough to join the Contact Group. To Heinbecker's dismay, Canada declined the invitation.¹¹¹

Coercion & Diplomacy

In 1997, a meeting of all the NATO countries took place in Brussels. Out of this meeting came a communique in which for the first time NATO announced its engagement on the Kosovo issue. In June 1998, NATO began shows of air force over Albania and Macedonia and began to prepare its military base in Aviano, Italy in an effort to intimidate Milošević. Two months later, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that NATO had military plans and were prepared to "act swiftly and effectively [in Kosovo] should the need arise."¹¹² In the same month, NATO defence ministers approved an activation warning, which allowed commanders to begin identifying potential military targets in Yugoslavia. This course of actions on the part of NATO is described by Manulak as an effort to "turn the screws in its efforts to persuade Milošević to moderate his forces actions."¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Manulak, "Forceful persuasion or half-hearted diplomacy?: Lessons from the Kosovo crisis," 357.

¹¹³ Ibid.

These coercive measures, such as “turning the screws” on Milošević, were happening parallel to diplomatic measures. As early as 1996, diplomats were voicing their concerns during their visits to Yugoslavia. By 1998, U.S. diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Chris Hill were regularly meeting with Milošević in an effort to settle the Kosovo issue. The efforts of American diplomats were reinforced by diplomats of other countries including Canada. For example, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy visited Yugoslavia and brought up Canadian concerns over the treatment of Kosovo Albanians. In March of 1998, Canada sent Jim Wright, the Director General for central, east and south Europe at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), to meet with Milošević and urge cooperation on the Kosovo issue. Following this meeting, Canada placed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. The objectives of these efforts were reinforced on 23 September, 1998 through UN Security Council Resolution 1199. This security resolution reaffirmed “the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so” and “condemned the escalating violence in Kosovo.”¹¹⁴ It also condemned violence by “all parties involved” and demanded rights for Kosovo Albanians.

The ineffectiveness of these efforts was exposed when, only three days after the UN Security Council Resolution, Serbian special police massacred Kosovo Albanian civilians in the village of Abria e Epërme / Gornje Obrinje. Following this massacre, Holbrooke was immediately sent to Belgrade to demand compliance from Milošević. At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright convened a secret meeting of the Contact Group’s foreign ministers at London’s Heathrow Airport. This meeting resulted in a NATO activation order

¹¹⁴ “Resolution 1199,” United Nations Security Council, 23 September 1998.

announced on 13 October, 1998. The activation order meant NATO was prepared to launch an air campaign within four days. Historians credit this activation order for the headway Holbrooke was able to make in his negotiations with Milošević. Manulak explains that “armed with what he considered a credible threat, Holbrooke reached an agreement with Milošević within hours.”¹¹⁵ The agreement Holbrooke and Milošević reached was the creation of the Organisation for Security in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).

Kosovo Verification Mission

The OSCE KVM launched in December 1998. As part of the mission, 2000 unarmed civilian monitors were allowed into Kosovo. These monitors were responsible for maintaining a ceasefire and seeing the peaceful return of 100,000 internally displaced refugees to their homes. Milošević also agreed to withdraw the bulk of his paramilitary forces from Kosovo. On 24 October, 1998, these terms were written in UN Security Council Resolution 1203. Under the KVM, Kosovo was split into five regional centres. Canada provided the head of Regional Centre 1 located in Prizren. Canada provided three million dollars in financial support as well as one hundred verifiers which ranged from serving and retired military personnel, police officers, and other civilian professionals. There were also Canadian law and human rights experts working in the OSCE KVM offices.

On 15 January, 1999, forty-five dead Kosovo Albanians were found in the village of Reçak / Račak. This massacre is widely credited as the turning point for the international community’s involvement in Kosovo. Axworthy states, “[m]atters came to a head early in the new year when Serb Militia massacred civilians in the town of Racak.”¹¹⁶ Manulak explains the

¹¹⁵ Manulak, “Forceful persuasion or half-hearted diplomacy?: Lessons from the Kosovo crisis,” 359.

¹¹⁶ Axworthy, 181.

evidence had been obvious well before Rečak / Račak, when he states that “despite the presence of credible indicators and formal feedback mechanisms, it was a focussing event, the January 1999 massacre in the village of Račak, which brought the Kosovo problem to the Canadian government agenda.”¹¹⁷ The cat was truly out of the bag when, after visiting the scene, the head of the OSCE mission, William Walker, addressed the media without the permission of Holbrooke, the Contact Group, OSCE, or the U.S. State Department and stated that Rečak / Račak was an “unspeakable atrocity [and a] crime very much against humanity.”¹¹⁸ U.S. diplomats James Pardew and Christopher Hill were immediately sent to meet with Milošević. When this meeting turned out to be fruitless, the North Atlantic Council sent the Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark and the chair of its military committee, General Klaus Naumann. Milošević was still obstinate and inspired by the success at Dayton, negotiations were convened in the French town of Rambouillet.

Rambouillet Conference

From 6 February, 1999 to 22 March, 1999, the Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo was held in France. At this conference, members of the Contact Group on Kosovo – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia – met with representatives from Yugoslavia and Kosovo to find a solution to the escalating ethnic tensions. The accord presented at Rambouillet would have granted Kosovo significant autonomy, however, still within Yugoslavia for three years. After three years, an international conference would have to be held to reach a final settlement. Other features included the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo with only a small police force remaining, and a multinational peace force which would

¹¹⁷ Michael W. Manulak, *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention* (Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 2011), 18.

¹¹⁸ Phillips, 99.

ensure KLA disarmament. Milošević himself did not attend the conference. On 22 March, 1999, Holbrooke delivered an ultimatum to Milošević. This effort was futile. On that same day, when Yugoslavia refused to sign the accord, the negotiations at Rambouillet ended in failure. Two days later on 24 March, 1999, Canada and its NATO allies were at war against Yugoslavia.

Canada was not invited to Rambouillet and Manulak argues that “[f]oreign affairs was extremely skeptical of the contact group and the Rambouillet exercise.”¹¹⁹ Despite previous insistence on UN approval, on 24 March, 1999, Canada was dropping bombs on Serbia along with the rest of NATO. When historian Adam Chapnick comments about Kosovo in his book *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage*, he emphasises that Canada was unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts to have the Security Council involved in a resolution for Kosovo. Chapnick explains that “Kosovo did not, however, dominate the Security Council after the first few days of February. With Kofi Annan’s tacit approval, the real debate shifted to NATO and, later, to the G8... After further unsuccessful Canadian efforts to Security Council authorization, members of NATO, Canada included, bypassed the council.”¹²⁰ All the time leading up to and during Rambouillet, Canada was pursuing the possibility of a “uniting for peace” resolution to convene an urgent meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. As part of this lobbying, Axworthy and Heinbecker made multiple trips to the United Nations in New York to build support. In the lead up to the Rambouillet Conference, Canada had argued ardently that no military action be taken without a UN Security Council resolution. However, it was decided by NATO that Russia and China’s support for Yugoslavia would make

¹¹⁹ Michael W. Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy?,” *International Journal* 64, no 2 (2009): 569.

¹²⁰ Adam Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019), 164.

a UN Security Council resolution impossible to obtain. Like the Contact Group's efforts at Rambouillet, Canada's efforts were unsuccessful, thus leading to Canada's participation in seventy-eight days of bombing Serbia.

The diplomatic efforts NATO and the United Nations engaged in have been the subject of much criticism. Some of the criticism is valid and some less so. The major criticism is that the extended and fruitless negotiating with Milošević, with multiple warnings and ultimatums, gave Yugoslavia the chance to prepare for potential war. The diplomats involved admit this failure. Richard Holbrooke called the events in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, "the greatest collective failure of the West since the 1930s."¹²¹ Lloyd Axworthy included a lengthy condemnation of the diplomatic failures both at Rambouillet and at the United Nations Security Council in his book:

The Rambouillet conference, held in a chateau outside Paris, was the Contact Group's last hurrah, a final stab at bringing the protagonists together. Except they never met face to face - all the discussions were through third parties. The conference failed, illustrating the inadequacy of last-minute, ad hoc diplomatic efforts undertaken without the proper representation of interests. This badly managed diplomatic manoeuvre underlined for many of us the reactive nature of the international community to humanitarian crises. The failure of the UN Security Council was exacting yet another toll in human lives. The fact that Milosevic had far exceeded in his brutality any right to claim impunity from international action should have been recognized and acted upon by the Security Council, which effectively abdicated its role as the central agency for protecting people.¹²²

Much of the criticism of the diplomatic efforts is valid, reinforced by the fact the criticism comes from the diplomats themselves. However, despite this criticism, it is important to remember what the diplomats were up against. For example, there is criticism that Western diplomats were too chummy with Milošević. In his book, Phillips quotes Holbrooke admitting he had to be friendly

¹²¹ Phillips, 60.

¹²² Axworthy, 182.

with Milošević as a negotiating tactic; however, he quotes Holbrooke saying, “I felt like washing my hands every time I came out of a meeting with Milosevic.”¹²³ The same sentiment is found in Axworthy’s reflections on his meetings with Milošević. Axworthy stated that in all of his time as Foreign Minister “there was three or four people that I’ve met that you could truly call evil, he [Milošević] was one of them.”¹²⁴ Axworthy went on to explain that he had many private meetings with all sorts of world leaders and had been a street politician for over twenty years when he met Milošević. Axworthy recalled, “I was used to dealing with all kinds and all sorts but sometimes you’d just run up on somebody and just say this person just is bad.”¹²⁵ Axworthy ended his reflections on his meetings with Milošević by stating simply, “it’s a big statement to make, but it’s true.”¹²⁶ This type of reflection by seasoned diplomats such as Holbrooke and Axworthy is very telling. It illustrates what the diplomats trying to solve the crisis in Kosovo were up against.

The Kosovo War

Despite over a year of posturing by NATO, on 24 March, 1999, the war started, albeit with more of a rumble than a bang. This was due to a combination of bad weather, casualty aversion, and hyper-vigilant target setting. The unimpressive start was so toned down that “lovers strolled down riverbanks and ate at outdoor cafes and watched fireworks.”¹²⁷ Axworthy explains that foreign ministers, himself included, set limits on targets in order to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. He comments, “[i]t was undoubtedly frustrating for the military people

¹²³ Phillips, 94.

¹²⁴ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Manulak, “Forceful persuasion or half-hearted diplomacy?: Lessons from the Kosovo crisis,” 363-64.

[...] but necessary as one of the defining elements of a humanitarian intervention.”¹²⁸

Unfortunately, one of the unintended consequences was that the war lasted much longer than NATO expected. This allowed more Kosovo Albanians to be killed or forced out of Kosovo. It also led to a lack of supplies and fatigue amongst NATO countries. Manulak writes, “as the air campaign began, Yugoslav forces unleashed a well-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing.”¹²⁹

Canada contributed eighteen CF-18s, dropped 532 bombs and half a million pounds of explosives, and represented 10 percent of the missions flown in Kosovo. The Kosovo War was the first time Canadian pilots flew combat missions since the Korean War. There was remarkable cohesion in the support for the Kosovo War in Canada. Opinion polls showed the public’s support, the Canadian government had unanimous support within parliament, and there was favourable media coverage. It was only as the war dragged on that the support dwindled, with members of the New Democratic Party eventually withdrawing support and calling for negotiations with Milošević.

As the war progressed, NATO’s willingness to intensify its military pressure on Belgrade progressed as well. NATO doubled the number of planes, loosened restrictions on targets, and public talk of using ground forces ensued. Lovers were no longer strolling in the streets. The final nail in the coffin was Russian President Boris Yeltsin telling Milošević that in the event of a ground war Russia would not come to Yugoslavia’s defence. On 11 June, 1999, the Kosovo War ended when NATO and Yugoslavia signed UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Axworthy describes the Canadian role by saying, “the Canadian delegation found itself playing middleman in drafting an acceptable compromise, conveying to the Security Council the need to have a

¹²⁸ Axworthy, 183.

¹²⁹ Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy?,” 573.

resolution enacted immediately.”¹³⁰ However, it is important to note that the Resolution was not negotiated at the United Nations Security Council. The Resolution was negotiated and drafted at the Cologne, Germany G8 meeting. As Axworthy recalls, “It was an amusing tableau to see the G-8 ministers sitting around the conference table, each with a cellphone to the ear, instructing their UN ambassadors in very undiplomatic language to get a resolution drafted and accepted post-haste.”¹³¹

UN Security Resolution 1244

The UN Security Resolution 1244 outlined that Serbia would withdraw its forces and the KLA would demilitarize. The administrative, judicial, executive, and legislative authority was given to the newly created United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Militarily and policing duties were given to the newly created Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR is the NATO led peacekeeping force which operated inside of Kosovo when the bombing campaign ended, which Russia was also involved in. Canada’s participation in KFOR, called Operation Kinetic, lasted from June 1999 to June 2000. Kosovo was divided into five operational sectors with each of the Contact Group, except Russia, getting a sector. However, operating areas where Russia had control were outlined. Canada's KFOR soldiers operated within the British sector and included a tactical helicopter squadron, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, and a mechanized infantry battle group.¹³² Many authors note that UN Security Resolution 1244 was unclear. Judah explains that “the resolution had been aimed at ending the bombing, so it was contradictory and, in key parts, unclear.”¹³³ Austin similarly maintains that “riddled with contradictory language,

¹³⁰ Axworthy, 186.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Maloney.

¹³³ Judah, 94.

this agreement would in the end do enormous harm to Kosovo...”¹³⁴ The main contradiction is that Security Council Resolution 1244 both reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”¹³⁵ but also demanded adherence to the Rambouillet accords which outlined determination by the will of the people. With the question of how and why Kosovo came to be a top agenda item in countries all over the world answered, this thesis will now explore the unique considerations Canada grappled with.

¹³⁴ Austin, 100.

¹³⁵ “Resolution 1244,” United Nations Security Council, June 10, 1999.

CHAPTER III: DIASPORA DISCONTENT

“No nation like Canada can do what its citizens of Sri Lankan or Pakistani or Somalian or Jewish or Muslim or Ukrainian origin want – all the time. No nation like Canada can do what its provinces, or founding peoples, or some of them may want – all the time. A nation must do what its national interests determine it must. And that requires that a nation like Canada know what its national interests are.”

- J.L. Granatstein, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy" in *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics*

“Just as we have been in the forefront of creating a multicultural society, so too could we be at the forefront of thinking through how to create a foreign policy that can respond to that reality.”

- Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the Public Have a Say?" quoted in *The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global Posture*

“Diaspora politics therefore deserves a special place in any discussion on Canada’s foreign policy because it occupies a kind of “grey zone” of political propriety”

- David Carment and Joseph Landry “Diaspora and Canadian Foreign Policy: The World in Canada" in the edited collection *The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global Posture*

According to the most recent census, more than one in five Canadians are foreign-born.¹³⁶ A further two in five Canadian children have an immigrant background.¹³⁷ According to David Carment and Joseph Landry, the editors of *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics*, members of diaspora communities in Canada can include “ethnic migrants, first-, second-, or even third-generation immigrants, as well as expatriates, students, guest workers, and refugees.”¹³⁸ Thus, presently more than half of Canadians belong to a diaspora community. Though the percentage of immigrants has varied throughout history, with the lowest

¹³⁶ Statistics Canada, “Immigration and ethnocultural diversity: Key results from the 2016 Census”, December 25, 2017.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ David Carment and Joseph Landry, *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 7.

percentage being between 14.7% to 16.1%, Canada has always been a country of immigrants.¹³⁹ Canadians have always maintained ties to their homelands, starting with English and French citizens from what are considered the two founding nations and continuing on to the present day with 260 nationalities represented.

The reality that Canada is a country of immigrants has led to the diaspora communities influence on Canadian foreign policy garnering an ever-increasing amount of scholarly attention. When scholars write about diaspora influences on Canadian foreign policy, the focus has mostly been on cases of successful lobbying efforts. This means that the bulk of the literature focuses on Chinese, Indian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Armenian diasporas in Canada. Much of the scholarship focuses on the success of diaspora lobbying during the tenure of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's conservative government. With the bar set at successful attempts at influence, lobbying during the Kosovo War has been infrequently mentioned and has never thoroughly been studied by scholars. Even though neither the Albanian-Canadian nor the Serbian-Canadian diasporas were overly successful at lobbying the government during the Kosovo War, their efforts merit scholarly attention for a few crucial reasons. First, Canada's demographics and domestic pressure from diaspora groups during the Kosovo War differed drastically from its most important allies, specifically the United States. Therefore, a study of the Albanian-Canadian nor the Serbian-Canadian diasporas during the Kosovo War helps distinguish Canada from its NATO allies and illustrates the unique considerations Canada had in the creation of its foreign policy. Second, a study of Albanian-Canadian diaspora activity during the Kosovo War shows that not all diasporas are created equal. It exemplifies the economic, political, and social barriers newer

¹³⁹ Statistics Canada, "Immigration and ethnocultural diversity: Key results from the 2016 Census", December 25, 2017.

diaspora groups have in establishing their influence. Third, there is consensus among the politicians and policy advisers closest to the Chrétien government that diaspora groups have impacted Canadian governments, regardless of political party. Politicians such as Bill Graham and Lloyd Axworthy specifically note the role of diaspora lobbying during the Kosovo War. Fourth, although the Serbian-Canadian diaspora was engaged in lobbying the government during multiple Yugoslav crises in the 1990s, the Kosovo War was different. As such, it deserves singular attention. Fifth, the fact that Canada continued its actions in Kosovo, despite the size and impact of its Serbian-Canadian diaspora, demonstrates the depth of Canada's commitment to its human security agenda. Sixth, the Serbian-Canadian efforts to influence foreign policy during the Kosovo War took many forms, from petitions to protests to personal pleas. Seventh, the non-diaspora Canadian reaction to Serbian protests during the Kosovo War was harsh and critical of multi-culturalism. A study of the Kosovo War illustrates the limits of multi-cultural values among Canadians. Finally, although neither diaspora group active during the Kosovo War impacted foreign policy to the extent they would have liked to, diaspora lobbying did have an impact on top level decision making during the Kosovo War. In summation, a study of the actions of the Albanian-Canadian and the Serbian-Canadian diasporas in Canada during the Kosovo War exemplifies the close relationship between domestic issues and foreign policy. It also provides crucial insight into the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges associated with being a nation of immigrants.

Canada & The U.S.: Contrasting Demographics

David L. Phillips' *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention* is, at its core, a history of statecraft and U.S. politics in Kosovo. The third chapter of *Liberating Kosovo* is called "Diaspora Politics" and includes an in-depth explanation of the role the Albanian

diaspora played in U.S. politics during the Kosovo War.¹⁴⁰ The chapter opens with the pronouncement that, “Albanian émigrés have always played a critical role in Albanian politics.”¹⁴¹ According to Phillips, throughout history the Albanian diaspora has been involved in the politics of their homeland more so than other diaspora communities. The influence of the Albanian diaspora in the United States cannot be understated. First started in 1882, Phillips contends that, “The Albanian-American diaspora became a force in U.S. politics, raising funds and mobilizing political support for Kosovo’s pro-independence movement. The community was well-known and influential in Washington circles.”¹⁴² The depth of commitment to Albanian issues was exemplified in the 1990s when Albanian-Americans, sometimes third generation, paid taxes to the shadow government being run out of houses in Kosovo.¹⁴³ This depth of commitment was only heightened as the crisis in Kosovo reached its boiling point. When the KLA formed in Kosovo, Albanian-Americans raised funds to support the efforts. In one case, at a meeting at Bruno’s Restaurant in New York, a table was covered in \$1.6 million dollars in cash to buy weapons for the KLA.¹⁴⁴ Albanian-Americans were, however, willing to give more than cash. Some of them gave up their lives. In 1999, the “Atlantic Brigade” formed, consisting of fire fighters from the Bronx who went to Kosovo to fight for the KLA.¹⁴⁵

Albanian-Americans not only influenced the politics of their homeland: they were well organized and influenced the politics of the United States as well. Ever the pragmatists, this meant forming connections with both Democrats and Republicans over the years. Some leading

¹⁴⁰ Phillips, 31-46.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 31

¹⁴² Ibid., 32.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 33.

¹⁴⁵ Stacy Sullivan, *Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004).

Albanian-Americans would make equally large donations to both parties during campaigns to achieve this end.¹⁴⁶ The 1990s saw a concerted effort by Albanian-Americans to put Kosovo on the U.S. policy agenda, with the creation of numerous lobby groups and organizations including the Albanian American Civil League (AACL), the Albanian Youth of Kosovo in the Free World, the Albanian American Public Affairs Committee (AAPAC), and the Albanian American Foundation.¹⁴⁷ Their efforts were aided by the fact that Albanians had been in America long enough that there were members of congress who traced their roots back to Albania. For example, Congressman Joseph J. DioGuardi, who became instrumental in bringing attention to Kosovo during both the Bush and the Clinton administrations, was the son of an Italian immigrant, who identified as “Arberesh”, meaning he (DioGuardi’s father) had come from a village in Italy where Albanians had lived for hundreds of years. The resounding scope and success of the influence of Albanian-Americans has been well documented in numerous books, including *Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War* by Newsweek journalist Stacy Sullivan.¹⁴⁸

The situation could not have been more different north of the 49th parallel. Whereas Richard Holbrooke was meeting with Albanian-Americans every six weeks in 1998, and then with increasing frequency while the Kosovo crisis escalated,¹⁴⁹ neither Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Canada, nor Bill Graham, the chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT), recall hearing Albanian-Canadian voices

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴⁷ Nadège Ragaru, Amilda Dymi. “The Albanian-American Community in the United States,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 31, no. 2 (2004), p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ Stacy Sullivan, *Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004).

¹⁴⁹ Phillips, 86.

during the Kosovo crisis.¹⁵⁰ This is unsurprising when one considers the difference in demographics between the United States and Canada. According to the 2000 United States Census, 113,661 Albanians lived in America.¹⁵¹ The accuracy of this tally is suspect, though, with scholars suggesting that the number could have been closer to 500 000.¹⁵² ¹⁵³ In sharp contrast, in 1996, there were 4140 Albanians living in Canada.¹⁵⁴ As with the case of Albanian-Americans, the more accurate number is likely higher. However, even the highest estimates only place between five and eight thousand Albanians in Canada at the time, which still pales in comparison to the number in the U.S.¹⁵⁵ Whether one trusts the official census data or the higher numbers, what is clear is that Canada and the United States had drastically different demographics when it came to the number of Albanians in their respective countries.¹⁵⁶ Canada was not only unique in comparison to the U.S., as Judah points out that other NATO countries, namely Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, also had large populations of Albanians.¹⁵⁷

One might assume that since Canada had significantly fewer Albanians, it would also have fewer Serbians. Thus, Canada's demography would mirror that of the United States, albeit

¹⁵⁰ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020., Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

¹⁵¹ United States Census Bureau. Census 2000 Brief – Ancestry.

<https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2000/briefs/c2kbr-35.pdf>

¹⁵² Ragaru and Dymi, p. 7.

¹⁵³ There are various historical and political reasons people who identify as “Albanian-Americans” would not be reflected in the Census data. A full explanation can be found in Nadège Ragaru, Amilda Dymi. “The Albanian-American Community in the United States,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 31, no. 2 (2004).

¹⁵⁴ Statistics Canada. *1996 Census of Population – Ethnic Origin and Population Group*. Statistics Canada, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 93F0026XDB96001.

¹⁵⁵ Kerry Gillespie, “Albanian community says 'it's about time'; But many worried about safety of relatives,” *Toronto Star*, March 26 1999.

¹⁵⁶ Canada's 1996 census was used instead of the 2001 census. This is because the 2001 census would reflect the influx of 7000 Albanian refugees to Canada. This influx of refugees significantly changed the Albanian demographics in Canada. However, the author made the decision to use the 2000 census for the United States because the census from a decade prior would not reflect the large influx of Albanians to the United States in the 1990s. In addition, the numbers 113 661 and 500 000 used in other scholarship when discussing Albanian lobbying during the Kosovo War. For reference, the 1990 U.S. census identifies 47 710 Albanians. However, the number was more likely between 250 000 and 500 000.

¹⁵⁷ Judah, 7.

on a smaller scale. That assumption would be false. According to the 1996 census, Canada had 40,200 Serbians. Another, 66,940 identified as Yugoslav.¹⁵⁸ By 1996, Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia had left Yugoslavia, and Albanians were unlikely to willingly identify with Yugoslavia. This suggests that respondents who identified as Yugoslav were likely from Serbia or Montenegro. Furthermore, the majority of people from Montenegro, who would identify as “Yugoslav”, would likely have been Serbian. Thus, an accurate estimate of Canada’s Serbian population, based on the 1996 census, was around 107,140. Again, the numbers are likely higher. By the time of the Kosovo War in 1999, the Serbian National Shield Society in Canada estimated about 250,000 Serbians lived in Canada.¹⁵⁹ Thus, using the highest estimates from 1999, Canada had 8000 Albanians and 250,000 Serbians, a stark difference. In comparison, and again using the highest estimate from 1999, the United States had a roughly equal number of Albanians and Serbians, around 500,000 each.¹⁶⁰ Despite having roughly equal numbers, the Albanian- and Serbian-American communities did not have equal advocacy power and ability to influence foreign policy in the United States. Albanian-Americans had much more advocacy power. Former American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, put it plainly when he stated that, “Serbian-Americans were not particularly influential.”¹⁶¹ Thus, the relevant demographic makeup of the United States and Canada differed drastically during the Kosovo War. This shows that Canada did, in fact, have unique considerations when making decisions and considering their alliance obligations during the Kosovo War. Canada’s unique domestic considerations, such as the imbalance between diaspora advocacy, has received little to no

¹⁵⁸ Census 1996.

¹⁵⁹ Sarah Lambert, “Canadian Serbs outraged, Albanians relieved [NATO air strikes]” *Canadian Press News Wire*, March 24 1999.

¹⁶⁰ This is the number most often cited by scholars. As in the calculation of the amount of Serbians in Canada, this number combines the number of people in the U.S. who identified as “Serbian” (140,337) and the number who identified as “Yugoslav” (328,547) totalling 468 884.

¹⁶¹ Ragaru and Dymi, 36.

attention in the previous literature. This is especially surprising given that the literature on Canada's role in the Kosovo crisis is strongly pre-occupied with distinguishing Canada from its allies during the Kosovo War.

Easily Forgotten: The Albanian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999

The only mention of the Canadian-Albanian diaspora in the literature is in Manulak's *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, in which he states, "[t]he Albanian Canadian diaspora community only numbered about 5000 and was not an important advocacy force."¹⁶² This sentiment is shared by Axworthy and Graham as well. Both Axworthy and Graham include the role of the Serbian diaspora during the Kosovo War in their political memoirs. Neither of them mentions the Albanian diaspora. This, however, does not mean that Albanians in Canada did not attempt to influence Canadian foreign policy. The few Albanians who did reside in Canada formed smaller and less effective organizations than those in the U.S. For example, the underground shadow government run by Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo had a Canadian branch in Toronto called the "Democratic Union of Kosovo".¹⁶³ In March 1998, the leader of the Canadian branch of the Kosovo Albanian government-in-exile, Agim Hadri, together with Ferzi Bekiri of the Albanian-Canadian Community Association, sent impassioned letters and petitions to Axworthy pleading for Canadian action on the Kosovo issue. One letter stated that, "Every day there are more accounts of atrocities the Serbs are inflicting on our families and friends. Every day the newspapers are filled with new horror stories and of more deaths. We are certain you share our fear that . . . the torture and the massacres are but the beginning of another ethnic cleansing in the Balkans."¹⁶⁴ This was part of a campaign by

¹⁶² Manulak, *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, 50.

¹⁶³ Haroon Siddiqui, "Kosovo's Canadian connections," *Toronto Star*. June 18 1998.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Albanian-Canadians to urge Canada to bring “an immediate, internationally enforced end to the conflict.”¹⁶⁵ Three months after the letter was sent, Axworthy responded in a letter in which he denounced both sides, Milošević and the Kosovo separatists who he says were engaging in “terrorism.” According to *Toronto Star* journalist, Haroon Siddiqui, in this response Axworthy “makes the same mistake as the Europeans: draw a moral equivalency between the Serbs and their victims. That’s what Gen. Lewis MacKenzie also did in Bosnia, and landed Canada on the wrong side of history.”¹⁶⁶ Axworthy’s letter, along with the attempts by Albanian-Canadians which were notably limited in their size and scope, was not impactful enough for Axworthy to recall any Albanian activity when asked.¹⁶⁷ This is due to the Albanian-Canadian community lacking the advocacy power to truly influence the Canadian political process, especially in foreign policy. The type of advocacy power needed for influence is described by Manulak as the “intensity of opinion, often from the frequency and vigour of communications. In addition to the intensity of expression, officials evaluate the relative advocacy power of actors based on political resources, group cohesion, electoral mobilization, and economic clout.”¹⁶⁸ The Albanian-Canadian community in the 1990s did not have the factors, as outlined by Manulak, to influence Canadian foreign policy.

There is another important factor worth assessing not listed by Manulak: media attention. To its credit, the media did, after some time, try to represent Albanian-Canadian voices. This was especially true when the NATO bombing campaign started, and journalists clamored to find Albanian-Canadians with family members in Kosovo to interview. One *Toronto Star* story titled,

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020., Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Manulak, *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*, 44.

“Brother killed by Serbs, Ontario man says ; 'They shot them, and left them to die by the wall” interviewed an Albanian-Canadian with family in Kosovo and then discusses the Albanian-Canadian community in Canada more generally. The article specifically mentions a fundraiser hosted by the Albanian-Canadian community to support refugees fleeing Kosovo at which thirty thousand dollars was collected in the first hour. The impact of diasporas in Canada sending money to their homeland should not be understated. Axworthy explains, “a lot of the new communities provide very substantial reparations back to their home regions. I mean it’s larger than our overseas development assistance programs.”¹⁶⁹ It goes on to tell of the Albanian Canadian Association members being appointed to canvass homes across the Greater Toronto Area to bring awareness for the cause.¹⁷⁰ However, as explained by Robert C. Austin of the University of Toronto, the media’s efforts were not without fault. Austin was a research associate with the Titan Group for Public Policy Analysis and the Albania analyst for CBC News. He was one of the leading experts in Canada in the 1990s on Albanian issues. Austin distinctly remembers one news interview that he describes as proof that, “the Serbs had a huge advantage in this diaspora politics.”¹⁷¹ Austin recalls being struck by an interview in which “they show this Serb diaspora guy and he’s in his library with books lining the walls ... and then they interview this Albanian guy and he was in a fish restaurant, like he was the cook, he had an apron on. I always thought - wow - was that purposeful?”¹⁷² Austin recognizes that “the Albanian diaspora was relatively new [and] didn’t have the financial resources” but maintains this type of media portrayal did not do them any favours.¹⁷³ This assessment is similar to Manulak’s assertion that

¹⁶⁹ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

¹⁷⁰ Tanya Ho, “Brother killed by Serbs, Ontario man says; 'They shot them, and left them to die by the wall',” *Toronto Star*, March 31 1999.

¹⁷¹ Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

advocacy power depends on “political resources, group cohesion, electoral mobilization, and economic clout.” The Albanian community in Canada may not have been large enough, nor economically or politically powerful enough, to meet the threshold required to have advocacy power in Canadian politics. However, as evidenced above, they understood the importance of the diaspora in advocating for policy in their host countries and attempted to pool their limited resources to do so.

Foreign Policy Potential: Consensus Among Experts

Similarly, the importance of diaspora communities in Canadian politics and foreign policy is well-recognized by those most familiar with then Prime Minister Chrétien’s foreign policy such as Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, Paul Heinbecker, and Eddie Goldenberg. Lloyd Axworthy served as Minister of Employment and Immigration in Chrétien's cabinet from 1993 to 1996 when he was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chrétien chose Axworthy as one of the "shooting stars" in his cabinet.¹⁷⁴ These were experienced politicians who had previously shown their mettle and could be trusted in the most important positions.¹⁷⁵ Axworthy served as the Minister of Employment and Immigration in Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Cabinet. Axworthy later held two portfolios in Chrétien’s Cabinet, first as Minister of Immigration then as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Axworthy’s cabinet positions gave him important insight into the importance of immigrants and diaspora communities in Canadian politics. In *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future*, Axworthy writes about the critical importance of diaspora communities in Canada to foreign policy. In a discussion of the power of NGOs in lobbying the government, Axworthy notes, “Often these groups are organized among the diaspora of the cultural group in

¹⁷⁴ Eddie Goldenberg, *The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2007), 61.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

question, taking on the cause of their homeland in their new surroundings."¹⁷⁶ Axworthy explains what he calls "the phenomenon of dual loyalty", where, "a group takes on the rights issue of its native soil and applies pressure through Canadian institutions."¹⁷⁷ Axworthy asserts that, "Canada's cultural interest groups and NGOs have come to be *key influences* in making foreign trouble spots and human crises part and parcel of domestic political scene. Given the increasing pluralism of our society, they are a *major factor* in setting our foreign policy. [emphasis added]"¹⁷⁸ By recognizing cultural interest groups as a "key influence," Axworthy underscores two crucial points. The first is that domestic issues and foreign policy are inextricably linked. The second is the potential for influence that cultural groups have in Canada. Axworthy argues that there is an unrealized foreign policy potential that the Canadian government should capitalize on, saying Canada should "take full advantage of the influence and resources of our diaspora communities and their communication networks around the world."¹⁷⁹

Axworthy's beliefs about the unrealized foreign policy potential of diaspora communities in Canada are shared by others, such as Eddie Goldenberg, who are knowledgeable about foreign policy. Eddie Goldenberg was a senior policy advisor to Prime Minister Chrétien, who has been described as Chrétien's "right hand man" and as the "ultimate insider" in Ottawa.¹⁸⁰ In his book, *The Way It Works: Inside Ottawa*, Goldenberg discusses the importance of ethnic diversity to Canadian politics. Goldenberg specifically addresses why Canada's cultural diversity should be reflected at the highest level of politics, such as in the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Goldenberg expresses that, "a Cabinet whose composition reflects the diversity of the country also brings a

¹⁷⁶ Axworthy, 66.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 67.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Goldenberg, Back Cover.

perspective to decision making that unfortunately is still not present enough in the ranks of the senior public service."¹⁸¹ Like Axworthy, Goldenberg contends that ethnic diversity (in this case in cabinet) has unrealized foreign policy potential. He says, "They [ethnically diverse cabinet ministers] serve another purpose that is little known but is becoming more and more important. In an era of globalization, the ethnic diversity of its governments can provide Canada with an advantage on the international stage."¹⁸² Thus, both Axworthy, an elected politician, and Goldenberg, a political advisor, recognize the importance of Canada's diversity and lament the unrealized foreign policy possibilities.

Like Axworthy and Goldenberg, Paul Heinbecker realizes the centrality of Canadian diversity to contemporary Canadian politics, especially in Foreign Affairs. Heinbecker was Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's chief foreign policy adviser until 1992, when he became Canada's ambassador to Germany, where he focused on NATO's response to the Bosnian War. In 1996, he became Assistant Deputy Minister for global and security policy. Heinbecker was crucial to the creation of Canada's human security agenda, which was invoked during the Kosovo War. Heinbecker headed the interdepartmental taskforce which met daily to review Canada's participation, both military and diplomatic, during the Kosovo War. Consequently, Heinbecker is well acquainted with Canada's foreign policy priorities, issues in the Balkans, and Kosovo. In his book *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada* Heinbecker presents his vision for the future of Canadian foreign policy and assesses past Canadian foreign policy matters. It is evident in *Getting Back in the Game* that Heinbecker, like Axworthy and Goldenberg, believes in the central role Canadian diversity plays in Canadian

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 62.

¹⁸² Ibid., 63.

politics and foreign policy. He advocates the benefits of diverse politicians and diplomats representing Canada on the world stage. The importance Heinbecker places on ethnic diversity and Canadian foreign policy is evidenced in the second of five principles that he presents to guide Canada's foreign policy: "serve Canadian unity, respect the diversity of our population, and privilege neither founding nation nor any province, ethnic group, economic interest, or religion."¹⁸³ Heinbecker is wary of the Canadian government "tailoring foreign policy to suit the desires of diasporas."¹⁸⁴ He argues that "the Liberals, especially, had scarcely been indifferent to the international interests of Canada's many ethnic groups."¹⁸⁵ Heinbecker realizes Canadian foreign policy should advance Canada's interests while also reflecting its values, including those of its diaspora. However, he strongly advocates that the Canadian foreign policy agenda "has to be much more than the sum of departmental interests, provincial ambitions, and diasporas' aspirations."¹⁸⁶ Thus, Heinbecker, Axworthy, and Goldenberg all recognize the centrality of diaspora groups to Canadian foreign policy, a view also shared by Bill Graham.

Bill Graham was an international lawyer who became a Liberal Member of Parliament in 1993. During the Kosovo War, he was the chair of the SCFAIT. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Liberals from 2002 to 2003. Much of his book, *Call of the World: A Political Memoir*, reflects how deeply related international and domestic politics are, as evidenced by his chapter "All Geopolitics is Local."¹⁸⁷ The central role immigrants play in Canadian politics is recognized by Graham when he states that, "many immigrants saw every issue from an international dimension."¹⁸⁸ Graham discusses what he calls "diaspora politics" in

¹⁸³ Heinbecker, 193.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 203.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 221.

¹⁸⁷ Graham, 193.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 94.

Call of the World. What it comes down to, according to Graham, is that those who migrate to Canada become voting citizens and “import the debates that are current in their homelands.”¹⁸⁹ According to Graham, the diversity of Canada and his constituents personal knowledge and experiences effected him deeply in politics, law, and his personal life.

As evidenced above, the importance of Canada’s diaspora communities to Canadian foreign policy is recognized by both politicians, policy experts, and international lawyers. Axworthy, Goldenberg, Heinbecker, and Graham all praise Canada’s diversity as one of its distinctive features, with the potential to help advance Canada’s foreign policy interest. However, they all caution that the influence of diaspora communities and Canada’s growing multi-cultural makeup also has disadvantages. Axworthy explains that diaspora groups are strategic when it comes to politics, “they often align themselves with members of Parliament from the constituencies where they are strongly represented, and increasingly use the political party nominating systems to gain access and influence.”¹⁹⁰ Whereas Axworthy discusses diaspora groups aligning themselves with political parties, Heinbecker discusses what happens when political parties align themselves with diaspora groups. He warns that courtship of diaspora communities for political gain can turn into pandering “undermining some of the basic tenets of our foreign policy in the process and damaging our international reputation.”¹⁹¹

Another drawback of the increasing advocacy of diaspora communities is that there are instances when Canadian politicians mistakenly believe that the diaspora concerns reflect those of their countries of origin. For example, the Canadian government passed a resolution to recognize the Armenian genocide, supported by Armenian-Canadians and opposed by Turkish-

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 95.

¹⁹⁰ Axworthy, 67.

¹⁹¹ Heinbecker, 203.

Canadians. Graham recalls this event in his book and asked, “What jurisdictional concern did Canada have about something that happened in present-day Turkey in 1915? None, but a large group of Armenians who had migrated to Canada were now voting citizens, and they wanted their MPs to acknowledge this tragedy from their past.”¹⁹² Axworthy recalled meeting the Foreign Minister from Armenia a few weeks after passing the resolution and telling him what Canada had done. Axworthy remembered that the Armenian Foreign Minister looked at him “quizzically and said that was nice, but Armenia was more interested in immediate support from Canada in its struggle to survive as a newly independent state.”¹⁹³ Another example of the greater passion within diaspora communities than within those in their homeland can be seen in the case of Ukrainian-Canadians. As Axworthy describes, “the Ukrainians in Canada tend to be a lot more hawkish than the Ukrainians in Ukraine. In terms of being anti-Russian ... they reflect a mindset that they or their family brought with them.”¹⁹⁴ Thus, diaspora communities in Canada play both advantageous and disadvantageous roles when it comes to influencing foreign policy and their motives must be treated with caution. As will be further explored, this was certainly the case with the Serbian-Canadian diaspora during the Kosovo War. The Serbian-Canadian diaspora brought with them to Canada extremely strong opinions and the mindset of their homeland. This had advantages and disadvantages during the Kosovo War.

What is evident, from the consensus of these former politicians and policy experts, is the deep connection between domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy decision making. The domestic issue, the ethnic makeup of constituencies in Canada, is recognized by Axworthy, Goldenberg, Heinbecker, and Graham as being influential enough to impact foreign policy. The

¹⁹² Graham, 95.

¹⁹³ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

dynamics of the relationship between diaspora communities and their influence are complicated. On the one hand, there is the potential for worthy causes to be brought to Canada's attention that otherwise might have been overlooked. The personal knowledge and experience of diverse Canadians, both as constituents and as personal representatives, can advance Canada's image and position on the world stage. On the other hand, some diaspora communities, such as the Albanian-Canadian community in 1999, are not big enough to make an impression on Canadian politicians and, consequently, on Canadian foreign policy. In addition, when Canada has conflicts with another country, domestic politics become complicated if diaspora communities have uncompromising attitudes. Diaspora communities know their potential for influence and court political parties. This can lead to political parties pandering to diaspora communities. What is even more complicated is when courting political parties to influence foreign policy does not work. Despite the strength of influence, sometimes Canada's interests and a diaspora communities' interests do not line up. This is all to say, the influence of diaspora communities on Canadian foreign policy is unquestionable. However, the dynamics are complicated. By 1999, Canada had plenty of experience juggling diaspora communities and foreign policy. By the Kosovo War, Canada even had plenty of experience handling the Serbian-Canadian diaspora specifically. However, when the Kosovo War started, all of these dynamics of diaspora relations came to a head in a unique way.

Different this time around: Serbian-Canadian Diaspora in 1999

The close ties between Yugoslavia and Canada as a result of diaspora communities became shockingly apparent during the Kosovo War. Serbians in Canada did not only have ideological, historic, and familial ties to their homelands; rather, some of them were directly tied to politicians as well. This was the case for Bogoljub Karic, a Serbian billionaire, who, along

with his three brothers, was in the process of getting his Canadian citizenship in 1999. Bogoljub was the son of a minister in Milošević's war cabinet. A *Maclean's* article titled "Knocking on the Door: Ottawa opposes citizenship for a Milosevic crony" recaps an interview with Karic at his mansion in Toronto.¹⁹⁵ The article describes the telephone "ringing steadily" during the interview and says many of the phone calls were from Karic's father in Belgrade. They were permanent residents of Canada since 1993; however, the Kosovo War complicated their plans for citizenship.¹⁹⁶ The day after *Maclean's* published their article on Bogoljub, the issue came up in the House of Commons when Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament, Daniel Turp, expressed frustration at Chrétien's refusal to freeze the Canadian assets of close collaborators of Milošević. Turp stated, "I would therefore like to submit a very concrete case, that of Bogoljub Karic, a Serbian minister, who owns a television station in Yugoslavia, three companies in Canada, and a luxurious home in Toronto."¹⁹⁷ Turp then asked, "Does the Prime Minister not think that, by freezing the assets of this man, who is propagandizing for Milosevic and against NATO, Canada would be taking concrete action to step up the pressure on the Milosevic government?"¹⁹⁸ The Karic brothers were not the only Serbians in Canada with direct ties to the political system in Yugoslavia. Graham says one of his constituents that contacted him regularly to furiously complain about Canada's involvement in Kosovo was the daughter of a former Prime Minister of Serbia.¹⁹⁹ Graham did not say whether this constituent still had familial political ties in 1999. Regardless, the actions of family members of Serbian politicians living in Canada shows how complicated diaspora communities make the political process, especially during times of war.

¹⁹⁵ Tom Fennel, "Knocking on the Door: Ottawa opposes citizenship for a Milosevic crony," *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999, 34.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 14673.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

By the time Kosovo was on Canada's agenda in the 1990s, protesting was already old hat for the Serbian-Canadian community. In the previous decade, Serbian-Canadians had protested Canada's foreign policy towards (and especially their recognition of the independence of) Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was different for a few closely related reasons. First, during the previous Yugoslav wars there was a voice to counter the Serbian-Canadian advocacy. In the words of Austin, during the previous Yugoslav wars "there were all kinds of struggles, they weren't violent struggles, but there were two communities who were on opposite sides of the war in Bosnia."²⁰⁰ A similar point was made by Graham, who "has no recollection" of Albanian advocacy during the Kosovo War.²⁰¹ He observed that when the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution in favour of recognizing the Armenian genocide it enraged the Turkish community but was strongly supported by the Armenian community.²⁰² According to Graham, the Canadian government had to balance the opinions of two very strongly opinionated communities. During the Kosovo crisis, there was only one side. However, as reflected by Graham, Axworthy, and the primary sources this one side was intensely passionate.

The second reason the Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was different was different is because, as explained in the preface, Kosovo played an integral role in the creation of the Serbian national narrative. U.S. diplomat James Pardew, who had negotiated with Milošević during multiple Yugoslav crises commented, "Kosovo was different. Milosevic was not the manipulative leader looking for a solution as he had been at Dayton. He knew that Kosovo was

²⁰⁰ Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020.

²⁰¹ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

²⁰² Ibid.

rapidly leading to war with NATO and seemed resigned."²⁰³ The role of Kosovo in the Serbian national narrative, and Milošević's unwavering commitment to Kosovo, influenced Serbian Canadian attitudes towards Kosovo. The April 5th, 1999 issue of *Macleans* was largely dedicated to covering the Kosovo War. One of the articles quotes a taxi driver in Serbia saying, "I don't like Milosevic very much ... but when it comes to Kosovo, we are united."²⁰⁴ The same article describes a couple in Serbia who "firmly refuse to blame the bombing on Milosevic" and quotes the mother passionately asserting, "the greatest thing for Serbs is to have a son, but I will be happy if he goes to fight in Kosovo, even if we become a second Vietnam."²⁰⁵ These quotes clearly illustrate the central role Kosovo played in Serbian nationalism, and that as Pardew notes, "Kosovo was different." This type of rhetoric was mirrored by the Serbian community in Canada. In another article, a Serbian Canadian in Vancouver asked journalist Peter C. Newman, "Don't you remember June 28, 1389?"²⁰⁶ The man went on to explain to Newman The Battle of Kosovo and said, "To us, it's holy ground. To bomb and machine gun Serb soldiers won't make much difference. Their places will be taken by their grandfathers and their teenage children. Ours is that strong a culture. We shall never surrender."²⁰⁷ This is a pertinent example of one of the defining qualities of a country of immigrants. Immigrants become fully fledged citizens and bring many things with them to Canada, including their national identity, national narratives and national myths. The Kosovo War was different for the Serbian-Canadian community because of the central role Kosovo played in the national narrative of their homeland.

²⁰³ Phillips, 99-100.

²⁰⁴ Tom Fennell, "United in Rage", *Macleans* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999, 32.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁰⁶ Peter C. Newman, "Horrorific reminders of my days as a refugee," *Macleans* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999, 52.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

The third reason that Serbian-Canadian reaction to Kosovo was different, was the effectiveness of Serbian propaganda from overseas. A common theme in the literature on the Kosovo War is discussing the astounding ability of Milošević's propaganda to influence the west. According to Axworthy, "he understood much better that in this kind of conflict soft power could be an invaluable tool, while the rest of us had to learn on the job."²⁰⁸ The propaganda was deemed so important that one of the main objectives for NATO, for which a special task force was created, was "[n]eutralizing the internal media and other components of the Milosevic propaganda machines."²⁰⁹ Neutralizing the propaganda coming from Belgrade would be an uphill battle as they were already running a successful campaign in the west. Axworthy comments in his book: "I recall my distress at watching an extensive CNN interview with Arkan, a Serb paramilitary leader who was denouncing NATO attacks against civilians. The report never mentioned that he had already been indicted as a war criminal for his notorious killing of civilians in Bosnia [...] the openness of Western media was not reciprocated."²¹⁰ It was not only CNN, Canadian news media company CTV also aired a long interview with Arkan.²¹¹ Axworthy was right to be shocked that Arkan, an accused war criminal and military leader of a country Canada was at war against, was given airtime on Canadian and American television. Additionally, the Yugoslav government had perfected a system which would distribute a constant stream of reports highlighting NATO bombing indiscretions in Canada. According to Axworthy, "they were a staple for consumption by the people of Serbia."²¹² Civilians were targeted in a Yugoslav campaign that sent emotional emails calling for an end to the bombing to

²⁰⁸ Axworthy, 184.

²⁰⁹ Maloney, 90.

²¹⁰ Axworthy, 184.

²¹¹ Anthony Wilson-Smith, "Why Canadian eyes matter," *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999, 9.

²¹² Axworthy, 184.

ten thousand Canadian inboxes.²¹³ The concerns over Yugoslav propaganda infiltrating Canada was well-founded. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the 19 April, 1999 issue of *Maclean's*. In the same issue where there is an article warning of the effectiveness of Yugoslavia's cyber warfare tactics, there is a section that presents six emails from Serbians in Yugoslavia. The emails are prefaced with a note that states, "These emails, *though unconfirmed factually*, vividly demonstrates how individuals are increasingly using the Internet to bypass traditional sources of information [emphasis added]."²¹⁴ Publishing emails that are unconfirmed factually, even with a warning, during a "cyber war" with rampant propaganda was a questionable decision on the part of *Maclean's*. In his book, *Virtual War*, Canadian journalist Michael Ignatieff argues that Milošević's propaganda was so effective it could even turn the opinion of Canadians against their government: "Milosevic could afford to lose military assets because he was not fighting NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the airwaves. Propaganda has been central to war since the dawn of democracy, but it took an authoritarian populist from the Balkans to understand the awesome potential for influencing the opinion base of an enemy, by manipulating real time news to his own advantage."²¹⁵ What can be understood from Ignatieff and Axworthy's explanation of the effectiveness of Serbian propaganda is that the west was specifically targeted. If, as Ignatieff says, the propaganda was so effective it was capable of "influencing the opinion base of an enemy", in this case Canada, it would most definitely have influenced Serbian-Canadians.

The final, and related, reason Kosovo was different for the Serbian-Canadian community compared to previous Yugoslav wars was that western involvement during Kosovo was more intense. Serbian-Canadians were unhappy with Canada's participation in an unarmed peace

²¹³ Anthony Wilson-Smith, "Why Canadian eyes matter," *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999, 9.

²¹⁴ "The internet weapon", *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999, 6.

²¹⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (Toronto: Viking, 0), xxx.

keeping force in Bosnia, and with the subsequent recognition of Bosnian independence. However, they were livid at Canada's participation in the bombing of their homeland, often due to fears for the wellbeing of their loved ones. In one newspaper article, a Serbian-Canadian is quoted saying that, "I love Canada. But now I hate being here and watching the Canadian military bomb my brothers and sisters who are still in Serbia."²¹⁶ Substantial media coverage in Canada focussed on Serbian-Canadians who felt similar fears and told stories of trying to ensure the safety of their families over seas. Axworthy and Graham were sympathetic to the concerns of the Serbian-Canadians. Axworthy notes: "I did not take a lot of umbrage at the protestors, I thought that they had a point of view."²¹⁷ Graham explains: "they [Serbian-Canadians] were very raw about it ... they are Canadians and they had a right to have their point of view, so I respected that."²¹⁸ Despite their sympathy over the concerns of Serbian-Canadians, they were steadfast in their conviction that the Kosovo War was justified for humanitarian reasons. "What happened in Rwanda led me inexorably to my decision to support military intervention in Kosovo launched to stop what had become a massive case of ethnic cleansing of the majority Muslim population", says Axworthy.²¹⁹ In the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton, made an impassioned speech in which he stated: "We are there because we are trying to stop a humanitarian disaster. We simply cannot allow evil to take over and good people do nothing. We must in fact ensure that this genocide comes to an end."²²⁰

Convicted: Canadian Government Response

²¹⁶ Jennifer Quinn, "Local Serbs pray for their families; 'I'm crying for my people,' tearful woman says," *Toronto Star*, March 29 1999.

²¹⁷ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

²¹⁸ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

²¹⁹ Axworthy, 162.

²²⁰ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13504.

The raw emotions and the fears of Serbian-Canadians were not enough to convince Axworthy or Graham of the Serbian-Canadian point of view. Conversely, Serbian-Canadians were not convinced of the other side's point of view. For Serbian-Canadians, either the humanitarian concerns were not enough to relieve them of their personal concerns for their homeland, or they simply did not believe that there were humanitarian concerns in the first place. This is clearly illustrated in a TVO debate between a representative from the Serbian National Shield Society in Canada, Daniel Dostanić and an Albanian-Canadian, Ahmet Jakupi, not affiliated with any organization. In this interview, the Serbian-Canadian repeatedly denied any wrong doing by Milošević or the Yugoslav government. The journalist read a report of Kosovo Albanians being gunned down by Serbian paramilitaries and asked Dostanić, "when you hear reports like that, what do you think?" to which Dostanić replies emphatically, "I think they're false!" The interviewer said in exasperation, "we have absolutely divergent views on what's going on" before wrapping up the interview.²²¹ Frustration over Serbian-Canadian denial of the facts is expressed by Axworthy when he comments that, "What was most distressful was a general unwillingness amongst Serbian Canadians to face the fact of the Milosevic government's campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo."²²²

The reason neither Graham nor Axworthy ever questioned the Canadian position on Kosovo, despite the adamant protesting of their Serbian constituents, is because of the high quality of intelligence Canada had. Graham had firsthand knowledge because he had been sent by Chrétien to assess the situation early on. After visiting the refugee camps in Macedonia,

²²¹ Paula Todd, "Studio 2" Show 1113, March 29, 1999. Accessed directly through TVO Ontario through media footage archival request. Public access is restricted by third party footage and The Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists rights.

²²² Axworthy, 185.

seeing burnt and bombed buildings in Kosovo, and talking to humanitarian aid workers on the ground, Graham returned and reported to caucus that something had to be done.²²³ Graham reflects on his visit and remembered that, “I reported back to caucus of my conclusion and I don’t like to use the word genocide because of the legal import that it has under the genocide convention, but it was. It certainly was a form of ethnic cleansing.”²²⁴ Other members of parliament also went to survey the region on their own accord. Graham remembers being surprised when he ran into NDP MP Svend Robinson at a refugee camp in Macedonia.²²⁵ Axworthy says that, although he was sympathetic to the outcry from Serbian-Canadians, he trusted the quality of Canada’s intelligence. He recalls that, “we had a lot of sources of quite verifiable information.”²²⁶ According to Axworthy, this included intelligence sharing networks such as the Five Eyes Alliance and also Canadian sources intelligence. “We had a very active effort, on our own, in terms of getting intelligence out of Serbia,” Axworthy asserts.²²⁷ The Canadian government and its Serbian citizens were at a stalemate on the issue of Kosovo. Despite the Canadian government’s clear commitment on Kosovo, a combination of a lack of Albanians, Serbian nationalism, Yugoslav propaganda, and fear for loved ones emboldened the Serbian diaspora in their protests. More so than during the previous Yugoslav wars.

Petitions, Personal Pleas & Protests: Serbian-Canadian Reaction

Both Graham and Axworthy had adverse experiences with Serbian protestors. Axworthy writes in his memoir that there were “personal attacks and allegations against many of us in the

²²³ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

²²⁷ Ibid.

government about our motives, suggesting this was a plot against the Serbian people."²²⁸ In some cases things escalated drastically. Axworthy tells of one incident when he recalls that, "I was out on a bicycle ride with my family when a number of Serb Canadians who had been demonstrating on Parliament Hill turned ugly with both verbal abuse and physical threats."²²⁹ Although he understood the depth of their feelings and their loyalty to their homeland, "it was not the kind of experience you want to share with your wife and son" Axworthy says.²³⁰ Axworthy was particularly frustrated that the Serbian-Canadian demonstrators protested outside his home in Ottawa.²³¹ Graham's memoir details a strikingly similar incident, when he recalls that, "during the bombing of Kosovo, I was threatened by a group of angry Serbs who showed up at my annual MP's picnic in a Cabbage town park."²³² Graham had to get used to being called all sorts of names instead of what he preferred which was "a back-and-forth gentlemanly debate."²³³ Graham understood part of politics meant dealing with opposing views; however, he emphasizes that, "one thing I did not like was being grabbed and abused by irate constituents."²³⁴

Axworthy's residence was not the only house at which Serbian-Canadians were making their voices heard: they were making their voices heard in the House of Commons as well. One of the ways Serbian-Canadians were garnering attention was through petitions sent to their Members of Parliament. On 25 May, 1998, the Member of Parliament for Kitchener-Centre presented a petition signed by 114 "constituents of Serbian descent" asking the government to "take action in reaching a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis."²³⁵ Another petition, presented

²²⁸ Axworthy, 185.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020..

²³² Graham, 209.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 7125.

on 10 June, 1998, by the Member of Parliament for Kitchener-Waterloo, on behalf of constituents of "Serbian descent," called upon the government to "take all necessary action to stop all forms of armament into Kosovo and Metohija."^{236 237} This petition presumably meant the arming of the KLA. The next day, on 11 June, 1998, the Member of Parliament for Ottawa West-Nepean presented a petition on behalf of Canadians of Serbian descent "calling attention that the actions of the Canadian government with regard to Serbia are in their view non-democratic."²³⁸ The petitioners asked that, "the House of Commons consider the best interests of all citizens of Serbia for peace and democracy in the Kosovo region."²³⁹ This petition is important because it represents the turn from petitioners advocating action on Kosovo to becoming critical of the Canadian government. On this same day, the Member of Parliament for Toronto Centre—Rosedale presented a petition regarding Kosovo.²⁴⁰ On 28 October, 1998, the Member of Parliament for Niagara Falls presented a petition that was given to him at the celebration, in his riding, for the 53rd Serbian Day. According to Hansard, "the petitioners, a large number for Niagara falls, are calling upon this House to consider very carefully the situation that is developing presently in Kosovo."²⁴¹ The circumstances surrounding this petition highlight the realities of diaspora communities in Canada, as analysed above. On Serbian Day, a day that commemorates The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and which is extremely important to Serbian nationalism, a Canadian politician was handed a petition regarding Canada's involvement in then present-day Kosovo. This illustrates how diaspora communities merge beliefs and nationalism from their homelands along with their pasts, and the political system in Canada in the present, in

²³⁶ "Kosovo and Metohija" is the full term used by Serbians to reference Kosovo.

²³⁷ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 7935.

²³⁸ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 8006.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 8005.

²⁴¹ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 9522.

an attempt to ultimately influence foreign policy. When petitions proved ineffective, Serbian-Canadians political intervention progressed to personal pleas.

When Canada's commitment in Kosovo progressed to participation in the 78-day NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Serbian-Canadians' commitment to having their voices heard in Parliament progressed as well. Canadian Members of Parliament across the country were inundated with phone calls and personal visits from Serbian-Canadian constituents. Often these phone calls and visits were accompanied by harrowing stories and passionate pleas. On 12 April, 1999, the Member of Parliament for Burnaby-Douglas, Svend Robinson, spoke to the House of Commons about the effect hearing from both Serbian-Canadians and Albanian-Canadians had on him and stated, "It was brought home to me when a Serbian constituent phoned. He said 'How do I explain to my daughter that her government, the Government of Canada, is bombing her grandmother's home?'"²⁴² Robinson said that within a couple of hours he heard from a "Kosovar Albanian living in Canada who said that he was unable to contact his parents. Silence. He has no idea. There is fear and uncertainty in not knowing what is happening to them."²⁴³ The first notable thing about the experience Robinson described is that he heard from both sides. The vast majority of Members of Parliament, who mention hearing from constituents in their office, only mention hearing from Serbian-Canadians. It is also worth noting the terminology Robinson uses. When discussing Serbian-Canadians, he says "Serbian constituent". Whereas, when discussing a phone call from the Albanian, Robinson uses the term "Kosovar Albanian in Canada." This could imply that the Serbian caller was a Canadian citizen and the Albanian caller was not. In that case, the weight and concerns of citizens have more potential to influence politicians and

²⁴² Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13616.

²⁴³ Ibid.

consequently foreign policy (more so than that of non-citizens). Robinson ends by asking: “We have to ask the question: What do we do now? How do we answer these anguished questions of our constituents and, indeed, of Canadians?”²⁴⁴ On the same day, Jean Augustine, the Member of Parliament for Etobicoke—Lakeshore, asked, “how do I respond to so many of my constituents who in the main are eastern European, many of them from Serbia? How do I speak to them about this issue at present?”²⁴⁵ Members of Parliament who supported Canada’s involvement in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons were increasingly concerned with how to respond to Serbian-Canadian constituents in their ridings.

How did Members of Parliament respond to desperate pleas from their own constituents that their families were in danger and that they were ashamed of being Canadian? According to Axworthy, with understanding, transparency, and firmness. First, Axworthy was understanding of Serbian-Canadians and empathized with them. He goes so far as to say that, “legitimate questions were raised by representatives of the Serbian community”, but does not specify which questions he is referring to.²⁴⁶ Axworthy’s understanding that Serbian-Canadians had legitimate questions and concerns convinced him of the need for transparency on the part of the Canadian government. This meant that Axworthy, with Members of Parliament with large Serbian-Canadian communities in their constituencies (such as Hamilton cabinet minister Sheila Copps), consistently met with groups of Serbian-Canadians to hear their concerns and explain Canada’s position.²⁴⁷ According to Graham, other than meetings, nightly televised hearings with the Chief of Defence Staff, General Ray Henault, and Jim Wright, the Director General for Central, East,

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13626.

²⁴⁶ Axworthy, 185.

²⁴⁷ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

and South Europe at DFAIT, were held for the sake of transparency.²⁴⁸ The policy of transparency that the government adopted was the direct result of the Serbian-Canadian community. Axworthy explains that the decision to hold a daily press briefing was to "counter the criticisms coming via Yugoslav media or from critics inside Canada, especially the Serb-Canadian community, who opposed Canadian intervention."²⁴⁹ Therefore, the government of Canada went to great lengths to respond to Serbian-Canadian concerns with both understanding and transparency. The voice of Serbian-Canadians was heard loudly enough that it influenced what the Canadian government's media policy was during the Kosovo War. However, in addition to understanding and transparency, the government responded with firmness. According to Axworthy: "we made an effort to reach out and connect but at the same time we had to say look we're trying to establish a principle that you have to intervene at certain periods in order to protect the human beings who are being risked."²⁵⁰

However, not all Members of Parliament were as firm as Axworthy and Graham. Some, like the Member of Parliament for Scarborough-Agincourt, Jim Karygiannis, passionately defended the Serbian-Canadian position and admonished his colleagues. In a lengthy reproach on 12 April, 1999, he stated:

A lot of members came here today pretending that they know the history of Bosnia. Well, to my honourable colleagues who pretend that they know the history of Bosnia, to my honourable colleagues who have travelled to Yugoslavia and to Kosovo and who say they know the Balkan history, I say to them that they have another thing coming. That part of the world has been in turmoil not for the last 50 years and not for the last 100 years, but we should say for the last millennium. Since history has been recorded, that part of the world has had atrocities done on both sides by all kinds of people. The atrocities happening there have been by both sides. It is not something new. I can quote text and verse from 50 years ago, from 100 years ago, from 200 years ago, the

²⁴⁸ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

²⁴⁹ Axworthy, 185.

²⁵⁰ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

history of what has happened in that part of the world. It was the Ottoman empire. Before that there was the Byzantine empire. Before that was the Roman empire. For my honourable colleagues who say that they know about Balkan history because they have visited Bosnia, I say go read the history and do not be ignorant.²⁵¹

What is important to note is that Karygiannis references the same historic conflicts that the Serbian-Canadian diaspora reference when claiming sovereignty over Kosovo. As mentioned in the first chapter, these events are shrouded in so much nationalist mythology, by both Albanians and Serbians, that little can be factually confirmed about the events. For Axworthy and the government of Canada, ancient, ethnic hatred could have no part in the conversation in the face of present human rights abuses. However, history continued to come up in the House of Commons, as constituents continued to bring it up in phone calls with their Members of Parliament. For example, on the same day Karygiannis lectured his colleagues on history, Paul Szabo the Member of Parliament for Mississauga South, told the story of “a Serbian gentleman [who] came to my office and gave me quite a lecture about the centuries of history of the area. His basic conclusion was that it was their turn, that many Serbians had died over the years and that they had to get even. It was as bald as that. It was their turn to kill somebody.”²⁵² The reality of diaspora politics in Canada meant that debates over history going back further than Canada had even existed continued to come up in discussion in the House of Commons.

After admonishing his colleagues on the shortcomings of their historical knowledge, Karygiannis then read multiple emails he received from Serbian-Canadian and Russian-Canadian constituents opposing Canada’s involvement in Yugoslavia. This illustrates an important aspect of diaspora politics; that is, like countries, diaspora groups also have allies. During the Kosovo

²⁵¹ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13627-13628.

²⁵² Ibid., 13677.

War, the majority of the opposition was coming from the Serbian-Canadian community; however, they were also aided by the Russian-Canadian and Greek-Canadian communities. The Russian and Greek communities were connected to the Serbian community by their shared Orthodox faith. Karygiannis himself came to Canada as an immigrant from Greece. It is impossible to say for certain whether this influenced how he approached the issues in Kosovo. That said, it is worth noting that, as previously discussed, foreign policy experts such as Goldenberg emphasize how diverse cabinet members are influenced, for better or for worse, by their homeland communities. The same could be said for Members of Parliament. Canada's approach to Kosovo was not only complicated by the Serbian-Canadian, Greek-Canadian, and Russian-Canadian cultural communities: other communities also capitalized on the events to further the interest of their homeland communities. For example, the Tamil community used Canada's involvement to protect Kosovo-Albanians as an opportunity to request Canada's protection of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils sent a letter for Foreign Minister Axworthy that says, "that the civil war in Sri Lanka not only predates the Kosovo conflict by more than a decade, but also has claimed many more lives, more than 75 000." They argued that "just like the Albanians fleeing the Serbian onslaught, over 700 Tamils fled when the Sinhalese army, after a bloody military campaign, occupied the Jaffna peninsula."²⁵³ Thus, when Canada makes foreign policy decisions, it must consider both the diaspora communities that will be directly affected and the diaspora communities that will not, but will argue for the precedents being set to be extended to their own homelands.

²⁵³ Ibid., 13628.

A part of Karygiannis' lengthy address to the House of Commons on 12 April, 1999 was reading the content of a petition with 15,000 signatures he said he had received:

We the undersigned residents of Canada draw to the attention of the House the following: that the Canadian government is blindly following the careless and dangerous U.S.-NATO policy of bombing the sovereign country of Yugoslavia and the Serbian people; that such policy sets dangerous precedents and could only open the door for foreign intervention in internal affairs of nations of minorities; and, that violence will not resolve the Kosovar problem but rather it facilitates the further entrenchment of the forces on both sides. We do not want to see the residents of Kosovo live in peace and harmony.²⁵⁴

The text of this petition illustrates a few important factors in the Serbian-Canadian diaspora's attempts to influence Canadian foreign policy. The phone calls and emails contained personal anecdotes and references to historical events. The petitions, in contrast, focussed on making arguments around foreign policy and potential precedents, as well as warning Canada of the consequences of their actions. It is worth noting that this petition was never formerly presented to the House of Commons. In his address to the House of Commons, Karygiannis, mentions that he "seem[s] to be the focus for e-mails and have received over 8,000 in the last week or so" and even received an email from somebody in New York.²⁵⁵ Members of Parliament quoting Canadians who directly called or visited their constituency offices is completely valid. Those Members of Parliament were elected to represent and voice the concerns of their constituents and were doing so. However, quoting from 9000 emails received without verifying the content (or that they were even from Canadian citizens) is problematic. This is especially so when it was well-established that the Yugoslav government was conducting a cyber war by spamming the email inboxes of journalists, citizens, and politicians in NATO countries, as noted by Ignatieff

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 13629.

and Axworthy earlier. This is not to say that none of the emails Karygiannis received were from Canadians. It does, however, illustrate how the presence of diaspora communities complicates foreign relations, especially during a cyber war. It also raises the question of why Karygiannis, in his own words, “seem[s] to be the focus for emails.” As Axworthy warns: “they [diaspora groups] often align themselves with members of Parliament from the constituencies where they are strongly represented.”²⁵⁶ With all of this said, Jim Karygiannis, a Liberal Member of Parliament, never voted against Canada’s actions in Kosovo.²⁵⁷ The lobbying of Members of Parliament by diaspora communities had both notable successes and limitations.

Public Reaction

It is also important to understand the successes and limitations of the lobbying of Canadian public opinion by diaspora communities. On 27 April, 1999, Reform Member of Parliament for North Vancouver, Ted White, said in his address to the House of Commons that other than from Serbian-Canadians he has heard very few opinions, “despite the serious nature of the issue.”²⁵⁸ White describes being surprised that when monitoring a radio talk show they did not pick up a single call regarding Kosovo and concluded that, “it would seem that the average person on the street considers it too far away and something that is not important enough to worry about. I receive more letters about the taxes families are paying and the difficulties with the immigration system or justice issues than I receive about the situation in Kosovo.”²⁵⁹ Polling at the time challenges White’s concerns that the lack of radio phone ins from Canadians equates to apathy or ignorance to what was happening. In an Environics poll conducted in May 1999, a

²⁵⁶ Axworthy, 66.

²⁵⁸ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 14420.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

sizeable majority of Canadians claimed to have followed the conflict attentively.²⁶⁰ What more likely explains the lack of feedback from non-diaspora Canadians is the overwhelming support for the mission. Constituents are more likely to write when they disagree with something than when they agree with it. In early April 1999, a Compass poll showed that 79% of Canadians supported NATO's actions and 72% approved Canada's involvement.²⁶¹ Even more significantly, over half, 57% of Canadians, favoured sending ground troops, something that politicians were very hesitant to do.²⁶² Other polls, such as a survey by Angus Reid, support the accuracy of these results. The Angus Reid survey shows that two-thirds approved NATO's actions and Canada's participation and 60% would approve the use of ground troops, if necessary.²⁶³ As the war progressed, public support fell slightly, but public approval continued to be in the majority at 57%.²⁶⁴ In addition to petitioning the government directly, influencing public opinion was integral to Serbian-Canadian's attempts to influence foreign policy during the Kosovo War.

Serbian-Canadians tried to influence public opinion through media and public protests. The *Toronto Star's* "Letter of the Week," for 3 April, 1999, was written by a Serbian-Canadian who asked, "[h]ow is my mother to blame for the policies of [Slobodan Milosevic]?"²⁶⁵ The author stressed that not all Serbians agreed with Milošević. However, other letters to the editor, such as the one found in *Maclean's* April 12th issue, illustrate that many did. The letter to the editor is from a Serbian-Canadian and reads: "I am deeply ashamed that the Canadian government sent its military forces to Yugoslavia [...] To me, it is mind boggling that NATO

²⁶⁰ Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Public Opinion: Obstacle, Partner or Scapegoat?" *Policy Options* 22, no. 1 (2001): 71.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Mariana Masic, "Letter Of The Week: How Will Bombing Innocents Remove Slobodan Milosevic?: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star* April 3, 1999.

attacked my country without a UN Security Council resolution. My heart goes to my family and friends and I completely understand Milosevic's rejection of an agreement that nobody has seen."²⁶⁶

These letters to the editor were published alongside articles about passionate protests by Serbian-Canadians in Canada and around the world. On 28 February, 1999, Serbian-Canadians gathered in front of U.S. consulate in Toronto to protest the peace initiatives at Rambouillet. The protestors held up U.S. flags with swastikas and signs that said, "U.S. Policy Cleanses Serbs."²⁶⁷ Three weeks later, on 23 March, 1999, when Canada announced its participation in Operation Allied Force, Serbian-Canadian protests erupted around the country. The protests took place in cities across Canada, but the one in Toronto was especially noteworthy. The second night of protests turned violent when demonstrators hurled rocks and eggs at the U.S. consulate in Toronto. According to one *Toronto Star* article, "more than 1,000 people -- many of them Serbs with young children in tow -- gathered in front of the consulate, shutting down University Ave."²⁶⁸ At this protest, a police officer, a police horse, and several other first responders were hit by rocks. Four protestors were arrested. The crowds sang Serbia's national anthem while chanting "Hey, hey U.S.A., how many Serbs have you killed today?"²⁶⁹ The article describes how hard it was for first responders: "When fire officials tried to get through the crowd to put out a large fire created by [burning] flags and other debris, they were pelted with eggs."²⁷⁰ Protestors called Canadians fascists, killers, and terrorists. One Serbian-Canadian is quoted as saying,

²⁶⁶ Tanya Benic, "The Mail: Responses to War is Hell," *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999, 4.

²⁶⁷ "RICK MADONIK / TORONTO STAR / ANTI-U: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*. March 1, 1999.

²⁶⁸ Kerry Gillespie, "Local Protest Turns Violent ; Demonstrators Throw Rocks, Eggs, Burn Flags in Front of U.S. Consulate Demonstrators Vow to Return Every Day Until NATO Ceases Its Air Strikes: 1 Edition," *Toronto Star* March 25, 1999.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

"What's a little vandalism? Our (Canadian) forces are committing murder."²⁷¹ The next week's issue of *Maclean's* included a photo of two heavily armed guards in front of the burning and vandalized U.S. consulate in Toronto.²⁷² The week after that, *Maclean's* included a photo of protestors burning a Canadian flag with a swastika drawn on it.²⁷³ In response to these protests, the Member of Parliament for Verchères-Les-Patriotes, Stéphane Bergeron, expressed sympathy, "I would also say that a degree of sympathy can be felt for the Serbian demonstrators throughout the world, including here in Canada and Quebec [...] It is understandable that seeing their country attacked in this way may indeed awake in them a certain nationalistic pride..."²⁷⁴ However, his sympathy was not enough to convince him: "While we can sympathize with these protesters, while we deeply care for peace, it is absolutely out of the question not to act, to stand idly by while terrible things are going on in Kosovo."²⁷⁵

While Members of Parliament in the House of Commons expressed understanding, the court of public opinion was much less sympathetic. Many letters to the editor during the Kosovo War supported Canada's involvement. However, even in a letter to the editor where the writer does not support NATO's bombing, the writer expressed frustration at Serbian-Canadian protests and asked, "As for the protests of Serbs in Canada, where were they when their brethren were ethnically cleansing the Bosnian Muslims?"²⁷⁶ In contrast to Axworthy, who admits there are drawbacks to the phenomenon of dual loyalty but emphasises the benefits instead, many Canadians were much less optimistic. The week after *Maclean's* published the letter mentioned previously, in which a Serbian Canadian says, "I am deeply ashamed that the Canadian

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² *Maclean's* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999, 30.

²⁷³ *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999, 3.

²⁷⁴ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135 (1997-99): 13709.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Maurice A. Rhodes, "The Mail: History Lessons," *Maclean's* 112, no. 17, April 26, 1999, 4.

government [...] NATO attacked my country [...]” *Maclean’s* received a letter directly responding to this writer from another Canadian.²⁷⁷ In her response, the author writes: “I have been amazed by the number of Serbian landed immigrants - and Canadian citizens - who feel so free to express their shame and discontent with a country they now call home. They chose to live here over their native land for a reason, but they refer to the NATO attacks taking place in their country. Which is it?”²⁷⁸ The writer goes on to say that she does not, “think the Canadian people are as concerned with the reasons behind the attacks as much as they are with helping all those poor refugees. After all, they are the innocent victims in all this, no matter who wins or loses.”²⁷⁹ Requiring Canadians to choose where their loyalty lies during a time of turmoil and criticizing them for concerns over their homeland is unfair. However, legitimate questions were raised by those expressing anger at the Serbian-Canadian demonstrators. As Bergeron said, referring to Serbian-Canadians, it was “understandable that seeing their country attacked in this way may indeed awake in them a certain nationalistic pride.” Similarly, seeing Canadian flags burnt, and the suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees was enough to awaken in Canadians nationalistic pride and humanitarian concern.

One letter to *Maclean’s* particularly expressed the frustration Canadians felt with their Serbian co-citizens:

I am confused by Canadian-Serbs who are angry because of Canada's involvement in Kosovo. So what if Kosovo has been part of Serbia for 900 years? I thought human beings were beyond this petty state in their evolution. It angers me to see a picture of a protester burning a Canadian flag with a swastika inside the Maple Leaf (‘Outrage in Kosovo, Cover, April 12). Who is involved in ethnic cleansing here? Is that not similar to what Hitler did to the Jews before and during the Second World War? It is time for Serbs to take a look in the

²⁷⁷ Tanya Benic, “The Mail: Responses to War is Hell,” *Maclean’s* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999, 4.

²⁷⁸ Kate Phillips, “In response to Tanja Benic,” *Maclean’s* 112, no. 17, April 26, 1999, 4.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

mirror. Are they proud the Serbian military and police are responsible for killing thousands of ethnic Albanians?²⁸⁰

This letter illustrates a few important aspects of the Canadian public's reaction. First, Serbian-Canadian protests angered the public instead of sparking sympathy for their cause. Second, the Canadian public was not interested in debates surrounding historic events, they were interested in contemporary suffering. Finally, like Axworthy and the Canadian government, the support of the Canadian public was motivated by the human rights abuses happening against Kosovo Albanians.

If the purpose of the protests was only to vent their frustrations, the Serbian-Canadians were successful. More likely, the purpose of the protests was also to influence public opinion, and consequently influence foreign policy towards Canada. In this case, the protests were unsuccessful. One *Toronto Star* article opens with, "The growing rage of the Serbian diaspora, including Serb Canadians, against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is understandable. [...]" However, a more pressing matter for the majority of the protesters is this: Have they ever paused to ponder what it is that they may be defending?"²⁸¹ The article continues, "Slobodan Milosevic? His ethnic cleansing?"²⁸² The author is critical of Serbian-Canadians "deafening silence on one of the most moral issues of our time."²⁸³ Following the protests, Canadians asked tough questions of their Serbian-Canadian counterparts. In an article titled, "Serb protests against Canada ring hollow", the author criticized the sudden "concern" of Serbian-Canadians about peace in Kosovo saying, "Maybe had they started protesting their government's slaughtering of

²⁸⁰ J.W. Hall, "The Mail: Canada and NATO" *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999, 4.

²⁸¹ "What are Serb Canadians Defending?" *Toronto Star*, Apr 01, 1999.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

civilians in Kosovo, they may have had a positive impact on what Slobodan Milosevic was doing to the Kosovars.”²⁸⁴ Public opinion continued to favour Canada’s involvement even as Serbian-Canadian’s vented their frustrations.

The Albanian-Canadian community capitalized on the bad publicity and public frustration Canadians were expressing over Serbian-Canadian actions. Following the Serbian-Canadian protests, the president of the Albanian Canadian Community Association of Toronto, Halit Hoxha, said that Albanian-Canadians were planning their own demonstration. Making obvious reference to the Serbian-Canadian protests, he emphasized: “We're not throwing stones or eggs. We'll be throwing flowers.”²⁸⁵ On 3 April, 1999, the Albanian-Canadian community held this gathering in front of Queen’s Park with the intention “to thank Canadians for their military, monetary and moral support of Kosovar refugees.”²⁸⁶ As at the Serbian protests, there was a large police presence. Unlike at the Serbian-Canadian protests, there was no violence and the signs mostly thanked Canada. People held signs which read, "Stop the genocide," "Thanks for your support NATO," and "May sanity prevail," as well as photos of Albanian-born Mother Theresa captioned "Kosovo needs your blessing."²⁸⁷ Demonstrators sang the Canadian national anthem and chanted "Free Kosovo."²⁸⁸ The demonstration was also much smaller, with roughly 300 people. Hours later, 1500 Serbian demonstrators began to gather for the eleventh day and were met by 250 members of the RCMP and the Toronto Police Services prepared for any escalation.²⁸⁹ While the demonstrations missed each other by only a few hours, the communities

²⁸⁴ Paul Newton, “Serb protests against Canada ring hollow,” *Toronto Star*, April 3, 1999.

²⁸⁵ Tanya Ho, “Brother killed by Serbs, Ontario man says; 'They shot them, and left them to die by the wall',” *Toronto Star*, March 31, 1999.

²⁸⁶ Theresa Boyle and Phinjo Gombu, “Albanians demonstrate to say thanks to Canada; 300 Albanians hold their first demonstration at Queen's Park,” *Toronto Star*, April 4, 1999.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

clashed in different ways. For example, after the previously mentioned TVO debate between a Serbian-Canadian and an Albanian-Canadian, the participants and their friends got into a confrontation behind the scenes. The *Toronto Star* described the confrontation this way: "behind the polite face of Canadian multiculturalism, emotions are running high..." and said that when the cameras turned off the confrontation was so intense security had to be called.²⁹⁰ The clashes between the two cultural communities went beyond verbal confrontations. In some cases, there was violence. An apartment in Toronto, where multiple Albanian-Canadian families lived, was vandalized with ethnic slurs and the words "Serbia will never surrender, and Muslim Albanians die."²⁹¹ A fire was also lit in the lobby of the building. The Albanian-Canadians interviewed in the news article describing these events said that they previously called the police when their children were threatened in school over the NATO bombing.²⁹² Of course, not all of the protests were violent, there was peaceful protests by Serbian-Canadian communities across Canada, including in Montreal, Ottawa, and Edmonton. However, the frustrations of the Serbian community, and the perceived threats of violence were strong enough that it affected decisions the Canadian government made, especially those dealing with the Armed Forces.

Policy Impact

As previously mentioned, during the Kosovo War, the Canadian government prioritized transparency and held daily press briefings. According to Axworthy, the protests of the Serbian-Canadian community were one of the factors that led to transparency being a top priority, and consequently the briefings were televised.²⁹³ However, the Canadian government's transparency

²⁹⁰ Sean Fine, "Neither time nor distance heals ancient hatred," *Toronto Star* April 1, 1999.

²⁹¹ Mark Stevenson, "A west-end Toronto apartment where nine Albanian...", *CanWest News*, March 26 1999.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

had its limits, which was also caused by the Serbian-Canadian community. During the Kosovo War, the Canadian Forces' media policy prevented pilots, except in rare exceptions, from being interviewed, and banned the use of identifiable information. The 5 April, 1999 issue of *Maclean's* was dedicated mostly to Canada's participation in the Kosovo War. According to one of the articles, pilots were banned from interviews. The reason for this was explained as being due to the fact "that the Canadian military authorities are worried about the possibility of reprisals back home, sparked by the same emotions that prompted Canadians of Serbian descent to mount angry demonstrations in Toronto last week."²⁹⁴ In the rare case pilots were allowed to give interviews their backs were to the camera.²⁹⁵ This policy was the cause of great consternation among the media; however, according to the Canadian government, it was necessary to keep the members of the Canadian Armed Forces and their families safe.²⁹⁶ At the daily briefing on 20 April, 1999, Brig. Gen. David Jurkowski explained the media policy banned the following: interviews, pictures, and any footage with the faces, names, and hometowns. Basically, nothing that could identify individual servicemen and women was allowed. Jurkowski explained:

We had learned some lessons during the Gulf War and some of those lessons relate to threats back to families back at home—telephone calls, harassing telephone calls, body bags on the lawns of wives and kiddies back home in Canada and of individuals who were found to be operating in the Gulf. We learned those lessons and until there is a proper moment to be more open with our pilots and ground crew, to a certain degree we're going to maintain this policy.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ William Lowther, "GOING TO WAR: Canada joins NATO's high-stakes battle for Kosovo" *Maclean's* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999, 30

²⁹⁵ Bergen, 185.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 211

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Canadian historian Bob Bergen is extremely critical of this media policy in his book *Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship During the Kosovo War*. According to Bergen, there is no evidence that missions would have been compromised by such media access, and the policy was damaging to democracy and to the pilots themselves. However, what is important to understand is that, at the time, the venting of frustrations by the Serbian-Canadians led policy makers to genuinely believe there was risk of reprisals in Canada. In effect, this meant that the diaspora community directly influenced foreign and military policy during the Kosovo War.

Conclusion

If Canada had a larger Albanian-Canadian presence in the 1990s, would Canada have advocated for intervention in Kosovo sooner? Would Canada have advocated for the use of ground forces? It is impossible to say for certain. What is evident from an analysis of the primary sources is that, at the very least, diaspora communities complicated decision making during the Kosovo War. At the very most, they directly influenced foreign policy decisions. As time passes and documents from the Kosovo War become declassified, historians will get a clearer sense of the true extent to which diaspora communities impacted foreign policy. As Axworthy states, "The role of the ethnic diaspora, as I've said, increasingly influences Canadian foreign policy decisions, and *this was certainly the case in Kosovo*. [emphasis added]"²⁹⁸ That said, the fact that Canada continued its actions in Kosovo, despite the size and impact of its Serbian-Canadian diaspora, proves the depth of Canada's conviction towards Kosovo. An analysis of the Kosovo War proves how domestic issues, such as the cultural makeup of the country, impact foreign policy decision making. The inextricable ties between domestic and foreign issues were not only

²⁹⁸ Axworthy, 185.

understood by the Serbian-Canadian diaspora, they were understood by Serbians living in Yugoslavia as well. This is evidenced by the words “Republic of Quebec,” which were prominently sprayed in graffiti on the vandalized Canadian Embassy in Belgrade.²⁹⁹ Diaspora communities were not the only domestic factor that preoccupied Canadians during the Kosovo War. Quebec separatism also played a role.

²⁹⁹ Andrew Phillips, "Human Outrage," *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999

CHAPTER IV: SOVEREIGNTY SENSITIVITY

" Canada has had a string of long-lived prime ministers of Quebec origin - Trudeau, Mulroney, and Chrétien - all of whom were exquisitely cognizant of these attitudes and, of course, all too aware of the *independantiste* attitudes in Quebec, ebbing and rising with events and the years. If it is bad policy to let Canadian Jews or Muslims have undue influence on policy to Israel, it is similarly bad policy to let Quebec, or any one province, determine Canadian defense and foreign policy."

- J.L. Granatstein, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy" in *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics*

"Republic of Quebec." These words were painted onto the damaged Canadian Embassy in Belgrade after a night of Serbian protests against NATO's intervention in Kosovo.³⁰⁰

A month prior, and a half a world away, across the Atlantic Ocean, a Serbian-Canadian protester in Toronto asked journalists, "How would you feel if Quebec decided they wanted to get out of the federation? And the U.S. bombed the Canadians for trying to keep their own land? How would you feel?"³⁰¹ In Macedonia, a resident in a Serbian village refused to speak to a Canadian journalist and said "Come back when you let Quebec go free and I'll talk to you!"³⁰² Another villager from the same community said that "Canada is just the same as America" after accusing the journalist of smelling like an Albanian.³⁰³ Were these accusations apt? Did Canada have no right to get involved in Kosovo unless they "let Quebec go free"? Was Canada "just the same as America"? No, these accusations were not correct. However, they did reflect an understanding of two sensitivities present within Canadian society and tried to capitalize on them. First, Canada's sensitivity when dealing with sovereignty issues around the world due to its own sovereignty issues at home. Second, the accusation that Canada is merely a follower of the United States and

³⁰⁰ Andrew Phillips, "Human Outrage," *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999.

³⁰¹ Jennifer Quinn, "Hands off Serbia, Toronto protesters tell U.S." *Toronto Star*, March 1, 1999.

³⁰² Dale Brazao, "Hatred for the West festers in tiny Macedonian village; Visitors greeted with suspicion, interrogated about ethnicity" *Toronto Star*, April 14, 1999.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

does not have its own distinct foreign policy. As to the first sensitivity, scholars have been quiet when it comes to the Kosovo War. Because there was broad consensus about the humanitarian and regional stability concerns in Kosovo, scholars have paid sparse attention to other considerations in the foreign policy. These same scholars have been pre-occupied with distinguishing Canada's contributions from that of their NATO allies, most importantly the United States, militarily and democratically. An analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada did in fact have an additional and unique consideration during the Kosovo crisis: national unity.

Canada's domestic national unity issue influenced Canadian foreign policy towards Kosovo at every stage. First, concerns over national unity were front and centre during Brian Mulroney's time as Prime Minister. It was during this time concerns over Kosovo first came to the attention of the Canadian government. It was also during this time the precedent for comparing Kosovo and Quebec was set. In addition, national unity continued to be a crucial concern during Chrétien's time as Prime Minister. It was during this time, from 1995 to 1999, that issues in Kosovo went from being on the government's radar to being the central issue in foreign policy through the Kosovo War. Finally, despite the Canadian government's attempts at minimizing the issue, the Canadian public, parliamentarians, and journalists continued to compare Kosovo and Quebec.

Separatism & The Mulroney Years

Brian Mulroney never mentions Kosovo in his book *Memoirs: 1939-1993*. Yugoslavia is mentioned only a few times: once, to mention that his wife is Serbian and the remaining six times to briefly mention that Yugoslavia was on the agenda. Not unsurprisingly, Quebec and separatism feature prominently. Even before entering politics, Mulroney was concerned with

separatist forces in Quebec. This is evidenced by the letter he wrote Prime Minister John Diefenbaker as a young law student warning of separatism's rise in Quebec. In this letter, Mulroney advocated for preventative action to be taken, such as official bilingualism, a Canadian diplomatic appointee to the Vatican, and the creation of a national flag.³⁰⁴ Part of the platform on which Mulroney was elected Prime Minister was national unity. He advertised himself as the one who could bring Quebec into the constitution. Mulroney was true to his platform and national unity was a central goal during his tenure. In pursuit of this goal, and under Mulroney's leadership, the Meech Lake Accord was signed by the premiers of all ten provinces in 1987. The proposed amendments to the constitution under the Meech Lake Accord included increased provincial power over immigration, provinces nominating senators and Supreme Court justices, provinces having a constitutional veto, and, importantly, Quebec being recognized as a distinct society. When the changes were not ratified by all ten provinces by the 23 June, 1990 deadline, Mulroney's first major attempt at constitutional change and securing national unity failed. The demise of Meech Lake meant that the accord had the opposite of its intended effect on national unity. Residents of Quebec felt alienated and support for separatism rose leading to the creation of a federal separatist party on the national stage, the Bloc Québécois. The original coalition that formed the Bloc Québécois was led by Mulroney's former cabinet minister, Lucien Bouchard. Mulroney's second attempt at national unity through the creation of a constitution that all provinces, especially Quebec, had signed was similarly ill-fated. The Charlottetown Accord of 1992 granted more powers to the province, addressed Indigenous self-government, reformed the Senate and the House of Commons, and importantly, like the Meech Lake Accord, recognized Quebec as a distinct society. Unlike the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Accord was

³⁰⁴ Brian Mulroney, *Memoirs: 1939–1993* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 84.

voted on by Canadian citizens in a referendum. Again, residents of Quebec felt slighted and support for separatism rose. This led to the Bloc Québécois gaining seats in the House of Commons and becoming the official opposition by the 1993 federal election. Thus, national unity and rising separatism in Quebec was one of the chief concerns during the Mulroney government, as it would be for Chrétien.

The most obvious way separatist concerns manifested themselves during the Mulroney government was through his repeated attempts at constitutional reform. However, the presence of these concerns also influenced foreign policy. Paul Heinbecker was Mulroney's chief foreign advisor and described by Mulroney as "meticulous, effective and loyal in every way." In his book, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada*, Heinbecker gives numerous examples of ways Quebec, and relatedly, separatism, influenced Canadian foreign policy throughout history. For example, article ii of the founding treaty of NATO, known as "the Canadian article" which promoted political, economic, and social co-operation among members was insisted upon by Canada. According to Heinbecker, it was "evident that the government in Ottawa wanted the clause in order to show Quebecers that there was more to NATO than military commitments."³⁰⁵ Heinbecker realizes the crucial importance national unity plays in Canadian foreign policy. This is evidenced in the second of five principles that Heinbecker presents to guide Canada's foreign policy: "serve Canadian unity, respect the diversity of our population, and privilege neither founding nation nor any province ..."³⁰⁶ He also argues that the Canadian government's attention to world affairs is deeply affected by Canada's domestic national unity concerns.³⁰⁷ Thus, during the years Brian Mulroney was prime minister, national

³⁰⁵ Heinbecker, 62.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 193.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 78.

unity was a top concern domestically, and consequently influenced foreign policy, including toward Kosovo.

Kosovo & The Mulroney Years

The issue of Kosovo's desire for independence had long been on the radar of Canada's then Department of Foreign Affairs. The groundwork for the domestic concern about national unity being applied to foreign policy was laid during Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's time in office. The 1990 issue of the journal of the then Department of External Affairs, *International Perspectives*, included an article titled, "Can Canada be a Role Model for a Changing Europe?" In this opinion piece, Louis Balthazar, a professor of political science at Université Laval, asked, "How can Yugoslavia manage to hold together in the face of the multitudinous national forces at work in Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia?"³⁰⁸ Balthazar argues that federalism is the only real option, and that Canada cannot support sovereignty in other nations. Balthazar described Canada as a "country with distinct allegiances, a 'community of communities,' a confederation" and argues that as such Canada "could serve as an interesting model for the world of tomorrow."³⁰⁹ Thus, Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs can be said to have advanced thinking that compared the national unity issue in Canada to separatist tensions in other parts of the world, including Kosovo.

The first ever mention of Kosovo in the House of Commons was during a discussion on Croatia's potential independence from Yugoslavia on 18 November, 1991. While discussing a majority ethnic population's right to self-determination, New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Svend J. Robinson mentioned the suffering of Kosovo Albanians: "We know that the

³⁰⁸ Louis Balthazar, "Can Canada be a Role Model for a Changing Europe?" *International Perspectives* 19, no. 4 (1990): 48.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

Albanian majority in Kosovo has been brutally repressed for too long. Our obligation as parliamentarians is to recognize that we must in the absence of leadership from this government provide leadership on behalf of the people that we have the honour to represent.”³¹⁰ Robinson did not connect the right to self-determination in Yugoslavia to the national unity issue in Canada. However, Liberal Member of Parliament Christine S. Stewart did, and she did not mince her words. Stewart accused the Canadian government of allowing a deplorable situation to continue out of self-interest:

Today we have all these innocent people within Yugoslavia who are suffering so much personally and it appears that those who have power to change things in the world are not prepared to take the necessary steps or do not have the political will to bring about a peaceful resolution to the problem that exists. *Sovereignty sensitivities* in this area have translated into inaction. This is unacceptable. Young people, students, men and women who have learned over years, mind you under a stern dictatorship, to live together. [emphasis added]³¹¹

Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament Alex Kindy was even more direct when he responded to, and disagreed with, Barbara McDougall, his own party’s Secretary of State for External Affairs. During his response on why Canada should recognize Croatia’s independence, Kindy read a quote from an article in *The Financial Post* which called the unravelling of Yugoslavia “almost a mirror image of Canada and therefore Canadian politicians think Quebecers might identify too much with the nationalists of the republics.”³¹² This means that from the very beginning of Kosovo being on the government’s radar, so was Quebec separatism.

This discussion in Parliament reveals important information about the motivations at the time. To begin, it reveals that the first time the issue of Kosovo was mentioned in Parliament was in the context of self-determination, even if the main discussion was about Croatia. Next, it

³¹⁰ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 34th Parl., 3rd sess., vol. 3 (1991-93): 4954.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4959.

³¹² Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 34th Parl., 3rd sess., vol.3 (1991-93): 4967.

illustrates how the potential independence of states in the Balkans was compared to Quebec. Relatedly, it reveals that parliamentarians understood one of the motivating factors in the government's foreign policy was the consideration of national unity in Canada. Finally, it illustrates that national unity had an influence on Canadian foreign policy. This influential presence was evident in Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government as well as in the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.

It was not just parliamentarians who made a connection between the breakup of Yugoslavia and Quebec's desire for separation: major Canadian newspapers published articles with similar comparisons. On 31 August, 1991, *The Globe and Mail* published an article called "Quebec's eyes light up at republics' rush to independence." In this article, journalist Lysiane Gagnon argued that secession in Yugoslavia will add fuel to the "independantiste" movement. However, she concluded that "what happens on the domestic front is what will shape Quebec's political mood. The real threat to national unity does not lie in Eastern Europe, but in Canada."³¹³ Gagnon may have concluded that secession in Yugoslavia will not be the deciding factor in Quebec separatism; however, the Canadian government was nervous about any influence on the national unity issue. Two weeks later, Jeffrey Simpson's article, "If Canada followed the Communists, things might not stop at Quebec," in *The Globe and Mail* commented on this nervousness:

Croats and Serbs fight in Yugoslavia. Macedonians declare their independence from the Yugoslav federation. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province resent their domination by Serbs. Another ethnically divided federation splits asunder. Despite all the evident differences between these federations and Canada, the obvious question remains: is their fate ours? Not the fighting part, but the breakup of a federal state into ethnic entities? The nervousness this question

³¹³ Lysiane Gagnon, "Quebec's eyes light up at republics' rush to independence," *The Globe and Mail*, August 31, 1991.

necessarily arouses explains the cat's paws on which External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall tip-toed through Kiev, the Ukrainian capital.³¹⁴

This mention of Kosovo among countries vying for independence crucially illustrates that Kosovo's potential independence was already on the radar of journalists, as well as that of politicians. This article illustrates how the national unity question was understood to be influencing the actions of Canadian parliamentarians.

On 15 January, 1992, Canada recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, and then recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April, 1992. At first glance, the recognition of these three former Yugoslav republics suggests that Canada's foreign policy on separation was changing. However, Canada was still operating with a healthy dose of sovereignty sensitivity. For Kosovo, this meant that Canadian policy towards separation remained unchanged. After years of being mentioned alongside ethnic, nationalists, and separatist struggles in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Canadian government had to explain why the policy towards the remaining movements was different. On 9 March, 1993, a press release by the Secretary of State for External Affairs explains that although they were aware of other parties in want of recognition, "Canada plans no action, however, that could contribute to further destabilization of the region."³¹⁵ This press release does not specifically mention Kosovo's desire for independence. It does, however, mention Macedonia. It states that "Canada's position with regard to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is that its people have a legitimate claim to recognition."³¹⁶ Thus, Canada's position was that they would not

³¹⁴ Jeffrey Simpson, "If Canada followed the Communists, things might not stop at Quebec," *The Globe and Mail*, September 10, 1991.

³¹⁵ External Affairs and International Trade Canada, News Release, "Canada Issues First Report to The United Nations on Violations of International Law in the Former Yugoslavia," (March 9, 1996), 3. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Digital Library http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_19930309EP/1?r=0&s=1

³¹⁶ Ibid.

destabilize the region, even if they agreed a republic had a legitimate claim to recognition. Official government documents, such as this one, emphasized that Kosovo was a province of Yugoslavia.³¹⁷ It is likely that because Kosovo was never a republic in Yugoslavia that Canada assessed their claims to independence as less legitimate.³¹⁸ Thus, when Prime Minister Chrétien was elected, and the Liberals took over the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, comparisons between Kosovo and Quebec were already prevalent and Canada's foreign policy dictated discouraging any separatist movements.

Separatism & The Chrétien Years

Like Mulroney, Chrétien's tenure as prime minister was marked by rising separatist concerns and preoccupation with Quebec. Chrétien, a French-Canadian politician who had been active in campaigning for the 'non' side during the 1980 Quebec Referendum, came into the office of Prime Minister in 1993, with years of experience dealing with separatism. A year after Chrétien took office, in 1994, Jacques Parizeau, the leader of the sovereigntist Parti Québécois was elected Premier of Quebec and announced that there would be another referendum on Quebec sovereignty. On 30 October, 1995, the referendum was held and the "non" side won by a very narrow margin of 50.58 per cent. This victory was too close for comfort for the Canadian government and the Chrétien government became fixated on national unity issues for the rest of its tenure.

The Canadian government's fixation on sovereignty was not just a domestic issue; rather, it influenced foreign policy as well. This is noted by the policy advisors and politicians closest to

³¹⁷ Kosovo's political status changed multiple times since the creation of Yugoslavia, but it was never a republic.

³¹⁸ The goals of the separatist movement in Kosovo changed frequently in the 1990s and there was not always consensus. At the beginning of the decade, most separatists asked to be granted the status of republic within Yugoslavia and by the end of the decade the ask was for full independence and recognition. For a full history of the changes, see Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999).

Chrétien. James Bartleman was Chrétien's chief diplomatic advisor from 1994 to 1998 and assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy in the Privy Council Office. In his memoir *Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994-1998*, Bartleman admits that he was Chrétien's advisor for less than half of his time in office and he "cannot comment as an insider on the big foreign-policy challenges that came up in his remaining years, in particular the Kosovo and Afghanistan military campaigns"³¹⁹ Nonetheless, Bartleman gives valuable insight into the foreign policy priorities and effect of separatist concerns. Bartleman comments on the central role sovereignty concerns played in Chrétien's foreign policy: "I am in no position to comment on the policies he adopted to counter separatists at home. Internationally, however, I was a witness to his actions to ensure that they gained no international support for their cause."³²⁰ Bartleman does not specifically mention Kosovo, but he does comment on the tie between separatist concern and international policy. He says there was concern about separatism in regards to "other multi-ethnic countries" including Yugoslavia.³²¹

The understanding that national unity was the primary domestic concern for the Canadian government is shared by policy advisors such as James Bartleman and politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Bill Graham. Axworthy and Graham were both closely involved with foreign policy in Chrétien's government and are described by Chrétien as members of his "A team."³²² As members of the "A team," they were acutely aware of Chrétien's priorities. Both Axworthy and Graham contend that national unity was the paramount consideration in decision-making. Axworthy explains that the role of the foreign minister meant "serving one master, the prime

³¹⁹ James Bartleman, *Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994-1998* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 324.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 168.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

³²² Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister* (Toronto: Knopf, 2007), 374.

minister.”³²³ However, he specifies that unlike Mulroney, Chrétien gave his ministers, including his ministers of foreign affairs, a “fair amount of latitude.”³²⁴ One of the “prime ministerial lines that one didn’t cross,” however, was national unity.³²⁵ Although the issue of national unity is principally a domestic concern, Axworthy was expected to apply foreign policy to this issue that was “closely watched by the PMO.”³²⁶ Graham’s assessment of the Chrétien government’s priorities are similar as he explains that the government was fixated on national unity above all else.³²⁷ Thus, it is well established that national unity was the primary domestic concern of the governing Liberals, and that domestic concerns were closely related to Canada’s foreign affairs under Chrétien. Therefore, it is not surprising that, although never explicitly mentioned as a motivating factor, an analysis of primary sources reveals that domestic concerns over national unity continued to influence Canada’s foreign policy towards Kosovo.

Kosovo & The Chrétien Years

By the time Prime Minister Chrétien and the Liberals came into power, the media, politicians, and the newly rechristened Department of Foreign Affairs, had already established a precedent for comparing the breakup of Yugoslavia to national unity issues in Canada. During these years, Kosovo was a part of the comparison but was overshadowed by more pressing issues in the Balkans. During Chrétien’s time as prime minister, the Kosovo issue escalated to the point that Canada needed a specific policy to deal with it. Even when Kosovo was seen as its own issue, the Liberals continued the trend of comparing the crisis there to the national unity crisis at

³²³ Axworthy, 56.

³²⁴ Axworthy, 57.

³²⁵ Ibid., 57.

³²⁶ Ibid., 58.

³²⁷ Graham, 199.

home. An analysis of the primary sources from 1993 to 2000 shows how the domestic concern of national unity was a factor in Canada's foreign policy towards Kosovo more than ever.

Kosovo was at the top of the agenda at a Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade roundtable on the Balkans held on 31 March, 1998. Speaking on the topic of "Albania and Kosovo" was Dr. Robert Austin. Austin was a research associate with the Titan Group for Public Policy Analysis, a professor at the University of Toronto, and the Albania analyst for *CBC News*. He was one of the leading experts in Canada in the 1990s on Albanian issues. The memorandum sent to Axworthy after this meeting summarized Austin's position as being that "[the] solution is not necessarily autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia but incremental growth of human rights ... dealing with political rights at a later time."³²⁸ The two policy recommendations given to Axworthy, written by Austin in the following months, continued to emphasize that a decision on Kosovo's status should be delayed. The first, from April 1998, explained that the main cause of the Kosovo crisis was that Kosovo's political status was "ambiguous" with both sides having "reasonable claims to the territory." The report stated:

Nearly all parties in the Balkan region and international community are treating the Kosovo conflict as a question of political status: Should Kosovo remain a region of the Serbian Republic within Yugoslavia, regain its status as an autonomous province within Serbia, become a republic within Yugoslavia or achieve independence as its own state?³²⁹

Austin believed that the international community was unanimous in its support for greater autonomy while categorically opposing independence.³³⁰ However, the report warned that both sides, Serbians and Kosovo Albanians, would be categorically opposed to greater autonomy for

³²⁸ Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Memorandum "Balkans Roundtable," (April 24, 1998), 3. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Digital Library <http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b4114942/7?r=0&s=1>

³²⁹ Robert Austin. *Albania and Kosovo: Canada's Interests and Policy Options*. (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 1998), 15.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

Kosovo in Yugoslavia. The report concluded that Canada should “get the issue of Kosovo's political status off the table for the time being” and instead focus on human rights and security.³³¹ Austin’s report in the fall of 1998 concluded the same: “Before any progress can be made in resolving Kosovo's political status, the basic human rights and democratic rights of the Albanian community must be assured.”³³² Canada’s foreign policy towards Kosovo did follow the recommendations in these reports. Canada delayed commenting on a preferred political solution for Kosovo, while making it clear that they did not support independence.

The policy recommendations presented to Axworthy stated that Canada’s interest in Kosovo were based on security and human rights issues. The recommendations did not mention Canada’s national unity interests playing a role. The recommendations did state that Canada’s role as a country where “politics of compromise are commonplace” gave Canada a unique and relevant perspective.³³³ This can be understood as alluding to Canada’s compromises surrounding its own issues of national unity.

When asked about the connection between national unity concerns in Canada and foreign policy in Kosovo Austin, the author of these reports, conceded that the Canadian government sometimes "fell into the trap" of comparing Kosovo and Quebec.³³⁴ Austin is clear that he resented comparisons being made between the two saying "it [Kosovo] had nothing to do with Quebec by the way." According to Austin, the comparison between Quebec and Kosovo "was always an overstated argument, more or less used by Belgrade."³³⁵ Although some bought the arguments that Kosovo opened a "pandora's box" when it came to separatist concerns, Austin

³³¹ Ibid., 18.

³³² Robert Austin. *Albania and Kosovo: Roots of Instability*. (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 1998), 71.

³³³ Austin, *Canada's Interests*, 7.

³³⁴ Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020

³³⁵ Ibid.

never did. Austin felt strongly that "to compare Canada and Quebec was absurd."³³⁶ He believed that any comparisons were baseless; despite this, he admitted that comparisons were common in journalism, academia, and especially Serbian diplomatic circles. He explained: "the Quebec link was put there by people who didn't get it or who were trying to make the story relevant for Canadians."³³⁷

While Austin now admits comparisons of Quebec and Kosovo were present, the government documents he wrote do not make the comparison outright. While government documents alluded to, but did not specifically mention, Canada's national unity issues, the media and politicians continued to draw comparisons between Canada's national unity and Kosovo. An April 1998 article in *The Globe and Mail*, titled "Kosovo and the Americans," criticized the American government and the international community for considering supporting Kosovo's independence. The article opens with the comparison between Canada and Serbia: "This is a mistake. Kosovo is as much a part of Serbia as Quebec is of Canada. No Serbian president could let it go and survive."³³⁸

On the evening of 7 October, 1998, the House of Commons held a special debate on the situation in Kosovo. In his opening remarks, Axworthy outlined Canada's position on Kosovo's political status. He stated, "It is very clear. Canada and the communities must reject terrorism as a means of obtaining independence for Kosovo. We have stated clearly that the solution for Kosovo is independence within Yugoslavia. No peace is possible in the Balkans if the borders can be changed by force."³³⁹ The Reform Party's lead foreign affairs critic Bob Mills responded by pressing Axworthy on potential independence and reminded him, "That is what Kosovans

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Marcus Gee, "Kosovo and the Americans," *The Globe and Mail*, April 1, 1998.

³³⁹ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135, no. 134 (1997-99): 8914.

want.”³⁴⁰ Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament Daniel Turp stated that he agreed that there was a lack of clarity on Canada’s position and again brought up the question of independence:

Reform Party members were right to point out that we do not have here, this evening, concrete indications on the measures that Canada favours ... We are told that these measures seek a diplomatic solution to the problem. This is fine, but what specific measures? What would be Kosovo's status within or outside the Yugoslav Republic? We should consider any solution that respects the wishes of the Kosovo people.³⁴¹

In response to the discussion, New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Gordon Earle stated that, “the federal NDP affirms and recognizes the right of self-determination for the people of Kosovo to decide their own political future”³⁴² While other Members of Parliament were pressing Axworthy on Canada’s position on independence in Kosovo, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament David Price was the first one to directly compare Quebec to Kosovo when he said that “it is certainly a difficult dilemma between self-determination and not breaking up countries. If only it could be as simple as pointing to Canada as a beacon of how two distinct peoples can live together with only occasional debate and heart ache ... if only Milosevic listened to reason the way the people of Quebec and the people of Alberta listen to reason.”³⁴³ Ultimately, despite pressure from members of all the other parties in the House of Commons, the Liberal government would not clarify its position on Kosovo’s potential independence and right to self-determination.

From 6 February, 1999 to 22 March, 1999, the Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo was held in France to find a solution to the escalating crisis in Kosovo. While these discussions were being held between the Contact Group and Yugoslavia, Canadian politicians continued to make

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 8917.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 8924.

³⁴² Ibid., 8928.

³⁴³ Ibid., 8930.

points about Kosovo's independence and comparisons to Quebec in the House of Commons. On 17 February, 1999, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament David Price argued that the "lack of Liberal clarity has left Canadians wondering what is the government's policy on Kosovo."³⁴⁴ Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament René Laurin took the lack of a Canadian position as an opportunity to argue in favour of recognizing Kosovo. Laurin emphasised that "independence for Kosovo must be seriously considered rather than simply dismissed."³⁴⁵ His party colleague, Paul Crête, similarly stated, "We must give thought to the possibility of recognizing the independence of Kosovo rather than writing off the idea, because it could be one of the solutions to be explored in order to restore peace to the region."³⁴⁶ These exchanges in the House of Commons illustrate that whether they liked it or not, Canadian parliamentarians were forced to consider Kosovo's potential independence and listen to comparisons be made between Canada and Quebec.

On 22 March, 1999, the negotiations at Rambouillet ended in failure when Yugoslavia refused to sign the accord. Two days later, Canada and its NATO allies were at war against Yugoslavia. As expected, during the first weeks of NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, the discussions in the House of Commons centred on military actions. However, it was not long before the government was pressed on the issue of Kosovo's political status. On 12 April, 1999, the leader of the New Democratic Party Alexa McDonough asked, "[b]ecause of the military focus, political solutions have been virtually ignored with 19 days of bombing but no real diplomatic leadership. Will the government now agree to show the leadership Canadians expect and push for a United Nations led negotiated solution?"³⁴⁷ In addition, Bloc Québécois Member

³⁴⁴ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135, no. 183 (1997-99): 12055.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 12049.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 12067.

³⁴⁷ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess., vol. 135, no. 205A (1997-99): 13566.

of Parliament Daniel Turp asked, “Could the Prime Minister tell us whether Canada intends to promote this solution, or will it continue reacting to events as it has been doing since the beginning of this conflict?”³⁴⁸ Like Robert Austin’s policy paper recommended a year earlier, Chrétien delayed taking a stance on a political solution. Instead, Chrétien stated, “At this time, the priority is to get an agreement, to allow Kosovars to return home. This is the top priority. Then, there is the issue of Kosovo's political status. Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy until President Milosevic took it away in 1989. What will the political solution be? We are prepared to look at every option.”³⁴⁹

Chrétien, however, was not off the hook. Members of Parliament continued to try and discern what Canada’s position was. The leader of the Reform Party, Preston Manning asked, “Are NATO and the Canadian government still committed to the Rambouillet agreement calling for an autonomous Kosovo within Yugoslavia? Or is NATO and our government now inclining toward supporting an independent Kosovo?”³⁵⁰ These comments in the House of Commons, on 12 April, 1999, illustrate two important things. First, there was pressure on the Liberals to define Canada’s foreign policy on the political status of Kosovo, and the Liberals avoided doing so. Second, the only firm position the Liberals held was that complete independence was unacceptable. The Canadian government had seemingly accepted Austin’s policy recommendation that Canada delay taking a stance on the political status of Kosovo.

While some politicians were pressing the government on its position on Kosovo’s political status and getting unsatisfactory answers, others were busy drawing the comparisons once more. Liberal Member of Parliament Clifford Lincoln argued that Canada had the upper

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 13567.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 13578.

hand in finding a solution: “given its tradition of peace and the fact that pluralism is one of its central policies and values.”³⁵¹ While other politicians, such as the New Democratic Party’s Pat Martin, drew darker comparisons. Martin exclaimed, “Canada ...is at risk of being split apart by disparate forces. There is a western separatist party pulling it in one direction and an eastern French separatist party pulling it in another. As we review the turmoil in Kosovo it is good for us to pause to reflect on some of the lessons that can be learned”³⁵² Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament Paul Mercier gave a long speech in which he compared the treatment of the Acadians by the British to the treatment of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs. He concluded that “perhaps the lesson to be drawn from the situations in Yugoslavia and in Canada is to allow nations their own governments.”³⁵³ Throughout the bombing campaign, Bloc Québécois politicians continued to compare Acadians to Kosovo Albanians. The comments in the House of Commons on 12 April, 1999, illustrate that even the bombing campaign could not stop comparisons between Quebec and Kosovo. Thus, though the Liberals did not address these comparisons, it is reasonable to assume that these issues played on the mind of a Prime Minister who held national unity as his number one priority.

Public Opinion & Quebec Comparisons

While the Liberals were downplaying the comparisons in the House of Commons, the media and public continued to debate the parallels between Kosovo and Quebec. One *Toronto Star* article titled “Could Quebec ever follow the example of Kosovo?” opened with the question, “It Could Never happen here, could it? As Canadians watch the human drama unfolding in Belgrade and Kosovo, how easy is it really to dismiss the thought that scenes of this nature could

³⁵¹ Ibid., 13622.

³⁵² Ibid., 13674.

³⁵³ Ibid., 13708.

one day unfold here?"³⁵⁴ The article described a hypothetical situation in which partition resolutions are adopted by Quebec municipalities, Quebecers are bombed by the rest of Canada, and Washington intervenes. Ultimately, the author concludes that Canada's strong foundation in democracy would prevent this unlikely scenario. However, it is important to note that writings with such comparisons were not uncommon during the Kosovo War.

Maclean's received multiple letters from readers comparing Kosovo to Quebec. One letter critical of the Kosovo War asked "If a guerilla war were to erupt in Mexico, or between Scotland and Britain, or between Quebec and the rest of Canada, would NATO assemble a military force to bomb Mexico, England or Canada?"³⁵⁵ One writer to the *Toronto Star* who was concerned about the precedent Canada was setting in Kosovo asked "[s]uppose that in the not-so-far-away future, Quebec decides to separate unilaterally from Canada. It is logical to assume that Canada will do everything in its power to prevent such an act. Now, suppose that the U.S. considers Canada's actions to be improper. Will the U.S. bomb Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, etc.?"³⁵⁶ A week later, the *Toronto Star* received a response to this letter from a reader who "found its comparisons of Serbia keeping Kosovo in Yugoslavia and a scenario in which Canada prevents Quebec from separating in a similar situation very upsetting."³⁵⁷ The reader explained that even if Canada kept Quebec from separating "it would not create the same reason NATO is launching its military action in Serbia. As I recall, Serbia is systematically forcing the Kosovars to move and killing the ones who resist its aggression. If Canada ever did that in Quebec, NATO certainly would be justified in bombing to stop it, although I know that we would never do such

³⁵⁴ Chantal Hebert, "Could Quebec ever follow the example of Kosovo?" *Toronto Star*. March 31, 1999.

³⁵⁵ Charles Hooker, "The Mail: Responses to War is Hell," *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999, 4.

³⁵⁶ Sam Baron, "Siding with Kosovars Sets Very Dangerous Precedent: 1 Edition," *Toronto Star*. April 5, 1999.

³⁵⁷ Gordon Grise, "Comparison Doesn't Hold: 1 Edition," *Toronto Star*, Apr 16, 1999.

a thing.”³⁵⁸ Similar sentiments are found in other publications. One writer to *Maclean's* stated she was proud of NATO's actions in Kosovo, even if they could set a precedent for Quebec, stating:

Consider the unthinkable. In a Quebec referendum, 90 per cent of Quebecers vote to separate from Canada. Heavily armoured English-Canadian troops go immediately into Quebec, burn villages, towns and cities, rape women, kill the young men, put hundreds of thousands of Quebecers on boats to France, and hundreds of thousands of refugees flood the U.S. border states. Would you not expect NATO to intervene? That is exactly what is happening in Kosovo.³⁵⁹

These letters illustrate two crucial points. First, comparisons between Quebec and Kosovo were prominent enough that the public were responding to hypothetical situations when writing to magazines such as *Maclean's* and *Toronto Star*. This illustrates that sovereignty concerns were on the mind of average Canadians as well as politicians. Second, not everyone who made the comparisons believed that they were valid. The author above explicitly points out that if Quebec were to commit wide scale human rights abuses, she would support intervention. The assumption is that since there is not wide spread human-rights abuses, Canada does not need to worry. For a Liberal government with a healthy dose of ‘sovereignty sensitivity,’ it did not matter whether the comparisons with Quebec were valid or not. The existence of such comparisons themselves were trouble.

On 10 June, 1999, the Kosovo War ended when Milošević agreed to the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, and to the presence of an armed international peacekeeping force made up of NATO countries and Russia. Members of Parliament from the Bloc Québécois immediately criticized the lack of clarity on Kosovo's political status. As NATO's bombing came to an end, so did the frequent mention of Kosovo and the political status of Kosovo in the

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Safa O. Kasap, “The Mail: Canada and NATO”, *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999, 4-5.

House of Commons. This is pointed out by historians of Canada's role in Kosovo, Bob Bergen and Sean Maloney, as well as by the media coverage of the issue. However, the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, chaired by Bill Graham and released in June 2000, a full year after the Kosovo War ended, illustrated that there was still discontent over Kosovo's political status. The report states that the majority of the committee agree that Canada's actions were a legitimate response to the crisis in Kosovo, and that Canada should continue to have a presence there. The report included a supplementary opinion by the Bloc Québécois in which they state that they agree with the majority of the report; however, they also believed that no permanent resolution will be found without recognition of the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of Kosovo:

The Liberal government, *in the grip of its Canadian unity obsession*, has managed to forget this simple truth: people have the right to determine their political future. If the international community, and especially Canada, do not put all their influence to support this right, regional conflicts will only proliferate in the future. And Canada will have no one to blame but itself. [emphasis added]³⁶⁰

The Bloc Québécois never directly accused the Liberals of being motivated by its own 'national unity obsession' during the Kosovo crisis. However, this damning indictment of the position of the Liberal government on Kosovo's political status illustrates that Canada's national unity was a motivating factor all along, and not just the humanitarian and regional stability interests they claimed.

Reflections

When asked, two decades later, if sovereignty sensitivities had an effect on foreign policy in 1999 both Graham and Axworthy conceded that they did. According to Axworthy, one of the

³⁶⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Resolution Following Public Hearings On Canada's Role in the Kosovo Conflict*. 39th Parl., 2nd sess., Rept. 8., 2000. Retrieved from the Parliament of Canada Website: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/36-2/FAIT/report-8/page-2>

reasons sovereignty sensitivity continued to influence Canadian foreign policy was because “there was a very aggressive effort by the government in Quebec to compete internationally.”³⁶¹ Axworthy explains that Canada’s actions were always guided by a sensitivity that we would not be seen as endorsing a separatist agenda internationally. This was the case for Kosovo as well. According to Axworthy, when decision making about Kosovo, they were “conscious” of the comparisons with Quebec but had to be “be very careful not to fall into the old Russian trick of equivalency.”³⁶² Like the writers to *Maclean’s* and the *Toronto Star*, Axworthy believes it was a false equivalency: “[it] wasn’t exactly the same as what was happening in Quebec. People in Quebec were not being ethnically cleansed ... I mean we had the FLQ crisis back in the 70s but it’s not comparable. So this idea of equivalency was always a problem but we always made the case that look what we’re doing in Kosovo was protecting people’s lives.”³⁶³ Graham agreed with Axworthy on the influence of separatism on foreign policy and explained: “the issue of Quebec, is bound to influence Canadian foreign policy and it influences domestic policy tremendously.”³⁶⁴ Graham recalled that Serbian-Canadian constituents who would phone his office would often ask him “how would you feel if Quebec was separating?”³⁶⁵ Graham explained that Canada had to act with extreme caution whenever “Canadians get involved in situations where there is a break up of a country” because Canadians are “always reminded of the fact that we have a Quebec situation where we are in theory not tolerant about the break-up of countries.” As such, the Canadian government regarded their actions in Kosovo as a very serious matter and proceeded with a “great deal of caution.” Graham said that “we [Canada] wouldn’t

³⁶¹ Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

have taken the steps we did unless we felt very strongly that human rights were being violated at a vast level.”³⁶⁶ Illustrating that humanitarian concerns overruled the sovereignty sensitivities the Canadian Government had. What further ameliorated the concerns over comparing Kosovo to Quebec was that Quebecers were largely in support of Canada’s actions in Kosovo. As Graham explained: “Quebecers as a whole were strongly in favour of a principled foreign policy recognizing the importance of human rights.”³⁶⁷ The reflections of Axworthy and Graham confirm what an analysis of the primary sources already revealed: Canada’s concerns over its own national unity affected its foreign policy and decision making towards issues in Kosovo.

Conclusion

If Canada did not have domestic concerns over national unity would they have advocated more strongly or sooner for a political solution to Kosovo? If the Bloc Québécois and residents of Quebec were opposed to action in Kosovo, would Canada have hesitated to participate in Operation Allied Force. It is impossible to say for certain the extent to which Canada’s domestic concerns over national unity, its own “sovereignty sensitivities,” affected Canadian foreign policy during the Kosovo War. What can be said is that officially Canada’s interests in developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were humanitarian and done with due regard to regional stability considerations. However, an analysis of the primary sources reveals the decision making in Canada was more complex because of its domestic concerns. Canada did, in fact, have an additional and unique consideration during the Kosovo crisis: its own national unity. Canada’s national unity issue influenced Canadian foreign policy towards Kosovo at every stage. As in the case of diaspora discontent, sovereignty sensitivity was a domestic issue that influenced foreign policy decision making during the Kosovo War. From the first time Kosovo

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

was mentioned in the House of Commons in 1992, and all the way through the Kosovo War in 1999, issues over Kosovo's potential independence were raised and debated. While the Canadian government tried to minimize comparisons between Quebec and Kosovo, they could not prevent parliamentarians, journalists, and the public from comparing the two. In the end, like with diaspora discontent, sovereignty sensitivity was not enough to outweigh the concerns over regional stability and human rights. This analysis shows both the unique considerations Canada had due to domestic issues and proves the depth of Canada's commitment to human rights.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

As the Kosovo War ended, media coverage and discussion about Kosovo, both in the House of Commons and with the public, became increasingly sparse. Of course, when the Kosovo War ended, Canada's involvement with Kosovo did not. In response to overcrowded refugee camps resulting from the Kosovo War, Canada initiated Operation Parasol, the airlift of thousands of 5051 Kosovo Albanian refugees to Canada. An additional 2266 refugees were fast-tracked for admission to Canada under the Kosovo Family Reunification program (KOF).³⁶⁸ In addition to participating in KFOR, Canada sent correctional service advisors to Kosovo. Canadian Corrections advisors worked in Kosovo on a joint initiative of the Canadian International Development Agency and the Correctional Service of Canada.³⁶⁹ Many Canadian NGOs operated in Kosovo, and Canada participated in UNMIK in various capacities. Two of the most influential war crimes prosecutors dealing with the Kosovo War, Elliott Behar and Louise Arbour, were Canadian. Despite the continued ties between the two countries, Kosovo faded into the periphery. Albanian experts, such as Austin, tried to keep Kosovo on Canada's agenda, but to little success. For Austin, who, during the Kosovo War, wrote policy recommendations which advocated postponing any decision on the political status of Kosovo, the time had come to stop postponing that decision. Austin wrote many newspaper articles "reminding people that Kosovo's destiny was to have an independent state" and "on some occasions advised the government about that need."³⁷⁰ For a long time, these efforts were fruitless. Canada continued

³⁶⁸ Lawrence Lam, *A report on the settlement experiences of Kosovar refugees in Ontario*. (Toronto: York University, 2011)

³⁶⁹ Danielle Murdoch, "Corrections Reform in Kosovo: A Qualitative Study of Canadian Corrections Advisers' Experiences in Post-Conflict Environment," *International Peacekeeping* 22, no. 3 (2015).

³⁷⁰ Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020.

to defer taking a position on the political status of Kosovo as issues in Kosovo were no longer high on the government's agenda.

The time eventually came when an issue in Kosovo returned the nation to Canada's agenda. On 17 February, 2008, Kosovo, with the support of the United States, unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Despite its substantial role in the 1999 NATO mission, which secured Kosovo's de facto independence, Canada did not follow. Within a week of Kosovo's declaration, some of Canada's major allies had recognized its independence: among them the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. Yet, Canada continued to delay. The second major time Kosovo was on the government of Canada's radar, the same two domestic influences of diaspora communities and Quebec separatism came to the forefront again. However, things were different this time.

The 7317 Kosovo Albanian refugees who settled in Canada following Operation Parasol immediately doubled the size of the Albanian diaspora in Canada. By the time of Kosovo's declaration in 2008, this number had grown even further. In the 2006 census, 22,395 people identified as Albanian and 1530 as Kosovar.³⁷¹ As before, the accurate numbers are likely higher. Regardless, by 2008, the Albanian-Canadian community was at least 23,925 strong: a major increase from the 4000 to 8000 in 1999. In 1999, Serbian-Canadians passionately protested Canada's role in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, but Albanian-Canadian community lacked the size to make up an effective advocacy force. In stark contrast, in 2008, when Canada was faced with a decision over whether to recognize Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, Kosovar Albanians passionately protested. The numbers of Albanian-Canadians had grown significantly and so had their potential for political influence. By 2008, enough time

³⁷¹ Statistics Canada. 2006 Census of Population – Ethnic Origin and Visible Minorities. Statistics Canada, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 94-580-XCB2006001.

had past that many of the Albanian refugees who had come would be both fully-fledged Canadians and voting citizens. As in 1999, Serbian-Canadians took to the streets to demonstrate and advocate for their position. Serbian-Canadians protested in cities around Canada holding signs that said, “Serbia Today, Quebec Tomorrow.”³⁷² What was different about the diaspora pressure on the Canadian government regarding Kosovo in 2008 was that this time there were two sides to be heard. In the days following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the streets of many major Canadian cities filled with the celebrations of Albanian-Canadians. Many of those rejoicing were the 7317 refugees that Canada had accepted in 1999. In the crowds in Toronto, many were holding signs that read “THANK YOU CANADA,” along with Canadian and American Flags.³⁷³ However, the Albanian-Canadians were too quick to thank Canada. In the days and weeks following 17 February, 2008, Canada’s major allies recognized Kosovo’s independence, but Canada continued to delay. To understand why it took Canada a full month to recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence, one must turn back to the other domestic issue that influences Canadian foreign policy: national unity.

When Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government was pressed by the Bloc Québécois in the House of Commons, government officials gave non-answers such as “we are assessing the situation” and “we will inform the house in due course.”³⁷⁴ While the other parties, especially the Bloc Québécois, relished the opportunity to hold the government’s feet to the fire on their position on separation, Canada was again delaying taking a position on the political status of Kosovo. The fact that Canada did not have a response ready to address

³⁷² Milan Markovic, “What the Kosovo ruling means for Canada: trouble” *The Globe and Mail*, July 31, 2010.

³⁷³ Matthew Jay, “Canada recognizes independent Kosovo,” *National Post*, March 19, 2008.

³⁷⁴ Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 39th Parl., 2nd sess., vol. 142, no. 053 (2007-2008): 3213.

Kosovo's declaration is all the more surprising when one considers that the government had been confronted with the issue of Kosovo's political status since Mulroney was in power.

It was not until a full month later, on 18 March, 2008, that Canada finally recognized Kosovo's independence. The government was still careful to repeatedly explain the uniqueness of Kosovo's situation. Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier emphatically stated, "So for us it's a unique case and as a declaration issues by Kosovo's parliament also makes clear, and this is what's important for us, the unique circumstances which have led to Kosovo's independence mean it does not constitute any kind of precedent."³⁷⁵ In 2008, Daniel Turp, who had pushed the Liberals on the political status of Kosovo in 1999, and continuously made comparisons to Quebec, had moved to provincial politics and was now the Parti Québécois' international relations critic. In response to Canada's recognition of Kosovo's independence, he stated, "Canada is recognizing a country, a new country, although the country it was part of disagreed. That is something that is new. We're happy that that has happened."³⁷⁶ Neither the statement of Daniel Turp nor that of Maxime Bernier mentions Quebec separatism directly. However, one can easily infer they are alluding to Quebec. Serbia's Ambassador to Canada, Dušan T. Bataković, did not "beat around the fleur-de-lis" in the same way. After Serbia withdrew Bataković from Canada in an act of diplomatic outrage, he directly invoked the status of Quebec within Canada when he asked, "Can you imagine, for instance, if the Quebec parliament declared its unilateral independence the same way the Kosovo parliament did? Would they recognize, in Ottawa, Quebec as an independent country or not?"³⁷⁷

³⁷⁵ "Canada recognizes Kosovo, Serbia pulls ambassador," CBC News, March 18 2008. Retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-recognizes-kosovo-serbia-pulls-ambassador-1.745469>

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

Why did Canada's foreign policy diverge from that of its major allies when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on 17 February, 2008? An analysis of the primary sources reveals that the government of Canada's fear over the political status of Kosovo, and its potential independence, was caused by the frequent comparisons between Kosovo's struggle for independence and that of Quebec's struggle for sovereignty; that is, Canada's own national unity issue. These comparisons were used by the Serbian-Canadian diaspora to try to influence Canadian foreign policy every step of the way. Canada's own domestic national unity issue and diaspora pressures were a continual influence on Canadian foreign policy towards Kosovo. Consequently, Canada delayed taking a stance on Kosovo's political status. However, they could not delay forever.

Officially, Canada's interests in developing its foreign policy towards Kosovo were humanitarian and regional stability considerations. These were shared with rest of its NATO allies. As such, on the surface, it would seem that Canada and its NATO allies had similar concerns during the decision-making process around Kosovo. Digging deeper, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada did, in fact, have a set of additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, namely national unity and diaspora discontent. This analysis, in turn, amply illustrates how interconnected domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy are. During the Kosovo War, Canada had to balance the interconnected domestic pressures of diaspora relations and national unity with their humanitarian concerns. Understanding Canada's unique internal pressures, makes their international actions all the more impressive.

Works Cited

- Author interview with Dr. Robert C. Austin, September 9, 2020.
- Author interview with Lloyd Axworthy, August 7, 2020.
- Author interview with Bill Graham, August 25, 2020.
- Austin, Robert. *Albania and Kosovo: Canada's Interests and Policy Options*. Toronto: Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 1998. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Website: <http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b3761964/2?r=0&s=1>
- Austin, Robert. *Albania and Kosovo: Roots of Instability*. Toronto: Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 1998. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Website: <http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b4114784/1?r=0&s=1>
- Austin, Robert. *Making and Remaking the Balkans: Nations and States since 1878*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019.
- Axworthy, Lloyd. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*. Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2003.
- Bacevich, A. J., and Andrew J. Cohen. *War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Balthazar, Louis. "Can Canada be a Role Model for a Changing Europe?" *International Perspectives* 19, no. 4 (1990): 48. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Digital Library: http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1557737E_026/9?r=0&s=3
- Baron, Sam. "Siding with Kosovars Sets Very Dangerous Precedent: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*. April 5, 1999.
- Bartleman, James. *Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994-1998*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011.
- Bartleman, James. *Seasons of Hope: Memoirs of Ontario's First Aboriginal Lieutenant Governor*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016.
- Bashow, Lt-Col. David L. et al. "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2001): 55-61.
- Benic, Tanya. "The Mail: Responses to War is Hell." *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999, 4.
- Bergen, Robert. *Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship during the Kosovo War*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019.

- Boyle, Theresa and Phinjo Gombu. "Albanians demonstrate to say thanks to Canada; 300 Albanians hold their first demonstration at Queen's Park." *Toronto Star*, April 4, 1999.
- Boyer, Alain. "Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign." *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 3 (2002): 37–44.
- Brazao, Dale. "Hatred for the West festers in tiny Macedonian village; Visitors greeted with suspicion, interrogated about ethnicity." *Toronto Star*, April 14, 1999.
- "Canada recognizes Kosovo, Serbia pulls ambassador." *CBC News*, last modified March 18, 2008. Retrieved from: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-recognizes-kosovo-serbia-pulls-ambassador-1.745469>
- Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 34th Parl., 3rd sess.
- Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 33rd Parl., 2nd sess.
- Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 36th Parl., 1st sess.
- Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates, 39th Parl., 2nd sess.
- Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Memorandum "Balkans Roundtable," (April 24, 1998). Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Digital Library: <http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b4114942/7?r=0&s=1>
- Carment, David and David Bercuson. *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008.
- Chapnick, Adam. *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019.
- Chapnick, Adam, and Christopher John Kukucha. *The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada's Global Posture*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016.
- Hooker, Charles. "The Mail: Responses to War is Hell." *Macleans* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999.
- Chomsky, Noam. *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999.
- Chrétien, Jean. *My Years as Prime Minister*. Toronto: Knopf, 2007.
- Cohen, Lenard J. "Living an Illusion: Political Transition in Kosovo." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 41–48.
- Delaney, Doug. "CIMIC Operations During Operations 'KINETIC'." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 4 (2000): 29–34.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Resolution Following Public Hearings On Canada's Role in the Kosovo Conflict*. 39th Parl., 2nd sess., Rept. 8., 2000. Retrieved from the Parliament of Canada Website:

<https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/36-2/FAIT/report-8/page-2>

English, John. "The Tragedies of Canadian International History: A Comment," *The Canadian Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (2015): 567–575.

Enright, Michael. "Sleeping with a very cranky elephant: The history of Canada-U.S. tensions," *CBC The Sunday Magazine*, June 15, 2018. <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/sunday/the-sunday-edition-june-17-2018-1.4692469/sleeping-with-a-very-cranky-elephant-the-history-of-canada-u-s-tensions-1.4699017>

External Affairs and International Trade Canada, News Release, "Canada Issues First Report to The United Nations on Violations of International Law in the Former Yugoslavia," (March 9, 1996), 3. Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada Digital Library:

http://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.sas_19930309EP/1?r=0&s=1

Fennel, Tom. "Knocking on the Door: Ottawa opposes citizenship for a Milosevic crony." *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999.

Fennel, Tom. "United in Rage." *Maclean's* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999.

Fine, Sean. "Neither time nor distance heals ancient hatred." *Toronto Star*, April 1, 1999.

Fitzpatrick, Maegan. "Justin Trudeau tells White House state dinner Canada and U.S. 'closer than friends'." *CBC News Online*, March 10, 2016. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-tells-white-house-state-dinner-canada-and-u-s-closer-than-friends-1.3483695>

Fromkin, David. *Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields*. New York: Free Press, 1999

Gagnon, Lysiane. "Quebec's eyes light up at republics' rush to independence." *Globe and Mail*, August 31, 1991.

Gee, Marcus. "Kosovo and the Americans." *Globe and Mail*, April 1, 1991.

Gillespie, Kerry. "Albanian community says 'it's about time'; But many worried about safety of relatives." *Toronto Star*, March 26 1999.

Gillespie, Kerry. "Local Protest Turns Violent ; Demonstrators Throw Rocks, Eggs, Burn Flags in Front of U.S. Consulate Demonstrators Vow to Return Every Day Until NATO Ceases Its Air Strikes: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*, March 25, 1999.

- Goldenberg, Eddie. *The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2007.
- Graham, Bill. *The Call of the World: A Political Memoir*. Vancouver: On Point Press, 2016.
- Grise, Gordon. "Comparison Doesn't Hold: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*, Apr 16, 1999.
- Hall, J.W. "The Mail: Canada and NATO." *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999
- Hebert, Chantal. "Could Quebec ever follow the example of Kosovo?" *Toronto Star*. March 31, 1999.
- Henault, Louis. "The Kosovo Crisis: Toward a New Conception of Aerial War Fare." *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 2 (2010): 61–64.
- Heinbecker, Paul. *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Handbook for Canada*. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010.
- Ho, Tanya. "Brother killed by Serbs, Ontario man says; 'They shot them, and left them to die by the wall'." *Toronto Star*, March 31 1999.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. Toronto: Viking, 2000.
- "The internet weapon." *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999.
- Jay, Matthew. "Canada recognizes independent Kosovo." *National Post*, March 19, 2008.
- Judah, Tim. *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Kasap, Safa O. "The Mail: Canada and NATO." *Maclean's* 112, no. 18, May 3, 1999
- Lam, Lawrence. *A report on the settlement experiences of Kosovar refugees in Ontario*. Toronto: York University, 2011.
- Lambert, Sarah. "Canadian Serbs outraged, Albanians relieved [NATO air strikes]." *Canadian Press News Wire*, March 24 1999.
- Legault, Albert. "NATO Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Context." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 63–66.
- Lowther, William. "GOING TO WAR: Canada joins NATO's high-stakes battle for Kosovo." *Maclean's* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999.
- Maclean's* 112, no. 14, April 5, 1999.
- Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999.

- Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Maloney, Sean M. *Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo*. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, An Imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2018.
- Manulak, Michael W. *Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention*. Kingston: Queens University Press, 2011. Retrieved from: <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.cidpwww/files/files/publications/Martellos/Martello36.pdf>
- Manulak, Michael W. "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: Looking back, 20 years on." OpenCanada. Centre for International Governance Innovation, Last modified June 6, 2019. Accessed October 3, 2019. <https://www.opencanada.org/features/canada-and-kosovo-crisis-looking-back-20-years/>
- Manulak, Michael W. "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A 'Golden Moment' in Canadian Foreign Policy?" *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009): 565–81.
- Manulak, Michael W. "Forceful persuasion or half-hearted diplomacy?: Lessons from the Kosovo crisis," *International Journal* 66, no 2 (2011): 351-369.
- Maisonneuve, J.R. Michel. "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 49–54.
- Markovic, Milan. "What the Kosovo ruling means for Canada: trouble." *The Globe and Mail*, July 31, 2010.
- Martin, Pierre, and Michel Fortmann. "Public Opinion: Obstacle, Partner or Scapegoat?" *Policy Options* 22, no. 1 (2001): 71.
- Masic, Mariana. "Letter Of The Week: How Will Bombing Innocents Remove Slobodan Milosevic?: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*, April 3, 1999.
- Meren, David. "The Tragedies of Canadian International History." *The Canadian Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (2015): 534–66.
- Mulroney, Brian. *Memoirs: 1939–1993*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007.
- Murdoch, Danielle. "Corrections Reform in Kosovo: A Qualitative Study of Canadian Corrections Advisers' Experiences in a Post-Conflict Environment." *International Peacekeeping* 22, no. 3 (2015): 248-72.
- Naumann, Klaus. "The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Military Force." *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 1 (2004): 21–30.

- Newman, Peter C. "Horrible reminders of my days as a refugee." *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999.
- Newton, Paul. "Serb protests against Canada ring hollow." *Toronto Star*, April 3, 1999.
- Nossal, Kim Richard and Stephane Roussel. "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower" in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Pitzul, Jerry et al. "The Responsibility to Protect: A Military Legal Comment." *Canadian Military Journal*, 5, no. 4 (2005): 31–38.
- Phillips, Andrew. "Human Outrage." *Maclean's* 112, no. 15, April 12, 1999
- Phillips, David L. *Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U. S. Intervention*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012.
- Phillips, Kate. "In response to Tanja Benic." *Maclean's* 112, no. 17, April 26, 1999.
- Quinn, Jennifer. "Local Serbs pray for their families; 'I'm crying for my people,' tearful woman says." *Toronto Star*, March 29, 1999.
- Quinn, Jennifer. "Hands off Serbia, Toronto protesters tell U.S." *Toronto Star*, March 1, 1999.
- Ragaru, Nadège and Amilda Dymi. "The Albanian-American Community in the United States." *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 31, no. 2 (2004), p. 1-45.
- "Resolution 1199," United Nations Security Council, 23 September 1998.
- "Resolution 1244," United Nations Security Council, June 10, 1999.
- Rhodes, Maurice A. "The Mail: History Lessons" *Maclean's* 112, no. 17, April 26, 1999, 4.
- "RICK MADONIK / TORONTO STAR / ANTI-U: 1 Edition." *Toronto Star*. March 1, 1999.
- Siddiqui, Haroon. "Kosovo's Canadian connections." *Toronto Star*. June 18, 1998.
- Simpson, Jeffrey. "If Canada followed the Communists, things might not stop at Quebec." *The Globe and Mail*, September 10, 1991.
- Statistics Canada. *1996 Census of Population – Ethnic Origin and Population Group*. Statistics Canada, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 93F0026XDB96001.
- Statistics Canada. *2006 Census of Population – Ethnic Origin and Visible Minorities*. Statistics Canada, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 94-580-XCB2006001.

- Statistics Canada, "Immigration and ethnocultural diversity: Key results from the 2016 Census", December 25, 2017.
- Stevenson, Mark. "A west-end Toronto apartment where nine Albanian..." *CanWest News*, March 26, 1999.
- Sullivan, Stacy. *Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the U.S. into the Kosovo War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004.
- The Lord Robertson. "NATO Operations in the Balkans." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 5–10.
- Todd, Paula. "Studio 2" Show 1113, March 29, 1999. Accessed directly through TVO Ontario through media footage archival request. Public access is restricted by third party footage and The Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists rights.
- United States Census Bureau. Census 2000 Brief – Ancestry.
<https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2000/briefs/c2kbr-35.pdf>
- Ward, Michael et al. "Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment." *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 67–74.
- "What are Serb Canadians Defending?" *Toronto Star*, Apr 01, 1999.
- Wilson-Smith, Anthony. "Why Canadian eyes matter," *Maclean's* 112, no. 16, April 19, 1999.