Centenary Republic Day in Istanbul:

Eventification of Urban Public Space during a National Day of Celebration

by

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Author's Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

Centenaries represent a significant milestone for nation-states as politically valuable occasions that permeate across public sphere(s), public realm(s), and public space(s). This dissertation examines the centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023 by investigating (1) the competing political visions about the state and the society; (2) the centenary's representation in the mediascape; and (3) public space animation projects in Istanbul by two public institutions aligned with different political factions: the President's Office and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Using critical event studies and public value theory, this study first focuses on the discursive influences on the construction of the nation, the centenary Republic Day, and the publics at centenary-related events. To this end, it adopts a discourse-analytic approach using speeches from the leaders of main political factions in Turkey during the 2023 election period, and a frame analysis on writings about the centenary published in national newspapers by different media factions. It then examines how public space animation projects of the two public institutions materialized by focusing on the publicness of three animated urban spaces. Through a qualitative analysis of primary visual data, a descriptive account of the parameters of access, security, and design as they are conceived by public institutions and experienced by individuals is provided. While the centenary was commonly positioned as a nation-unifying phenomenon, this study demonstrates that the pre-existing and continuously evolving polarizing mechanisms in politics, media, and society were integral in the construction of the nation and the publics at the events. As such, public space animation projects took significantly different forms. The presidential project, on the one hand, was a spectacle of hard power that deployed recent achievements for passive consumption. On the other hand, the municipal project was a

partially interactive celebratory event that positioned the centenary in its historical context. Furthermore, the presidential spectacle aimed to use existing urban amenities without any specific boundaries demarcating the public gathering from the everyday life of the city whereas the municipal event was mostly isolated from its surrounding areas with self-sustaining amenities. The municipal event offered higher flexibility to urban inhabitants' interactions with the space although the space was less public on a conceived level in terms of its formal features like access and securitization. While publicness is often interpreted through physical spatial features, the experiences on the centenary underscore the decisive influence of symbolic and social features on perceived publicness.

Keywords: public space animation; leisure-in-public; critical event studies; social infrastructure; national day; Turkey

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List of Abbreviations

AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party)
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CES	Critical Event Studies
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party)
HDP	*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (Publics' Democratic Party)
IBB	*İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi* (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality)
MHP	*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Movement Party)
NPM	New Public Management
PA	Public Administration
PDC	Presidential Directorate of Communications
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PVM	Public Value Management
TPA	Traditional Public Administration

Statement of Positionality

Working on hundredth national day celebrations in Turkey in my doctoral dissertation stemmed from a combination of factors: first, I wanted a research project about my hometown Istanbul whose complex, ever-evolving nature meant it will be perpetually understudied. Second, timewise, it coincided with the time I started working on planning my dissertation. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it was a one-of-a-kind event—with no possibility of reoccurrence, no flexibilities to redo, and (almost) no chances of being cancelled—that found its presence from official politics to daily chit-chat, firmly established at the intersection of politics, urban public space, and society—each in their broadest possible conceptualizations.

Turkey has a relatively tense socio-political structure which resonates in all aspects of urban life, particularly in spatial politics that lay bare the polarizing tendencies in the society. After experiencing a very long time-period under the same political leadership, to those who are insiders to Turkey's context like me, the conflicts and tensions that draw people to far ends of polarization spectra do not need much explanation. In this state of polarization, how an event like the centenary national day—one that purportedly belongs to "the nation"—is constructed and contested in the public sphere has the potential to reveal its connotative elements and alternative associations with its symbolisms. The centenary (and, more broadly, the national day) involves innumerable associations for different people as a reflection of their own subjectivities—political and otherwise. While I consider myself to predominantly to lean toward the political oppositions in Turkey—not all of which are included in this dissertation—urban life is forged at the intersection of diverse political influences and their subjective perceptions—not necessarily predictable or controllable. This viewpoint undergirds this research project.

As I contemplated the various steps of this project, I came to a few realizations about my relationship to the topic and the context I chose to study, i.e., my relationship with the national day and politics of Turkey. While I do not consider myself a politically active citizen, all aspects of what I perceive as a social reality in Turkey are self-evidently forged dialectically through its political framework, including decisions made at different administrative levels as well as the tensions among them. I should acknowledge that one of the main challenges I faced during this time was to achieve a partial compartmentalization of the research focus in a political atmosphere that I found to become increasingly volatile and unpredictable—even more so than when I first embarked on this research project. While some statements in this dissertation will reflect these perceptions, I aimed to maintain a safe distance to differential viewpoints as they manifested in public sphere and public realms and to ensure their representation in this dissertation to mitigate such subjectivities that may result in a biased interpretation. This process has equipped me with a broader understanding of political realities in Turkey—and potentially other contexts undergoing similar political transformations—and their strategizing forces, which, in the case of this research, was about how urban inhabitants were positioned and influenced in terms of the centenary and its celebrations. What follows shaped under these influences.

Chapter 1

Introduction

National days of celebration evoke certain iconic images. Conventionally, they tend to showcase the increased presence of the national flag, the military, public addresses by political leaders, and fireworks. National days commemorate, and mostly celebrate, historical achievements, like the signing of the Declaration of Independence in the USA or the reunification of East and West Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With few exceptions, almost all nation-states mark such designated days.

On the one hand, national days reveal how societies construct and reinforce their collective identities and shared histories; on the other, they are venues in which social and political tensions come to the fore and are negotiated through symbolic practices in an exceptionally emotional setting. Studying how national days materialize, therefore, has the potential to identify socio-cultural differences and tensions within a society—including some that may not be always apparent but are amplified in the interplay of symbolisms surrounding national days—and guide policymakers and decision-makers on how to navigate them.

National days can be viewed as political instruments that support and facilitate "nation-building" (Woods & Tsang, 2014, p. 385). Accordingly, they are invented days designed deliberately to reproduce the nation and link generations on the basis of membership in an imagined community (Anderson, 1983). How national days are perceived and experienced by members of a nation-state varies significantly; while some people are enthusiastic and engaged, others may remain indifferent (Fox, 2014; Skey, 2008). The way these days are lived and remembered by the citizenry is ultimately forged in the dialectical relationship between the political leadership and the nation-state it governs and the nation it claims to represent (Smith,

2014). Therefore, national days are imbued with symbolic significance when political power is consolidated and/or contested (Collins, 2014; Northcutt, 1991). On these days, the nation is offered for symbolic (and also commonly material) consumption (e.g., Klein, 1977) and the vision for its future is articulated and conveyed by the political elite to the public(s) (e.g., Madiema, 2005).

In the context of event studies, national days are viewed as heritage commemoration wherein "programmes … include something symbolic and interpretive" (Getz, 2007, p. 34). As Getz (2007) recognized, heritage is "politically charged" and materializes through value orientations; therefore, it becomes a tool to bind certain groups by excluding others (Smith, 2006). Accordingly, national days as part of national heritage become objects of interest as instruments to achieve preconceived ends. National days as politically peculiar events (see Spracklen & Lamond, 2016) are rarely (just) about their economies. They too are prone to certain forms of commodification inward (i.e., toward the citizenry)—e.g., through memorabilia (for an early example, see Klein, 1977) and televised content (and, hence, advertising)—and outward (e.g., tourism)—e.g., through event tourism like King's Day, the "one party you don't want to miss if you're in the Netherlands" (holland.com, 2023, par. 1).

However, the social and cultural perceptions surrounding national days remain important determinants of the extent to which they become commodified, therein representing the friction between the structural forces and the social experiences of the individuals. Social pathologies or conflicts arise with the colonization of the lifeworld by the capitalist system and commodity thinking (Habermas, 1984, 1987). The state has an important function in influencing the public(s) it governs through what Foucault (2009) described as governmentality, the "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the

exercise of … power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.". These processes have implications for the social production of space, which is embedded in Lefebvre's (1991) spatial dialectic: the space is produced in the tension between how it is conceived (by those with political power on the physical, abstract space), perceived (in its physical form in the absence of social factors), and lived (and experienced by the individuals and social groups that inhabit it). These social theories that emanated from different schools of thought and disciplinary traditions form the foundation of the emerging field of critical event studies (CES) (Spracklen & Lamond, 2016), which are particularly relevant to national days at the intersection of political, economic, and social-cultural world (more on these social theories in the literature review that follows).

Elements that collectively constitute national day celebrations are rarely uniform—instead, commonly, a diverse portfolio of events is offered to public(s). This variability allows the citizenry (individually or as part of larger social groups) to engage with the national day in profoundly different ways, ranging from indifference and passive engagement (e.g., through televised events and spectacles) to participation in celebrations and organizing one's own events (Fox, 2014; Skey, 2008). The wide-ranging collection of events has the aim of engaging a large number of people in diverse ways through the symbolisms and values. With these events, national days aim for collective effervescence (Collins, 2004, 2014), whereby "the assembled … is translated outwardly by exuberant emotions that are not easily subordinated to ends that are defined too strictly" (Durkheim, 1995).

National days, broadly conceptualized, (re)produce the socially constructed nation (Dar, 2022; Fox, 2006). For Simon (2009), they are "site[s] of political communication, a moment where 'the nation' is debated" (p. 152). In this debate—not a one-time occurrence but a

continuous process—elements of national identity are negotiated, consolidated and/or contested in the public sphere. Habermas (1996) "described [public sphere] as a network of communicating information and points of view [in which] the streams of [noninstitutionalized] communication are … filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified *public* opinions" (p. 360, italics in original). But evidently, political, economic, and social power structures have a significant role in the scale and scope of this process, including which social groups can become a part of it.

The dialectical relationship between political leadership and the citizenry in the context of national days almost always has the potential to illuminate the differences between them (Smith, 2014). In particular, the politically constructed "nation"—or the one that is found in the state sphere (e.g., Hazama, 2014)—is not always reflective of the diverse publics that collectively constitute it. The social conflicts that may arise in this process are not purely political; instead, they can be viewed as part of the process in which different ethical communities (i.e., those communities with different definitions of a good life [Forst, 2002]) negotiate their value orientations. This perspective is part of the aforementioned debate on the nation amplified on such days (Simon, 2009).

Because of their inherent plurality, nations (and nation-states) can, in fact, be viewed as social entities organized at a high level of collectiveness—ones that ideally incorporate all publics present within. In this view, the debate among publics in their pursuit to reach this higher level occurs through their understanding of (or consensus on) their collective value orientations (Meynhardt, 2021; Moore, 2014) in the public sphere (also see Habermas, 1996) under the influence of structural (i.e., political, economic, cultural, and social) and institutional forces (Moulton, 2009). Therefore, how publics become part of this process—or how they are created

(Benington, 2009)—is essential in contextualizing the social impact they may generate. Studying national days through a public value lens—which originated as a new perspective to guide public administration (PA) and builds on the (potential) interconnections between public sector organizations and the public(s) they serve (Moore, 1995)—has the potential to reconcile imagined politics and experienced realities concerning a collective social entity that is "the nation."

Through different affective and cognitive mechanisms, national days activate a considerable number of people in various ways. The interplay of political and social mechanisms surrounding them has received considerable scholarly interest in the context of numerous nation-states (e.g., Madiema, 2005; McCrone & McPherson, 2009; Tsang & Woods, 2013). National days not only commemorate and reproduce a historical "event as rupture in the normal run of things" (Žižek, 2014, p. 38, italics removed), but they also become events in their own right as ruptures in contemporary public life. In other words, they reproduce the historical event through "complex and interconnected managed discourses, curated histories, and choreographed narratives" (Spracklen & Lamond, 2016, p. 155). Thus, national days discursively construct "the nation" as a (collection of) public(s). Part of this "public" mobilizes (or is mobilized) as part of the celebrations in the public realm—"associated with symbolic communication and spatial practices … [and] as a site of collectivization through the uses and activities in an urban area" (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021, p. 15)—but this process cannot be thought of separately from the preceding and ongoing debate on the nation (Simon, 2009).

One aspect of this mobilization occurs through public space animation projects—"the deliberate, usually temporary employment of festivals, events, programmed activities, or pop-up leisure to transform, enliven, and/ or alter public spaces and stage urban life" (Glover, 2015, p.

96). Public spaces are where public realm materializes (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021) and are, theoretically, physical spaces open to use by all without restrictions—which almost never is the case (Johnson & Glover, 2013; Németh & Schmidt, 2007; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010). Numerous animation projects (see Glover, 2020) are commonly employed in urban public spaces on national days, but typically large-scale events with mass participation are the hallmarks of celebrations which hold great significance for the political power structures.

National days depend on public visibility and participation. The lived experiences of individuals when participating in this event materializes partly through "leisure-in-public," those "activities that take place outside of the home in the view of others for eudaimonic (i.e., personal enrichment) and/or hedonic (i.e., pleasure) purposes" (Glover, 2022, p. 158). Leisure-in-public surrounding national days, if one were to follow Lefebvre (1991), is carefully curated in the conceived space but is shaped in the lived space. In this context, the event is one of the connectors between the instrumentally acting political sphere and the non-institutionalized public sphere in the physical space—affecting all in perpetuity. The non-responsiveness of political institutions forging national days (as one indicator of their institutional rigidity) to changing societal expectations may therefore lead some publics' disengagement and alienation—aggravating existing social pathologies or creating new ones.

National days are unique—both to their respective nations and in their own respect. They build on past experiences as regular, periodic events in terms of the public space animation strategies employed. How these strategies evolve over time has the potential to illuminate the broader political and sociological changes present in what is construed as the nation and how the nation perceives itself. Also, at the same time, every animation project (more broadly conceptualized, every event) constructs a unique public—which is then subsumed into the

reproduction of the national day. This process is shaped by two entangled discursive mechanisms through which public(s) are constructed: (1) the discourse on the National Day (and, by implication, on the nation and the centenary) and (2) the discourse on particular events. These twin mechanisms constitute the focus of this research project.

This research concentrates on Turkey's centenary "Republic Day," celebrating the founding of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923. As is the case with most countries, Turkey marks Republic Day as a statutory holiday which includes, but is not limited to, various events organized in public spaces across the country. Research on national days in Turkey is traditionally historiographic with a particular attention on the early years of the republic (most notably the tenth anniversary) and the initial nation-building process of the era (e.g., Bolat, 2007; Öztürkmen, 2001; Roy, 2006). As Öztürkmen (2001) notes, the way national day celebrations were formalized over time has led to a waning public interest in them, which was partially revitalized in 1990s. This revitalization can be partially attributed to the conflict in the value orientations between publics that lean politically towards republican (i.e., westward-looking, secular, modernist) or conservative (i.e., Neo-Ottoman, religion-oriented).

National day celebrations in this time period have received limited scholarly attention with Çelikçi's (2013) investigation that interprets 75th Republic Day celebrations as a political statement of the republican regime vis-à-vis the growing power of political Islam being a rare exception. The shifting political power dynamics in this period continued in which the growing influence of conservatism has steadily increased in the following decades that gradually became a more authoritarian political regime that attaches considerable importance to religious values (Arat & Pamuk, 2019) with more than two decades of uninterrupted political power that continued into the centenary. While this recent political era, especially the socio-cultural and

economic transformation it facilitated, has been fruitful for social researchers, how it resonates in urban public life remains underexamined. Moreover, the vision articulation—which also includes the political conception of social organization—that becomes visible on national days touches many different aspects of everyday life, but they are most commonly investigated in their historical context.

The idea of the "new century" of Turkey had been omnipresent in the political rhetoric, and by implication in the public sphere, for well over a decade preceding the centenary in 2023. In Istanbul, the centenary took place in a bipartite political power structure in which the president and central government and the administration of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (*Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi*, IBB) aligned with different political factions after a long period of political alignment (as was also the case for numerous cities in Turkey). Istanbul played host to centenary public celebrations of both institutions which fostered mass participation. The presidential events included exhibition spaces in two major public squares, and a naval parade and drone show on the Bosporus and aerial acrobatics in various parts of Istanbul whereas IBB organized a two-day event at on open-air concourse with featured entertainment with a 4.5-hour-long main show on the evening of national day. The concomitant centenary celebrations organized by these institutions offer a unique setting to investigate how different political views and power structures materialized in public spaces of Istanbul.

The purpose of this mixed-method case study is to investigate the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and to examine how public(s) were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul. To this end, this research focuses on the how the centenary is constructed by the political leadership and in the media to identify the common elements as well as conflicts and tensions as they relate to

the relationship between state and society and its implications for centenary. It then focuses on how the main celebratory endeavours organized by public institutions utilized public spaces in which it uses the publicness framework (Németh & Schmidt, 2007; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010) as it manifested in the conceived and lived space (Lefebvre, 1991). In this context, the research questions for this study are as follows:

(1) Which public value orientations did the political leadership(s) address and employ in influencing the construction of the public(s) for the hallmark event of the national day celebrations in Istanbul?; and

(2) How did the hallmark events of the national day celebrations in Istanbul materialize in their respective public space(s)?

To address these questions, this research will primarily use critical discourse analysis (CDA) that incorporates the "more abstract, more structural, level" of social realities and how this reality is represented by different actors in different discourses (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). The interrelations between texts (i.e., intertextuality) and between texts in different discourses (i.e., interdiscursivity) allow one to identify semiotic components of a communicating text and to gain a deeper understanding into what is said (or, crucially, not said) and how it is linguistically represented. This process can be used to build a bridge between the discourse(s), social realities, and social theories (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999) and address the power dynamics and ideologies present within a society that do not influence all social groups to the same extent (van Dijk, 1997a, 2001).

In line with the political and institutional focus of this research, in two interconnected steps, first, an analysis of the relationship between the state and the society at the centenary as articulated by the main political factions in Turkey is conducted. The corpus of texts in this stage

consists of the speeches delivered by the president as the leader of the government and the leader of the main opposition during the 2023 general and presidential election period that ended approximately five months before the centenary. In the second step, news stories in the media about the centenary and related events—including the hallmark celebration event(s) in Istanbul—are analysed. Using the coverage over a two-week period in eight purposefully selected national newspapers representing different political views (İşeri et al., 2019; Panayırcı et al., 2016), a frame analysis is conducted to determine how the centenary and associated events were represented in the media (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). In the third stage of the research, collected visual data of the animated public spaces (Glover, 2020) was qualitatively analysed to determine the changes and programming implemented in these spaces and how urban inhabitants interacted with and in them under the guiding framework of publicness of spaces (Németh & Schmidt, 2007; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010).

This dissertation is structured as follows: the second chapter provides an outline of the social theories that constitute the foundation for CES and this research project. The third chapter is the literature review on public value theory and PA paradigm, public life in public spaces, and national days, followed by the introduction of the conceptual model. The fifth chapter provides an outline of Republic Day and the context of the centenary in Turkey. The sixth chapter describes the methodology employed followed by the findings of the study as it relates to the relationship between the centenary and the politics, its representation in the mediascape, and how it materialized through public space animation projects in Istanbul. The eighth chapter discusses the findings as it relates to the centenary in the public sphere and the investigated public space animation projects in Istanbul. The final chapter introduces the contributions to the literature, practical implications, limitations and future research directions emanating from this study.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Foundations

In this chapter, five social theories that form the basis of critical event studies (CES) are briefly introduced. It starts with the concept of public sphere and public opinion formation process, and then takes a closer look at the concept of urban public realm and the performative behaviour within. Subsequently, Lefebvre's (1991) social production of space is introduced with particular attention on public space and the concept of governmentality and its role in the reproduction of social and political power structures. The final section in this chapter is the synthesis of these social theories.

2.1 Public Sphere and Public Opinion Formation

Events such as National Days happen within the public sphere. The concept of public sphere is most commonly associated with the work of Habermas (1989) who described it as being "made up of private people … articulating the needs of society with the state" (p. 176) under the principles of "unrestricted inclusion and equality" connected by a common language (Habermas, 1996, p. 374). As early critics of the Habermasian public sphere rightly pointed out, however, there are multiple different publics constructed through various characteristics of their members despite being part of the same linguistic community (Fraser, 1992; Negt & Kluge, 1993), and these publics have co-terminous opinion formation processes.

Habermas (1996) distinguished among three levels of public sphere: (1) "*episodic* publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets"; (2) "*occasional* or 'arranged' publics of particular presentations and events"; and (3) "the *abstract* public sphere of isolated [individuals] scattered across large geographic areas … brought together only through the mass media" (p. 374, italics in original). These levels are not independent of one another; rather, public spheres

operating at a higher level of abstraction provide the context for the smaller public spheres. The linkage between civil society (i.e., represented in these public spheres) and the political actors are, to a large extent, depend on "media strategies … [that] raise the discursive level of public communication" (Habermas, 1996, p. 380).

Habermas positioned communication between social entities at the centre of his work through which capitalist instrumental rationality is critiqued and an alternative scenario that builds on communicative interactions is imagined. In this view, public sphere ideally functions through communicative rationality which strives to achieve a mutual understanding and consensus in linguistically mediated interactions among individuals in an inclusive, coercion-free setting (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Central to Habermas' early work is that the boundaries between public and private spheres began to dissipate with the development of industrial capitalism after which private interests started to have increased influence over public sphere and the division between the state and the society disappeared (Habermas, 1989). In this process, the public sphere's opinion-forming function was devalued, further debilitating publics' role in informing and guiding state policy. Capitalist economic structure (monetarization) and the state administration (bureaucratization) led toward "a colonization of the lifeworld by system imperatives that drive moral-practical elements out of private and political-public spheres of life" (Habermas, 1987, p. 325).

While the role of public sphere as the facilitator of public opinion formation is a crucial element for theories of democracy, its assumption of equal, inclusive, unrestricted, and coercion-free deliberation to reach a consensus is also criticized for the difficulties in implementing them to practice. This limitation is particularly relevant when one considers the ethical and political-ideological differences that characterize pluralist modern societies in which some scholars argue

that “any form of consensus is the result of a hegemonic articulation” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xviii). In this view, the particularities of social groups are inseparable from their political subjectivity and this entanglement renders full rationality a practical impossibility. Part of this pluralism is visible in the form of numerous ethical communities (i.e., consisting of those individuals with a common understanding on what constitutes a good life) that are (partially or fully) part of a moral community (“as moral persons with right to moral respect” [p. 5]), legal community (i.e., as subjects of the law), and a political community (i.e., as authors of the law in a democratic setting) (Forst, 2002).

Although national days are shaped in the abstract public sphere of “the nation,” they also concern the lower-level public spheres through two mechanisms. First, each component of national days (e.g., events) self-evidently creates a unique occasional (and, presumably, episodic) public sphere. Second, national days are interpreted and experienced differently by the numerous publics that make up the society, which, does not necessarily correspond with the public of the nation due to its pluralist structure. These dual mechanisms in which public spheres emerge have a formative function in both how national days are conceptualized by the various publics and how they materialize.

2.2 Public Realm and Life in Public

Events associated with National Days also happen within the public realm. Public sphere and public realm are two concepts that often appear side by side, and are sometimes even used interchangeably with one another (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021). Notwithstanding their interrelations, they both have distinct connotations and denotations as they emerged from different disciplinary traditions. Different from the public sphere as a host of communicative interactions (Habermas, 1989), public realm is associated with “with symbolic communication

and spatial practices, and thus with the sociology of publics … where real political action takes place" (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021, p. 15). One important perspective on public realm is public behaviour that has followed the works of Simmel (1950) and further developed by sociologists and urban scholars such as Goffman (1956, 1963) and Sennett (1970, 1977). In this view, public realm is often described as a site of difference.

As opposed to consensus-oriented public sphere where differences persist but lose their relevance for communicatively interacting subjects, this school of thought points toward the theatricality of public behaviour and self-dramatization (what Habermas [1984] placed under the term dramaturgical action) as the mechanisms with which individuals navigate difference (Goffman, 1956). Diverging from the public sphere as it is situated in public life, Sennett (2011) put the emphasis on "how [the] impersonal realm of the public can be conceived in collective terms rather than in terms of issues of rationality" (p. 397). Therefore, the material conditions of how different people come to together can be viewed as an influential factor in shaping the totality of (verbal and non-verbal) communications among people in the public realm. The theatricality of behaviour thus influences the actual (i.e., not ideal) public sphere by potentially distorting the communicative rationality within.

National days are forged to facilitate and encourage public participation. Expectedly, because of the inherently subjective evaluation of national days by individuals, the modes of participation vary (Fox, 2014). However, the scale of assembly in public realm on national days is important from a political standpoint as these gatherings provide an insight into the relationship political leadership (and the state) has cultivated with the society (and the nation) (Northcutt, 1991). Therefore, how the public realm is curated through political influence is

essential to understand the context in which urban inhabitants experience their social reality in public spaces.

2.3 (Public) Space

Events such as National Days also occur within public space. Determining what constitutes a public space remains a contested topic, but conceptually, it can be viewed as "a physical manifestation … of the public realm" (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021, p. 15). Looking through a Lefebvrian lens (1991), space is a dialectically constructed concept: how a space is conceived by those with a "legitimate" power over its organization, how the space is perceived by its inhabitants, and how it is used and experienced (i.e., lived) are inseparable from one another in the social production of space. Publicness of spaces is forged in this triad, too, and the political nature of public spaces results in a fierce competition over their control as means of influencing social organization (Harvey, 2005; Zukin, 1998).

Lefebvre (1991) maintained that development of the modern city in the era of industrial capitalism (and onwards) resulted in the homogenization of urban space in which the conceived space as an abstraction of cities from its social features aimed at dominating the lived space of urban inhabitants (also see Gottdiener, 1993; Wilson, 2013). To this domination, Lefebvre (1996) proposed urban inhabitants' right to the city as a potential solution where inhabitants not only have a right to participate in decision-making but also have the right to (re)appropriate urban space (Purcell, 2002) to align with their own vision for the city and the distinctive spaces therein (Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2025). Harvey (2008) interpreted the right to the city as "a right to change ourselves by changing the city" (p. 23). The right to the city represents the mechanisms with which urban inhabitants may resist the homogenizing influence of political and economic authority over social organization. Mitchell (2003) viewed such tensions between the conceived

and the lived space as the "*struggle* ... that truly shapes public space" (p. 233, italics in original). Self-evidently, the power structures in a society have an immense significance for how this struggle unfolds.

The concept of governmentality, as a system-level manifestation of social-political power relations, can be viewed as the mechanism with which governments attempt (or manage) to exert control over the population (Foucault, 2009). This control is realized by a "series of specific governmental apparatuses … [and] a series of knowledges" in the process of "'governmentalization'" (p. 144). How space is administered or conceived can be viewed as part of governmentality whose ultimate aim is for members of the society to internalize policies and preferred practices (Foucault, 1995) so that there is self-correction and self-regulation in the population (Foucault, 2008). Through governmentality, social-political power structures are reproduced (Kerr, 1999). As highlighted by Ettlinger (2011), "[c]alculated courses of action that target the population connect with the mentalities that are produced by the citizenry" (p. 548) is how different forms of power diffuse to the society.

2.4 Synthesis

The social theories that have been briefly introduced in the preceding sections, despite the differences in how they are conceptualized and operationalized, problematize how the process of modernization has impacted societies. The public sphere view represented by Habermas underlines consensus-oriented communication as key for emancipation from instrumental rationality; the public realm view articulated by Sennett advocates for spontaneity and disorder as a potential contributor to collectivization in (instead of rationalization of) the impersonal city; the Lefebvre's spatial perspective points towards urban inhabitants' obligation to react to and resist the homogenization of cities; and the Foucauldian perspective gives us an insight into the

state's significant role over the population and its self-regulation. The common element in these schools of thought is the critique of how the state and economy aims to construct a certain vision of the city—and a certain public in the city—and the potential ways to resist or overcome this tendency.

It is important to remember that each state and each society—and thereby each city—has a unique context in which individuals operate their everyday lives. This research project focuses on this context which is integral to the emerging field of CES that situate events within the broader political, economic, and social structures (Spracklen & Lamond, 2016) instead of purely focusing on their function as commodities that are offered for consumption by capitalist economic actors. Building on these theoretical foundations, this research offers a critical examination of the political context, and public sector organizations in planning and executing events in public spaces on the example of the centenary national day celebrations in Istanbul, Turkey. The literature review that follows focuses on PA paradigms, the relationship between public life and public space, and national days.

Chapter 3

Literature Review

National days are notable occasions for social collectivization as they can be considered relevant to a considerably larger portion of the society composed of multiple publics. The value orientations that facilitates the cohesion of collective social entities (Meynhardt, 2021) can be viewed as a central pillar in how public(s) differentiate themselves and, in turn, reflect on their behavioural patterns, intra- and inter-public interactions, and how they navigate differences in public life (or, crucially, not). National days, which concern multiple publics of "the nation," provide a window of opportunity to investigate this collectivization process. While the collectivization and the negotiations over value orientations occur in the public sphere(s) of the affected public(s), macro-level contextual elements have a guiding power over how this process unfolds. The concept of public value, that has at its core the connection between the government and the governed without universalizing any particular set of value orientations, is a potential framework to guide political authorities and public sector organizations interactions with urban inhabitants, i.e., the actual creators of public life on national days. The next section provides an outline of the public value literature followed by a review of the relationship between public life and public spaces.

3.1 Public Value

The concept of public value emerged in PA literature with Moore's (1995) *Creating Public Value* as a conceptual tool to guide managers of public sector organizations. Subsequent theorizations concerning public value focused on how public values can be determined (Bozeman, 2007; Meynhardt, 2009), but also expanded on the processes that create public value (Benington, 2009) and questioned whether public value creation is also beyond public sector's

purview (e.g., Meynhardt & Bäro, 2019). The first subsection introduces the literature on what public values are, followed by how public value is created by public sector organizations, and public value as a PA paradigm. A synthesis of these viewpoints is provided in the last subsection.

3.1.1 What are public values?

Public values framework aims to understand what different public values are and how they may be assessed. Bozeman (2007) defined "[a] society's *public values* [as] those providing normative consensus about: (1) the *rights, benefits, and prerogatives* to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (2) the *obligations* of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (3) the *principles* on which governments and policies should be based" (p. 17, italics in original). Thus, public values are integral to the relationship among members of a society and the state. Building on the psychological theory of basic needs (Epstein, 2003), Meynhardt (2009) contended that public values emerge in the relationship between individuals and social groups that are perceived as the public. Essentially, public values are individuals' assessment of something particular (e.g., an activity, a space, a policy, law) according to their needs that determines the value they attach to them and the consensus in the social entity transforms this initiative into a public value. The socially constructed nature of public values means that while they can be observed, it is impossible to accurately predict or control public value outcomes of administrative actions as they are influenced by the relationalities in what is perceived as the public (Meynhardt, 2021).

Moore (2014), focusing on liberal societies, attributed the emergence of publics to two interrelated mechanisms: public deliberation and discussion of individuals' privately held (and possibly conflicting) values "push these views toward greater concern for others and toward visions of collective governmental action that could satisfy many" (p. 467). This process, he

added, may lead the public to also "*act* collectively … [by] join[ing] together and pool[ing] their privately held assets to advance their own individual and collective well-being" (pp. 467, italics in original). This process puts an emphasis on the role of the public sphere in the articulation of collectively held value orientations and aligns with the perspective offered by Benington.

Benington (2009) suggested the collective orientation of public value would best be addressed by both *what the public values are* and *what adds value to the public sphere*. Here, public sphere refers to "the web of values, places, organisations, rules, knowledge, and other cultural resources held in common by people through their everyday commitments and behaviours, and held in trust by government and public institutions" (Benington, 2009, p. 235). Benington's framework does not assume an "imagined" unitary public; rather, publics are continuously constructed. Thus, publics are dynamic and fluid social entities whose composition and, by implication, value orientations may change over time in tandem with the relationalities that characterize them. The multiplicity of publics implied here is evidently linked to a corresponding multiplicity of public spheres in which public values are held, created, and destroyed (Bryson et al., 2014). Democratic principles are an integral part of these processes. However, some scholars suggest the extended definition of the public sphere (compared to Habermas [1989]) by Benington (2009) also allows for the public value framework to be utilized in non-democracies (Bryson et al., 2014).

This distinction is also supported in Meynhardt (2021) who argued that public values help the cohesion of collective social entities and sustain them. While Benington (2009) ascribed a central role to governments as guarantors of public value, its creation often incorporates different public and private enterprises, as well as civil society organizations and individual citizens (Benington, 2009; Shaw, 2013; Sørensen et al., 2021; Stoker, 2006). The multiplicity of

publics with often conflicting sets of public values has the potential to introduce a certain ambiguity to organizations' strategic and operational decision-making processes (Hartley et al., 2019; van der Wal & van Hout, 2009). Thus, the negotiations on public values is a dialectical process that operates under, not just the characteristics of publics, but also the actions of organizations (Benington, 2009; Moore, 2014; also see Moulton, 2009).

3.1.2 Public value creation

The societal perspective employed both by Bozeman (2007) and Meynhardt (2009) in their conceptualization of public values ascribes a public value dimension to activities of both public and private sector organizations. When neither sector is able to deliver outcomes necessary for achieving public values, then public values failure occurs (Bozeman, 2002). This model points toward the entanglement of public and private sectors in contributing to public values which, in practice, translates into the concept of dimensional publicness of organizations where the influence of political authority (i.e., government) and economic authority (i.e., market) over an organization influences its publicness and privateness, respectively. Moulton (2009) expanded the political authority from government to institutions by building on Scott (2003) who distinguished between regulative institutions (e.g., rules, surveillance), normative associative institutions (i.e., morally governed dimension of social life), and cultural cognitive institutions (i.e., shared understanding on social reality and meaning-making framework). Moulton (2009) outlined a circular process of how the institutionalization of public values influence organizations' strategies to achieve *realized publicness* (i.e., outputs and outcomes) and noted that this process has the potential to influence "future desired public values" (p. 891).

Although public value has varied implications for organizations of all sectors, it originally emerged as a tool to guide government operations. In his original conception, Moore

(1995) described public value as public managers' equivalent to corporate managers' duty to create private (i.e., shareholder) value. It is important to note that public managers are not considered as political actors as they are commonly appointed (not elected) to their positions. Furthermore, public value is not viewed solely in terms of financial resources. The main difference between private and public sector organizations is that the latter uses not only financial resources (i.e., government assets and income through taxes) but also state authority in their operations (Moore, 1995, 2014). Different from the conceptualization offered by Bozeman (2007), while public sector organizations are commonly influenced by the political authority to a higher extent, they also perpetuate the role of political authority as it affects more broadly the relationships between the state and the citizens. The governance dynamics in a given context, therefore, holds great significance in interpreting these interrelations.

Public managers are not simply agents in the higher levels of bureaucratic apparatus with certain resources and a pre-determined purpose; instead, they continuously define and refine their organizations' purpose (and how to achieve that purpose) together with the political actors. In this view, public managers navigate a *strategic triangle* composed of (1) the substantive value generated, (2) the authorizing environment that legitimizes the value creation process through political support, and (3) the operational capabilities of the organization (and external partners) to create public value (Moore, 1995). The authorizing environment that provides political legitimation to the organizations' activities is not composed of a single entity or individual, but rather a complex network of organizations and institutions (e.g., Moore & Moore, 2015, p. 38).

The strategic triangle highlights that public managers work in an environment that poses restrictions on their activities from multiple angles (Alford & O'Flynn, 2009); thus the managerial attention should be focused "*outward*, to the value of the organization's production

[in the broader governance network], *upward*, toward the political definition of value, and *downward* and *inward*, to the organization's current performance" (Moore, 1995, p. 73, italics in original). Employing this differentiation in the example of Texas school system, O'Toole et al. (2005) suggested that "performance-relevant dimension … [and its] impact … is contingent to a large degree on the quality of the relationship between political principals and agents" (p. 63), underscoring the importance of the strength of public managers' connection to the authorizing environment.

While authorizing environment provides the political support for the operations of public sector organizations, the value created is ultimately decided on by the public. These two groups (i.e., the authorizing environment and public[s]) are not always aligned in their evaluation (Bozeman, 2007). Moore (2014) suggested that publics' evaluation is essentially rooted in a function of the attributes of the valued object and the level of collective social entity as the arbiter of value. In his words "*valuing agents* and *substantive values* become 'more public' … either by becoming more public regarding in the object of their attention or by becoming more collectively established as the shared view of many in a society" (p. 468, italics in original). The examples of such different levels of collective entities offered in Moore (2014) are individuals, voluntary associations and social movements of private individuals (i.e., first collective level), and citizens in democratic government and public policy (second collective level). So, any initiative of public sector organizations is evaluated differently by the multiple publics they affect which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The differential value orientations of different publics vis-à-vis different issues or initiatives add an added layer of complexity to public sector organizations' operations.

The public value accounting approach, developed by Moore two decades after the publication of *Public Value Creation*, asserts that public value generated through the organizational production (in the form of policies, programmes, procedures, and activities) are first evaluated by individuals and subsequently by the social outcomes they generate (Moore, 2013). Public money and state authority should be used not only efficiently and effectively (i.e., utilitarian framework), but also fairly and contribute to justice at different collective levels (i.e., deontological framework). Recognizing the dynamic nature of public opinion "about the relative importance of both the utilitarian and deontological values that public agencies pursue," Moore (2014) also pointed toward "seeking to improve democratic political processes governing public policy making" (p. 473), which reiterates the importance of continued engagement with publics in identifying and monitoring public value orientations (Nabatchi, 2012).

One of the criticisms levelled against Moore (1995) is that his conceptualization of public value is limited to basic service provision-oriented organizations where there is a higher likelihood of reaching consensus (Rhodes & Wanna, 2007). However, as Geuijen et al. (2016) suggested, public value approach and the strategic triangle may also be operationalized in "global wicked problems" and would foster reimagining the institutional arrangements suitable for the authorizing environment for addressing global issues. Starting with local examples by associating them with governance networks that operate on a larger scale is viewed as a potential way to achieve this, but it would also require a compatibility between the different political traditions in which organizations operate (e.g., Rhodes & Wanna, 2007).

In sum, when one looks at scholarly public value(s) debate, three points can be highlighted. First, activities of all organizations have a public value dimension (Bozeman, 2007; Meynhardt & Bäro, 2019); however, public sector has a duty to create public value because it

uses publicly provided state authority and tax-based income as its resources (Moore, 1995). Second, public sector organizations operate under the purview of the authorizing environment (which includes the political leadership), but creation of public value is ultimately arbitrated by the affected public(s) (Moore, 1995). Third, public value orientations change in a process that cannot be controlled or predicted (Meynhardt, 2021), which renders the politically motivated insertion of "new" or "alternative" public values into the public sphere a practical impossibility, especially when one acknowledges that publics are continuously constructed (Benington, 2009). Next subsection provides an outline of public value as an emerging PA paradigm.

3.1.3 Public value as a PA paradigm

In many countries, principles guiding public sector administration have changed significantly over the course of the twentieth century, and PA reform remains a permanent item on many governmental agendas (Rhodes, 2016). In the decades that followed the rapid industrialization process, politics and PA frameworks experienced a transformation. In this time period, what is now called *traditional public administration* (TPA) rose to prominence simultaneously in different industrialized countries (Katsamunska, 2012). Weber's (1978) scholarship on bureaucracy and politics is commonly regarded as the most influential scholarship on TPA. Weber distinguished between political leadership, party, and bureaucracy as "institutions … essential to coping with the complexity of modernity and delivering order to the governance process" (Stoker, 2006, p. 43), and bureaucracy is what facilitates PA (Weber, 1978). This bureaucratization is viewed by Habermas (1987) as one of the mechanisms with which lifeworld is colonized.

Here, public sector enterprises and their administrators (i.e., appointed officials) are tasked with delivering the welfare objectives set for them by politicians (i.e., elected officials)

and technical experts (Bryson et al., 2014). Bureaucratic hierarchy facilitates efficiency in delivering the organizational objectives, and public managers are responsible for adherence to established rules and procedures (Langer, 2022). Citizens are viewed as voters insofar as accountability (to the citizenry) is ensured by the competition for elected positions. In short, TPA outlines a framework in which public sector enterprises facilitate service delivery for welfare with a focus on continuity and standardization.

The first paradigm shift away from TPA occurred with the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) framework, which has at its core the supremacy of market-based structures for efficiency and efficacy and seeks to introduce the performance measures and management practices adapted from private businesses to services traditionally provided by the public sector. In NPM, the monopolistic public sector enterprises of TPA are viewed as economically inefficient and unresponsive to consumer needs and are therefore dismantled (Stoker, 2006). The adoption of NPM perspective in the Western context increased significantly after the PA reforms in the 1980s, particularly in the UK and the USA. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) are among the most influential scholars to formalize this trend in which citizens came to be perceived as consumers and the main task of public organizations is to satisfy their needs and expectations (e.g., Bryson et al., 2014; Stoker, 2006). But, it is important to note that this change was first conceptualized as a mechanism to empower citizens' and communities' role in PA through decentralization (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). This shift can principally be viewed as the manifestation of the convergence of economic and administrative systems.

In NPM, politicians are tasked with performance targets and budgetary oversight and "public managers are urged to 'steer, not row'" (Bryson et al., 2014, p. 447). Public administrators are the managers of their organizations and have a certain level of managerial

flexibility and freedom to accomplish the organizational goals and objectives set by politicians who also review the outputs (Stoker, 2006). Numerous methods have been employed to incorporate market mechanisms in government operations that include privatization of public assets, outsourcing (or contracting), and public-private partnerships (PPP) (Bozeman, 2007). These changes scaled back governmental operations under NPM, which some viewed as the emergence of "hollow states" (Milward & Provan, 2000). However, as Warner (2008) noted, there have been numerous examples where this model did not work as was foreseen and led to democratic deficits which gave way to reverse privatization.

The third and the most recent approaches to PA are values-based frameworks (e.g., Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Moore, 1995). Here, the main objective for governmental organizations is to be in continued engagement with the publics they serve in order to address the pressing issues the publics face that are determined through deliberative reflections (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Stoker, 2006). While there are several nuanced approaches and conceptualizations for it (Bryson et al., 2014), this paper uses public value management (PVM) following Stoker (2006) as an umbrella term for the emerging paradigm. PVM aims to move beyond assigning certain pre-determined roles to governmental organizations and their managers as is largely the case in TPA and NPM frameworks. In this view, the generation of public value is the goal; and organizations strive to contribute to it using the resources at their disposal. Stoker (2006) viewed this approach as being closely related to networked governance structures. Therefore, public value creation of any administrative action theoretically expands on the NPM-perspective—i.e., citizens as consumers—to also include relationship(s) between the state and the society (and the individual). In other words, public value encompasses more than economic performance.

3.1.4 Synthesis

Public value can be viewed as the reflection of social theories that attempted to illuminate the relationship between governments, society, and economy. In essence, it advocates for establishing a closer connection between public(s) and public administrators and their organizations who represent the state. The different conceptualizations of public value ascribe different weights to the various actors involved in its creation and articulation which is not only a self-evident aspect of governmentality (Foucault, 2009) but also of the formation of public opinion through communicative practices of autonomous individuals in the public sphere (Habermas, 1989, 1996). These processes do not proceed independently. The government and the economic system construct a certain lifeworld against the background of which individuals and social groups engage in deliberations concerning their value orientations.

Public values are, as per the definition provided in Bozeman (2007), a "normative consensus." But they are articulated in the public sphere (Benington, 2009) which relates them closely to the works of Habermas (1984, 1987, 1989, 1996). The emancipatory potential of communicative rationality in addressing the impact economy and political administration exerts on society can therefore be viewed as an asset in PVM's ascent into relevancy for PA. Public sectors create public value to the extent that their operations are linked with outcomes perceived positively by the affected public(s) (Moore, 1995, 2014). The pluralism in societies has public value implications, and reaching higher levels of collectivization requires public(s) to actively construct and revise the value orientations that facilitate their cohesion. Construction of public(s), how they are linked in the public sphere, and how they are "governed" are crucial in how public values emerge, persevere, and/or evolve (Moulton, 2009). Public life as it shapes in public spaces provides the conceptual setting in which these processes of transformation occur.

3.2 Public Life and Public Space

3.2.1 Relationalities in public spaces

The frameworks on assessing the publicness of spaces rely predominantly on physical spatial and administrative features of spaces (e.g., Johnson & Glover, 2013; Németh & Schmidt, 2011; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010). These features include ownership structure, physical characteristics (e.g., accessibility), control measures in the space (e.g., police presence, surveillance), exclusionary practices (e.g., limited hours of operation, defensive architecture) and the scope of supported functions. In light of these factors, one may view spaces' publicness as a continuum and where a space is situated alongside this continuum has a significant influence over the attributes of the public realm, and by implication public sphere(s) (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021). Although public spaces have the important function of facilitating public life, in contemporary cities, the latter's dependence on the former declined considerably, breaking the public spaces' conceptual linkage to the public sphere (Banerjee, 2001).

In this line of reasoning, the formal control over spaces in cities (whether they concern the physical attributes of the space or its administration) has an inevitable influence over the construction of publics. One of the primary functions of urban public spaces is to enable inhabitants' presence in the public realm as strangers (Young, 1990), but public spaces may also host multiple publics simultaneously and at different times, allowing these spaces to serve as incubators of a higher level of collectiveness (Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2023; Latham & Layton, 2022). Recognizing the limitations that arise from employing the spatio-temporal boundedness of public(s) in cities, Iveson (2007) views "to *make a public* … [as] to construct a scene through which ideas, claims, expressions and the objects through which they are articulated can circulate to others" (p. 3, italics in original) and highlights the necessity to consider the instrumental

political effort to construct particular publics by "*differentiat*[*ing*] between strangers" rather than "support[ing] a vision of the public city as 'being-together of strangers'" (p. 221, italics in original).

The never-static composition of inhabitants in public spaces is indirectly associated with a continuously evolving public realm (and sphere) and the concept of placemaking occurs through the social aspects of a space. This conceptualization aligns with Merrifield (1993) who constructs the connection between space and place—by building on the spatial dialectic of Lefebvre (1991)—as the connection between conceived and lived space that is mediated by spatial practices. Therefore, the attempted changes in the conceived space would have an inevitable influence on the lived space and vice versa—in an ever-evolving process. This points to the significance of processes that support continuous placemaking (Silberberg et al., 2013)—a process that incorporates physical and social features of a space to influence the lived experiences in it. These lived experiences include but are not necessarily limited to the interactions between the occupants of the space (Koch & Latham, 2013).

Public spaces can be viewed as part of what Klinenberg (2018) views as social infrastructure, i.e., "physical spaces that shape the way people interact" (p. 5). The broad spectrum of relationalities embedded in this definition leads Latham and Layton (2022) to a more concise formulation: social infrastructures operate on the range from "co-inhabiting spaces with strangers … [to] practices of full, fun, absorbing, enthusiastic engagement" (p. 665). Although public spaces are more commonly associated with the former end of the spectrum, changes in the physical/ administrative and social attributes, such as the composition of the publics present in spaces (i.e., "constructed public[s]"), have the potential to influence the relationalities in such spaces and thereby alter the position of spaces on this continuum. (This, however, is not to say

that the entirety of this continuum can be accommodated in all spaces at different times.) Animation of public spaces is a versatile conceptual and operational tool to exert this influence.

3.2.2 Public space animation

Animation strategies are employed to induce temporary changes in public spaces with various different functions to influence the public life and relationalities emerging in them (Glover, 2015; Smith, 2017). While an important component of public space animation is bottom-up strategies to invite fellow urbanites to the public realm (e.g., Glover, 2020), the degree of control exerted over specific urban public spaces vary significantly with various implications for how the space can be altered. Control mechanisms (whether they manifest explicitly or implicitly) essentially serve to influence who is included in the public realm in a given space and time and what can be done therein (see Aldoori et al., 2025).

When spaces are temporarily altered, administrative framework may also adapt to the expected changes in the social organization of and in the space. This means that some rules may be bent or not enforced in the animated space (Evans, 2017) but it is also possible to tighten the control for reasons of security and to maintain "orderly behaviour" (Mitchell, 2003). However, maintaining this order, or as Mitchell (2003) put it "'to secure the city' … has [always] served *particular* interests" (p. 230, italics in original) that often leads to homogenous and sterilized public spaces (e.g., Loughran, 2022; Zukin, 1995). Publicness level of a space can in itself be viewed as an object of evaluation by publics: increasing publicness is not necessarily valued by all publics. Examples would be the supporters of defensive architecture measures (e.g., preventing underhoused individuals from using public parks, restrictions on skateboarding) (Aldoori et al., 2025), and controversial voluntary association groups (e.g., anti-vaxxers, extremists) (Sharpe & Glover, 2021). As Koch and Latham (2013) reminded us, changing public

spaces should be viewed as part of a "continuous becoming of urban space" (p. 13) that relies on the relationships between people and the built (and natural) environment. Therefore, the animation projects that take place in public spaces implies, by definition, different forms of relationships (i.e., different people or different modes of interaction between people) that is influenced—not controlled—by the interventions to the public space deemed necessary for realizing the project on the level of conceived space whether the animation project is top-down or bottom-up.

Public space animation can operate on a range of scales—in terms of both the physical changes exerted over the space and the number of inhabitants the project aims to invite to the public realm. Glover (2020) identified eight such strategies that either rely primarily on physical changes in the space (e.g., introducing new things into the space such as natural elements or works of art) or use social mechanisms to regenerate public life (e.g., parades, neighbourhood block parties), or a combination of them. For most urban settings, one may reasonably expect there to be some public spaces more amenable to spontaneous temporary modifications, and some highly regulated ones where any change would require some form of administrative/ official approval (Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2025). These different versions can roughly be classified respectively as *unsanctioned* and *sanctioned* animation projects. This, however, does not mean that bottom-up animation projects are always unsanctioned or that sanctioned animation projects always remain within their pre-authorized boundaries.

Irrespective of the intervention strategy employed, animation strategies have the common purpose of bringing together urban inhabitants in the public realm and to alter the modes of interaction between them (Smith, 2017). In this view, the conceived purpose of the public space—as social infrastructure—is temporarily and inevitably modified but this modification

does not necessarily require the formation of closer interpersonal bonds among participants; rather, it remains on the level of sociable co-presence (Latham & Layton, 2022). Instead—using Goffman's terms—for the duration of the animation, *civil inattention* that commonly marks public spaces may prevail, but it may also be pushed toward an increased awareness to the surroundings and other people as a result of the socio-spatial changes enacted through the animation project—that is, toward *civil attention* (e.g., Glover, 2021). The commonalities between participants that emanate from their views toward the features of the animation projects' curation (Wangro, 2018)—i.e., common interests (Gilroy, 2004)—may also change how they perceive the space as well (Lofland, 1989).

3.2.3 Eventifying public spaces and CES

The primary focus in this project is the strategy of "festivalizing and eventifying" public spaces, defined by Glover (2020) as "the use of organized festivals and events to encourage public gatherings and bring a festive atmosphere to a public space" (p. 418). As Getz (2007) argued, "most events are planned to meet numerous specific economic, business, social, cultural and other policy aims" (p. 24). Central to these aims, self-evidently, is the question of who is invited to the public realm with the project, i.e., how the public is constructed. With increasing operational scale and complexity (e.g., number of participants, organizations involved, foreseeable spatial alterations required), the projects are likelier to be pre-planned and not spontaneous (Getz, 2007). Focusing on such events "helps to explore the way recent trends are driven by official urban policy and event management objectives" (Smith, 2016, p. 2).

While event studies have predominantly focused on the administrative and operational mechanisms in organizing successful events, the emerging field of CES "locates events in the context of politics, and in social and cultural struggles against injustice and inequality" (Lamond

& Spracklen, 2015, p. 4) and aims to transcend its economic and operational aspect which has so far been guiding events research (also see, Lamond & Platt, 2016; Spracklen & Lamond, 2016). It is contended in this view that the corporatization of events concurred with their depoliticization. Yet, for events organized with the involvement of public institutions, one can confidently assume they are, in fact, manifestations of the political framework. For example, who performs in a public concert and the specific location of the event have political, cultural, economic, and social dimensions that influence who become part of the public(s) in the animated public space.

Furthermore, as suggested by Quinn et al. (2021), despite their perceived importance for cities (e.g., creative class, branding, tourism, etc.), policy frameworks on events and festivals also reflect the priority on their commercial aspects which results in the limited representation of the cultural diversity in cities. This recognition, too, illustrates the trends toward homogenization (and domestication) of public spaces in contemporary cities (e.g., Loughran, 2022; Zukin, 1995). This perspective is illuminating given that a nontrivial portion of events in public spaces is organized with the direct involvement or the support of government(s) and/ or public sector organizations. Events utilize a wide variety of resources in cities in playing their part in facilitating a vibrant public life, and public spaces have historically been important event venues (Smith, 2016). Yet, in the modernization process, the increasing commercialization and corporatization of events contributed to whom they intend to include and by whom they would be valued. In this view, the primary indicator of an event's success is often viewed through objectively evaluated criteria, such as its economic performance, the number of attendees, and so on. However, focusing on public events in public spaces that are organized by public institutions in a post-NPM world, the public value that is intended and realized by events have additional

layers of complexity. Viewed through the lens offered by Moore (1995), not only do these events use public funds in their operationalization, but they also have a spatial reflection in that the state authority exerts its power over the public space.

When events use public spaces, the publicness of such spaces may also be altered for the duration of the event as it is accompanied by a commercialization of the space and exclusionary measures introduced to facilitate it. For example, organizing sports or cultural events in urban parks is common but—despite generating significant revenue for park administrations—has the disadvantage of significantly reducing the area allocated to regular park users (Layton & Latham, 2022; Smith, 2017). Even when thinking with ideal conditions, it is difficult to find an animation project that does not instigate some form of exclusion. Using historical evolution of festivals and events in Vienna's Town Hall Square, Krisch and Hiltgartner (2019) suggested that increasing frequency of festivalization changes the beneficiaries of public spaces in contemporary cities by restricting access and point towards the possibility of "right to public space [to] be employed as a new collective normative value, building on the concept of public space as social infrastructure" (p. 369).

3.2.4 Synthesis

In sum, what is officially authorized and what is valued by the public(s) are not necessarily the same (Bozeman, 2007). As Sharpe and Glover (2021) argued, broader publics' (e.g., society) views toward urban interventions are influenced by their collective value orientations. But, at the same time, sanctioned animation projects are an extension of the 'legitimate' administrative control over the space and, by implication, the attempted control over the social experience within (Lefebvre, 1991)—underlining the inherently political character of these interventions. In other words, the state apparatus is always an interested party vis-à-vis any

actions pertinent to public spaces. Even when the conceived purpose of a space is for it to be "public," it is ultimately its users/ inhabitants that determine whether they (collectively) experience it as a public space. Therefore, participants' experiences during an event are influenced by the way it is conceived (Smith, 2016) and this also reflects how the space is perceived. Hence, it is important for sanctioned projects to balance the societal and administrative/ political considerations regarding alterations of public space to address collective value dimensions—and to create public value in the process (Moore, 1995). The next section introduces national day celebrations as urban events.

3.3 National Day Celebrations

While events may have an overarching aim or vision statement that alludes to a "noble" cause—as Spracklen and Lamond (2016) cite the example of the Olympic Games and its governing body—they are ultimately designed and shaped mostly as commodities for people to consume. National celebrations can be viewed as ritualistic and/ or performative events that have the noble cause of nation-building and national cohesion (Woods & Tsang, 2014). On these days, the "nation" is offered for symbolic consumption; state cortege, military parades, overt display of the national flag are commonly found as part of national celebrations. Even if one is not physically present in spaces of celebration, people can become passive consumers of such events (e.g., through televised events, internet, etc.) and feel part of a nation (or not).

In this context, it is not surprising to find the concepts of nation and nationalism(s) in scholarly investigations of national celebrations. As is the case with many social theories, the concepts of nation and nationalism have many different definitions. In a recent review of the literature on the subject, Dar (2022) identified three strains in the nationalism debate and concluded that the earlier conceptualizations of nation/ nationalism revolves around establishing

the factors that determine memberships to a nation. Here, early focus on the objective (e.g., common language, territory, culture) and subjective factors (e.g., solidarity, self-consciousness) have, over the course of the debate, converged on political (i.e., as nation relates to the "state") and cultural definitions. Thus, one can view nations as "socially constructed and historically contingent phenomena … [that] possess a multifaceted character with particularity, subjectivity, and relativity as their defining features" (Dar, 2022, pp. 10–11). This aligns with Anderson's (1983) popular characterization of nations as "imagined communities."

National day celebrations are part of what Skey (2008) called ecstatic nationalism: "events designed to celebrate or explicate a particular national community on a mass public scale with reference to symbols and assumptions that inform an understanding of everyday life in a world of nations" (p. 151). Whether and the extent to which national celebrations (and commemorations) contribute to the feeling of membership into these imagined communities (i.e., to nation-building), or the social cohesion of this collective social entity remain debatable. As ritualized and highly curated phenomena (Wangro, 2018), they are inseparable from the political power structures (Lukes, 1975). Viewed through this lens, an important epistemological debate on understanding national celebrations is taking shape.

Two different approaches to investigating national celebrations are offered by Smith (2014) and Fox (2014). The former argues the central role of how rituals and performances are forged by the (political) elites for the masses to collectivize is essential to understanding their role for a nation. Recognizing the importance of what is intended and how these celebrations are forged, the latter advocates for investigating national celebrations from below (see also Fox, 2006), i.e., "from the perspective of the ordinary people who might—or, crucially, might not—constitute potential audiences for these events" (p. 49). At its essence, this debate bears a

significant similarity to conceived/ lived differentiation of Lefebvre (1991) and how this differentiation becomes the site of struggle in contemporary cities (Mitchell, 2003).

The intended and actual experiences that unfold during any event, as argued in the previous section, do not always overlap. Collins (2004) identified "multimodal intercommunication" through physical co-presence, "sense of intersubjectivity" through achieving mutual awareness of others' attention on the same thing, and "high levels of rhythmic entertainment that Durkheim called collective effervescence" through shared emotions, as essential components of events like national celebrations. This blueprint outlines how a national celebration-related animation project is "supposed" to operate to achieve a higher level of collective entity. However, there are always multiple publics with differing value orientations which makes it not possible to accurately foresee the outcomes of such events (e.g., Meynhardt, 2021). Where Fox (2006) pointed toward inclusion and exclusion of different publics in national celebrations in cities with multi-ethnic (and multinational) populations, Collins (2014) underlined the potential of events with mass participation to evolve into social movements, particularly to political protests—an example of how public spaces can be reappropriated by urban inhabitants (Lefebvre, 1996; Purcell, 2002).

Although national celebrations are comparatively large events in terms of both their intended audiences and their geographical impact area, if one were to follow Spracklen and Lamond (2016), whether they constitute mega-events is debatable as mega-events are "staged for the purposes of making money and selling *the event host* in some way" (p. 76, italics added). As such, one can view mega-events (e.g., World Cup, Olympic Games, city festivals) as having a transboundary character: they aim to include/ invite those who do not live in the city, too—and bring prestige to the city in the process. While a consumptive aspect to national celebrations (that

both include symbolic consumption of "the nation" and the material consumption) is evident, they differ from mega-events in that they are intended primarily for inhabitants that perceive themselves to be members of the imagined community of the nation. But, as Fox (2014) rightly pointed out referencing Skey (2008), "[f]or many members of the putative nation, then, these festive occasions are just another day, a day off work, a day *of* work; for many people, these holidays are ordinary days that are not necessarily any more national than any other day" (p. 46, italics in original).

From a political vantage point, national celebrations are of special importance. Observing the anniversaries of specific events (sometimes clearly defined, sometimes somewhat ambiguous) are laden with symbolic value in national consciousness that waits for the political elite to seize. For example, Northcutt (1991) suggested that the carefully curated events of the bicentenary celebrations in France on July 14, 1989 helped François Mitterrand's political power through building/ upgrading iconic buildings in Paris and through politically ambitious modernization projects. In Argentina, centenary and bicentenary (1910 and 2010, respectively) were key elements in the national identity struggle, particularly as it related to symbolisms in public space (Frei, 2019). In the Canadian context, Madiema (2005) argued that the centenary celebrations in 1967 showed the first overt signs of shift away from the Christianity toward secularization and the unity in diversity. In the USA, Klein (1977) traced the evolution of the Fourth of July Celebration in that its bicentenary (i.e., 1976) became a mass commodity and a "mountain of Bicentennial trash" (p. 260) emerged. As it can be viewed in these examples, countries use the symbolic value of these dates (and events) to engage the attention of their citizens (and sometimes the world) by and make some form of connection between the political elite and the masses—contingent, of course, on the unique characteristics of countries.

Chapter 4

Conceptual Model

Broadly conceptualized, this research is about the understanding the politico-economic and cultural context in which members of Turkey's society experiences its centenary national day. This brief section aims to build a conceptual model, which is illustrated in Figure 1, by using the literature provided in the preceding chapters, starting with the role of government.

In the context of this research project, government has a dual function. First, it provides the system-level imperatives that each subject is expected to operate within and reproduce through governmentality (Foucault, 2009). The accumulated knowledge and apparatuses are used by the government—i.e., the political leadership—to formulate and operationalize a certain course of action for the future. Questions pertaining to such diverse areas as economic development, state security and national defence, education, and healthcare are all part of the political discourse. This articulation lays out what the state expects from its citizen-subjects to reproduce. Sense of belonging to the imagined community of the nation (Anderson, 1983) can also be viewed as part of this set of expectations. The government is integral in forging a particular, politically preferred version of the national day.




Figure 1 Conceptual model

Second, government—through its formal power—conceives urban space (Lefebvre, 1991). On the one hand, it has legitimate control over the Cartesian (or topographic) space dealing with such questions as where public spaces are allowed, the size of the public space, etc. On the other hand, it sanctions the types of activities that are allowed or acceptable in public spaces, i.e., the so-called "orderly behaviour" (Mitchell, 2003). Those individuals who do not conform the governmental preference may be excluded from particular public spaces; alternatively, interactions in public are (self-)regulated. Through these dual mechanisms, government influences the public realm and the collectivization (Sennett, 2011) and the public opinion that may form therein (Habermas, 1989).

Descending to lower levels of political ladder, government lays out the framework in which public sector organizations are expected to operate. The government, in other words, is part of the authorizing environment of public sector operations, and governmentality is reflected in the state authority as a resource for public sector organizations (Moore, 1995). These organizations are intrinsically connected to the government, but they have a more limited access to certain governmental apparatuses. Therefore, it is expected from public sector that they abide by system-level restrictions. Systemic and institutionalized influence over public values—i.e., whether and how they persevere or transform (Moulton, 2009)—is important to consider because public values may emerge differently in increasing levels of collective organization and foster their internal cohesion (Meynhardt, 2021; Moore, 2014).

When examining the national day celebrations, two levels of collectivization as publics occur, i.e., two publics are constructed (Benington, 2009). The first one is the public of "the nation" which can be viewed as Habermas' abstract public sphere (1996) consisting of individuals connected with each other through intermediaries, such as media outlets. The abstract

public sphere has a central importance for the government and all factions of the political spectrum. In essence, this abstract public sphere provides the context in which all smaller public(s) act. The second form of collectivization occurs in each event pertinent to the national day (i.e., the public space animation projects) which is the occasional (or arranged) public sphere (Habermas, 1996). It is at once a public in its own right, and a collection of publics (and also counter-publics) through the pluralism in the society. Occasional public sphere is often temporary, but it is where abstract public sphere converges with public life—where communicative and performative interactions co-exist in urban inhabitants' intersubjective meaning-making processes (Mitrašinović & Mehta, 2021; Sennett, 2011). The experiences in the occasional public sphere are interlinked with the abstract public sphere.

Arguably, parts of the occasional public sphere are more amenable to be controlled. The actual event is first discursively constructed by the organizations that plan and execute it in the abstract public sphere to construct its occasional sub-sphere. Particular features of any event as conceived by public sector organizations would act effectively as a filtering mechanism for the construction of the public of the event. For example, which public space is eventified (e.g., through the symbolisms of the space), the timing of the event, the publicness of the space for the duration of the event (i.e., accessibility, commercialization, security, defensive architecture), the content of the event (e.g., if it is a public concert, who performs; if it is a festival, what is the theme) are all important to how the public of the event materializes.

On a more abstract level, there is a discursive aspect to the construction of public that complements its material features. The political discourse surrounding the event—that is shaped within the broader discourse on the nation and the national day—is primarily undertaken by the public sector organizations where they leverage value orientations to construct the occasional

public and, by implication, the counter-publics. But, whether a higher level collective organization occurs and if it does, despite the control (physically and discursively) that may be exerted over the public(s) of the event, which value orientations would lead this collectivization cannot be known *a priori* (Meynhardt, 2021). This is perhaps most evident in highly politically-choreographed events that turn into protests or social movements against the very political regime that forged it in the first place (e.g., Collins, 2014). In other words, collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1995), if achieved, can take vastly different forms. The next chapter provides an outline of the national day in Turkey.

Chapter 5

Centenary of the Republic of Turkey

While Turkey observes a number of official holidays for commemorating historical events, Republic Day is the national day in Turkey. A list of the national and official holidays in Turkey is provided in Table 1.

Table 1 List of national and official holidays in Turkey

Date	Name of the Holiday	Description
January 1	New Year's Day	
April 23	National Sovereignty and Children's Day	Commemorating the founding of Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1920
May 1	International Workers' Day	
May 19	Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day	Commemorating the start of Turkey's War of Independence in 1919
July 15	Democracy and National Unity Day	Commemorating the failed coup attempt in 2015
August 30	Victory Day	Commemorating the Great Offensive in Greco-Turkish War in 1922
October 29	Republic Day	Commemorating the founding of Republic of Turkey in 1923

In the first section of this chapter, a brief historical background of Republic Day is provided, followed by the current political context in Turkey.

5.1 Historical Background of Republic Day in Turkey

Modern Turkey officially became a republic on October 29, 1923, approximately three years after the founding of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) that oversaw Turkey's War of Independence. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1, these three years are a period of wars against the Allied occupation of the Ottoman land—drawing modern Turkey's territorial boundaries. With the first anniversary of the republic celebrated in what can be described as a bottom-up manner with limited involvement of

the government, October 29 was designated officially as the national day of Turkey in 1925 and a statutory holiday of a day and a half starting noon on October 28 (Bolat, 2007).

Turkey's transformation into a republic was accompanied by important reforms (or in the context of Turkey's history writing, revolutions) that affected virtually all aspects of everyday life. These reforms include adopting the Latin alphabet and international measurement units; limiting the role of religion in public life and in politics by enforcing restrictions on using religious attires and symbols; equalizing civil rights for men and women and the subsequent extension of universal suffrage for women in the 1930s; and unifying the education system by eliminating religious education. Starting with the early years of the republic, economic growth and independence were important purposes which necessitated the introduction of modern agricultural technologies and a rapid industrialization process. Republic Day, as viewed by many scholars, most importantly communicated the progress of these reforms to the public—aiding in the nation-building process on the axes of these socio-cultural, economic, and political reforms.

Expectedly, after the designation of October 29 as the national day, the central government became the primary actor in leading the celebrations. Bolat's (2007) historical investigation of the national day celebrations between 1924 and 1960 found pageants, firework displays, decorations of public spaces, and torchlight processions as common elements which were supported with conferences for public participation as well as state receptions in Turkey and in embassies and consulates abroad, and programs in foreign radios as part of celebrations. These efforts served to assert the legitimacy of the new regime abroad and aided the political consolidation within. From the state's perspective, the pageantries were arguably the highlight for the public gaze: carefully selected groups that symbolized the ideals of the republic and the progress it has achieved (e.g., scouts, student organizations, farmers, industrial workers, military

personnel) were brought to the capital city from different parts of the country to participate and to be visible to the public(s) present in the celebrations. While these events commonly took place in public squares and streets, they were moved to stadiums and to the hippodrome in mid-1930s which expectedly imposed some limitations of public participation (Bolat, 2007). Pageantries on a smaller scale were also organized other cities, occasionally including some representation of local cultural elements (e.g., Alpaslan, 2015; Çoban, 2019).

In their comparative investigation of national celebrations in India and Turkey, Roy (2006) noted:

> reflecting the difference between the "pluralizing" and "unitary" forms of nation-building undertaken in India and Turkey respectively, in striking contrast to the emphasis on cultural diversity and on the unique manifestations of folk culture in the Republic Day pageantry of India, in Turkey it was the uniformity and interchangeability of villagers that was of paramount importance. (p. 217)

The intended homogeneity (at the very least in appearance with strict dress codes) in the official celebrations in Turkey is aligned with Göle's (2002) interpretation of the "authoritarian modernism" (p. 176) of early republican period that saw the institutionalization of the public sphere through state-sponsored secular lifestyles and their preferred visibility in public and hence the exclusion of those who did not conform these criteria.

While the scale of the events that collectively formed the celebrations fluctuated during this period, special attention was paid to events every five years. Overall, the content of the celebrations remains more or less the same with the ten-year anniversary program serving as a blueprint for successive ones (Bolat, 2007). However, as Öztürkmen (2001) argued, this "continuity of formalism in the celebrations eventually produced a decline in the level of

enthusiasm" (p. 51) and celebrations became venues of political contestations with the rise of political Islam in Turkey. When the Islamists ascended to political power in 1990s, there was a successful effort to revive public interest in national celebrations that were augmented in the formalized celebrations through events that also catered to the popular interests (e.g., public concerts, television coverage) which was further complicated when national holidays "symbolized support for the Republic's reforms and secularism, in opposition to rising Islamic fundamentalism" (p. 47).

5.2 Current Context in Turkey

The three decades since the revived interest in Republic Day celebrations (as noted in Öztürkmen, 2001), the political power of Islamists grew almost uninterruptedly: what started with a political victory in local elections in 1994 was followed by 21 years (since 2002) of parliamentary majority and government that saw the gradual transformation of Turkey towards authoritarianism that challenged the ideal of secularism (Arat & Pamuk, 2019; Bermek, 2019) by manoeuvring the state apparatus to increase the role religion occupies in Turkey's contemporary society (e.g., Eder, 2010; Janson & Kınıkoğlu, 2021). While contestations between different political factions have always been present in Turkey with its ups and downs (leading to such things as *coup d'états* in 1960 and 1980, or closure of political parties for unconstitutional activities), through an uninterrupted political power for more than two decades, Turkey now finds itself with a deeply fragmented and polarized society (e.g., Laebens & Öztürk, 2021).

Çelik et al. (2016) argued this polarization to have emerged on three fault lines: ethnic (Turk vs. Kurd), sectarian (Sunni vs. Alevi), and ideological (supporters vs. opponents of Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP]). Such polarizing mechanisms are typically reflected in media organizations depending on their positionality on these three fault

lines (e.g., Babaee & Avcı, 2024; Gümüş & Dural, 2012; Polat et al., 2018), especially when one considers that a considerable portion of the mediascape in Turkey became increasingly owned and controlled by pro-government capital groups (e.g., Kaya & Çakmur, 2011; Tunç, 2018). Moreover, recent experience in Turkey suggests a paradigm shift in social and educational policies coupled with an "appropriate" economic agenda indicating a change in the welfare regime (Eder, 2010) and aimed to "[create] a new social memory, on which a religiously defined national identity is going to be crafted" (Lüküslü, 2016, p. 638, also see Kaya, 2014). This process surely has various implications (education, foreign relations, migrants and refugees, minorities, to name a few), but for this research, how this process resonates in the urban public realm (e.g., Janson & Kınıkoğlu, 2021) is the main focus.

In Turkey's context, the concept of public sphere has evolved in a way to be predominantly understood in a state-centric fashion with the presence of religious symbols in public being a central element. Hazama (2014) traced the conflation of state and public spheres to the headscarf debate, more specifically, to a statement made by the then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (former head of the Constitutional Court) in 2002 in which he suggested that "the areas in which Islamic headscarves were banned included not only state institutions but also places in which state ceremonies were performed" (p. 164). The spatial perspective employed in this view can thus be viewed as the point of departure from the Habermasian conception of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989). Interestingly, the discourse over public sphere in Turkey, different political-ideological groups have come to adopt the state-centric understanding of the concept (Hazama, 2014). The historically pro-state positioning of civil society is viewed by some scholars as a major issue for democratization process because of its totalizing features (Cevik & Tas, 2013).

How different publics perceive and experience urban space cannot be thought separately from such societal characteristics because the built environment acts as a mediator between institutional power (i.e., state functions) and everyday life (Baykan & Hatuka, 2010). In a recent research on bans on protests and assembly in Turkey, Arslanalp and Erkmen (2022) suggested that government reacts to "threats to public order, the state, and the safety and security of citizens among the larger public" (p. 8) by spatial regulation aimed to restrict the visibility of protests to the broader public and hence their success. This example shows how spatial mechanisms influence public life in Turkey (Akbalık, 2022) alongside a variety of mechanisms that enhance the securitization of public spaces (e.g., Batuman & Erkip, 2019). Although these restrictions and spatial practices are frequent, and to a certain extent, normalized by a considerable portion of urban inhabitants, "democratizing" public spaces became a centrepiece for the opposition's political rhetoric.

This democratization perspective became particularly visible following the opposition's electoral success in the local elections in 2019—which resulted in the election of Ekrem İmamoğlu as the mayor for Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (*İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi* [IBB]) from Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), the main opposition party—and a renewed interest in public spaces emerged. Public squares and streets (e.g., constructing of new ones, rehabilitation/ domestication) and cultural facilities (e.g., libraries, cultural centres, museums, historical/ archaeological renovations) (see IBB, 2019; IBB, 2022) are particularly relevant for understanding how the new city administration aims to conceive public life which is not necessarily compatible with that of the central government and thereby constituting a wide array of potential political tensions.

With the general election process in May 2023 concluded, political-ideological misalignment between IBB and the central government persisted in the period that includes the centenary celebrations. This misalignment is noteworthy for two reasons: first, although municipalities have an important role in organizing and executing the celebrations, the central government has considerable power over spatial practices. In Turkey, the central government's power is best observed in the role of governors—appointed by the president—who oversee all services provided by the central government in provinces (e.g., education, health, police). Second, a presidential memorandum assigned the coordination, and planning of all aspects of the celebrations—that involve the public sector—to the Presidential Directorate of Communications (PDC) (Official Gazette, 2020). Through these dual mechanisms, central government has considerable influence in the authorizing environment of the centenary celebrations.

As suggested earlier, centenaries are commonly associated with a symbolic significance—hence the grandiosity and opulence in celebrating them (Frei, 2019; Klein, 1977; Madiema, 2005; Northcutt, 1991). The political discourse in the preceding decade indicated that the political rhetoric attached utmost importance to 2023 as the year when economic and social development benchmarks were originally set to be achieved that would mark the "building [the government's] 'Turkey Century' vision" (President's Office, 2023a, par. 5). The realization of these development goals remains questionable (Diken, 2022). Instead, in the past decade, Turkey has experienced a deinstitutionalization of state functions—including judiciary and military—and a turn towards authoritarianism (Arat & Pamuk, 2019) with significant ramifications on how inhabitants are able/ allowed to engage with and in urban public space (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2022; Batuman & Erkip, 2019).

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided an introduction to the national day of Turkey, and to the political context in which the centenary celebrations took shape. As suggested in the first section, scholarly investigations of Republic Day most commonly employ a historical perspective. While there is extensive information on celebrations for the first few decades of Turkey (e.g., Bolat, 2007; Öztürkmen, 2001) in the literature, more recent national days have not received comparable attention (Çelikçi, 2013). However, the symbolic value ascribed by the political actors to the centenary and its manifestation in 2023 can be interpreted as the national day's continued perceived relevance to Turkey's society and politics. With polarization taking shape through value orientations and manifest politically (Çelik et al., 2016; İşeri et al., 2019; Laebens & Öztürk, 2021), the differences between the central government and the local administration in Istanbul and may contribute to a fruitful synthesis of competing visions concerning urban public life. The next chapter outlines the proposed methodology for examining the interplay of political influences in the discursive construction of publics in the centenary of Turkey and how the hallmark events for centenary celebrations materialized in Istanbul's public spaces.

Chapter 6

Methodology

Before introducing the methods that will be employed in this research project, a recap of research aims is necessary. The objective is to investigate the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and to examine how public(s) were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul. These two interconnected mechanisms provide the context in which social subjects perceive and experience as part of their everyday lives. Gaining a deeper insight into this context will allow addressing the questions of this research:

(1) Which public value orientations did the political leadership(s) address and employ in influencing the construction of the public(s) for the hallmark event of the centenary national day celebrations in Istanbul?; and

(2) How did the hallmark events of the centenary national day celebrations in Istanbul materialize in their respective public space(s)?

In the sections that follow, I will first focus on the case study features of this research project and then introduce critical discourse analysis (CDA). The third section provides an outline of the data sources that will be included in the research, followed by the data analysis strategy.

6.1 Centenary Celebrations in Istanbul: A Case Study

This research can be viewed as an embedded single-case study because of its focus on context-setting factors as they manifested on different levels of abstraction (i.e., units of analysis) (Yin, 2003) that can be conceptualized as having three layers (see Figure 2). The political framework emanating from the political leadership (i.e., government and opposition) represents

the first layer that affects all territorial and administrative units—each with a unique relationship with the government. The second layer consists of the administrative units that undertake the role of forging the national day in their territories. The third layer are comprised of the collection of events (as unique objects) that are executed as part of the national day celebrations. In this view, the inner layer of events embody the context-setting factors through the outer layers of central government and local administration, and the unique relationships between these layers (Budiyanto et al., 2019).




Figure 2 Three layers of national day celebrations

As outlined earlier, in the context of national celebrations, two levels of collective social entities emerge: collectivization of the nation and collectivization of specific events. National day celebrations are one-time events in the timeline of nation-states. They are relevant for political actors where different visions for the nation-state and the nation crystallize that dialectically construct the future of society. The public value perspective, as employed in this case study, does not focus on the whether and how public value is created with a particular urban

intervention; rather, it investigates the public value dimensions prioritized by the state and public sectors organizations and how this reflects on the constitution of the public realm in a large urban setting with a deeply fractured and polarized society. Therefore, this research concentrates on the top-down approach in forging national days (Smith, 2014).

The politico-ideological differences between the central government of Turkey and the local administration of Istanbul provide a fertile ground to investigate the how different political factions navigate and structure the abstract public sphere and public realm as evidenced on a day with considerable symbolic significance for different publics that collectively constitute the nation. With such particularities, centenary Republic Day celebrations in Istanbul can be considered a unique case (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2003). On the one hand, celebrations included a diverse set of political and economic actors, and a relatively large geographical reach within the city than most events; on the other, celebration facilitated a mass participation of primarily urban inhabitants in the form of a politically infused and nationalistically flared leisure-in-public.

Stake (1995) argued the aim of case studies "is particularization [where] we take a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is different from others but what it is, what it does" (p. 8). However, this does not mean that findings uncovered through case studies do not have any generalizability (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Simons (2014), noting the paradoxical nature of this assertion, suggested that effectively capturing the uniqueness, the essence, and the particularity of the case being investigated increases the likelihood of finding something universal. Critically analysing the discourses that influence the collectivization process of urban inhabitants would potentially allow one to reimagine the ways in which this collectivization may occur and guide political authorities and public sector organizations in their decision-making processes.

6.2 Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis

A discourse can be characterized as operating on the dimensions of "language use, cognition, and interaction in their sociocultural contexts" (van Dijk, 1997b, p. 32). At its most fundamental level, CDA focuses on how social and cultural processes and power relations as they manifest linguistically and semiotically. Any "social problem which has a semiotic aspect" of interest for CDA (Fairclough, 2001, p. 125) which, in its operationalization, would expectedly oscillate between macro, meso, and micro levels to understand and explore the discursive dynamics within them, and their interrelations with each other (van Dijk, 1997b). The necessity to address the interplay of these levels renders CDA an appropriate approach for gaining a deeper understanding into how political actors operating at different levels influence the construction of publics in the context of a national day (i.e., the public of the nation, and the public of event).

Viewed as both theory and method focusing on the "discourse moments within the linking of the theoretical and practical concerns and public spheres" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 16), CDA may take different forms in its operationalization (e.g., Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 2001) and has neither a generalizable data source or collection process nor a specific analysis procedure that can be considered in isolation from the research questions. CDA employs qualitative research methods in the analysis of language, discourse, and social practice by positioning them in their social, historical, and cultural contexts. How language is used in a discourse is both a descriptive and a performative concern which ascribes an important role to rhetorical aspects of discursive elements that include word choices, discursive strategies, and framing in illuminating social power structures and hierarchies.

Meyer (2001) provided an outline for the methodological diversity in CDA literature and underscored that CDA may use a wide range of theoretical viewpoints (e.g., grand social theories, micro-sociological theories, linguistic theories). Such different approaches, however, all have the common element of adopting a perspective that best aligns with the social groups negatively affected by social injustices, power imbalances, and inequalities—which are entrenched in ideologies that "serve as an interface between collective group interests and individual social practices" (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 27)—and aim to promote social transformation and emancipation (van Dijk, 2001). The national day—situated in this research as an event that potentially illuminates the relationship between political power structures and public value orientations—operates predominantly at the societal level. If consensus-oriented communication is considered to be the primary mechanism in the public sphere (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1996) through which public values are forged (Benington, 2009; Meynhardt, 2021; Moore, 2014), a discourse analytical approach makes it possible to understand the structural influences over the constitution and the operation of public sphere(s).

The normative stance of CDA suggests that research cannot be entirely value-free or neutral. In this context, CDA does not assume an objective, neutral observer; instead, it critically engages with power structures and social contexts under the assumption that knowledge is constructed by individuals and shaped by social, historical, and cultural factors. However, as some scholars argue, the subjectivist view of constructivism may be complemented to further investigate the causal mechanisms at play in the social world (Bogna et al., 2020; Fiaz, 2013) operating under the ontological assumption of the existence of both a material and an ideational reality which is the central premise of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1998; Elder-Vass, 2012).

Critical realism occupies the middle point between the positivist and subjectivist continuum and "defines an objective reality as one that exists independently of individual perception but also recognizes the role that individual subjective interpretation plays in defining reality" (Taylor, 2018, p. 217) and is among the philosophical underpinnings of CDA as employed in this research (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2003). Fairclough et al. (2002) underlined the differentiation between *the real* (i.e., "objects, their structures or natures and their causal powers and liabilities"), *the actual* (i.e., "what happens when these powers and liabilities are activated and produce change"), and *the empirical* (i.e., "the subset of the real and the actual that is experienced by actors") (p. 3) as a key feature of critical realism. Although the real, the actual, and the empirical are interrelated, they cannot be reduced to each other. Moreover, while objects can instigate change in the social world, how and when these powers are activated are context dependent. Hence, meaning making takes place under the influence of a myriad of social forces (that also include extra-discursive elements), or, as a co-production of the social actors involved. The subjective viewpoint of CDA necessitates acknowledging the differences that may emanate from researchers' predispositions. The next subsection provides an overview of my positionality as a researcher as it pertains to the core issues of this research project.

6.3 Data and analysis

The timeline for this research project, to a large extent, coincided with the time period leading up to the centenary celebrations. Although the centenary and the vision for the second century received political attention prior to 2023 (e.g., Official Gazette, 2020; President's Office, 2023c), there had been limited indication about what the centenary would entail for the first half 2023. Major "disruptions" marked the first half of 2023 worth mentioning here included (1) a

strong dual earthquake in February that affected a large geographical area in south-eastern Turkey and claimed the lives of at least fifty-thousand people; and (2) presidential and general elections announced in February and took place in May. While there were some small-scale events in the country that related to the centenary, the hallmark events in Istanbul by the President's Office and IBB that constituted the focus of this research project were publicly announced in mid-October.

As the purpose of this research is to investigate the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and to examine how publics were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul, the empirical data used in this project were, to a large extent, one-way communications initiated by politicians and public sector organizations in which there was limited responsibility ascribed to the receiver, i.e., urban inhabitants (e.g., McMillan, 2002). Moving from the abstract public sphere toward the occasional public sphere of the event started with the political discourse on the nation and the centenary, how the centenary and related celebrations were communicated to the public, and then focused on the actual public space animation projects, i.e., the hallmark events.

6.3.1 Centenary and the politics

Self-evidently, a general election process included a wide variety of political argumentation to entice the citizens of a nation-state. From a political vantage point, the elections rendered this process particularly valuable for underscoring the Turkey's "new century" with the possibility of laying out the competing (and conflicting) political visions. Therefore, in this research, the first step was to gain a deeper understanding into the construction of the centenary—and the nation within—through politicians' public speeches, which allowed one to understand the changes in government perspective and policy (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016). Public

addresses of political leadership provided important contextual factors in national identity construction, which included not only political rallies but other public addresses (Wodak et al., 2009).

The propaganda period for Turkey's 2023 presidential and general elections was, admittedly, somewhat unique. As a result of recent changes in electoral legislation, there were five party alliances that competed in the elections. People's Alliance (*Cumhur İttifakı*) of the incumbent government and Nation Alliance (*Millet İttifakı*) of the main opposition can be considered the strongest political actors. People's Alliance—that brought together political Islam with ultranationalist conservatives—led by the Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the President of Turkey and the chairman of AKP, was the parliamentary majority. Therefore, the public addresses of the president in the campaign period were used to analyse how the political authority constructed the centenary and "the nation" celebrating it. Here, the vision statement for Turkey century (President's Office, 2023c) was integral to the election process. One important issue to remember is that the president's addresses rarely, if at all, made a distinction between presidential speeches and candidate speeches where most of the propaganda was embedded in official engagements and ceremonies. The president first mentioned the election in his speech at the opening ceremony of an industrial plant on March 19, and delivered 79 presidential speeches (during the election campaign) including his victory speech on May 28 (President's Office, 2023b; see Appendix A).

In the same period, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who was the leader and the presidential candidate of the main opposition alliance, and the chairman of CHP in the election period—delivered 47 political rally speeches between March 6 and May 25 (CHP, 2023; see Appendix B) (see Appendix B). The main opposition's viewpoint was relevant for this research project not

only as representatives of an alternative imaginary for the central government surrounding the political and social environment (i.e., an alternative discourse) but also because the opposition held the mayoral office in Istanbul whose activities surrounding the centenary celebrations was the focus in the subsequent stages of the research. These speeches, expectedly, frequently mentioned different political figures and parties, so, a list of prominent political figures and parties in the centenary that appear in the political speeches examined in this research are provided in Table 2.

Table 2 Overview of the political parties and figures in Turkey's 2023 general and presidential elections

Political Party Acronyms	Party Name	Affiliation in Electoral Alliances	Notes
AKP	Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)	People's Alliance	Right-wing conservative, Parliamentary majority, President's party
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)	People's Alliance	Right-wing nationalist, allied with the ruling AKP
CHP	Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)	Nation Alliance	Turkey's oldest political party, typically fluctuates between centre-right and centre-left, main opposition party, success in municipal elections in 2019 including Istanbul
İyi Parti	Good Party	Nation Alliance	Spin-off from MHP, centre-right, allied with the main opposition
HDP	People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi)*	Labour and Freedom Alliance	Pro-Kurdish party, minority opposition

Key Political Figures	Position in 2023	Political Affiliation
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President of Turkey, presidential candidate	Leader of AKP
Devlet Bahçeli	Member of Parliament	Leader of MHP
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu	Member of Parliament, presidential candidate	Leader of CHP
Meral Akşener	Member of Parliament	Leader of İyi Parti
Ekrem İmamoğlu	Mayor of Istanbul	Member of CHP

The transcriptions of both the president's and the opposition leader's speeches were publicly accessible (CHP, 2023; President's Office, 2023b). These corpora of texts were used to

investigate the public value orientations that political leaders emphasize and aimed to reproduce through their proposed and preferred policies as they related to the nation and the centenary. The textual analysis, including the structural and rhetorical tools employed (Fairclough, 2003; Linström & Marais, 2012; Wodak et al., 2009), laid out discursive representation of the social reality and the political context in which urban inhabitants navigated everyday life, and the concealed public values (i.e., as connotative aspects of the texts of the discourse) embedded within. The latter was particularly significant to point toward contextualizing potential changes in the value orientations as institutional mechanisms influence public values (Moulton, 2009), although how they changed could not be predicted or planned *a priori* (Meynhardt, 2021). The analysis of the texts was conducted in their original Turkish language. In the reporting, a bilingual format was employed in which the selected excerpts were provided in both English, translated by the researcher, and the original Turkish. The next component of the research was how the centenary and the related events were covered in the media.

6.3.2 Centenary and the media

How objective facts are represented in the discourse on the event, and the alignment of the discursively constructed event with its physical manifestation have a significant influence in shaping the construction of the public. As Spracklen and Lamond (2016) underlined, managing interconnected discourses stages a particular reproduction of a historical event. The discourse on the event was coordinated through multiple media and therefore consisted of texts in a variety of genres that addressed different Istanbulite (and non-Istanbulite) publics. While there were numerous ways with which publics accessed news and opinions, the focus in this stage was national print newspapers as the proxy of the professional mediascape.

Through a purposive sampling of newspapers that ensured the representation of different factions in the mediascape (e.g., İşeri et al., 2019; Panayırcı et al., 2016; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), the copies of eight newspapers (i.e., BirGün, Cumhuriyet, Evrensel, Hürriyet, Sabah, Sözcü, Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak) were collected for 14 days (i.e., October 23-November 5, 2023). This selection represented media factions of left-wing opposition (i.e., BirGün, Evrensel), republican opposition (i.e., Cumhuriyet, Sözcü), mainstream pro-government (i.e., Hürriyet, Sabah), and conservative pro-government newspapers (i.e., Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak). Four-hundred-forty-five news stories had a content related to the centenary. Fourty-one percent of the news stories were published in mainstream pro-government newspapers, followed by republican opposition (36%), conservative pro-government (17%), and left-wing opposition newspapers (6%) (see Figure 3). The left-wing newspapers had the lowest circulation rates, followed by the republican and conservative outlets, and mainstream newspapers. The average daily circulation of the newspapers represented in this study between October 23-29 is provided in Table 3.




Figure 3 Distribution of news stories by newspaper

Table 3 Average circulation number and rank of the newspapers

Newspaper	Average Circulation	Circulation Rank
BirGün	4,659	25
Cumhuriyet	16,304	21
Evrensel	3,210	27
Hürriyet	111,733	2
Sabah	113,652	1
Sözcü	101,713	4
Yeni Akit	53,210	8
Yeni Şafak	50,759	12

Source: Medya Takip Merkezi (2023)

The preparation of the data for analysis included the isolation of each news story from their respective pages and sections in the newspapers and a subsequent coding to anonymize their outlets to minimize bias. The coding involved letters A thru H with each letter corresponding to a newspaper in alphabetical order, numbers 1 through 14 corresponding to each day of collected data, and a number delineating each news story's position in the newspaper issues (i.e., A1-1 referred to the first news story in BirGün newspaper on October 23, 2023). Figure 4 provides the distribution of the news stories among the newspapers selected. An examination of the chronological evolution of centenary in the news cycle suggests the topic was gradually increased in frequency in the days leading up to the centenary and peaked on October 30, 2023, i.e., the day following the national day in which about two-thirds of the news stories were published between October 28-October 31 (see Figure 4).




Figure 4 Distribution of news stories by date and newspaper

Depending on the positionality of a text's author and/or animator (following the typology employed by Goffman, 1981) and the publisher (e.g., newspaper) within the broader discourse, how a particular version of reality was conveyed to recipients in editorial communication occurred through framing. Entman (1993) defined framing as "select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (p. 52). The concept of frames (e.g., van Gorp, 2010) was important to take into account because they had a significant influence over the individual and public opinion formation process (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989)—in this research, over how they made meaning of the nation and the centenary, and the public life of their cities. Both the text, and the audio-visual material that accompanied it, had a semiotic aspect. How the event was represented in the discourse(s) potentially illuminates the public value orientations that were leveraged for its

actualization and execution (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Therefore, how information was processed in the mediation process held significant weight for spatially and temporally delimited event and was a crucial aspect of the discourse.

Frame analysis is a widely used research methodology in communications studies and have previously been used for in a wide variety of topics (e.g., natural disasters, policy analysis, organizational research) (Hawdon et al., 2014; Osei Fordwour & Sikanku, 2022; Vu & Lynn, 2020) including national days (Ben-Aaron, 2005; Yeshambel & Bayable, 2016) with both quantitative and qualitative approaches employed in its execution. While frame analysis can also be used to have a clearer insight into the historical evolution of recurring events (e.g., Ben-Aaron, 2005), event-related frame analyses typically focus on a specific time period around with the peak public interest (e.g., in the aftermath of a tragedy, or in the build-up and subsequent reporting of a scheduled event). As Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011) underscored, frames evolve not solely through agency of individual journalists and editorial teams; rather, they are simultaneously shaped by organizational as well as broader social, cultural, and economic factors. Therefore, how and the extent to which certain frames are used can be considered as context-dependent, reflecting societal value orientations, popular public opinions as well as conflicts and tensions—resultant of a collective process of negotiation in the public sphere.

In this stage of the research, the analysis of the news stories involved their evaluation vis-à-vis generic frames—using a deductive approach (Linström & Marais, 2012)—that were applicable to different contexts and social and political issues (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The frames included in the research were commonality and (its counter-frame) ostracism, demonization, call to action, affirmation of republican values, attribution of responsibility, mythicizing and (its counter-frame) idolization, consequence, and morality (Carey, 2008;

Hutcheson et al., 2004; İşeri et al., 2019; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Most of these frames were previously used in research on Turkey's mediascape with the exception of (mythicizing's counter-frame) idolization, which, in the context of this research, was deemed necessary to include to get a nuanced frames concerning the different personalities (e.g., founding leaders, contemporary figures) and historical eras (e.g., foundation era of the republic, contemporary era) reflecting the context-dependent nature of frames (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Broadly speaking, the mythicizing frame centred on the founding period of Turkey and its key historical figures (e.g., Mustafa Kemal Atatürk [founder and first president], İsmet İnönü [first prime minister and second president]) as well as their secular/Kemalist narrative whereas idolization frame focused on contemporary political figures, most notably President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and aligned with the perspective of the government and its supporters. In addition to the frames, the analysis also included questions about the content of the news stories—more specifically, whether they referred to specific events, including whether they referred to the focal events of the study (i.e., those organized by the President's Office's and IBB). Table 4 provides an outline of the frames included in the analysis and the full list of questions is provided in Appendix C.

The analysis included a referential qualitative coding process that involves the connection between the news stories with readers' own experiences (Michelle, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Two independent raters, both native Turkish speakers and residents, were involved in the coding process that included both the written (e.g., word choices, sentence structures, key words) and the technical elements (e.g., quotations, visual content) (Linström & Marais, 2012) that are used in "helping accomplish the regular reproduction of social hierarchy and emotional order embodied in 'the nation's birthday'" (Ben-Aaron, 2005, p. 716). The coders answered each question in the list (see Appendix C) for each news story with yes or no, resulting

in a quantified outline of the frame usage patterns. If at least one of the questions for any of the frame was coded as affirmative, the news story was considered to use the frame in question; therefore it was possible for each news story to be coded into multiple frames as well as none (see e.g., İşeri et al., 2019).

Inter-rater agreement for nominal data was measured with Cohen's Kappa (Cohen, 1960) which is a reliability coefficient that calculates the true agreement between two raters by adjusting for chance agreement. The reliability analysis was conducted on R with the "kappa2()" function from the "irr" package (version 0.84.1) (Gamer et al., 2012). A total of 1,187 observations was evaluated in the analysis that indicated an unweighted Kappa value (Cohen, 1968) of 0.554 suggesting a moderate level of agreement between raters. Since the data were nominal, weighted Kappa was not considered relevant for evaluation and, hence, not computed.

Table 4 Outline of the frames used in the analysis

Frame	Explanation	Reference
Commonality	• Sense of national unity • Nationalistic feelings	Carey (2008)
Ostracism	• Counter-frame for commonality • Sense of division between social groups • Different ideological beliefs or racial identity • Expression of otherness	İşeri et al. (2019)
Demonization	• Depiction of groups as evil • Feelings of outrage and hate	Hutcheson et al. (2004)
Call to Action	• Collective experiences and mobilization of citizens • Call to action as call of duty	İşeri et al. (2019)
Affirmation of Republican Values	• Democracy, liberty, and public' sovereignty • Defence of republican values	Hutcheson et al. (2004)
Attribution of Responsibility	• Solution to a problem • Government's perceived ability to solve a problem • Responsibility for a problem	Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)
Mythicising	• Historical individuals or groups • Martyrdom and veterans	İşeri et al. (2019)
Idolization	• Counter-frame for mythicizing • Contemporary individuals or groups • Martyrdom and veterans in contemporary era	
Consequence	• Political, social, or economic consequences	Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)
Morality	• Religious values and God • Social prescriptions and behaviour	Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)

6.3.3 Centenary and the events

According to the official announcements made in the weeks leading up to the national day, the main events of the IBB and the President's Office were scheduled to take part in three locations, i.e., Taksim and Üsküdar Squares (by the President's Office) and Maltepe Event Space (MES) (by IBB). While a light show was originally planned by IBB in Üsküdar according to an internal memorandum, it was presumably cancelled in tandem with the presidential celebration program. Figure 5 provides the geographical position of each location in the city. The programs organized by each organization were announced through press releases; subsequently, IBB used a variation of its visual on the press release (see Figure 6) in different formats throughout the city (e.g., billboards).




Figure 5 Event locations in Istanbul



Figure 6 Promotional material for IBB's event

Self-evidently, there are certain straightforward features of an event that influences the emergence of a public. As mentioned previously, these features include, but are not limited to, the public space in which the event takes place (e.g., accessibility, symbolism), the animation strategy/ strategies employed, and the content of the animation (e.g., if eventification involves a concert, who performs). It is worth remembering that animation projects may temporarily alter the publicness of spaces, but not always by intent (Layton & Latham, 2022; Smith, 2017). For example, animation projects may require road closures, temporary pedestrianization, changes in

public transportation network, as well as alterations to the accessibility of the spaces. Similarly, the transformation of spaces may be accompanied by limiting entrance and/ or outsider gaze (to which ticketed events in public parks is an example; see Layton & Latham, 2022). These changes have direct (e.g., limited entrance) and indirect (e.g., changes in the transportation network) influences on who becomes part of public in that space that is called into existence through the animation project. Through such strategic choices, those who conceive the space also influence how it is or will be experienced by urban inhabitants (Lefebvre, 1991).

Prior to the national day event, 15 research assistants, 13 of whom were undergraduate students at local universities, were recruited for the data collection process to visually document the eventified spaces. An initial in-person meeting with the team was organized on October 13 to provide an overview of the research project which included the main spatial features of interest that would facilitate gaining a better insight into the publicness of the space. Although the initial plan was for all team members to be present on IBB's main event site, upon receiving updated news on the two-day nature of IBB's events and the activities planned by the President's Office in two prominent public spaces in Turkey, it was deemed necessary to devise a strategy to make sure that the relevant sites were covered over the entire weekend.

To get a better sense of the public spaces in question, a preliminary visit to the MES, still under construction at the time, was scheduled for October 25 by one of the team members. Taksim and Üsküdar Squares were surveyed by the researcher on October 27. Based on the physical features of the spaces in question, research assistants were allocated to three sites: six and seven team members were present in the MES on October 28 and 29, respectively; four and three team members were arranged to cover Taksim and Üsküdar Squares on October 29, respectively. On October 28, the researcher and the coordinating team member in Maltepe

arrived at the site at 11.30 am to document the perimeter of the event venue and its surrounding spaces. Upon the opening of the gates, the event venue was documented with the least number of attendees present in the space. Research assistants were instructed to work in pairs to collect visual documentation of the site characteristics throughout the day for understanding the parameters that may influence their publicness, particularly about control mechanisms employed (e.g., access points, security measures) and the physical configuration and the commercial elements in the space (Németh & Schmidt, 2007; Smith, 2017; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010), event participants interactions with the built environment and the activities that were incorporated into the event setting as part of the conceived (i.e., top-down interventions) and the lived space (i.e., bottom-up interventions) (Glover, 2020; Lefebvre, 1991).

Teams were coordinated by the researcher using a text-messaging application and hourly check-ins with the teams were used to monitor the fieldwork on both days. In case the research assistants could not record a particular observation, the relevant information was shared in these chat groups. Observations in Maltepe ended at 11.30 p.m. on both days. Team members in Taksim were redirected to the shoreline on the European side at 8 p.m. on October 29, where the fieldwork ended at 9.30 p.m. as the crowds had dispersed by then. Similarly, by 9 p.m., the crowd in Üsküdar Square also dissipated and the fieldwork was adjourned at 9.30 p.m.

The collected data from the event sites amounted to photo and video recordings in excess of 4,000. The data were transferred by the research assistants to the researcher in the week following the event using a cloud hosting service. The collected data were qualitatively analysed for indicators of publicness (Németh & Schmidt, 2011) in tandem with the collected group chat data for cross-referencing with the timestamps included in the meta-data of visuals. While this framework is often used to quantify publicness in different urban public spaces, a qualitative

interpretation of these parameters allowed for a scoping evaluation of the spaces that were eventified as part of the centenary that had diverse characteristics and thereby different roles in the socio-cultural life of the city. In the analysis, the visual data were analysed under the guiding themes of (1) access and territoriality, (2) surveillance and policing, and (3) design and image, on the conceived level; and to their corresponding categories of (1) entry/exit and crowd formation, (2) security, and (3) experiencing the animated space, in the lived space. The findings compiled in this stage of the research was also reviewed by research assistants in the relevant sites in a peer debriefing process (Janesick, 2007).

Chapter 7

Findings

The purpose of this research is to investigate the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and to examine how public(s) were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul. As outlined in the conceptual model (see Figure 1), the research differentiated between three different levels of abstraction that started with the political leadership's vision for the value orientations that fostered collectivization on the level of the nation. The second stage of abstraction concerned the representation of the centenary in the mediascape, which included both the mediation of the content from the political arena and the representation of centenary-related events. The third stage was the physical manifestation of hallmark events for the centenary in Istanbul organized by the central government and the IBB. In what follows, the findings of this research on these levels of abstraction are presented to address the following research questions:

(1) Which public value orientations did the political leadership(s) address and employ in influencing the construction of the public(s) for the hallmark event of the national day celebrations in Istanbul?; and

(2) How did the hallmark events of the national day celebrations in Istanbul materialize in their respective public space(s)?

The first section of this chapter focuses on the discursive strategies of political leadership in the abstract public sphere, followed by how the media organizations framed the centenary-related developments when conveying them to the publics. These discursive elements in the abstract public sphere provided the context in which centenary celebrations occurred in Istanbul's public realm, which is introduced in the third section.

7.1 Shaping the Abstract Public Sphere: Political Leadership in the Centenary

This section focuses on the political leadership's vision statements as context-setting elements in the abstract public sphere which constituted the highest stage of abstraction in this research. Its primary focus was the discursive construction of the nation (i.e., abstract public sphere) which included its idealized (politically favoured) aspirations and the political authorities' preferred value orientations (i.e., governmentality) as it related to those who identified themselves as part of the imagined community of the nation. With the aim of understanding the nuanced approaches of different political factions, the speeches delivered by the leaders of the largest political alliances—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president and the leader of the governing party and the People Alliance, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the opposition and the presidential candidate of Nation Alliance—during the 2023 general election period were analysed. In the reporting of these speeches, both the president's and opposition leader's speeches were coded chronologically, as listed in Appendices A and B.

However, before starting with the examination of the political speeches delivered by the president and the leader of the opposition in the months leading to a general election, it is important to remember the context in which these speeches took place. First, starting with late 2021, Turkey started experiencing the outcomes of significant budget and reserve deficits which led to a significant devaluation of its currency; and the policies enacted to stabilize the currency, combined with systemic issues and monetary policies, culminated in rampant inflation. Second, in early February 2023, a dual earthquake hit the southeastern part of Turkey in which officially more than 50 thousand people died and a considerable portion of the infrastructure and superstructure in the region was destroyed or damaged. The elections were announced roughly one month following the earthquake. Understandably, the response to the earthquake had a

significant presence in the political arena—both in terms of the contents of the political speeches delivered and in terms of where the speeches were held.

7.1.1 The state of the earthquake

During the pre-election stage, the President made 17 speeches in provinces impacted by the earthquake. Except for 15 of the total of 79 presidential addresses, earthquake-related content is incorporated into presidential speeches in diverse forms, such as rebuilding frameworks and supports provided to inhabitants of affected regions, which included eight groundbreaking ceremonies for housing and turnkey ceremonies for completed post-earthquake constructions. Using earthquake-struck regions, more specifically the relocation efforts of the affected population that was funded by the central government, the president described the state as "not Hakim-ül Haremeyn but Hadimü'l Haremeyn" (P37, p. 4) which used the title of the historical Islamic sultans' title as the protector as opposed to being the ruler of the areas surrounding Mecca and Medina (Yavuz, 1997).

While the earthquake's centrality in the speeches declined over time (excluding in speeches made in the affected region), in the propaganda period prior to the second round of presidential elections, the earthquake and the earthquake-affected communities was predominantly utilized to criticize how the opposition—and those that supported it—reacted to receiving a minority vote in the general elections in most of the region. For example, on May 20, 2023, in his speech during a meeting with the youth program (P71, p. 3), the president criticized the opposition:

> We will hopefully retire those who play with the nerves of this nation just to prolong their political lives for 3-5 day. Together, we will save this country from those with a political

language that is getting ugly—even filthy. Think about it, 11 provinces in the earthquake region, could anyone insult these people in the earthquake-stricken region to this extent?

Siyasi ömürlerini 3-5 gün daha uzatmak için milletin sinir uçlarıyla oynayanları inşallah sizlerin desteğiyle siyasetten emekli edeceğiz. Çirkinleşen ve hatta çirkefleşen bir siyaset dilinin sahiplerinden bu ülkeyi hep birlikte kurtaracağız. Düşünün, yani şu 11 şehir deprem bölgesi bu deprem bölgesindeki insanlara bu denli hakaretler edilir mi?

With such an approach, the President attempted to position the opposition leadership in a morally ambiguous position for his audience by constructing a humanitarian vs. political dichotomy aimed to solidify his superior position by underscoring the governments' investments on May 21 (P72, p.1), 2023 in areas where he received less than 10% of the popular vote:

Now, they told us; right here, Kılıçdaroğlu, "bye bye" Kemal[1], received 90 percent of the votes. So? You got eight percent. These do not concern us, [what matters is] whether my citizens live here, whether there was an earthquake here, are there dead or injured, I love the created because of the Creator. We don't discriminate—sects, dispositions, race—we don't have it in our religion nor in our book.

Şimdi bize dediler ki; işte burada Kılıçdaroğlu, bay bay Kemal yüzde 90 oy aldı. Eee? Siz yüzde 8 aldınız. Bizi bunlar ilgilendirmez, burada benim vatandaşım yaşıyor mu, burada deprem oldu mu, ölenler, yaralılar var mı, ben yaratılanı Yaradan'dan ötürü severim. Biz ayrım yapamayız, mezhep, meşrep, ırk, böyle bir şey bizim dinimizde de yok, kitabımızda da yok.

[1] The President referred to the opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as "bye bye Kemal" during the election period to signify his expectation that this election is the latest in his political career.

Meanwhile, mention of the earthquake was largely absent in the opposition leader's speeches—only eleven speeches mentioned "earthquake." The main focus point of the opposition when invoking earthquakes was to reiterate the state's responsibility to improve the affected communities' livelihood and to finance the rebuilding efforts (which the government pledged to partially do) by attributing the responsibility of destruction to state institutions tasked with ensuring constructions' compatibility with regulations and bylaws—just like the following statement in Adana on May 8, 2023 (O36, p. 2) exemplified:

> I promised; I will build all your homes, workplaces, and barns to withstand and earthquake and will not take one penny. Because those people are not at fault at all. They [i.e., governmental institutions] saw 43 signatures on 23 documents[2], and allowed them to be sold because they were earthquake-proof. Then [the citizen] went and bought the apartment with one signature [thinking they're safe]. So, if there's anyone responsible, it is those who do not do right by the rights and laws of those buildings: it is those who do not construct the buildings to withstand earthquakes.
>
> *Söz verdim; bütün evlerinizi, işyerlerinizi, ahırlarınızı depreme dayanıklı yeniden inşa edeceğim ve bir kuruş para almayacağım. Çünkü o insanların hiçbir kabahati yok. Onlar 23 belgede 43 imzayı gördüler, binalar depreme dayanıklı diye satışına izin verdiler. O da gitti tapuda tek imza attı ve dairesini satın aldı. Dolayısıyla sorumlu varsa; o binaların hakkını, hukukunu teslim etmeyen, yani binaları depreme dirençli, dayanıklı halde yapmayanlardır.*

[2] These numbers refer to the number of permits that need to be obtained for building construction and the number of the officials whose signatures are needed on those permits.

In other instances where "earthquake" is mentioned by the opposition leader, he was not necessarily referring to the February 2023 earthquakes, but rather the sites of previous major earthquakes in Turkey (e.g., Van in 2011, İzmir and Elazığ in 2020) to underscore that the rebuilding strategies implemented in these regions were yet to be completed and positioned these as examples whose fate provided indications for what would follow the most recent earthquake's impact zone.

As these framings of the earthquake suggest, the President used the state's and government's actions in the aftermath of the earthquake as part of the infrastructural development frameworks his government established in the course of their political power by providing timelines and indicative, albeit aspirational, examples to support the development of popular public opinion on how the earthquake's impacts would be managed. By contrast, the opposition framed the devastation caused by the earthquake as the result of mismanagement and oversight failures to attribute the responsibility to the government. In other words, the output-oriented focus in the post-earthquake discourse heralded by the President was contrasted with a process-oriented focus on governmental action by the opposition.

7.1.2 The state of the society

An important aspect of the political speeches of both the President and the opposition leader was the state of Turkey's contemporary societal structures. Both leaders reiterated the importance of overcoming divisions in society and discriminatory practices.

7.1.2.1 Polarization

The main approach employed by the President in this regard was mainly concerned with the relationship between the state and the society as a unified entity—which also alluded in typical endings to his speeches "One nation… One flag… One country… One State"—

predominantly to remind the audience about his government's past actions (e.g., lifting the headscarf ban in universities). In his speech on April 19, 2023 (P45, p. 1):

> We will not exclude anyone who has dreams for their country and are concerned for the future of their country. With Turks, Kurds, Laz, Arabs, Immigrants, Sunnis, Alevites, we as 85 million will be one and together. … We will not be baited by those who want to transform political competition into political enmity.
>
> *Ülkesi için hayal kuran, ülkesinin geleceği için dertlenen hiçbir insanımızı dışarıda bırakmayacağız. Türk'üyle, Kürt'üyle, Laz'ıyla, Arap'ıyla, Muhacir'iyle, Sünni'siyle, Alevi'siyle 85 milyon bir ve beraber olacağız. … Siyasi rekabeti siyasi husumete dönüştürmek isteyenlerin oyununa gelmeyeceğiz.*

The commonality aspect underlined by the president, while acknowledging some differences in the society, laid the emphasis on the attributes that had the potential to facilitate some form of higher collectiveness, albeit in relatively abstract terms: "So long as we stake a claim on our unity, our togetherness, our fellowship, our common future, our common dreams, and our common goals, the rest will follow [*Yeter ki biz birliğimize, beraberliğimize, kardeşliğimize, ortak geleceğimize, ortak hayallerimize, ortak hedeflerimize sahip çıkalım, gerisi kendiliğinden gelecektir*]" (P4, p. 2). When one looks at the different communities mentioned by the President in the first example quote, one can immediately see that ethnic roots and religious sects were utilized to highlight the differences in Turkey's society and their desire to entice these diverse groups for political support through the common elements mentioned in the latter. The sectarian differences has a particular relevance in this context, as the opposition leader made a reference to his Alevi identity in a video circulated on social media (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXGiLwDvBSA). While the President uttered "we respect

Alevis, we respect all species" in a speech on April 30, 2023 (https://www.youtube.com/shorts/gd9H587ysLA), he adopted a more cautious and critical tone in his speech on the following day, May 1, 2023 (P61, p. 5):

> "Bye bye" Kemal says, I'm Alevi. What's it to us of your Alevism? Have we ever criticized you for something like that? Congratulations, how beautiful. But you weren't talking about it until today. What happened that made you say it now? … Whether you're Alevi, or this or that, none of this, "bye bye" Kemal, concern us.
>
> *Bay bay Kemal diyor ki, ben Aleviyim. Ya senin Aleviliğinden bize ne? Biz böyle bir şeyden dolayı seni eleştirdik mi? Hayırlı olsun, ne kadar güzel. Ama bugüne kadar sen bunu hiç söylemiyordun, ne oldu da şimdi söyledin? … Sen Alevi olmuşsun, şu olmuşsun-bu olmuşsun, bunların hiç birisi bay bay Kemal bizi ilgilendirmiyor.*

Throughout the speeches, there was one group explicitly excluded by the President from his construction of the society: LGBT communities, and, in a broader understanding LGBTists (*LGBT'ciler*) encompassing a larger portion of the society that supports LGBTQ+ communities whom "we as the People Alliance unequivocally oppose [*Cumhur İttifakı olarak LGBT'nin tam manasıyla karşısındayız*]" (P52, p. 6), as exemplified in the extended excerpt that follows (P67, p. 3):

> I have to speak candidly here; this CHP is LGBTist. This İYİ Parti is LGBTist. This HADEP[3] is LGBTist. Those who walk alongside them, since they can't say no to them, they are too LGBTists.

[3] HADEP (People's Democracy Party [*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*]) was a pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey active between 1994 and 2003 and can be considered a predecessor to HDP, which is the main addressee in this statement. Why HADEP instead of HDP is used remains unclear.

> LGBT can't leak into AK Parti, not into MHP, LGBT can't leak into People Alliance. Because we believe in the sanctity of the family institution. Without strong families, you can't be a strong nation. This is where we get our strength from.
>
> *Burada açık konuşmak zorundayım; bu CHP LGBT'cidir. Bu İYİ Parti LGBT'cidir. Bu HADEP LGBT'cidir. Onlarla beraber yol yürüyenler bunlara hayır diyemediklerine göre, onlar da LGBT'cidir.*
>
> *AK Parti'nin içine LGBT sızamaz, MHP'ye sızamaz, Cumhur İttifakı'na LGBT sızamaz. Çünkü biz aile kurumunun kutsiyetine inanıyoruz. Eğer güçlü aileler olmazsa, güçlü millet olamazsınız. İşte biz de gücümüzü buradan alıyoruz.*

As evident in this passage, the "LGBTist communities," as branded by the presidential discourse were positioned as a threat to building a strong nation—i.e., "what makes nations are strong families, and strong families don't have LGBT in them [*milletleri millet yapan güçlü ailelerdir ve bu güçlü ailelerin içinde LGBT olmaz*]" (P50, p. 3)—as these communities and the political actors supporting them were deemed "neither domestic nor national … [who] set their eyes on our boys and girls [*ne yerli ne millidir. Erkek ve kız evlatlarımıza göz diken*]" trying to "make our kids and youth into appetizers to deviant trends [*çocuklarımızı, gençlerimizi sapkın akımların mezesi yapmak için*]" (P26, p. 3) and viewed these efforts as threats to previous governmental actions (P45, p. 3):

> These have all types of ignominy including converting Hagia Sophia back into a museum. Fellows, we are against LGBT, People Alliance is against LGBT, CHP is LGBTist, HPD [sic] is LGBTist, unfortunately İYİ Parti[4] too is LGBTist, have you ever

[4] The "unfortunate" aspect in this statement is presumably the fact that İYİ Parti—an off-shoot of nationalist MHP, a key ally of president in the People Alliance—allied with the opposition in 2023 election period.

heard them say anything suggesting otherwise? We will never compromise the primary values of this nation.

Ayasofya'yı tekrar müze yapma vaadine kadar bunlarda her türlü kepazelik var. Kardeşlerim; biz LGBT'ye karşıyız, Cumhur İttifakı LGBT'ye karşı. CHP LGBT'ci, HPD LGBT'ci, ne yazık ki İYİ Parti de LGBT'ci, bunların aykırı bir şey söylediğini duydunuz mu? Bu milletin asli değerlerinden taviz vermeyeceğiz.

In light of such statements, one may assert that, except for the "LGBTists," the presidential rhetoric was distant from explicitly excluding any communities from its conceptualization of the unitary collective entity of the society. With regard to different religious sects, how Alevis were positioned remains ambiguous in the discourse—in a sense, the opposition leader's statements on being an Alevi initiated its partial inclusion in the presidential speeches. Except for a few Freudian slips, however, the official discourse on the topic of Alevis, though arguably somewhat adversarial, remain intact.

In contrast to the president's elaboration on the relationship between political actors and the society, the opposition leader, in his speeches, aimed to maintain a focus on the state of Turkey's society, more specifically on the social divisions and polarization allegedly fostered through the actions of the government (O35, p. 3):

We're very divided, very polarized. We almost started to view each other as enemies. I will get Turkey out of this. I'll be the President of 85 million people. Not of a specific group, or a specific walk of life, I'll serve as the President of 85 million. You will see this and I want you to believe in it. Because only together will we be strong. Only with each other will we be strong. Only if we bring justice will we be strong.

Çok kamplaştık, çok kutuplaştık. Neredeyse birbirimizi düşman gibi görmeye başladık. Buradan Türkiye'yi çıkaracağım. 85 milyonun Cumhurbaşkanı olacağım. Bir grubun değil, bir kesimin değil, 85 milyonun Cumhurbaşkanı olarak görev yapacağım. Bunu göreceksiniz ve buna inanmanızı istiyorum, Çünkü beraber olursak güçlü oluruz, birlikte olursak güçlü oluruz, adaleti getirirsek güçlü oluruz.

One of the common phrases that appeared in the opposition leader's speeches was "othering [*ötekileştirmek*]", with particular reference to identities, belief systems, and lifestyles. While the concept of othering remained predominantly on an abstract level (as opposed to the president's speeches), it was often linked with justice which commonly surfaced with a religiously flared rationale, quite similar to how the president uttered "I love the created because of the Creator [*ben yaratılanı Yaradan'dan ötürü severim*]" (e.g., P73, p. 1). As articulated by the opposition leader (O9, p. 2) and with a striking commonalities with the president's wording (see p. 75):

> The religion of the state is justice. Holy Creator has built the universe on the principles of justice. You don't deviate from justice, you don't divide people by their identities or by their beliefs, you don't "other" anyone. Human is the Creator's holiest creation. So, … discriminating among people is not a part of us, it's not in our book.
>
> *Devletin dini adalettir. Yüce Yaradan kâinatı adalet üzerine inşa etmiştir. Adaletten sapmayacaksınız, insanları kimlikleriyle, insanları inançlarıyla ayrıştırmayacaksınız, kimseyi ötekileştirmeyeceksiniz. İnsan Yüce Yaradan'ın yarattığı eşref-i mahlûktur, yani en yüce varlıktır. Dolayısıyla … insanlar arasında ayrımcılık yapmak bizde yoktur, bizim kitabımızda yoktur.*

As these examples illustrated, there were certain attributes amplified in the political speeches that explicitly indicated areas of societal polarization. The president positioned LGBT communities (and, more broadly, "LGBTists") as being incompatible with the values of the nation as a unified social entity. In terms of the religious practices within the society, the president seemingly trivialized the sectarian differences by minimizing the adversarial tone but nonetheless utilized it in the speeches. The opposition, on the other hand, maintained an abstract notion of inclusiveness and highlighted the need to address societal polarization in which he suggested discrimination and polarization as being incompatible with the divine principles, i.e., the concept of justice was positioned as a fundamental aspect of the universe and the state by evoking a religiously flared rhetoric. The section that follows focuses on how the president and the opposition leader construct justice in their speeches.

7.1.2.2 Justice

The president's speeches underscored the legislative changes they enacted in their political tenure and these changes' impact on minimizing unjust practices in Turkey, by focusing predominantly on lifting the restrictions on religious symbols in the public realm, a key point of social conflict since the early years of the republic (P67, p. 5):

> We expanded the rights and freedoms of all groups in the society. Before us, there were restrictions on headscarves, on how to dress. We removed them. There was injustice towards *imam hatips* [high schools for training religious personnel] and vocational high schools. We ended it. People weren't living their beliefs freely. We changed it.
>
> *Toplumun tüm kesimlerinin hak ve özgürlük alanlarını genişlettik. Bizden önce bu ülkede başörtüsü, kılık kıyafet yasakları vardı, kaldırdık. İmam hatiplere ve meslek liselerine*

adaletsiz yapılıyordu, sonlandırdık. İnsanlar inançlarını özgürce yaşayamıyorlardı, değiştirdik.

Drawing on this statement, the domain of justice varied significantly between the presidential and opposition discourses where the former positioned justice (i.e., the legislative and judicial apparatus) alongside other domains of political and governmental action and used a variation of the following statement multiple times in his speeches (P1, p. 2):

> Over the past 20 years, the strong infrastructure we built in education and healthcare, in security and justice, in transportation and energy, in industry and agriculture, in sport and social security constitute the foundation of this advantage [in becoming a global production hub].
>
> *Geçtiğimiz 20 yılda eğitimden sağlığa, güvenlikten adalete, ulaşımdan enerjiye, sanayiden tarıma, spordan sosyal güvenliğe kadar her alanda ülkemize kazandırdığımız güçlü altyapı bu avantajın temelini oluşturuyor.*

The president associated the opposition leader's stance regarding justice with aiding separatist terrorists—more specifically, by releasing the former leader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, from prison to whom the opposition leader did not allude in his speeches. This way, he was able to assert that "Turkey is not a terror state. Turkey is a state that is governed with justice, where right is the ruler [*Türkiye, bir terör devleti değildir. Türkiye, adaletle hükmedilen, hakkın egemen olduğu bir devlettir*]" (P36, p. 3). He used this rhetoric to suggest in P67 (p. 5):

> As 85 million, we have all watched the preview of the Turkey governed by these. We have all seen their yearning for a *dikta* [dictatorial regime] that is hidden behind the terms spring, peace, and justice with our own eyes. Not just us, all of 85 million irrespective of their political affiliation has seen and followed this disgrace. I know very well that none

of my citizens that love their country and their nation, even though they may have different worldviews, condones what happened.

Bunların yönettiği Türkiye'nin fragmanını geçtiğimiz 2 ay içinde 85 milyon olarak hep birlikte izledik. Bahar, barış, adalet kavramları arkasına saklanan dikta heveslerini bizzat kendi gözlerimizle gördük. Sadece biz değil, hangi siyasi partiye gönül verirse versin 85 milyonun tamamı bu rezillikleri gördü, takip etti. Dünya görüşü farklı olsa da, ülkesini ve milletini seven hiçbir vatandaşımın yaşananları tasvip etmediğini çok iyi biliyorum.

The concept of justice was central to the opposition's discourse, albeit in an abstract fashion. In five of his speeches, the opposition leader quoted from Saadi (Shirazi), a thirteenth century Iranian poet and writer (stylized in speeches as a "wise man" [*bilge*]): "All the rivers of the world would not suffice to quench the thirst of someone thirsty for justice [*Adalete susamış bir insanın susuzluğunu gidermeye dünyanın bütün nehirleri yetmez*]" and in addition to the discriminatory practices or othering, it was also explicitly connected to other issues, such as the economic hardships, rural-urban migration, and the modes of PA in Turkey.

When talking about economic hardships, certain concepts were highlighted in speeches:

(1) Unemployment "the mother of all evil [*bütün kötülüklerin anası*]" (O12, p. 2)

Unemployment, particularly among the members of the younger generation was one of the most important subjects throughout the opposition leader's speeches. In fact, in most of his speeches, the opposition leader appealed to younger voters by highlighting high rates of unemployment and contrasting them with those who were appointed to multiple salaried positions in state institutions and nepotism that materialized through interview-based hiring processes (in addition to central examinations) as the following illustrative quotes suggest:

Everybody is content with their lives in the Palace. Everyone's in good spirits. There are some who get paid from three positions, five positions. But the kid of the poor has finished university, is unemployed, looking for a job for years and can't find one. (O38, p. 2)

Saray'da herkes hayatından memnun. Herkesin keyfi yerinde. 3 yerden, 5 yerden maaş alanlar var. Ama garibanın çocuğu üniversiteyi bitirmiş, işsiz, yıllardır iş arıyor, iş bulamıyor.

You'll take KPSS [central Public Servant Selection Examination], you'll succeed, and you'll be appointed immediately. We'll finish nepotism. You'll get a position if you have an uncle. But the poor doesn't have an uncle. What will happen than? Will they be unprotected [literal translation, unowned]. No sir, Mr. Kemal will be their guardian. Don't you worry, Mr. Kemal will be the guardian of the poors. (O14, p. 3)

KPSS'ye gireceksiniz, başarılı olacaksınız, atamanız hemen yapılacak. Torpili bitireceğiz, torpili. Efendim dayın varsa giriyorsun. İyi de garibanın dayısı yok. Peki ne olacak? Sahipsiz mi olacak? Hayır efendim, onun sahibi Bay Kemal olacak. Hiç endişe etmeyin, bütün garibanların sahibi Bay Kemal olacak.

As these examples show, unemployment was positioned primarily as a problem rooted in the governance system that procedurally allowed preferential treatment and suggested that a structured public hiring process as a potential remedy for unemployment, indicating the perceived need of transparency in the process.

(2) Pension system;

Pension system in Turkey has traditionally been one of the most politically valuable tools of government in the last decades as efforts to increase retirement age, which put newer generations of the workforce at a disadvantaged position, were commonly circumvented by policy interventions to grant those meeting certain criteria an early retirement option (including in 2023)—leading to an unbalanced ratio between the active workforce and the number of retirees which had, over time, culminated in decreased benefits and pension payments to retirees who were disproportionately affected by economic hardships, "if you give retirees less than the hunger threshold, then there is no justice there [*emekliye açlık sınırının altında aylık veriyorsan orada adalet yok demektir*]" (O18, p. 3):

> Do you know what a retiree is? This is what retirees are; they are those who worked with great effort for this country to grow, for this country to develop, those who strive, earn, make a living, pay their pension contributions—because it's deducted from their salaries—and contribute to Turkey's development, those, when the time comes, retire and ask for a good life. One retires but can't make a living. (O11, p. 3)
>
> *Emekli ne demektir biliyor musunuz? Emekli şu demektir; bu ülkenin büyümesi için, bu ülkenin kalkınması için alın teri döken, çaba harcayan, kazanan, geçimini sağlayan, sosyal güvenlik primini ödeyen- çünkü maaşından kesiliyor- Türkiye'nin kalkınmasına katkıda bulunan, zamanı gelince de emekli olan ve güzel bir hayat sürmek isteyen kişi demektir. Kişi emekli oluyor, geçinemiyor.*

In the public pension system as well, the opposition leader underlined the difficulty for retirees to make a decent living due to the structural changes in the pension system, which positioned (prospective) retirees at a significant economic disadvantage.

(3) Family support insurance;

In the opposition leader's discourse, "the state is the one that stands by the down-and-outs [*Fakir fukaranın yanında duran devlettir*]" (O15, p. 3) and the social support mechanisms designed by the state should operate on the principles of discretion ("the right hand will not see what the left hand gives [*sağ elin verdiğini sol el görmeyecek*]"). At the centre of the opposition's social support framework directed to families were women (e.g., O34, p. 3):

> No women will be unprotected in this country. Social state will be every woman's guardian. I have a promise to you. I will bring Family Support insurance. You'll see, I will build a Turkey where no child goes to bed hungry. … A family's water will never be cut, electricity will never be cut, natural gas will never be cut. If there is poverty, if there is destitution in this country, it is not the poor that is responsible for it, rather it is those who govern the state.
>
> *Hiçbir kadın bu ülkede sahipsiz olmayacak. Her kadının sahibi sosyal devlet olacak. Ve benim size sözüm var. Aile Destekleri Sigortası'nı getireceğim. Göreceksiniz, hiçbir çocuğun yatağa aç girmediği bir Türkiye inşa edeceğim. ... Hiçbir ailenin suyu asla kesilmeyecek, elektriği asla kesilmeyecek, doğalgazı asla kesilmeyecek. Eğer bu ülkede fakirlik varsa, yoksulluk varsa sorumlusu fakir olan değil, sorumlusu devleti yönetenler.*

The state, in this context, was viewed to have the responsibility to facilitate economic redistribution and a social safety net to ensure the citizens' continuous access to essential services without politicizing the allocation of resources. However, it is important to underscore that the opposition leader positioned women's role as homemakers, potentially reinforcing the gender-based differences in contribution to economic life which was particularly relevant for rural areas and agricultural production.

(4) Rural communities

The rural-urban migration in Turkey, which has important ramification for agricultural production and food security, was another concerning point for the opposition which was discursively connected to the absence of supporting qualified personnel and state institutions in rural settings. In a sense, the reason for rural-urban migration was viewed as a result of governmental action that relegated these communities to secondary importance and thereby contributing to the rural-urban divide (O32; p. 2):

> Villages will have teachers, imams, agricultural engineers and technicians, veterinary doctors. They will serve the village[r]s. We will revitalize the village. The people living in the village have given up; they come to the city so that their children have an education.
>
> *Köyde öğretmen olacak, imam olacak, ziraat mühendisi, ziraat teknisyeni olacak, veteriner hekim olacak. Köylüye hizmet edecek. Köyü yeniden ayağa kaldıracağız. Köydeki insanlar vazgeçtiler; şehre geliyorlar, evlatlarını okutmak için.*

The illustrative quotes, which appeared multiple times in the opposition leader's speeches (often as word-for-word or with slight modification), positioned the political system—or the past governmental action— as the main culprit of unjust economic distribution and refrained from positioning economic troubles' responsibility to individuals or communities. By positioning the role of the state as the guardian of its citizens—at times, by making a reference to Atatürk's quote "republic is, above all, someone to those with no one [*Cumhuriyet bilhassa kimsesizlerin kimsesidir*]" (e.g., O33, p. 4; O39, p. 2), thus underscoring the republican regime's "duty" to support just distribution of resources and utilizing state resources to support all communities and livelihoods.

These four topics (i.e., unemployment, pension system, family support, rural communities) were not isolated from one another; rather, they were connected through political, economic, and social threads. For the opposition leader, issues with justice system (on an abstract level) were positioned as the state's and government's systemic deficiencies and the main reason for the uneven distribution of economic (and non-economic) resources.

Central to the opposition leader's discourse was the distribution mechanisms of public funding in which he criticized government's reliance on five large corporations that received an overwhelming majority of government's infrastructure-related tenders (to which he referred as Gangs of Five [*Beşli Çete*]) from which the opposition had long claimed to generate disproportionate profits through unrealistic government guarantees in PPP projects (e.g., vehicles using bridges, number of passengers at airports, number of patients at hospitals). Using "Gangs of Five" as the symbolic embodiment of the misappropriation of public funds, he underscored in his speeches that the government's distribution mechanisms for public funds were central to the economic issues for the society (as summarized in four key points above) and the resulting income gap between different population groups that permeated into social and cultural spheres as well. Such practices also had a presence in nationalism debate.

7.1.2.3 Nationalism

In his speeches, the nationalistic approach highlighted by the president was heavily reliant on the national defence sector, more specifically on the rapid development of a "domestic and national" ("*yerli ve milli*") research and development and production of military supplies and equipment. For the president (P10, p. 2),

> We are at the stage of making sure that our defence industry projects that we continue with attention, care, and determination to complement our political and economic power.

> When we achieve this too, God permitting, Turkey Century will no longer be a mere slogan for this country and nation, but a reality.
>
> *Dikkatle, özenle, kararlılıkla sürdürdüğümüz savunma sanayi projelerimizi siyasi ve ekonomik gücümüzün tamamlayıcısı haline getirme safhasındayız. Bunu da başardığımızda, Allah'ın izniyle bu ülkenin ve milletin önünde sadece slogan olarak değil, gerçek manada bir Türkiye yüzyılı başlayacaktır.*

The defence sector as well as the large-scale investment projects had a prominent presence in presidential speeches. In many instances, the examples employed by the president were framed in a historical context, such as the production of a domestic EV as "our nation's 60-year-old dream [*milletimizin 60 yıllık hayali*]" (P28, p. 4) or by evoking "[Mehmet] the Conqueror [who slided navy ships over land in the conquest of Istanbul], we will build Marmaray [i.e., a railway tunnel constructed under the Bosporus] under the sea [*Fatih karadan yürüttü kadırgaları … bizde denizen altından Marmaray'ı yürüteceğiz*]" (P32, p. 3). It is interesting to observe in the president's speeches that the term "nationalist(ic)" appears only once which was utilized to question the nationalism aspect highlighted by the opposition leader and framing their relationship with different political factions (most notably with HDP) as "supporting terrorism" and therefore unnationalistic. In this context, the president described their political alliance as a "voluntary alliance [*hasbi birliktelik*]" as opposed to an "instrumental alliance [*hesabi birliktelik*] (P15, p. 4) that puts the country and nation first.

The opposition adopted a more overt approach in describing their nationalism. While the national defence sector remained a key point in the opposition leader's speeches, his main point of critique remained the political decisions surrounding the national defence industry (O5, p. 3):

> Let me be very clear; defence industry is a national issue, and a national issue cannot be a topic of day-to-day politics, irrespective of your worldview, you have to support defence industry. But you'll support it sincerely. After saying you'll support it, you're not going to give the Tank Track Factory to the Qatari Army.
>
> *Bakın açık ve net söylüyorum; savunma sanayii milli bir meseledir, milli meseleyse sıcak siyasetin konusu olmaz, hangi görüşten olursan ol, savunma sanayiini desteklemek zorundasın. Ama desteği samimi yapacaksın. Destekliyorum deyip Tank Palet Fabrikasını Katar ordusuna vermeyeceksin.*

Despite the prevalence of defence sector in opposition leader's speeches, the concept of nationalism can be viewed to be developed more thoroughly by using border security (by referring to the uncontrolled border crossings of Syrian refugees in the aftermath of the civil war, and Afghan refugees after the withdrawal of the US Armed Forces), Turkey's land overseas (i.e., Tomb of Suleyman Shah in northern Syria), and the closure of military hospitals. Referring to the government's view of nationalism as "seasonal nationalism" ("*mevsimlik milliyetçilik"*) and positioning themselves as "fundamental nationalists" ("*kökten milliyetçi")* (O43, p. 4), the opposition invoked "*Kuva-yi Milliye*[5]" as their guiding principle and positions "flag and country [*bayrak ve vatan*] as their red line with an emphasis on border security. National defence—as an industry and border security—for both political figures, surfaced as the embodiment of their definition of nationalism. However, the president's focus on the "domestic and national" as a contemporary political slogan associated with the political rhetoric of the right-wing governments since the 1960s (see Bora, 2018), whereas the opposition focused on the founding

[5] *Kuva-yi Milliye* refers to the irregular militia forces that were active in the earlier stages of Turkey's War of Independence after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1. *Kuva-yi Milliye* was later incorporated into the regular army controlled by the Turkey's Grand National Assembly.

principles of the republic, namely statism and border security. The next section briefly describes the rhetorical styles employed by the political leadership.

7.1.3 Rhetorical styles

Following this analysis of the contents of the political speeches by the president and the leader of the opposition, it is important to have a closer look into the rhetorical styles employed by these political leaders. Overall, the linguistic styles employed by the president and the opposition leader varied significantly, particularly with regard to the use of historical figures and quotations, word choices in terms of their accessibility, and the literary elements employed.

Religious references constituted an important aspect of president's speeches which included the significance of religious days (e.g., the month of Ramadan, Eid, etc.) and a tendency to use relatively obscure words that were rarely used in everyday language which rendered some portions of the speeches inaccessible to a general audience. The choice of using these words—often derived from Arabic despite having synonyms in contemporary Turkish—complemented and, at times, amplified religious connotations in president's speeches which at times was further strengthened by employing verses from the Qur'an (e.g., P8, p. 3) and other historical literary sayings with religious connotations. Additionally, the president commonly recited poems in his speeches where he mostly refrained from mentioning the name of the poet and opted to anonymize the quotations. While the president made frequent quotations from poets that could be considered conservative and pro-Ottoman (e.g., Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Arif Nihat Asya), his speeches also included verses from poets from the cities in which he was delivering the speech (e.g., Nabi in Şanlıurfa, Ahmed Arif in Diyarbakır) and other widely known poets and scholars (e.g., Yahya Kemal, Yunus Emre, Ziya Paşa).

The rhetorical style of the opposition leader was generally more accessible than that of the president. The opposition leader rarely employed quotations in the speeches and, when he did, it was from a considerably limited pool with relatively higher frequency. Bülent Ecevit, a prominent political figure in Turkish politics starting with the 1960s and the former leader of CHP was quoted most frequently ("Neither oppressed nor oppressor, a humane and just order" [*Ne ezen ne ezilen, insanca hakça bir düzen*]), and the previously mentioned Iranian scholar Saadi, and Plato's quotes were used to criticize the government's practices in terms of justice and accountability.

7.1.4 Section summary

As one would expect, content of the speeches delivered by the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, in the election period primarily concentrated on their proposed actions in the government. While the president tended to focus on his government's past actions (first as prime minister between 2003 and 2014, then as president) by evoking the advancements made in justice system, infrastructure, and national defence projects. Building on these past governmental actions, the president aimed to justify the government's response to the earthquake. The president, however, commonly employed an output-based justification in which the realization of tangible elements (e.g., transportation infrastructure, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.) which were mostly funded through such NPM-related practices as government subsidies, privatization, and PPPs that were increasingly used during AKP's tenure in the government. The prevalence of these methods constituted the foundation of opposition's critique of the government's economic policies that supposedly resulted in a considerable wealth transfer that culminated in social problems by exacerbating polarization in the society. Although both political leaders aimed to adopt an inclusive stance

toward different demographic groups to avoid an exclusionary rhetoric in general, the president explicitly singled out LGBT communities and "LGBTists" in his speeches, and more subtly the sectarian differences in the society.

Although the president and the opposition leader were aligned (in principle) on certain topics such as the importance of national defence, the president's output-oriented outlook was criticized by the opposition leader as he focused on the process of governance concerning them, most notably the privatization of some national defence-related production facilities and infrastructure to foreign entities as well as the favouritism toward certain corporations in public projects. A notable difference between these political factions was border security in which the president adopted a more welcoming approach to refugees, whereas the opposition leader employed a stauncher stance toward border security and remigrating refugees to their origin—a key tenet in his characterization of his political faction's definition of nationalism.

While religious connotations were evident in both political leaders' speeches, the rhetorical style used by the President was more overt in that he both attended religiously oriented venues (e.g., fast-breaking ceremonies during Ramadan), and integrated religious sayings and themes as well as quotations from conservative scholars and writers to a higher extent. The opposition leader's speeches, in terms of the rhetorical style employed and choice of words were more accessible to a general audience compared to those of the president in which the latter tended to use older words that are not part of the contemporary vernacular with a larger frequency. The key points as introduced in this section provided the priorities articulated by political leaderships in the centenary and the next section will focus on the centenary's positioning in the media.

7.2 Gateway to the Publics: Representation of Centenary in the Media

This section focuses on how the centenary was represented in the mediascape over the two-week period between October 23-November 5, 2023, and how centenary-related information was conveyed to the publics by media organizations. The news stories published in this period provided an outline of how different socio-political camps represented centenary and the multitude of events scheduled for the centenary celebrations, including those organized by the President's Office and IBB in Istanbul. Using the news stories published in eight purposefully selected news outlets, a frame analysis was conducted (see Table 4 in *Methodology*). The following subsections provide a descriptive outline about the employment of frames in the 445 news stories concerned with the centenary in three layers of specificity starting with the entire dataset. In the second subsection, the frame usage in the news stories that related to a specific event concerning centenary celebrations are provided. In the third layer, the focus is on the news stories concerned with the events organized by President's Office and IBB.

7.2.1 All news stories

Commonality had the highest frequency among the frames that were employed in the news stories related to the centenary (n=360, 81%). Considering the commonality frame was about national unity and written and visual information about nationalistic values, this high frequency in all the newspapers in the sample was expected. As one may imagine, there was a higher usage of images displaying crowds with the national flag and symbolic structures (e.g., Atatürk's Mausoleum) (see Figure 7) and content related to centenary celebrations in the newspapers—particularly between October 27-30—included not only the announcements of the major events taking place in the country but also the reporting of their aftermath (i.e., evaluation). In left-leaning opposition newspapers, commonality was employed in 78% (n=21)

of news stories, in republican opposition 81% (n=130), in mainstream pro-government %83 (n=151), in conservative pro-government 76% (n=58). The lowest frequency for commonality was the Yeni Akit newspaper with 68% (n=23). While the commonality frame in conservative news media was comparatively lower than the other representative media factions, it was nevertheless high.



Figure 7 Hürriyet (left) and BirGün Newspapers on October 30

Examining the ostracism frame—i.e., the counter-frame for commonality, which focuses on societal divisions, disagreements, and the perceptions of otherness—its significantly lower frequency in the news stories (n=111, 25%) was aligned with the perceived unifying aspect of the centenary and the relatively limited willingness in the media outlets to position the national day and the centenary in a divisive discourse. However, different than the commonality frame, the distribution of ostracism showed a different distribution pattern. Of the total of 111 news stories that employed ostracism frame, 75 (68%) were in opposition newspapers and was also

relatively higher in left-leaning newspapers (n=18, 68%) than republican ones (n=57, 36%). The highest usage of ostracism frame in pro-government media outlets was Yeni Akit (n=9, 26%) and Hürriyet (n=20, 17%). The differences between commonality and ostracism frames suggest that the centenary was constructed as a unifying phenomenon in Turkey's mediascape, yet the opposition news outlets point towards the social divisions to a higher extent. The varying levels of ostracism utilization across newspapers from different sociopolitical camps may suggest that the sense of unification over centenary implied by the commonality frame is limited to a shallow, celebratory sentiment especially in opposition outlets. To support this claim, we can examine the utilization of other news frames included in our analysis.

In this context, the demonization frame—i.e., depiction of groups as evil, outrage-and-hate-inciting news to certain individuals and groups—can be viewed as having a complementary role in understanding ostracism. Demonization frame was present in 75 of the news stories (25%) and was clustered on the left and republican side of the media spectrum that represent 73% of the uses of the frame. While the demonization frame (e.g., Figure 9 and Figure 8[6]) has a relatively high occurrence in conservative pro-government newspapers (n=13, 17%) compared to their moderate counterparts (n=7, 9%), in the context of the centenary and the national day, the use of demonization frame was less prevalent in pro-government news outlets. Therefore, one



Figure 8 Yeni Akit newspaper on October 28, "People in uprising, disgrace in entertainment"

[6] "Zillet [disgrace]" used in this heading is a appropriation of "Millet [Nation Alliance]" first used by the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, after the announcement of the electoral alliance led by CHP.



Figure 9 Yeki Akit newspaper on October 24, "Umma grieves Palestine, Ekrem chases entertainment"

may accept that the centenary and the national day was viewed as universally positive level and constitute a sphere of consensus. However, the diverging views on the societal divisions instigated by a "demon" figure indicated its relative superficiality as it did not extend to the bridging the socio-political tensions.

The second most commonly employed frame in the news stories was mythicizing, i.e., the use of historical individuals and their characterization as martyrs or veterans. This frame had the purpose to identify how the news stories about the centenary and the national day with the founding era of the republic and those involved in it. Fourty-eight percent (n=215) of the news stories employed mythicizing as a frame; in opposition media, this number was 51% (n=95), slightly higher in mainstream pro-government media (n=99, 54%), and lower in conservative media (n=19, %25). Mythicizing's counter-frame, idolization, which aimed to understand the link established with the centenary and the national day with contemporary individuals and political figures, was used in a significantly lower number of news stories (n=64, 14%). In terms of its differentiation among the media factions, idolization was very low in opposition newspapers (n=13, 7%), but comparatively higher in pro-government press at 16% (n=29) and 29% (n=22) mainstream and conservative newspapers, respectively. These findings indicated a partially similar pattern with the dual frames of commonality and ostracism: the contemporary

political figures were viewed less favourably than in the opposition media's discourse and had their highest presence among conservative news outlets. However, the mainstream pro-government newspapers were more lenient towards historical individuals and their role with regard to the republic, centenary, and the national day rather than contemporary individuals. This difference may be interpreted as a reflection of how broader society established an association between the national day and the founding era of the republic. Using mythicizing to a higher extent in the context of centenary was paramount to maintaining their mainstream position in the mediascape.

The third most employed frame in the analysis was call to action, which focused on whether the news story had the aim to mobilize citizens as a call of duty and to warn them of the possible consequences if they did not respond to the call of action. Overall, the results suggest the call-to-action frame was employed more frequently by opposition newspapers (n=91, 49%) compared to pro-government mediascape (n=78, 30%). These results may be interpreted as the pro-government media's tendency to supporting the existing status quo whereas the opposition media underscored social, political, and economic change. As a frame, affirmation of republican values arose as the next one, being used in 32% (n=143) of the news stories in the analysis. Similarly, affirmation of republican values—which assessed the story's referral to democracy, liberty, and sovereignty; and current administration's stance towards republican values—displayed, as a news frame, a similar pattern. While 32% of the news stories employed this frame (n=143), its distribution was 39% (n=73) to 27% (n=70) in the news stories published by opposition and pro-government newspapers, respectively. The attribution of responsibility frame, which assessed the relationship between a social issue and the government's role in it, was also

mostly employed by the opposition media (n=66, 35%) compared to the pro-government newspapers (i.e., n=10, 4%).

The consequence frame, which is the next most frequent one in the frames this research investigated, described the mentioning of political, social, and economic consequences of an action. Overall, the results suggest the use of this frame, albeit used less frequently than the former ones, was evenly distributed among the different factions in the mediascape in which both the opposition mediascape (n=25, 13%) and the pro-government media used the frame in a similar frequency (n=31, 13%). Despite the fact that much had been discussed in the academic and the public sphere regarding the presence of religion in Turkey's public life, the news stories concerning the centenary and the national day did not reflect this tendency as evaluated by the morality frame. Overall, only 5% of the news stories (n=22) employed a morality frame. Table 5 below provides an overview of the frame analysis and Figure 10 illustrates frame usage in each newspaper. The next subsection focuses on the event-related news stories in the data set.

Table 5 Crosstabulation of frame usage frequencies

Newspaper		BirGün	Cumhuriyet	Evrensel	Hürriyet	Sabah	Sözcü	Yeni Akit	Yeni Şafak	Total
Number of news stories		25	80	2	117	65	80	34	42	445
Frames										
Commonality	n	19	68	2	100	51	62	23	35	360
	%	76.00	85.00	100.00	85.47	78.46	77.50	67.65	83.33	80.90
Ostracism	n	17	33	1	20	4	24	9	3	111
	%	68.00	41.25	50.00	17.09	6.15	30.00	26.47	7.14	24.94
Demonization	n	12	27	0	3	4	16	9	4	75
	%	48.00	33.75	0.00	2.56	6.15	20.00	26.47	9.52	16.85
Call to Action	n	15	46	1	40	18	29	8	12	169
	%	60.00	57.50	50.00	34.19	27.69	36.25	23.53	28.57	37.98
Affirmation of Republican Values	n	10	35	2	31	11	26	14	14	143
	%	40.00	43.75	100.00	26.50	16.92	32.50	41.18	33.33	32.13
Attribution of Responsibility	n	14	33	1	4	2	18	3	1	76
	%	56.00	41.25	50.00	3.42	3.08	22.50	8.82	2.38	17.08
Mythicising	n	13	43	2	58	41	39	6	13	215
	%	52.00	53.75	100.00	49.57	63.08	48.75	17.65	30.95	48.31
Idolization	n	3	5	0	18	11	5	11	11	64
	%	12.00	6.25	0.00	15.38	16.92	6.25	32.35	26.19	14.38
Consequence	n	6	12	1	21	3	6	3	4	56
	%	24.00	15.00	50.00	17.95	4.62	7.50	8.82	9.52	12.58
Morality	n	3	3	0	2	2	5	5	2	22
	%	12.00	3.75	0.00	1.71	3.08	6.25	14.71	4.76	4.94




Figure 10 Distribution of frame usage by newspaper

7.2.2 Event-related news

In the second stage of analysis, a subset of the news stories that referred to (a) specific event(s) about the centenary (e.g., Figure 11) were analysed. There were 258 news stories whose content was related to an event (on the national scale) corresponding to 58% of the total dataset. On an aggregated level, this subset displays similar tendencies concerning frame usage as the entire data set. There are, however, some minor fluctuations on the newspaper level.

In the general event-related news stories published in the selected newspapers, the overall percentage of those employing commonality frame were comparatively higher at 85% (n=220). The most significant difference in percentage point was in the newspapers BirGün (85% compared to 76%), and Sözcü (87% compared to 77%). The ostracism and demonization frames—which were mostly used by the opposition newspapers in the aggregate data set—were employed less frequently in this subset of news stories. Combining this tendency with the relatively higher levels of commonality, the event portfolio was viewed more in the context of



Yurtta 100. yıl coşkusu

Cumhuriyetin 100. yılı nedeniyle yurdun birçok yerinde 100. yıl kutlamaları gerçekleşiyor. İstanbul başta olmak üzere birçok kentte konserler, gösteriler, sergiler ve çeşitli etkinlik yer alıyor.

İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi (İBB) cumhuriyetin 100. yılı nedeniyle konserler düzenliyor. Maltepe etkinlik alanında gerçekleşecek etkinlikte, cumhuriyet kutlamalarına özel şarkılarıyla Zülfü Livaneli, Duman, Kubat ve Edis'in de aralarında bulunduğu ünlü isimleri sahnede sevenleriyle buluşacak. Kutlamalar kapsamında Duman, Edis, Sıla, Mazhar Alanson, Adamlar Maltepe'de, Sertap Erener Ataşehir'de, Zülfü Livaneli Kadıköy'de, Burak Kut, Yonca Evcimik, Vitamin ve Mansur Ark da Sarıyer'de sahne alacak.

'ÇOCUKLARA RENKLERİNİ GERİ VERMEK İÇİN SÖZ VERDİK'

Maraş'ta da 100 yıl etkinliği kapsamında depremzede çocuklar 'Kırmızı Çocuklar Derneği' tarafından oluşturulan 'Kırmızı Çatı' projesiyle eğlendi. Ünlü oyuncu ve tasarımcılarla buluşan çocuklar, 100'üncü yılı bando eşliğindeki geçit töreni ve çeşitli etkinliklerle kutladı. Etkinlikler kapsamında cumhuriyetin 100'üncü yılı pastası da çocuklar tarafından kesildi.

CUMHURİYETİN ÖNCÜ KADINLARI SERGİSİ

Aynı zamanda 100'üncü yıla özel

Fotoğraf: DHA

zar Özlem Özdemir, "İkinci asır da cumhuriyet kadınların ellerinde yükselecek. Yaşasın cumhuriyet" dedi. 6 Kasım'a kadar Artopol Sanat Galerisinde devam edecek olan sergi, ardından merak edenleriyle dijital ortamda buluşturulacak.

'BENİM İÇİN TARİFSİZ BİR DUYGU'

Antalya'nın Konyaaltı Sahili'nde Büyükşehir Belediyesi tarafından düzenlenen etkinlikler kapsamında kadın ve erkek yüzücüler, 100'üncü yıl anısına açık

le kadınların yoğun ilgisi ile karşılaşan Ercümen, "Benim için de tarifsiz bir duygu. Çok mutluyum" dedi.

'HERKESE ÖZGÜR YARINLAR DİLİYORUZ'

Cumhuriyetin 100. yılını kutlayan Türkiye Yazarlar Sendikası Yönetim Kurulu yaptığı paylaşımda, "Yüz yıllık cumhuriyet, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve arkadaşlarıyla Ulusal Kurtuluş savaşımızın kahraman askerlerinin, işgalcilere karşı savaşmış acı çeken, yoksul halkın topluca armağanıdır bize. Bugün yüzüncü yaşına

Figure 11 Evrensel's reporting of centenary-related activities on October 29

their unifying features in the opposition mediascape. While the pro-government media representatives in the dataset mostly had a similar approach, Yeni Akit—a conservative newspaper—as the only paper exhibiting a meaningful difference in using ostracism and demonization (%27 compared to %60 and %50, respectively) (see Figure 12), thereby suggesting that they viewed the events regarding centenary comparatively more in their potential to create a notion of otherness and societal divisions.


MERSİN'DE BÜYÜK REZALET

LGBT, Cumhuriyet Yürüyüşü'ne bulaştı

HABER MERKEZİ

Gazze'de yaşanan insanlık dramı sırasında Cumhuriyet Bayramı'nın şenliklerle kutlanıp kutlanmayacağı tartışmaları sürerken bir rezalet haberi de Mersin'in Tarsus ilçesinden geldi. Zillet paydaşları ve medyasının kalemşorları Siyonist İsrail'in Gazze'de Müslümanlara yönelik uyguladığı soykırım nedeniyle gerçekleştirilecek olan Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılı kutlamalarının sönük geçtiğini iddia ederek, 'AK Parti iktidarı Cumhuriyet Bayramı'nı kutlamayacak' algısını üretip 'Arap bayrağı dalgalandırmayacağız' naraları atarken Allah'ın lanetlediği LGBT'li sapkınlar gökkuşağı bayrağıyla sahneye çıktı. 24 Ekim'de Mersin'in Tarsus ilçesinde bulunan tüm anaokulları öğrencilerinin katılımı ile gerçekleştirilen 'Cumhuriyet Yürüyüşü' sırasında Allah'ın lanetlediği eşcinsel sapkınların görselleri kullanıldı. İlçenin protokolünün hazır bulunduğu törende stadın ortasında sapkın homoların renkleriyle boyanmış devasa bir balon uçuruldu. Minik öğrencilerinin katılımı ile gerçekleştirilen etkinlikte LGBT'li renklerle süslenmiş bir balonun bulunması tepkilere neden olurken vatandaşın hizmetinde olan bürokratların bu tür sapkınlıklara göz yumması 'bu nasıl aymazlık' yorumlarını beraberinde getirdi.

BAKAN KOCA'DAN ÇAĞRI

DOLMABAHÇE GELENEĞİ BOZULDU

CUMHURİYETİN 100. Yılı dolayısıyla Milli Savunma Bakanlığı İstanbul Boğazı'nda 100 gemiyle 29 Ekim Cumhuriyet Bayramı kutlamaları için geçit töreni düzenledi. Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın bu tören için Dolmabahçe geleneğini bozarak son Osmanlı Padişahı Vahdettin'in köşkünü seçmesi dikkat çekti. Gemiler, Vahdettin Köşkü'nden töreni izleyen Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'a çımariva selamında bulundu. Töreni yurttaşlar da sahil kenarlarından izledi.

Anadolu'nun rehberliğinde fırkateynler, ada sınıfı korvetler, mayın avlama gemileri, amfibi gemiler, karakol gemileri, lojistik gemileri, hücumbotlar ve denizaltılar katıldı. Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı'nın envanterine henüz girmeyen Türkiye'nin ilk millî fırkateyni TCG İstanbul, Pireus denizaltısı ve Derya gemisi de geçit töreninde yer aldı. İstanbul Boğazı'ndaki geçişe Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı'na bağlı 9 F-16 ve 3 F-4E uçakları ve helikopterleri eşlik etti. Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı tarafından da geçiş sırasında 101 pare top atışı yapıldı.

Cumhuriyet sayesinde

Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında düşman donanma gemilerinin girdiği İstanbul Boğazı, Cumhuriyetimizin 100. yıldönümünde Türk donanmasına ait 100 geminin görkemli geçişine tanıklık etti. Resmigeçitte, TCG

ÇİMARİVA SELAMI NEDİR?

PERSONELİN gemi boyunca düzenli bir şekilde selamlama için yanyana dizilmesidir. Personelin aynı hizada nizami olarak durabilmesi için fiziki olarak aynı yapıda seçilmesi ve aynı tip giyinmesi gerekir.

Atatürksüz paylaşıma tepki yağdı!

CUMHURBAŞKANI Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Cumhuriyetin 100. yıldönümünde sosyal medya hesabından yaptığı paylaşım tepki topladı. Paylaşımında, Hüsnü Kazım Özler'in Cumhuriyet'in sembollerinden biri haline gelen "Cumhuriyeti biz böyle kazandık" fotoğrafını, "Bugün Cumhuriyetimizin 100. yıldönümüne ulaşmanın heyecanını ve gururunu yaşıyoruz. Ülkemizde ve dünyanın dört bir yanında yaşayan vatandaşlarımızın 29 Ekim Cumhuriyet Bayramı'nı canıgönülden tebrik ediyorum" notuyla paylaşan Erdoğan'a, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sayesinde!", "Size de zahmet olmuş ama.." yorumları yapıldı ayrıca binlerce kişi bu paylaşıma yaptıkları yorumlara Atatürk fotoğrafları da ekledi.

Figure 12 Ostracism examples of Yeni Akit's LGBT flag criticism (left) on October 27, and Cumhuriyet's criticism to Atatürk's absence in a presidential social media post on October 30

A similar divergence between the republican opposition Cumhuriyet and conservative pro-government Yeni Akit can be observed for the mythicizing frame in which the former further amplified the presence of historical figures in its reporting of centenary related event (65% compared to 54%), whereas in the latter it was comparatively higher as well (30% compared to

18%). While there were variations indicating a slight decline in other newspapers, they were at a comparable level to their values in the aggregate dataset. Almost all of the newspapers had a marginally higher use of the mythicizing's counter-frame idolization, which can be attributed to the presidential events (see next subsection), but its relative frequency remained at a comparable level.

Call-to-action frame was also employed relatively more in the event-related data by the opposition newspapers, as well as the conservative Yeni Akit, to mobilize the citizens to partake in collective experiences. While affirmation of republican values frame had a slightly lower frequency in the event-related sub-dataset for almost all newspapers, Cumhuriyet's use of this frame has a higher concentration compared to its overall use of the frame (55% compared to 41%). The results of the attribution of responsibility frame reveal event-related news mostly reflected the overall tendency with two exceptions: first, BirGün, a left-leaning opposition newspaper used this frame relatively less frequently than their aggregate data (46% compared to 56%). Second, all of Yeni Akit's usage of the attribution of responsibility in event-related news deflected the higher relative level of frequency in the consequence frame. These findings regarding these four frames therefore can be regarded as divisive in terms of their usage in the two opposite sides of the political spectrum in the mediascape. The only newspaper that exhibited a comparatively higher use of the morality frame—i.e., the religion-related content—in the event-related dataset was Yeni Akit (n=4, 40%). A summary table for the frame usage in event-related news and the distribution of frame usage by newspaper outlets are provided in Table 6 and Figure 13 respectively. The next subsection presents the results of a comparative analysis of the centenary-related events by the President's Office and IBB.

Table 6 Crosstabulation of frame usage in event-related news

Newspaper		BirGün	Cumhuriyet	Evrensel	Hürriyet	Sabah	Sözcü	Yeni Akit	Yeni Şafak	Total
Number of news stories		13	49	2	78	39	40	10	27	258
Frames										
Commonality	n	11	42	2	69	31	35	7	23	220
	%	84.62	85.71	100.00	88.46	79.49	87.50	70.00	85.19	85.27
Ostracism	n	8	24	1	10	2	9	6	2	62
	%	61.54	48.98	50.00	12.82	5.13	22.50	60.00	7.41	24.03
Demonization	n	6	20	0	2	2	4	5	2	41
	%	46.15	40.82	0.00	2.56	5.13	10.00	50.00	7.41	15.89
Call to Action	n	10	39	1	31	12	20	4	7	124
	%	76.92	79.59	50.00	39.74	30.77	50.00	40.00	25.93	48.06
Affirmation of Republican Values	n	6	27	2	20	7	14	5	9	90
	%	46.15	55.10	100.00	25.64	17.95	35.00	50.00	33.33	34.88
Attribution of Responsibility	n	6	21	1	2	1	8	3	1	43
	%	46.15	42.86	50.00	2.56	2.56	20.00	30.00	3.70	16.67
Mythicising	n	6	32	2	37	22	16	3	9	127
	%	46.15	65.31	100.00	47.44	56.41	40.00	30.00	33.33	49.22
Idolization	n	2	6	0	15	7	3	3	6	42
	%	15.38	12.24	0.00	19.23	17.95	7.50	30.00	22.22	16.28
Consequence	n	3	10	1	16	1	5	2	2	40
	%	23.08	20.41	50.00	20.51	2.56	12.50	20.00	7.41	15.50
Morality	n	0	3	0	2	1	2	4	2	14
	%	0.00	6.12	0.00	2.56	2.56	5.00	40.00	7.41	5.43




Figure 13 Distribution of frame usage in event-related news

7.2.3 News about presidential and IBB's events

Of the 258 news stories published about specific events about the centenary celebrations in the dataset, 52 news stories (20%) were about presidential events and 21 (8%) about IBB's event in MES. Thirty-seven (73%) news stories about the presidential events were published in pro-government newspapers (e.g., Figure 14) whereas 14 of the 21 (67%) news stories that included IBB's event were published in opposition newspapers. The left-leaning Evrensel—which only published a handful of news stories about the centenary—did not report the events organized by the President's Office, and two newspapers did not publish any news stories mentioning IBB's events about the centenary, namely mainstream Sabah and conservative Yeni Şafak. The tendency of news outlets affiliated with different political camps to overlook and refrain from reporting on events associated with the opposing side can be seen as the manifestation of the political polarization experienced in Turkey in the media landscape. In other words, the content published by three of the news outlets selected for this study did not allow for a comparative evaluation.

The commonality frame reveals a consensus on the unifying aspect of the centenary-related celebrations with one exception: while all of the news outlets have a significantly high usage of the frame, for conservative Yeni Akit, there is a significant divergence in which all of the news stories about the presidential event had commonality as a frame and none for IBB's event. This usage's reflection was evident in the ostracism and demonization frames, as well, and a clear separation of the different factions of the mediascape was evident. While BirGün used the ostracism frame in most of the news stories concerning presidential events, Yeni Akit used ostracism and demonization exclusively for IBB's event (see Figure 9 and Figure 8).



Figure 14 Presidential events in Sabah (top), Sözcü (left), BirGün (mid-right), and Hürriyet on October 30

Mythicizing frame was used more frequently than idolization frame by the opposition newspapers. While the mainstream pro-government media had a balanced used of the frame, the

use of historical individuals was also present in the conservative mediascape in the context of presidential events, indicating a tendency to establish a historical association between the government's undertaking and the historical perspective. However, evaluating idolization frame, the results suggested the presidential events were viewed comparatively favourably in the mediascape. The idolization frame, on the aggregate event-related dataset, was used in 16% of the news stories published; however, this usage was 48% for presidential events (n=25) and 24% for IBB's events (n=5) in the stories being evaluated. While the pro-government newspaper outlets employed the idolization frame to a higher extent, it was also used by the opposition newspapers. This finding in tandem with the results in the first subsection suggests the common unifying aspect of the centenary and the centenary-related events is evident in this analysis of the polarizing elements in the socio-political conjecture: the events on the state level were perceived as less divisive in the context of centenary.

Call-to-action frame was employed by the opposition newspapers almost universally for IBB's event with the exception of Sözcü whereas they exhibit a more balanced distribution in the mediascape for presidential events. Similarly, the affirmation of republican values did not have much difference in terms of their distribution; while the news stories mentioning the presidential events by the pro-government newspapers had a relatively higher frequency, the frame's usage was almost identical in the opposition newspapers. Table 7 provides the summary of the frame usage in news stories about the presidential (see Figure 15) and IBB's events (see Figure 16).

Table 7 Crosstabulation of news stories about presidential and IBB's events

Newspaper		BirGün	Cumhuriyet	Evrensel	Hürriyet	Sabah	Sözcü	Yeni Akit	Yeni Şafak	Total
Number of news stories (Presidential)		4	4	0	14	10	7	4	9	52
Number of news stories (IBB)		7	2	1	5		4	2		21
Frames										
Commonality	n	4	4		12	9	7	4	8	48
Presidential	%	100.00	100.00		85.71	90.00	100.00	100.00	88.89	92.31
IBB	n	7	2	1	5		3	0		18
	%	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		75.00	0.00		85.71
Ostracism	n	4	1		3	2	2	1	1	14
Presidential	%	100.00	25.00		21.43	20.00	28.57	25.00	11.11	26.92
IBB	n	5	1	0	2		2	2		12
	%	71.43	50.00	0.00	40.00		50.00	100.00		57.14
Demonization	n	2	1		2	2	1	1	2	11
Presidential	%	50.00	25.00		14.29	20.00	14.29	25.00%	22.22	21.15
IBB	n	3	0	0	0		0	2		5
	%	42.86	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00%	100.00		23.81
Call to Action	n	3	2		8	3	5	2	4	27
Presidential	%	75.00	50.00		57.14	30.00	71.43	50.00	44.44	51.92
IBB	n	7	2	1	5		0	1		16
	%	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		0.00	50.00		76.19
Affirmation of Republican Values	n	2	2		7	2	4	3	4	24
Presidential	%	50.00	50.00		50.00	20.00	57.14	75.00	44.44	46.15
IBB	n	4	1	1	4		2	1		13
	%	57.14	50.00	100.00	80.00		50.00	50.00		61.90
Attribution of Responsibility	n	3	1		2	1	2	0	1	10
Presidential	%	75.00	25.00		14.29	10.00	28.57	0.00	11.11	19.23
IBB	n	3	1	0	0		2	1		7
	%	42.86	50.00	0.00	0.00		50.00	50.00		33.33
Mythicising	n	1	1		8	8	2	2	2	24
Presidential	%	25.00	25.00		57.14	80.00	28.57	50.00	22.22	46.15
IBB	n	3	0	1	3		2	0		9
	%	42.86	0.00	100.00	60.00		50.00	0.00		42.86
Idolization	n	2	1		8	2	3	3	6	25
Presidential	%	50.00	25.00		57.14	20.00	42.86	75.00	66.67	48.08
IBB	n	1	0	0	2		1	1		5
	%	14.29	0.00	0.00	40.00		25.00	50.00		23.81
Consequence	n	2	1		5	1	1	1	3	14
Presidential	%	50.00	25.00		35.71	10.00	14.29	25.00	33.33	26.92
IBB	n	3	1	0	1		0	0		5
	%	42.86	50.00	0.00	20.00		0.00	0.00		23.81
Morality	n	1	0		2	1	0	2	0	6
Presidential	%	25.00	0.00		14.29	10.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	11.54
IBB	n	0	0	0	0		0	2		7
	%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	100.00		33.33




Figure 15 Frame usage in news stories about presidential events by newspaper




Figure 16 Frame usage in news stories about IBB's event by newspaper

7.2.4 Section summary

The frame analysis on the news stories about the centenary published in the weeks preceding and succeeding the national day illustrated that, despite the significant polarization in Turkey's mediascape, the centenary and the national day were mostly associated with their unifying features for the country, in particular with reference to the high usage of the commonality frame. The ostracism frame's usage corresponded mostly with the political orientation of the newspapers included in the analysis and it was directed predominantly at the political opposite underscoring that the national day was viewed predominantly in a positive manner but the political figures' role in actualizing the centenary and the national day celebrations received mixed results which became evident in how different factions in the mediascape framed the presidential and IBB's events. The respective offices' political rivalry, particularly in large cities like Istanbul, was reflected in how the media outlets forged the news stories about these events. Overall, the news stories mostly amplified the unifying aspects of the events, but the opposing ends of the political spectrum employed the divides within the society to a higher extent in which the left-leaning opposition newspapers and the conservation pro-government newspapers used ostracism and demonization frames to a higher extent. Therefore, the centenary as symbolizing the foundations of the republic and the state represented an area of consensus on the highest level of abstraction which starts to display certain cracks and divisions as one descends into tangible events concerning the centenary. With this background on how the centenary, the centenary-related events, and the events organized by the President's Office and IBB were represented in the media, the next section focuses on how the latter two events materialized in the public realm.

7.3 Forging and Experiencing the Celebrations: Centenary Events in Istanbul

This section focuses on the centenary events in the public spaces of Istanbul as they were conceived by the President's Office and IBB and the attendees' experiences in the animated spaces. As outlined above, the respective public organizations planned their portions of centenary Republic Day celebrations in different parts of Istanbul. The President's Office animated Taksim and Üsküdar Squares (on the European and Asian sides, respectively) with installations and utilized the Bosporus for events whereas IBB's venue for its main event was Maltepe Event Space (MES) on the Asian side of Istanbul for two days. It should be noted that, on October 28, i.e., the official start of the national day holiday, the president held a "Support for Palestine" rally in Istanbul approximately three weeks after the escalation of conflict in Gaza that 'coincided' with the national day celebrations. While the connection between the two events remained tangential at best, one should bear in mind that the municipalities run by those political factions closer to the government did not organize any events with featured entertainment in Istanbul—on the contrary, almost all municipalities run by the opposition faction did. Although this differentiation is important to remember for appropriate contextualization, for the purposes of this research, the following subsections provide the results of the concerning public space usage in, first, by the events organized by the President's Office, followed by that of IBB event in MES.

7.3.1 Presidential events: Taksim and Üsküdar

While the President's Office announced small-scale changes throughout Istanbul (e.g., lightings on monumental buildings) and other cities, the public spaces in Istanbul highlighted in the announcements were Taksim and Üsküdar Squares. Before continuing with the interventions in the built environment in these public squares, it is important to remind the reader that Taksim

Square has long been considered (among) the most politically and socially significant public space(s) in modern Istanbul. It has hosted numerous protests and rallies over the years—a recent example being the Gezi Park protests in 2013, and Üsküdar square and promenade along the Bosporus where the primary residence of the President is located (see Figure 5). What follows is a description of the event spaces as they were conceived before moving on to urban inhabitants' experiences on the day of the event.

7.3.1.1 The Conceived Event Space

Taksim and Üsküdar Squares can be considered central pillars of social life in Istanbul's old city and represent focal points for commerce, entertainment, and transportation. The characteristics of conceived space incorporate both the permanent attributes of the space as well as the changes that were enacted by city administrators and the central government for centenary-related events. In the following subsections, three main themes of access and territoriality, surveillance and policing, and the design and image of the spaces as they were conceived by those with formal power over the space (Lefebvre, 1974/1991) are outlined.

7.3.1.1.1 Access and territoriality

Taksim Square is about 26,500 square metres in size, nestled between Gezi Park (to the north), Atatürk Cultural Centre (to the east)—a space owned and operated by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, home to the permanent stages of State Orchestra, State Theatre, and State Opera and Ballet, as well as exhibition areas—and the recently constructed Taksim Mosque (to the west). The 1928 Victory Monument is located at the centre of the square. The southwestern edge of Taksim Square marks the entry to Istiklal Avenue, a 1,400-meter-long pedestrian street central to Istanbul's socio-cultural life (shopping, entertainment, food, nightlife). Taksim Square is a relatively unobstructed space with very few observable amenities. There are a limited

number of benches and trees on its eastern side at the visual intersection point of Atatürk Cultural Centre and the stairs leading up to Gezi Park.

Üsküdar Square is located at the southeastern edge of the Bosporus (on the Asian side). While Üsküdar Square is not directly located at the coastline, it is across from the main road that separates the Üsküdar Promenade (i.e., the section between the ferry stations and Şemsi Paşa Mosque) with a size of approximately 7,250 square metres (where the president's exhibition space was installed). In other words, the promenade can be viewed as an extension to the official Üsküdar Square. The promenade space is sparsely populated with trees and most of the trees are surrounded by a square-shaped benches with garbage cans intermittently positioned between them. The coastal border is lined with a protective fence and the promenade is typically used by hobbyist anglers. Opposite the ferry stations is the Mihrimah Sultan Mosque and the road adjacent to the mosque leads to the commercial centre of Üsküdar.

Both Taksim and Üsküdar can be considered major transportation hubs (see Figure 17) in Istanbul and are therefore accessible through the main axes of the public transportation network. Taksim is located roughly 80 metres above sealine and is connected with the rest of the city with subway and terminals for shared taxis and buses. The main arteries leading to Taksim Square can be considered pedestrian friendly. Üsküdar, by contrast, is accessible through ferries that run on the Bosporus, subway, Marmaray—i.e., the railway that runs through the city—and, similar to Taksim, through buses and shared taxis. The railway stations are located near Üsküdar Square on the opposite side of the ferry stations. The space is also accessible on foot from both sides of the coastline.




Figure 17 Locations of Taksim, Üsküdar, and MES on Istanbul's public transportation map (stars from left to right)

Source: Adapted from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Istanbul_Railway_Systems_Network_Map.svg (CC BY-SA 4.0)

7.3.1.1.2 Surveillance and policing

As spaces with high vehicular and pedestrian traffic, both Taksim and Üsküdar Squares are equipped with surveillance infrastructure for a variety of purposes (e.g., traffic, police, businesses). Aside from surveillance, the public spaces in question had different levels of security present. In Taksim's case, which can be considered a highly securitized pedestrian space

at all times, the entrance to the adjacent Gezi Park was closed and the area in-between was used by the police (see Figure 18).



Figure 18 Entrance to Gezi Park from Taksim Square

Similarly, the area surrounding the Victory Monument at the centre of Taksim Square was cordoned off by the police for controlled access which was opened to public on October 29 in the afternoon. There was considerable police presence in Taksim Square and Istiklal Avenue and there were some parts (e.g., near consulate buildings, around the 50th year monument) that were barricaded off by the police (see Figure 19). In Üsküdar, there was limited additional security measures, except for piled police barricades for potential use and security personnel around the public transportation stations.



Figure 19 Ambulances in Taksim Square (left) and riot police patrolling

7.3.1.1.3 Design and image

Both Taksim and Üsküdar Squares were surveyed on October 27, two days before the centenary celebrations. As outlined in the official announcement of the PDC, Taksim Square was equipped with a temporary exhibition with the title "*Maziden Atiye Türkiye Yüzyılı*[1]" (Turkey Century from Past to Future) (see Figure 20), which featured audio-visual materials showcasing the government's national security and infrastructure-related projects, as well as a large screen and speakers at its entrance broadcasting PDC's content in a loop (see Figure 21). Opposite this screen, with the Victory Monument at its background, IBB's "ISTANBUL" sign installation was also present. The "S" in the sign was rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise (to resemble infinity sign ∞) and was inscribed with "Democracy Century" [*Demokrasi Yüzyılı*]. To the left of the monument and at the entrance to the Istiklal Avenue, IBB had installed an archway celebrating the centenary of the republic (see Figure 22). Istiklal Avenue was decorated by the Beyoğlu

[1] The title of this exhibition space employs a wording derived from Arabic which is rarely used in contemporary Turkish.

district municipality with standing flags roughly 20 metres apart on both sides of the avenue (see Figure 22), complemented by the storefront decorations of public and commercial enterprises (see Figure 23) alongside it. Outside the public square and the avenue, there was minimal intervention in public spaces that reminded of the national day.




Figure 20 The temporary exhibition space in Taksim Square


Figure 21 PDC's broadcasting structure in Taksim Square



Figure 22 The archway of IBB and decorated Istiklal Avenue



Figure 23 Decorated commercial spaces in Taksim

In Üsküdar, the venue for the "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Special Exhibition" was almost identical to the one in Taksim Square and located in the promenade a short walk away from the ferry stations. The promenade also had an example of IBB's "ISTANBUL" installation with the Bosporus at its background (see Figure 24). Aside from the exhibition, the changes in the space can be considered limited: on the day of the initial survey, the seating infrastructure around the trees in the promenade were renewed by IBB. The space offered easy access to the local market centre, and there were a wide variety of food and beverage options in close vicinity of the promenade and the public square. In terms of amenities, there were washrooms in both Taksim and Üsküdar in public transport stations and mosques nearby. Since the President's Office had scheduled events to take place in the Bosporus, the southern part of the Bosporus coastline—including Üsküdar—was considered a more appropriate venue for watching the presidential activities.


Figure 24 The temporary exhibition space (top) and view of promenade in Üsküdar

7.3.1.2 The Lived Event

This section introduces the findings concerning the lived space under three themes corresponding to conceived space characteristics outlined above, starting with the entry/exit and crowd formation, followed by security in Taksim and Üsküdar. The last subsection will provide an outline of how the activities in these spaces were experienced by the participants.

7.3.1.2.1 Entry and crowd formation

As public spaces well-connected with the rest of the city through various transportation options, individuals who wanted to participate in centenary celebration in Taksim and Üsküdar

had the opportunity to access these spaces through various mediums. Taksim Square is a highly securitized space throughout the year (see above), and it is not uncommon for the governorship to limit access to this space when there are "risks of protests." Under such circumstances, entry is only available to residents of the area. However, such measures were not in place for the centenary national day. While there were some areas cordoned off by the police throughout the day, overall, there were no barriers to entry to Taksim Square, nor to its surrounding area. The data were collected in Taksim Square, Istiklal Avenue, and Gezi Park, and their peripheral space with two teams making periodic routes on the axis that connected the three main sites. While the space had a significant number of visual elements marking the national day, the number of people in Taksim throughout the day could not be considered to be different than any normal day in the area. There was a continuous flow of individuals to and from Taksim Square, which did not result in the formation of a crowd in the focal points of the research. The team was directed to the coastline along the Bosporus at 8 p.m. where there was a considerable crowd—not unlike Üsküdar.

The crowd formation in Üsküdar was significantly different from Taksim. There was already a significant number of individuals in Üsküdar Square shortly after noon when data collection started. The crowd had occupied the square and the promenade by 4 p.m. and, eventually, there was no visual or functional separation between pedestrian and vehicular arteries around the space. (It should be noted, however, that the crowd was not limited to Üsküdar; rather, the Bosporus coastline on both sides were lined with a significant crowd.) In Üsküdar, one research assistant described the crowd "at a level of ridiculous" at 6 p.m. (see Figure 25). Around this time, the crowd had reached its peak and it was difficult to even move around in the space insofar as some people had climbed the entries of public transport stations (see Figure 26)

and research assistants climbed a tree to get a better view. Vehicular traffic came to a halt around afternoon. The crowd started to dissipate in the evening around 9 p.m.



Figure 25 Üsküdar at 2 p.m. (left) and 5 p.m.



Figure 26 People on top of the public transportation station entry

7.3.1.2.2 Security

As outlined above, the areas surrounding Taksim Square had a relatively high presence of security personnel on October 29 compared to Üsküdar, but the surveillance infrastructure that had been installed in the space were presumably operational. Presence of security personnel and police barricades in Taksim was not much different than it would be on any other day for

inhabitants (and tourists) in the space surrounding the public square. Considering that it was not uncommon for Taksim to experience broad scale closures and a surge in security personnel at times of "politically sensitive" events (e.g., Labour Day, International Women's Day, Pride Parade), such measures were not visible and there was a continuous, uninterrupted movement of people in the area. After the police barricades around the Victory Monument were removed, there was a significant number of people accessing the space.

Aside from the general surveillance infrastructure, the security measures in the Üsküdar Square and the promenade were absent (or, invisible). While there may be some forms of police presence in the surrounding area (such as cordoned-off spaces), the density of occupants that obstructed normal movement within the space, the peripheries of the square and the promenade were inaccessible at all times during the day. In the centre of the animated space, police (including traffic) were not observed. At the peak of the crowd around the afternoon of October 29 when the pedestrian and vehicular zones "merged," it was near impossible for any emergency service to access the area as even vehicles like ambulances were unable to move. Despite these limitations on the activities of security services, there were no major incidents that required the emergency services.

7.3.1.2.3 Experiencing the animated space

In Taksim, the data collection procedure involved periodical co-terminous walks of two teams of two connecting the southern end of Istiklal Avenue, Taksim Square, and Gezi Park in opposite directions. While there was a continuous flow of individuals joining the route at various junctions through different transportation options, there was limited movement that could be specifically tied to the National Day, despite the public and commercial spaces' adornment with the flag all around (see Figure 27), except for the occasional photo opportunity. In Taksim



Figure 27 St. Antoine Church and Istanbul Bar Association building

Square, the Victory Monument (after the police barricade was removed) and the exhibition space, served as stops in the pedestrian traffic, but the queues for both were minimal throughout most of the day (see Figure 28). The large screen installed as part of the presidential activities managed to facilitate brief stops from passersby before moving on with their walks. Except for



Figure 28 Victory Monument in Taksim Square open (left) and restricted

the photographic opportunity of the streetscape, there was only one documented instance of a small group of individuals chanting on Istiklal Avenue that lasted not more than a few minutes. The number of people around this area declined significantly in the evening (see Figure 29), coinciding mostly with the closing time of most retail shops on Istiklal Avenue.



Figure 29 Taksim Square in the afternoon and evening, October 29

As mentioned above, the crowd started to form in Üsküdar by the time data collection had started at 1.30 p.m. While the crowd was considerable starting in the early afternoon, most of the individuals in the promenade and the surrounding area were described by research assistants as doing practically nothing, mostly just idly standing in the spaces in question. The crowd had occupied the entire area including the surrounding streets around the time the military

organizations (i.e., aerial acrobatics, and the air force and navy parade) started organized by the President's Office (see Figure 30). It is worth noting that, while the space typically has a clear sight of the Bosporus, the size of the crowd made it difficult if not impossible for the participants



Figure 30 People taking pictures of aerial acrobatics in Üsküdar

to keep track of the different components of the military parade. For example, the research assistants were unable to hear the salvo, or pinpoint exactly when different events took place. Crowd management measures in the space, as mentioned previously, were practically non-existent from a security-centric viewpoint. There were limited to no police presence or areas with restricted access observed in the space. The scene was described as chaotic for most of the day with limited possibilities to move within the space (e.g., Figure 31), whether vehicular or pedestrian, which also rendered entry to and exit from the space difficult for participants.



Figure 31 Entry to Marmaray railway network in Üsküdar

Alternative uses of the space, such as climbing on top of public transportation station entries or trying to reach a higher ground to get a better view of the planned activities were spotted among the crowd, particularly among younger participants (see crowd formation process above). In general, the crowd that had gathered in Üsküdar can be described as a form of passive voyeurism with limited "excitement" in participating in the event. One incident that diverged from this voyeuristic participation was a small-scale torchlight procession (see Figure 32). As one can observe in the pictures at the peak size of the crowd, the people in the crowd displayed minimal number of national flags—except for those installed on the streets through administrative interventions (see Figure 30 above)—which was very different than what was observed in other parts of the city around that time. The limited possibilities of movement within the space and surrounding areas also impacted the local businesses. By early evening, most of the food available to participants in the space had sold out and it became impossible to find.



Figure 32 Torchlight procession in Üsküdar

7.3.2 IBB: Maltepe Event Space

The main event for the Centenary Republic Day is organized by IBB in MES, an unobstructed outdoor concourse used for large-scale urban gatherings such as public concerts, festivals, and political rallies and is the largest event space on the Asian side. In what follows, first, the event space as it was conceived for the centenary celebrations is outlined. The second part focuses on how event participants interacted with the built environment during the celebrations.

7.3.2.1 The Conceived Event Space

7.3.2.1.1 Access and territoriality

Located between a main artery connecting the districts alongside the southern coast of Istanbul's Asian side and a parallel coastline promenade, MES was accessible by bicycle and walking near the road or on the promenade, as well as by motorized (public) transportation (car, bus, [shared] taxi) options through the main artery and by Marmaray—the railway that runs across the city—with a few minutes of walking and by subway with the closest station being a 30-minute walk away (see public transportation map of Istanbul in Figure 17). The opposite side of the main artery was lined with a variety of establishments, including food vendors, kiosks, grocery stores; and there were parking spaces available on both sides of the main artery around MES. As mentioned in the *Method* section, the periphery of the event space was documented prior to the opening of the gates and the event space immediately after access was granted. As part of the centenary celebrations, the perimeter of MES was cordoned off by steel barriers covered with IBB's promotional materials for the event, i.e., the MES was not visible from the outside (see Figure 33). There was a single point of entry to and exit from the MES on the side of the main artery.



Figure 33 Entry checkpoint to (top) and the barricaded periphery in MES

7.3.2.1.2 Surveillance and policing

The entry to MES was equipped with x-ray machines, metal detectors, private security personnel and police officers. MES' border with the promenade was also cordoned off with steel barriers with a single emergency exit (e.g., ambulance, fire truck) (see Figure 34). For the programmes on October 28 and the daytime on October 29, the area hosting the main stage was closed to public access and only the greenspace area was open to participants. The measures installed at the entry point (i.e., x-ray machines, metal detectors, and security personnel) were supported by visible CCTV cameras in the area covering the entrance, as well as on some lampposts and on the stages. Additionally, both private security personnel and police officers frequently patrolled the greenspace and there were several drones spotted as part of the security measures employed. Consistent with the regulation for such events, there were ambulances and fire trucks located at designated spots in MES.



Figure 34 Security measures at the entry (left) and the emergency exit at MES

7.3.2.1.3 Design and image

Following the security checks, attendees walked along the tree-lined pathway through the permanent structures in the space, consisting of security and management buildings and washrooms (two large washrooms for men and women each accommodating approximately 50

people, and a wheelchair accessible washroom) to reach the concourse which consists of a greenspace to the right and a concrete-tiled area with the main stage to the left. The greenspace had a rectangular form with spotlights around its periphery with the primary stage located at the centre of the far shorter side upon entry behind which the preparation area for the performers was situated. Large screens were installed at both sides of the stage. While these displays livestreamed the on-stage performances, they were used to advertise IBB's promotional materials about municipal activities when there was no performance on-stage. Opposite the primary stage (i.e., between the primary stage and the main stage for the 29th) were sound towers. On the longer sides of the rectangle, two smaller stages were built for small-scale activities scheduled for throughout the day. Next to these stages, on both sides, small booths were installed which included food and beverage stalls, bottled water distribution, and a gaming area (e.g., foosball). On the right side of the primary stage, in addition to these amenities, there was also a small bookstore. The location of these booths effectively determined the borders of the event space participants were expected to occupy. The booths were operated by IBB's affiliated companies.

While the space in-between the booths was more or less unobstructed, there were some additions to the space to encourage taking pictures (or have one's pictures taken), such as booths with commemorative backgrounds closer to the primary stage and one of IBB's large "ISTANBUL" installations. In addition to these static additions to the space, about 20 picnic tables that could seat six to eight people were positioned at the long sides of the rectangular green space and large pillows were scattered in piles in areas closer to the primary stage. Photographs of the greenspace for illustrative purposes are provided in Figure 35 and Figure 36.



Figure 35 Seating areas (left), photo booths (top-right), and food vendors in MES



Figure 36 The greenspace of MES with vendors and stage on its perimeter

The concrete-tiled area where the main stage was located was also rectangular in shape but was smaller compared to the greenspace. The main stage, surrounded by large screens on both sides, was located at the far end of the space (i.e., opposite the primary stage) and had a size exceeding 6,000 square meters (see Figure 37 and Figure 38 for main stage during and after construction, respectively). This area did not have any amenities (e.g., sitting areas, washrooms, food and drinks), other than those that supported backstage operations. There were also floating



Figure 37 The construction of the main stage at MES on October 25



Figure 38 The main stage at MES

platforms to the right side of the stage across the promenade which only became discernible when the lightshow and fireworks show started.

While the MES was continuously animated throughout the two-day event with numerous performances and supporting activities, a short description of the content of the hallmark activity of MES celebrations on the evening of October 29 is necessary to include. This quasi theatrical, quasi entertainment-focused 4.5-hours-long event (broadcast live over IBB's YouTube channel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tE0ZXT4BNE4) started with a speech from Istanbul's mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu and then continued with a theatrical performance that was centred

around the conversation between a 100-year-old sycamore tree—signifying the republic at the centre of the stage and also featured in the promotional materials for the event in MES—and a young girl which was supported by visual displays of prominent Turkish intellectuals and artists from different ethnic backgrounds and ideological orientations underscoring the inherently inclusive democratic ideals of a republican regime (e.g., Aykol, 2023). The performance continued with an imagined artificial intelligence-generated conversation between the girl and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, followed by a series of dance and musical performances.

7.3.2.2 The Days of the Event

7.3.2.2.1 Entry/exit and crowd formation

On October 28, entry to MES was allowed at 1 p.m., about half an hour later than scheduled. The metal detectors and x-ray machines were made operational in line with the crowd formation at the main entrance. While there was a significant number of people entering MES, on the first day of the events, the security line was observed to be moving efficiently as it did not take people more than a few minutes to pass the checkpoint. Since the entry to and exit from the MES were facilitated at the same location (and the emergency exits remained closed), in the earlier hours of the day, most of the entrance was dedicated to entry and the number of exit slots gradually increased over the course of the evening. Entry to the space was not allowed roughly after 11 p.m. In terms of the entry process, October 29 was more or less identical with the preceding day. However, the influx of people to MES was significantly higher and, except for one, all of the slots at the entrance were dedicated to entry. The observations of the research assistants around afternoon were that the crowd had reached the peak size of the preceding day by 2.30 p.m. Figure 39 illustrates the differences in crowd size at different times of the event.



Figure 39 MES crowd on Oct. 28, Oct. 29 afternoon and night (top to bottom)

Around evening, prior to the start of the activities at the main stage, a significant entry line had been formed and entry to the area became difficult and time-consuming with research assistants estimating exit and re-entry to take about an hour. The crowd in the closest public transportation station (i.e., Marmaray) and the entrance area around 6 p.m. is shown in Figure 40. After the area housing the main stage was opened, there were a couple of documented instances of people entering the MES by climbing the steel barriers surrounding the space (see also Figure 40). The most crowded time in the space was estimated to be around 8 p.m., after which people started leaving MES. However, with the crowd in front of the main stage expanding to the greenspace meant that the entry and exit path in the space was congested resulting in a tense

relationship between those entering and exiting and those remaining in MES to the extent that it was not possible for the research assistants to get a representative photo of the "chaotic" scene between 10-10.30 p.m. The crowd had dispersed significantly by 11.30 p.m. (despite the activity on the main stage being ongoing at this time). It was also around this time that some of the barricades were observed to be damaged and "moved" resulting in an effective additional exit from MES. Different from the day before, there were no restrictions on entry on October 29.




Figure 40 Crowds in the public transportation station (top-left), entrance (bottom left), and fence-jumpers

7.3.2.2.2 Security in the space

As mentioned above, the entry to MES was facilitated through a multi-step security check and the space was equipped with surveillance infrastructure. There were minimal, albeit observable, security personnel within the space during the earlier hours of October 28. There were a few instances of security issues in the evening which included a few cases of brawls between groups of adolescents (which led to some expulsions from the site) and at least two incidences of stabbing observed in the site between 9-10 p.m. After these incidents, the police presence increased as they started patrolling the greenspace geared with nightsticks and the occasional tactical shields. A group of anti-riot police officers were spotted later in the evening, as well (see Figure 41).



Figure 41 Anti-riot police in MES on October 28

On October 29, the security personnel presence was slightly higher than the previous day. Police officers patrolled the greenspace prior to the opening of the area with the main stage and the number of private security personnel was visibly higher (e.g., Figure 42). The size of the crowd made patrolling at times difficult, which led some members of the security team to get creative (Figure 42, left, on the tree). While there were a few cases of brawls witnessed in the space, they were smaller in scale in comparison to the previous day and in some cases, they were broken up by participants.



Figure 42 Security personnel in MES

7.3.2.2.3 Experiencing the animated space

The preceding subsections described the in- and outflow of participants and the security-related matters during the centenary celebrations in MES. In what follows is a description of how the event space was used by the participants.

While the size of the crowd varied throughout the days of the events, participants in the crowd can be roughly classified into three groups that were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first group was the "programmees" whose main area of focus in the MES was the stage performances. They positioned themselves as close as possible to the stage (see Figure 43). On both days, the front of the stage was continuously populated and had the highest density of participants. When the main stage area was opened to public in the afternoon on October 29, there was a rush among the participants to get closer to the main stage (Figure 43).



Figure 43 The stage on October 28 (left), opening the main stage on October 29

The second group can be viewed as the "relaxationists," those urban inhabitants who primarily positioned themselves farther away from the stage and used the sitting amenities in the space to a higher extent. This group included a noticeable number of people—mostly in small groups—who brought with them folding chairs (and the occasional folding tables or picnic cloths

and beach umbrellas for protection from sun), in addition to those using the amenities provided by the IBB in the space (see Figure 44). Expectedly, the IBB-provided pillows moved through the space during both days. Most of these amenities remained in use until the end of the activities, but they were rarely located near the most crowded areas in the space. Some event participants in this group were well-prepared to spend a prolonged period of time in MES by bringing food and beverages with them.



Figure 44 People sitting on their foldable chairs in MES

The third group was comprised of "wanderers" whose interaction with the space varied. They were not as "enthusiastic" about being closer to stage performances as the "programmees," nor were they as well-equipped as the "relaxationists" to arrange a stationary spot in MES. This group was mobile in the space to the extent that the crowd in the MES allowed. Wanderers included those who utilized the changing conditions in MES (e.g., individuals tended to concentrate in shaded areas, see Figure 45) and used the space for activities not necessarily

planned for in the conceived space (e.g., playing volleyball or soccer, skateboarding, dancing, see Figure 46).



Figure 45 People concentrated in shaded areas of MES during the day



Figure 46 People playing volleyball (left) and skateboarders in MES

As mentioned previously, this rough categorization of occupants of MES is an indicative, not a definitive one. Individuals, during different times during the event, belonged to different groups. For example, an individual or a group that used the greenspace for playing ball games during the day could move to the front of the stage when a performance was more interesting to them.

While establishing the demographic distribution of the crowd that assembled in MES was beyond the scope of this research project, the fieldwork still made possible to observe a relatively diverse group of urban inhabitants in MES. While the majority of the crowd can be considered young adults (with or without their families), there were also older adults present in the space in the daytime and the crowd became younger after the start of the evening activities when the number of teenaged male groups seemingly increased, especially on October 28 which may be attributed to the collection of performances targeting a younger demographic. Children and teenagers were observed to use the space to play during the day (e.g., gaming booths, soccer, skateboard), occasionally joined by their parents or other adults. There were countless numbers of strollers in the space. The commemorative photo booths were used during the daytime, and, on October 29, there were also professional photographers providing framed photos taken (e.g., Figure 47). On October 29, entry into the MES with bicycles (but not electric scooters or skateboards) seemed to be prohibited with some individuals turned away from the entry during the earlier hours; however, there were individuals spotted with their bicycles in MES in the afternoon.



Figure 47 Complimentary commemorative photo at MES

Although most of the amenities provided in MES was adequate for October 28, they proved to be insufficient for the size of the crowd on the 29th. Some of the booths selling food and beverages ran out of items by 5 p.m., and there were long queues in front of those who were open, practically at all times. Similarly, entering the washrooms was found to be chaotic at times (see Figure 48). Except for the entry, the washrooms were observed to be well-kept and well-stocked at all times on both days.



Figure 48 Kiosk queue (left), area in front of the washrooms

Aside from the stage performances and the associated fireworks show, there were two side events that served as focal points for the majority of the participants: paragliders, presumably organized as part of IBB's event (3-4 p.m.); and the aerial acrobatics of the presidential events that was replicated in numerous parts of the city, which in MES was observable around 4.30 p.m (see Figure 49). Both spectacles effectively paused what many participants in MES were doing at the time.


Figure 49 Aerial acrobatics (left) and paragliders as observed in the MES

7.3.3 Section summary

This section focused on three public spaces in Istanbul that served as the main venue for the centenary celebrations organized by the President's Office (i.e., Taksim and Üsküdar) and the IBB (i.e., MES). The presidential events included temporary exhibition spaces in the public squares as well as naval parade, a drone and fireworks show on the Bosporus which the gathered publics had the chance to view from different areas alongside the Bosporus. IBB, on the other hand, executed a two-day long celebration event that included different local artists with supporting activities dispersed throughout the space, ending the celebrations with a 4.5-hour long hallmark stage show.

In terms of the changes enacted in these spaces, Taksim and Üsküdar Squares had minimal additional security measures and, as spaces that were well-connected in the public transportation network in the city, were inviting to a large portion of the city's inhabitants. While Taksim represented a central node in the city's economic and cultural life, the centenary day did not significantly change the number of people in it. Taksim's centenary celebrations were mostly confined to a decorative level both administratively and commercially and hence a significant pedestrian traffic or crowding did not take place. However, in Üsküdar— as well as along the

coast of Bosporus—a significant crowd formed prior to the naval parade. While there were minimal changes in the space in terms of public space animation elements, the space nevertheless experienced significant congestion that included the public square and the promenade as well as the public transportation stations. In this setting, it was not always possible for the people in the crowd to experience the different aspects of the centenary celebration events implemented in the space as part of the animation project. The areas surrounding the animated space hosted a number of amenities (e.g., food vendors and shops) but most of these establishments experienced inventory shortages. While Üsküdar remained accessible, it was the organic volume of people in the public square and the promenade that made it difficult to gain access to the space (and to leave it) at the peak crowding hour.

The MES, albeit still connected to the public transportation network, the relatively less diverse modes of transportation resulted in congestion in parts surrounding the entry to the MES. This congestion was further exacerbated by the security checkpoint(s) in its single entry and exit point which resulted in occasional trespassing during peak crowd hours. While the space itself experienced varying levels of crowding, the second day of the event hosted more inhabitants than its first day, marked by a visibly younger crowd and a few security incidents. On a conceived level, the space was equipped with some amenities like seating elements and food and beverage options—from IBB's companies—it was also a common practice for people to bring folding chairs and food, converting some parts of the space into impromptu picnic spaces. While the scheduled concerts and other activities generated interest for many inhabitants on-site, it was also possible to observe different modes of engagement with the space and the components of the event. When a perceivably engaging activity was not in the space at certain times, there were people doing other activities like skateboarding, playing volleyball or soccer, or just relaxing on

the greenspace, both using the materials provided by IBB in the space and with what urban inhabitants brought to the space. In other words, inhabitants in MES on October 28 and 29, 2023, had the opportunity to engage with the space in ways they preferred, and the physical layout of the area allowed for alternative uses of the space even though the crowd formation process was associated with challenges due to the nature of the security measures in space.

Chapter 8

Discussion

This research project focused on the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and examined how public(s) were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul to address the following research questions:

(1) Which public value orientations did the political leadership(s) address and employ in influencing the construction of the public(s) for the hallmark event of the national day celebrations in Istanbul?; and

(2) How did the hallmark events of the national day celebrations in Istanbul materialize in their respective public space(s)?

Recognizing the political significance and symbolisms of national days, especially centenaries (e.g., Madiema, 2005; Northcutt, 1991), central to this research project was the interconnected nature of different political, social, and cultural factors in how the centenary as a phenomenon that is discursively constructed in the triad of politics, communication, and everyday experiences—positioning the research project within the scope of CES (Spracklen & Lamond, 2016). The first section of this chapter discusses the discursive construction of the abstract public sphere, followed by how the centenary was celebrated in the public realm of Istanbul.

8.1 Nation at the Centenary in the Public Sphere

Throughout the 2010s, the approaching centenary of the Republic of Turkey in 2023 emerged as a prominent theme in public discourse and was framed as a milestone by which political, social, and cultural goals outlined in the national vision were to be achieved (see Diken,

2022). Indeed, the centenary was framed by the government as part of a four-year-long project that commemorated the centenaries of different occasions (see Table 1) with the Republic Day positioned as the pinnacle of these celebratory endeavours. The centenary took place during a period of notable political and social polarization (Çelik et al., 2016; Laebens & Öztürk, 2021) whose instrumentalization for political capital remained intact during its celebrations. While the dominant political discourses in 2023 focused on the same issues and themes concerning Turkish society, they gave voice to different perspectives. For the president, the centenary represented an idea that would best be characterized by his (government's) accomplishments in governmental power, whereas the opposition focused on its heritage in the founding of the republic. In a sense, the president's discourse strived to position his recent accomplishments in governmental power as a rupture leading to rapid development and economic growth, but the opposition viewed the centenary in the context of its own role in the historical continuity as the oldest political party in Turkey—a difference which discursively crystallized as the former's idea of "Turkey Century" and the second century.

The key themes in the political arena as utilized by the president and the opposition, as outlined in the *Findings* chapter, displayed significant overlaps—most notably (1) infrastructure and national security, (2) family, and (3) justice. These three themes can be viewed as matters of public interest, or as potential domains of public value creation through governmental action as conceived by the political leadership (Bozeman, 2007; Moore, 1995). How these different themes were treated by the different political factions, however, diverged significantly. Military power and R&D, as well as large-scale infrastructure projects, were, for the president, an important indicator of the government's national defence strategy and an integral component of its "Turkey Century." The president did not build a connection between immigration and

refugees as having a national defence implication, despite the topic being recognized as a contentious issue in the public sphere (Babaee & Avcı, 2024; Bozdağ, 2020) and helped opposition to build a mental association with the founding era of the republic.

National defence and infrastructure, in Turkey's context, should be viewed as important indicators of Public Administration (PA) paradigms in which the New Public Management (NPM) perspective permeated different aspects of governmental operations in the past few decades. The output-oriented perspective associated with NPM highlighted in the presidential discourse did not necessarily consider the long-term societal impacts of such large-scale endeavours, which constituted the central discursive point of the opposition. By highlighting the hidden costs associated with these projects on both an economic and a societal level, the opposition leader underscored that the state needed to take a more central position in large-scale projects and decrease the reliance on private sector to facilitate a more just distribution of benefits to the citizens (Moore, 2013). This viewpoint underlined the perceived processual deficiencies in PA and to advocate for the state to assume more responsibility, signalling an intended reversal to some principles of Traditional Public Administration (TPA).

The president supported the traditional family structure (i.e., heterosexual marriage with kids) and the state's role in its reproduction. In this context, his use of the concept "LGBTists"—encompassing both LGTBQ+ communities and those individuals and political factions that supported them—surfaced as the singular threat to the traditional societal structure of the nation that was considered to be based on family. This singling out of the LGBTQ+ communities was strategic as it aligned with the general perception of these communities in the Turkish context as the "most mistrusted" and "outsiders within the national community" (Ergin & Gökşen, 2023, p. 103). With the conceptual expansion to LGBTists, it became possible for the president to equate

the political adversaries and citizens alike that supported LGBTQ+ communities' rights with a threat to the unity of the nation reinforcing the idea of these communities "not … as equal citizens" (Yılmaz & Göçmen, 2016, p. 485). This perspective also secured a foothold in the conservative mediascape—ascribing the groups of citizens singled out in the presidential rhetoric as the counter-publics of the nation (see Figure 12) by virtue of being outside the moral boundaries of the society (Ergin & Gökşen, 2023). This expanded exclusionary discourse utilized cultural identity issues as a political wedge in that it aimed all individuals and political actors showing support for these communities, effectively deepening the ideological fault line where "LGBTists," as the epitome of counter-publics of the nation, were discursively aligned explicitly with the opposition (of AKP, and its political allies) (Çelik et al., 2016). The issues that were raised by the opposition leader in terms of the relationship between families and the state, by contrast, remained on the extent of responsibilities of the state toward citizens—as part of the political community and not according to their ethical predilections (Forst, 2002)—in terms of providing them with appropriate resources to ensure the subsistence level for their livelihoods (i.e., a social safety net as a public good; Bozeman, 2007) and thereby a more just distribution of material and immaterial resources through the state apparatus.

The different viewpoints in the discursive construction of the state's relationship with the citizens and the principles of PA suggest the social inequalities and divisions that proliferated in Turkey were appropriated in different ways. The president's discourse can arguably be viewed to be more in line with the general public perspective in that the sources of polarization are politically instrumentalized with limited allusion or intent on overcoming them; instead, this instrumentalization suggested the continued intention to subsume such differences. In terms of PA principles, the output-oriented view that resulted in tangible outputs point toward the

continuation of the use of NPM mechanisms such as privatization, outsourcing, or PPPs (Bozeman, 2007), despite the long-term social and economic costs associated therewith. The relatively higher inclusivity in the opposition's discourse, however, suggested an aversion to use diversity as a political instrument and instead focused on the state responsibilities, especially to those communities that had been disproportionately affected by the changing socio-political developments. The opposition's proposed solution to this observation was a partial increase in the diversity of public sector operations (i.e., reassuming some of the principles of TPA). This positive perspective toward TPA can be viewed in tandem with the aversion to the emergence of hollow states (Milward & Provan, 2000) by facilitating a (partial) reversal of privatization (Warner, 2008). Considering these discussions regarding the competing approaches to governance on a political level, one may assert that the centenary took place with seemingly limited consensus on the how to conceptualize the relationship between the state and the society.

As outlined so far, polarization in Turkey has prominent indicators on various levels of political abstraction, starting from the political actors (e.g., Çelik et al., 2016) and descending toward intermediaries (e.g., Panayırcı et al., 2016) and the ordinary members of the society (e.g., Laebens & Öztürk, 2021). However, previous research suggested that temporary periods of widespread consensus were possible in the event of certain external shocks (e.g., natural disasters, political crises) (e.g., İşeri et al., 2019). Centenary's representation in the political discourse and how this was conveyed to the publics can also be potentially regarded as one such occasion in the sense that it was perceived as a unifying event for a considerable portion of the general public, as suggested by the widespread use of the commonality frame in all factions in the mediascape (Skey, 2008; Woods & Tsang, 2014). While societal polarization articulated in the political speeches resonated in the public sphere, the centenary's relevance to the broader

society reverberated across the mediascape. The politically valuable nature of the centenary, evoked across the political spectrum, manifested in a consensus on the significance of the national day for "the nation" in the media (Hallin, 1986).

However, it is precisely through the discursive construction of the "politically preferred" version of the public of the nation that leveraged society as a political instrument, which meant the potentially unifying function of the centenary remained on a superficial level. In the mediascape, the centenary was seemingly positioned as inherently positive for the nation and the country, but as one focuses on the differences in the mediascape, the political conflicts that were present in the political speeches were also observed to resonate in differential views toward political actors and the relationship between the state and the society. Depending on the positionality of the news outlets on the political spectrum, newspapers used their relational differences to the government and the opposition and positioned their opposing factions as being responsible for the state of the society, or for deficiencies with regard to the political promises in relation to the centenary.

This positional dissonance meant, opposition newspapers vilified the government (and, by implication, the president), whereas the pro-government media focused on opposition figures in their ostracism and demonization, particularly municipalities and mayors, including those of Istanbul. Recognizing the Republic Day traditionally as an inward-oriented event (Bolat, 2007) to support national cohesion (Woods & Tsang, 2014), the differential points of view in the national mediascape reiterated the competition between contemporary political, social, and cultural value orientations and those rooted in the founding era of the republic (Küçükcan, 2011). While the conservative pro-government news outlets expectedly used the mythicizing frame less frequently than the others included in the analysis, presumably influenced by the dominant

political factions' differences in appropriating the centenary (Babaee & Avcı, 2024; Gümüş & Dural, 2012), the fact that the mainstream pro-government news outlets (i.e., Hürriyet and Sabah with the highest circulation rates in the sample) used this frame the most underscored the continued relevance of this period in public memory. This observed approach suggests that despite the government's efforts (as proxied by the presidential speeches) to position their performance as foundational to the "Turkey Century" with minimal reference to the founding era constitutes a discrepancy from popular public opinion. In the context of the national day, the founding era of the republic and those individuals involved therein remained unscathed and their symbolisms persevered; instead, it was their perceived contemporary successors (i.e., the main opposition through party connections and their political allies) who became the political targets.

Similarly, despite the continued efforts to increase the presence of religion in the public realm, as supported by a religiously embroidered presidential rhetoric and changing administrative priorities (Eder, 2010; Janson & Kınıkoğlu, 2021; Lüküslü, 2016), references to religious values (i.e., morality frame) had limited presence in the media coverage surrounding the centenary and the national day. This outcome appeared to be a conscious aversion to conflate religion with what the national day ought to signify for the general public. In this context, national day, as a commemoration, was more or less immune to the differential points of view in the context of politics and PA; despite the nuanced approaches in the mediascape, the centenary was positioned as an event that would support national cohesion (Woods & Tsang, 2014). Therefore, the efforts to celebrate the (centenary) national day, irrespective of ideological orientation, represented a broad consensus in the media (Hallin, 1986) to mobilize citizens and urban inhabitants to participate in collective experiences by highlighting such occasions that align with their political position.

To summarize, the centenary had a significant presence in the political arena and the mediascape, thereby having a constitutive role in Turkey's abstract public sphere. Overall, the centenary was positioned as a unifying element for the nation, but when one considers divisions and polarization in Turkey's socio-political context, this possibility of higher level of collectiveness to overcome the dividing forces materialized neither in the political arena—primarily visible in the presidential discourse—nor in the mediascape. Instead, the use of the political "other" was a prominent fixture that reinforced the political polarization and how it permeated the process of political construction of the public and the counter-publics of the nation. In other words, the discursive differences unearthed in the analysis, despite their common tendency to frame the centenary in a positive light, did not aim for a higher level of collectiveness, but instead mostly served to amplify existing divisions in the society.

Such observations about how social and political tensions are reflected and treated are not uncommon in Turkey's public sphere(s) when one considers how polarization became a systemic issue with the authoritarian turn in Turkish politics that reverberated across the mediascape through direct and indirect (i.e., through capital owners) political influence, and inadvertently in the society (both through the state apparatus and everyday experiences). Remembering the central role ascribed to media organizations in relation to their function as intermediaries between political actors and the society (Habermas, 1992/1996), the centenary's potential for higher level of unity was conveyed to the publics in a divisive manner and not in a search for value orientations that transcended the usual patterns of collectivization through the fault lines of polarization (Çelik et al., 2016) in the abstract public sphere (Habermas, 1992/1996; Meynhardt, 2021; Moore, 2014; Moulton, 2009). However, this line of reasoning does not suggest that such patterns of polarization can be viewed as solely the result of unilateral political influence;

instead, the political framework functioned dialectically as a reflection and amplifier of certain areas of public interest (e.g., LGBTists, national defence). The public opinions paramount to polarizing patterns were first identified and selected, and then reappropriated and enforced in the abstract public sphere which are then re-conveyed to the publics in the official narrative. This process created a creating a vicious cycle of exclusion, polarization, and marginalization—reiterating the continued conflation of state sphere and public sphere in Turkey (Hazama, 2014) and the state's relative power over the opinion formation process and self-regulation (Foucault, 2009). Therefore, even occasions like national days that seem to be (politically) relevant for the imagined community of the nation, social and political divides have an indispensable impact on how such occasions are conceived on an abstract level. In the section that follows, I will focus on how the hallmark events organized for the centenary unfolded in Istanbul.

8.2 Celebrating the Centenary in Istanbul: As Spectacle and Event

As outlined in the previous section, the construction of the abstract idea of the centenary was intertwined with the political leadership's predilections and its resonance in the mediascape that was marked with commonality on the surface, but with tensions and divisions in the socio-political landscape as one descends into details. And Istanbul, as Turkey's largest city, as well as its economic and cultural centre, had a significant role in the construction of the centenary-in-public. As one would expect, the idea of the centenary materialized in various aspects of public life. While the focus of this research project was public institutions' forging of the centenary celebrations, it should be noted that centenary also became a commodity in the various domains of the city (e.g., Klein, 1977) in which particularly in commerce-oriented areas with high pedestrian traffic, private establishments used some form of paraphernalia to celebrate the centenary well before the national day that compounded the institutionalized presence of the

national symbols in the public realm (Fox, 2014; Skey, 2008). In this section, I will first discuss how the centenary celebrations organized by the President's Office and IBB were positioned in the public sphere, followed by their materialization in the public realm.

Central to this research is the idea that the government and IBB were represented by different political factions during the centenary, and Istanbul served as the host for public gatherings conceived by both institutions in different locations in the city—which was announced a few weeks before the centenary. How these public events are communicated to urban inhabitants is particularly relevant in understanding the political influence both over the events and on the mediascape (Spracklen & Lamond, 2016). The analysis of the mediascape relied on national newspapers; while acknowledging that print media represents only one channel of mediated communication, they remain an important tool for gaining a deeper understanding for how they influence opinion formation processes regarding the events under study in their respective publics of readers and followers (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The fact that approximately a quarter of the event-related news published were about these events in Istanbul speaks to their centrality (and that of the city) for centenary celebrations. However, the two events received differential treatment in the media discourse.

As outlined in the *Findings* chapter, the presidential events found a strong presence across the mediascape, whereas IBB's event was downplayed in the pro-government media outlets—absent in two, reported through ostracism and demonization frames in one—effectively influencing the politically instigated processes of construction of publics in the celebratory public realm (Habermas, 1992/1996; Iveson, 2007; Sennett, 2011). The celebrations of IBB, the symbolically and politically important Istanbul's local administrator, represented by the political "other," was also excluded from PDC's official three-volume report on the centenary

celebrations and their press coverage published shortly after the centenary (2023), even though it included other events by opposition municipalities. This selective omission in both the official publications and most of the pro-government news outlets covered in this research suggests an uneven level of hostility in the political landscape around the time of the centenary, particularly in the context of Istanbul—with a potential to limit the public perception of and participation in IBB's event. In this context, these differential perceptions in the mediascape can be considered a legitimate controversy as they echoed diverging points of view in the political arena and amplified them when conveying them to members of the public (Hallin, 1986). It was in such intricate web of relations in the political arena and its associated reflections in the mediascape that the centenary-related events were organized and executed in Istanbul.

Before continuing with the discussion on the execution of the presidential and IBB's events, contextually, it should be noted that all of the public gatherings that involved such festival-like approaches, such as public concerts, were organized by municipalities that were politically aligned with the opposition (and IBB). While there was no direct indication in the media outlets about the association between the two phenomena, the open criticism in some news stories in pro-government newspapers that celebratory events like the one organized by IBB (e.g., Figure 8) can be interpreted as the president's aversion to overt events in areas administered by his political party or allies due to Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Overall, the national day celebrations in Istanbul invited significant number of urban inhabitants to the public realm through a combination of public and private efforts in which public spaces in the city underwent changes to facilitate public gatherings (Glover, 2020) with a discernible impact on the everyday functioning of the city (Žižek, 2014). When we observe the public space animation projects by the President's Office and IBB and compare them with the

general narrative of those in respective leadership positions, the discursive elements employed in their narrative and their execution were internally consistent. For the presidential events, the idea of the Turkey Century constituted the foundation of the content in exhibition spaces built in Taksim and Üsküdar with an emphasis on national defence and infrastructure. This approach was supported by positioning the navy and the air force as the central pillars of the temporally delimited spectacle. Overall, building a strong mental association between the president's (and his government's) tenure and the republic's centenary constituted the overarching strategy of the presidential centenary celebrations.

A similar parallelism can also be discerned between the opposition's discourse and their approach to centenary celebrations. As mentioned previously, one of the central pillars of the opposition's discourse was the emphasis on inclusivity and addressing the societal polarization exacerbated by political mechanisms (Laebens & Öztürk, 2021) and a broader understanding of national security by evoking the idea of border security and associating it with the founding era of the republic to which CHP perceived itself to be the evident successor. For the IBB's hallmark show at the event in MES, the strategic positioning of public intellectuals can be construed as a symbolic nod to their emphasis on inclusivity; and the use of the symbolic hundred-year-old sycamore established a firm connection to the founding era of the republic and their perception of the centenary as a continuation of that period, as opposed to the narrative of the Turkey Century that aimed to cultivate a symbolic break from the historical continuity. Hence, for both political factions, the centenary represented a unique opportunity to cultivate symbolisms (e.g., Küçükcan, 2011) through material interventions.

All of the animated spaces for the centenary were part of the social infrastructure of the city that mediated relationalities between urban inhabitants (Klinenberg, 2018). However, the

relatively large physical size and capacity (and for the presidential events, their undeniable role as thoroughfares in the public transportation network) meant that the spaces that hosted the hallmark events were arguably more suitable for sociable co-presence of strangers when facilitating leisure-in-public. This mode of relationality was marked by a heightened awareness to surroundings (Glover, 2021, 2022; Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2023) including individuals and small groups but would not be expected to foster meaningful relationships between them (Latham & Layton, 2022). The fact that none of the spaces were privatized[1], and public access remained mostly unrestricted during the celebrations organized for the centenary, emphasized that public institutions continue to attach an importance to the national day as a link between state and local governments and Turkish society with minimal interference. Therefore, on a conceived level (Lefebvre, 1974/1991), spaces were animated to connect political entities with urban inhabitants who were attracted to the public realm, so that the contents of the animation were a message. On the one hand, the presidential events positioned tangible assets like infrastructure and national defence projects centrally in inviting urban inhabitants to the public realm. While some elements like the exhibition spaces remained in-place for a longer time, the main spectacle had a relatively short duration with limited possibilities of interaction with the spectaclized space. IBB, on the other hand, eventified MES with a relatively large portfolio of artists (and other supporting animation strategies) that would speak to a relatively diverse interests and maintained a dynamic programming that allowed prospective attendees to both be flexible in terms of when and how they were in the space but also for their prolonged presence therein. Despite the presence of some overlapping elements (e.g., aerial acrobatics) observable in different parts of the city, the

[1] Privatization in this context refers to changes in public space characteristics such as ticketed entry or presence of commercial enterprises and not services rendered by private enterprises in the preparations of the materials used in the execution of the animation projects (e.g., contractors, AV specialists, etc.) for expertise outside the scope of the public institutions.

presidential and IBB's events can be considered mutually exclusive, which aligned with their overall representation in the mediascape. The following subsections discuss the presidential and IBB's centenary celebrations under the themes of animation strategies, control measures, and publicness management.

8.2.1 Approach to animating the space

The centenary celebrations organized by both the President's Office and IBB utilized urban public spaces that drew considerable number of urban inhabitants to the public realm. However, there were some key differences in how the presidential and IBB's events altered the physical space and influenced participants' interactions with the space. The presidential events relied on static exhibition areas. For example, the naval parade and air shows confined participants to a relatively passive position as voyeuristic (symbolic) consumers of the highlighted indicators of national development that undergird the concept of Turkey Century. Interaction with these spaces can therefore be characterized as a form of passive engagement in the form of a mass gathering (Smith et al., 2021) by "spectaclizing" the space (Glover, 2020) through curated elements with which the government wanted to associate the centenary (Wangro, 2018). The spectacle, designed for passive consumption, also pointed toward the symbolic distance between the state and society. Aside from the main elements of the spectacle itself, there were no additional supporting features—what Chellew (2019) calls "ghost amenities"—beyond the existing amenities and establishments already located near the spaces. This absence, which is atypical for gatherings of comparable size in Turkey (such as political rallies), likely influenced how, and for how long, inhabitants interacted with the space. The IBB-organized centenary celebrations aimed at the general public, by contrast, eventified a considerably large urban green/event space with multiple coterminous event components. By

including numerous different supporting elements in the space, such as the multiple stages, gaming areas, sitting infrastructures, food and beverage kiosks, and washrooms, IBB utilized its public resources to ensure the space not only offered different contents for entertainment (Smith et al., 2021), but also catered to participants' everyday needs in the event space, thereby allowing a longer presence in and engagement with the space (Aldoori et al., 2025; Chellew, 2019). Hence, invitation to a prolonged engagement during the two-day long event rested on using a broad spectrum of public space animation strategies in MES, including activating, convivializing, and culinizing (Glover, 2020), which supported and shaped eventification. These elements in the space, coupled with the general spatial attributes of MES (most importantly, the large grass field) allowed urban inhabitants not only with different expectations of the space to co-exist (i.e., programmees, relaxationists, and wanderers), but also to explore alternative options (i.e., bottom-up interventions) that were not prescribed by the administrative interventions (e.g., picnicking, sports, skateboarding).

The animated public spaces brought together strangers whose presence was supported by their perceived affiliation with a social entity characterized by their common characteristics (Gilroy, 2004; Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2023) and aimed for a heightened emotional state (Collins, 2004, 2014) to support national cohesion and sense of belonging (Woods & Tsang, 2014). Some urban inhabitants were attracted by the symbolisms of the spectacle of hard power, while others sought a shared sense of celebration through soft power to support this process of collectivization. In this context, arguably, the urban inhabitants who participated in the public events in Istanbul collectivized merely through different interests (Gilroy, 2004) and value orientations (Meynhardt, 2021) leveraged through political agendas (Smith, 2014) and conveyed by a polarized mediascape (e.g., Babaee & Avcı, 2024; İşeri et al., 2019) to a polarized society

(Laebens & Öztürk, 2021). Therefore, the bipartite centenary celebrations at the highest levels of central and local administrations can be viewed as a physical manifestation of the societal divides and instrumental to their potential reproduction.

8.2.2 Controlling the animated space

The presidential and IBB's celebrations displayed different approaches to the securitization of the spaces, especially in terms of entrance to the public spaces and the visible security measured embedded therein. In contrast to the wide-ranging security measures in public spaces that may host large crowds (e.g., demonstrations, parades) typically employed by the central government (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2022), there were limited additional securitization in the spaces that hosted presidential events on the centenary. Even in the case of Taksim Square—a prominent, symbolically important public space that also became an embodiment of public space restrictions in Turkey (Akpınar & Ayataç, 2012; Baykan & Hatuka, 2010)—the centenary day was marked with periods of de-securitization. In Üsküdar, too, where the presidential events drew significant crowds, minimal additional (visible) security and crowd management personnel was stationed on-site. However, as opposed to the spectacle in Taksim that included static interventions in public spaces and a flow of urban inhabitants in the area, in Üsküdar, the spectacle had multiple parts—i.e., a stationary exhibition area, and the moving components of the military parade—that necessitated participants to remain on-site for a certain time period as passive observers of the spectacle (Smith et al., 2021). In this context, the similarities in the execution of the presidential public space animation projects led to two different outcomes—one of flow and one of congestion, thereby underscoring the importance of contextual factors influencing pedestrian mobilities when designing a large scale urban events (Molyneaux et al., 2021). However, aside from the overcrowding and congestion, Üsküdar did not have any major

issues concerning security similar to Taksim, yet the physical and social infrastructure in the area was seemingly insufficient to accommodate the needs of urban inhabitants for a prolonged period of time.

MES, meanwhile, was designed as a heavily securitized space with a fenced-off periphery, controlled entry, and multiple layers of security measures and personnel at the entry and within the space. From an operational perspective, the inefficiencies in crowd management that resulted in prolonged waiting periods and related alternative ways of entry observed (i.e., fence-jumping)—especially on the second evening of the programmed event—highlighted the importance of dynamic visitor and queue management strategies in large-scale events (Cummings et al., 2021). Nevertheless, aside from the entry/exit point, the physical characteristics of the event space in which the amenities were positioned at the periphery allowed participants to be mobile within the space with relatively limited difficulty (Smith et al., 2021). In a sense, the securitization measures in how the space was animated confined people to the event space by imposing strategic restrictions (Németh & Schmidt, 2007; Smith, 2017).

The relatively limited security measures in Taksim and Üsküdar align with Evans' (2017) observation that strict enforcement of rules and regulations may be loosened in certain contexts. The regular police patrols in and around Taksim, in this context, were permanent fixtures in the area and the centenary-related animation projects in the area did not result in visibly increased numbers. While securitization is often associated in relatively sterile public spaces (Mitchell, 2003), national days, as days of commemoration of a historical event valued by the collective imagined community of the nation (Anderson, 1983; Fox, 2014; Öztürkmen, 2001), can become sites where security is collectively and organically ensured—not necessarily enforced (Foucault, 2009). In other words, one may argue that a new, transitory social prescription on public

behaviour that emerged through the symbolisms in collective memory can conceptually be linked with the perceived and lived spaces that limited the need for sanctioned securitization in the how the space is conceived (Lefebvre, 1974/1991). In other words, temporary expectations about public behaviour, shaped by shared symbols and collective memory, influenced how people experienced the space and lessened the need for formal security measures.

In this line of reasoning, we can view the mass gatherings that materialized on the centenary as a form of temporary parochialization of public spaces. While the parochial space was initially conceptualized in relation to the mutual knowledge and level of intimacy that marks the relationalities in a physical space (Hunter, 1985), a sense of safety and security may also be supported when one becomes part of a collective social entity populated by strangers with similar perceived interests and/or shared purposes (Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2023; Lofland, 1989; McPherson et al., 2001). Public gatherings, in other words, can physically bring together people who, apart from living in the same city, often share little more than loose or indirect connections in their private lives, uniting them through their ties to the abstract public sphere (Sennett, 1977).

8.2.3 Managing the spaces' publicness

When comparing the different approaches to security and crowd formation strategies employed in the spaces that hosted centenary celebrations, the major diverging factor was that the presidential events were not only in easily accessible spaces but also enmeshed with the everyday life of the city and merged with the amenities present in these spaces. IBB's event, by contrast, was less central in terms of transportation, isolated from its surrounding urban elements, and structured as a stand-alone activity with amenities embedded therein. That is, the presidential events had a wider impact because they drew on the commercial and social infrastructure surrounding the event spaces, while the IBB's event was more contained within the venue itself

insofar as it was limited to what was available inside due to controlled entry and the way the crowd was managed. The different approaches to how public spaces were animated and securitized were essential in understanding their intended publicness (Németh & Schmidt, 2011). The seemingly more public spaces for the presidential events foresaw limited engagement with the space other than the spectacle inserted (Glover, 2020). The urban inhabitants were expected to come to the space, observe the spectacle, and then leave the space, which characterized how the centenary celebrations in Taksim and Üsküdar unfolded. MES, despite being less public in objective terms of access and securitization during the centenary celebrations, offered more flexibility to urban inhabitants in how they wanted to interact with the space and fellow inhabitants therein. This interaction was not only facilitated by the amenities in how the space was conceived, but also through what urban inhabitants brought into and did in the space. In other words, Taksim and Üsküdar were intended as more public, albeit tight spaces, whereas MES was intended as a less public, but loose space based on what was available for participants (Franck & Stevens, 2007; Németh & Schmidt, 2011).

This difference is significant for conceptualizing publicness of spaces as its investigation typically involves understanding the quantifiable spatial features, such as physical elements located in spaces (e.g., entry, signage, security, amenities) (Németh & Schmidt, 2011; Varna & Tiesdell, 2010), as well as the perceptual cues that influence inhabitants' interactions with and within the space (Aldoori et al., 2025; Chellew, 2019; Franck & Stevens, 2007). Therefore, mostly, the publicness of spaces is commonly viewed as an extension of its physical characteristics. However, employment of animation strategies in (or permanent alterations to) public spaces have an impact on their publicness not just through how they are conceived but how they change the social features of the space and the different types of activities that are

perceived to be possible and permissible in the space. Therefore, the realized publicness of spaces emerges in the interactions between quantifiable measures of publicness on the conceived level, and how the spaces are perceived, and experienced. Such interrelations between socio-spatial attributes contribute to the formation of tight and loose spaces that are not necessarily inherent attributes of spaces; rather, a space's position on this spectrum may change over time and perceived differently by prospective inhabitants of spaces, depending on their characteristics (Lefebvre, 1974/1991). Publicness, therefore, emerges in the subjective interpretation of the conditional and contextual socio-spatial features that cannot be fully determined and designed a priori (e.g., Loughran, 2014; Manshel, 2020) as it is part of the "continuous becoming of urban space" (Koch & Latham, 2013, p. 13).

8.3 Synthesis

This research on the centenary of Turkey, a commemorative event (Getz, 2007) that predominantly targeted those who viewed themselves as part of the nation (Anderson, 1983), focused on how the President's Office and IBB executed public space animation projects in Istanbul in accordance with their divergent political conceptions and symbolisms surrounding the centenary. The discursive differences in how the centenary—despite being superficially framed as a unifying phenomenon—was constructed by the dominant political factions were aligned with their overall vision that crystallized in the election period in the preceding months. The social and political frictions were an integral part of the political narratives and their representation in the mediascape: they not only resonated in the contents of the public space animation projects, but also instrumental in influencing urban inhabitants' modes of participation to centenary-related events and therefore the construction of publics therein (Iveson, 2007).

Both public organizations included in this research achieved masses of strangers to be co-present in public spaces. Even though the spaces animated in the centenary were not necessarily about building relationships but rather about co-inhabiting public spaces (Latham & Layton, 2022), being among strangers with a sense of belonging to the same social entity sharing similar interests (Wangro, 2018) helped to support perceived collectivization (Sennett, 2011) in occasional public spheres—and, by implication, in the abstract public sphere of the nation—conceived by the political factions (Habermas, 1992/1996). Yet, when contextualizing such collectivization in light of the societal differences that were leveraged in the process, how the hallmark events were planned, communicated, and executed reiterated the embeddedness of difference and polarization in the public sphere and public life to such an extent that the centenary national day, considered in a broad consensus to be a unifying event built on common values, became a venue that instead illustrated deep socio-political divisions instead of aiming (at least symbolically) to overcome them.

How the centenary celebration was conceived by the political authorities and experienced by the urban inhabitants was surely influenced by their socio-cultural and political predispositions, as well as the subjective meanings they attach to the (centenary) national day (Smith, 2014). The politically favourable vision for the centenary differed significantly in the political factions and their approach to centenary celebrations and utilization of socio-political differences to aid and influence public perception had a spatial reflection (Lefebvre, 1974/1991; Spracklen & Lamond, 2016). While Taksim has a significant role in public life as an (impromptu) insurgent political site, the differences between the usual security measures employed in Taksim and those on the centenary suggested that the administration did not expect Taksim to facilitate unsanctioned gatherings on the national day by the administration. The

alignment of this expectation with the findings of the study pointed toward the degrading symbolic role for Taksim in public imagination as a site for celebration (Koch & Latham, 2013) in which the politically conceived space became dominant (e.g., Akpınar & Ayataç, 2012). Üsküdar, one of the most accessible spaces for attending presidential events on the Bosporus (and a conservative-majority voter profile), experienced a fully populated day. Despite the limitations on its (social) infrastructure and amenities to support, it became a focal point of the celebrations as the one of the best spaces to view the naval spectacle. MES, which can be viewed as the least central of venues hosting large-scale events organized by public institutions in terms of its accessibility to the urban inhabitants residing in different parts of Istanbul, experienced a crowd of comparable sizes, if not more; however, the MES was a purpose-built space for such events, so whether the centenary celebrations contributed to strengthening symbolisms about the space remains to be seen.

Chapter 9

Implications, Limitations and Future Research

Most people who spent some time in Istanbul (and presumably in other cities in Turkey) in 2023 would agree that the idea of the centenary and its associated symbolisms had a significant presence in public life. This presence was partly conveyed through public institutions (e.g., the use of centenary logo) and partly through private efforts that commemorated the centenary. In their entirety, they ensured people interacted with the idea of the centenary daily in the time period that led up to its celebration. In their various forms, celebrations of the "big round number" were spread throughout the cities and culminated in arguably the largest national day event in recent public memory. This research focused on how the centenary Republic Day was discursively constructed and how publics were forged through public space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul that drew millions of urban inhabitants to the public realm. This chapter synthesizes the contributions and implications emanating from the findings of this research. Before introducing the contributions and implications, a brief outline of the research findings is warranted.

The first step of research focused first on how the leaders of the two dominant factions constructed their vision for politics in Turkey and its society. The president, the leader of the dominant political faction, highlighted tangible assets materialized during his tenure in office (e.g., infrastructure and national defence projects) to underline his commitment to continuing such efforts as paramount to the "Turkey Century"—a moniker of their governmental tenure's achievements as defining elements in the country's prospects. Polarizing tendencies in the society were continued to be amplified in the presidential discourse as well, in which certain communities based on their cultural and ethnic identities were singled out as a wedge in the

social structure and utilized to reinforce the existing social divisions. The opposition leader (with whom IBB was aligned on the centenary), on the other hand, used a comparatively inclusive discourse and instead focused on how the governmental approaches have, over time, contributed to heightened inequalities with an emphasis on economy and justice system. In this context, his main approach revolved mostly around an idealized (and perhaps even romanticized) relationship between state and society which was associated with a commitment to the functions of a social welfare state and a partial reversion to traditional public administration.

In its second step, the research focused on the media representation of the centenary and associated events in newspapers that were aligned with different political ideologies. The general tendency observed in this stage was that centenary was constructed predominantly in a unifying discourse through use of words and symbolisms that revolved around "national" commonalities. However, a closer analysis of how these news outlets differed revealed that the pro-government and opposition newspapers used centenary to underscore the social issues to a greater extent—most often by pointing toward the actions of their political opposites. This observation suggested a relative superficiality of the centenary and the national day as a unifying concept, especially when one considers that IBB's event was mostly downplayed or disregarded in the pro-government media faction whereas the presidential events received considerable coverage in opposition mediascape. This divergence underscored the unbalanced level of political animosity at the time of the centenary as amplified by the mediascape.

Finally, the research project focused on how the President's Office and IBB used public space animation projects for the public celebrations of the centenary in Istanbul. The celebrations organized by both the President's Office and IBB reflected the overall discursive elements employed by their respective leaders. The presidential events in Taksim and Üsküdar, aligned

with his discursive construction of the centenary, relied on showcasing infrastructure and national defence (e.g., the naval parade and aerial acrobatics) as the main component of the spectacle. While the animated spaces were designed in a way to not be isolated from their surroundings—with limited additional restrictions on entry and securitization, and reliance on urban amenities already included in the vicinity—they positioned attendees as passive spectators for the duration of the celebrations which was rarely supportive of any flexible interaction with the space. By contrast, IBB's event, on a conceived level was isolated from its urban surroundings with access protocols and security presence but provided a relatively self-sustaining space with the amenities positioned therein. The entertainment options in the space allowed for the event in MES to not only target diverse groups of urban inhabitants (albeit possibly at different times) but also supported prolonged presence in the space for the participants. Despite such different approaches that alternated between favouring external and internal flexibilities, it was ultimately the attendees' perception of and engagement with the spaces that determined their modes of interaction. Ultimately, it was the highly securitized less public MES on a conceived level that allowed for more diverse forms of interaction whereas the presidential spectacle with its higher level of conceived publicness did not manifest in diversifying attendees' interactions therein. In other words, how the animated spaces were conceived did not determine how the spaces were perceived and experienced by the attendees.

Following this brief outline of the findings, the next sections focus first on how this research contributes to the scholarly literature. Then, I will introduce the practical implications of the research before providing the research limitations and future research directions. The section and the dissertation conclude with final reflections.

9.1 Theoretical Contributions

The idea of the centenary, just like its role in the public imagination and memory, started to permeate into the academic scholarship with a significant focus on (corporate) communication (e.g., Altıntop, 2024; Erdal, 2020; Kaya Samut, 2024; Rizo, 2021; Tokatlı, 2025). While different disciplines and topics are represented in this emerging body of scholarship, the public celebrations of the centenary have so far received limited attention. One of the few examples of such research, Polatoğlu (2024), provided a descriptive account of the celebratory projects in Erzurum, a province in Eastern Turkey. The examination of the subset of centenary celebrations in Istanbul using a critical event studies (CES) perspective offered in this research can therefore be viewed as the starting point of situating the centenary in its social, political, and cultural context in Turkey and contribute to the centenary's retrospective investigations.

CES, as a guiding framework, allows for more comprehensive and context-driven approach to analysing critical events which ranges from political movements to disasters, from mega-events to socio-culturally relevant occasions and events (Lamond & Platt, 2016; Spracklen & Lamond, 2016). While the criticality of events should be approached and constructed with caution, the discursive nature of certain events warrant a thorough analysis of the sociopolitical context in which they emerged and materialized (Montessori, 2016). This study viewed the centenary not only in its historical context going back a century, but also how it was moulded over more than a decade as politically relevant milestone that positioned it as an important indicator of a rupture. With this approach, the research underscored political and societal meaning-making processes on events with a relatively broader audience and collective attendance and the varied political and cultural actors who played a decisive role in its discursive construction and physical and symbolic materialization. In light of the continuous shifts in

political orientations and shifts in structures of power balance on global, regional, and national levels, the findings pointed toward the potentially polarizing influences of political appropriation of events with a relatively broader societal reach and relevance. It is important to remember for CES scholars that it is not just events like national days that are susceptible to such influences; rather, it is possible for events at varied scales and orientations (e.g., public, commercial, and mega-events) to become politicized or politically targeted—underscoring the importance of proper and thorough contextualization of events in their critical analysis.

Moreover, this research differs from previous scholarship on Turkey's national day—which has traditionally been historiographic (e.g., Bolat, 2007; Öztürkmen, 2001) insofar as it utilized a mixed-method approach to incorporate centenary's discursive representation in different levels of abstraction (i.e., politics, media, and public life) to build a more comprehensive account of its construction with the potential to guide future research on national days. The primary data collected from public celebrations that documented how people interacted with public spaces revealed how the conceived centenary constructed publics and influenced urban inhabitants in animated spaces, thereby contributing to a more thorough understanding of the relationship between centenary as a political construct and social experiences (Fox, 2014; Smith, 2014). Considering that organizations such as these that Istanbul experienced in the centenary in terms of their scale regularly take place in urban settings—albeit with varying degrees of political significance—the multi-faceted approach employed in this research reiterates the political nature of leisure and leisure-in-public on how it is experienced by urban inhabitants and conceived by the political elites (Kuzuoglu & Glover, 2023). Given that all large-scale events have a political relevance, particularly through the economic impact they might generate, this research—in both its focus and methodology—contributed to the

development of CES in that it underscored the divergences between the events at the conceived and experienced levels for participants and highlighted the nuances between the varying levels of abstraction between the political and experienced social realities.

Another important contribution of this research concerns the temporal fluidity and the relationships between formal control and informal use of urban spaces and their publicness. The idea that the space is socially produced in the dialectical relationship between how it is conceived, perceived, and lived was first proposed by Lefebvre (1974/1991) and provided an alternative way of thinking about space and the social beings that inhabit it. However, it remains relatively common to focus first on the physical aspects of spaces rather than their social features, even for those who do not possess any formal power over spatial organization. The differences in how different spaces were animated for centenary celebrations and how people were able to interact with the spaces and other individuals co-inhabiting them underscored the differential perceptions of spaces at different temporalities. When thinking with the spatial triad, the perceived space is commonly considered to encompass the possibilities a space affords based on its physical aspects and the predispositions of the perceiving individual or groups in the absence of any social beings therein (Aldoori et al., 2025; Lefebvre, 1974/1991). The concept of publicness of spaces, which emerged in the scholarship first through physical characteristics (Németh & Schmidt, 2007) and underwent a conceptual expansion to also include the types of activities individuals may engage with in a spatial setting (Varna & Tiesdell, 2010), as this research suggests, can also be viewed as a subjective construct when looking through a Lefebvrean lens. Depending on the social characteristics, a social activity (including but not limited to the perceived characteristics of individuals and their observable behaviours) in a physical space has the potential to influence behaviour both in terms of restrictions and

allowances—which can be further amplified by the symbolisms associated with time (e.g., national day) and space (symbolisms).

The symbolisms associated with urban public spaces, despite emerging over long periods of time, are dynamic constructs that are influenced by social contexts. What Taksim Square experienced in the centenary points towards a peculiar symbolic transformation that warrants the attention of urban researchers for it can be described neither as a domesticated space nor a space of resistance—underscoring that changing the perceived position of certain public spaces in popular imagination. As the relative absence of interest in the centenary in Taksim Square (both from a conceived and a lived perspective) indicated, the site is no longer associated with shared celebrations—or more broadly, with positive emotions on a collective level—but it remains a central location of resistance and political opposition on numerous (other) days. Therefore, the case of Taksim is noteworthy: the efforts to limit "insurgent" practices through physical changes and securitization (Akpınar & Ayataç, 2012) have not dismantled the symbolic association of the site for political resistance and demonstrations, but significantly decreased its role about sociability and shared (positive) sense of belonging. One should remember that placemaking does not necessarily work on the foundation of positive emotional connections, it can also function through negative or even subversive relationalities between inhabitants (Gieryn, 2000) and how domestication of spaces unfold is difficult to predict due to their entanglement with social forces (Koch & Latham, 2013). This change should be viewed as another reminder to researchers and local and national administrations about the various functions of public spaces and the varied ways in which different publics engage with placemaking in public spaces of cities—not always in the politically favourable ways.

9.2 Practical Implications

One of the foundational differences between how political factions' constructed the centenary was the focus on rupture and change versus continuity which was supported by various examples of dichotomies that have, over time, culminated in political and societal polarization. While the concept of public value(s) did not surface as a probable guiding framework in Turkey, the tensions between different political factions in terms of governance and PA principles were evident. Considering that public value thinking primarily concerns thinking about the ways that would be most beneficial to publics at different levels of collectivization (e.g., Benington, 2009; Meynhardt, 2021; Moore, 2014), identification of value orientations that would foster collectivization at various social levels would help policymakers to more accurately address societal needs and overcome (some of the) polarizing influences under broader sets of values.

Secondly, it was due to the national day being the centenary that Istanbul hosted the central government and the President's Office for national day celebrations, which are typically confined to the state sphere and official engagements in the capital city, Ankara, with the central government's local events (e.g., official pageantry). Therefore, the centenary provided a unique national day in Istanbul in which the local and central administration simultaneously appropriated and animated the public spaces in the city, laying bare their differential approaches to the occasion and arguably competed for the participation of the urban inhabitants on the city level. However differently the political actors positioned the centenary (and the national day, more broadly) within their respective agendas, acknowledging the ritualistic aspect of such occasions (Smith, 2014), the components that make up such days take shape over time. In this context, different public institutions are tasked with different functions in the public perception. The "traditional" separation of duties in the context of national days for commemoration (i.e.,

government and the state function) and celebration (i.e., local administrations) that had been the case prior to the centenary (and thereafter) was partially changed with the centenary in which the former received a higher visibility in the public realm of Istanbul, seemingly as an isolated incident. Therefore, it is future political courses of action that will position the relationship between these public institutions and the public realm of Istanbul and other cities.

The third implication emanating from this research concerns the operational aspects of public space animation projects of such scales. Self-evidently, the spaces that were investigated in this research had their advantages and disadvantages from the conception to the experiential aspects of the animation projects. While Üsküdar was the focus in this research, the presidential event had a widespread presence alongside the Bosporus where the spectacle was observable which presumably capped the number of inhabitants who came to Üsküdar (which still experienced significant levels of congestion). If one were to disregard the adversarial relationship between the political factions and the competitive relationship between the events organized by them (see O'Toole et al., 2005), a joint strategy between different levels of administrations to support public gatherings (i.e., local publics) in different parts of the city (e.g., live broadcasting) of the celebrations would have the potential to include different communities in the public realm—increasing the reach of the events without causing additional stress on local(ized) infrastructure by larger crowds and higher congestion.

9.3 Limitations and Future Research

This research project focused on an approximately six-month-long time period in 2023 that started with the general and presidential election period and ended in the immediate aftermath of the centenary with the aim of investigating the discursive construction of the centenary Republic Day in Turkey, and to examine how public(s) were forged through public

space animation projects organized by public administrations in Istanbul. While the centenary celebrations marked the end of this project, as the first limitation of the study, they also represent the beginning of the political vision articulated in the process that preceded it. The centenary marked an important milestone for Turkey as well as the contemporary political figures therein and represented the end point for this research. Considering that continuous changes in the political dynamics in Turkey, investigating how they relate to the vision statements for the future of the state and the society in its new century, and its interrelations with subsequent social experiences are essential in constructing possible trajectories for future development. It is therefore for future scholarship to contextualize the centenary as part of the historical continuity in retrospect (e.g., Madiema, 2005).

Secondly, this research treated the centenary celebrations as temporally delimited events with the aim of understanding the specific linkages between politics, media, and national day celebrations on a symbolically important anniversary. However, as previous scholarship on national days underlined (e.g., Bolat, 2007; Frei, 2019; Klein, 1977; Öztürkmen, 2001), how national days are forged (Smith, 2014) takes its cues from the past and adapt them to the present context. While the scale of the celebrations may not be as extensive as it was in the centenary, the conflicts and tensions (or lack thereof) in the levels of abstraction investigated in this study would presumably permeate all iterations of the national day, rendering a comparative investigation of national day celebrations over time, across different cities, and abroad, illuminating for understanding their political and politicized nature. While Istanbul offered a unique setting to investigate the approaches of different political factions in forging their respective celebrations, how political alignment between national and local administrations resonated in such celebrations would provide added depth to the construction of the national day.

Similarly, investigations of the outward-oriented communications regarding the national day (e.g., through international organizations, foreign press, etc.) would complement this research as discursive elements that are directed towards an audience that does not necessarily share the emotional and/or symbolic connection to the national day.

Third, this research focused on the top-down construction of the centenary (Smith, 2014) and relied on a combination of secondary sources in its investigation of the political arena and the mediascape, and observational primary data for public space animation projects and urban inhabitants' modes of interaction with and in these spaces. However, how the national day is forged for the citizens, as Fox (2014) underlined, cannot be thought separately from their experiential aspect for the urban inhabitants who participated in such mass gatherings. While this research was able to discern certain patterns of participation that were directly observable in the animated spaces, the subjective experiences of the individuals in different public spaces are essential in gaining a deeper understanding of how different animation strategies contribute to their emotive impacts on different groups of people. Therefore, qualitative and quantitative studies that comparatively evaluate different animation projects as well as unique components within animated spaces would help elicit those approaches that are valued by different publics and why. Such approaches as narrative inquiry and oral history would help in understanding how such differences would contribute to placemaking initiatives, which would especially be valuable for the administrative perspective in guiding future planning of such gatherings from an event design and management perspective.

Fourth limitation of the study is its focus on two dominant political factions in the centenary which do not encompass the diversity in Turkey's political landscape, especially left-wing and pro-Kurdish parties. Noting, for instance, that the centenary events were almost non-

existent in the left-wing Evrensel newspaper, the relevance of the national day, or more crucially its irrelevance for certain groups, is indicative of the differential ascription of values to such days in the society which to a certain extent is represented in the political landscape. Therefore, how political factions outside the mainstream conceptualized and constructed centenary and the new century in the public sphere is important to understand, particularly as they relate to their socio-political and economic objectives which concentrate more specifically on the social inequalities and marginalization central to these political groups' narrative. Such alternative investigations hold immense potential for evaluating the social justice implications of political constructions related to the national day.

National days materialize under the influence of the histories of nation-states and political actors' influence over them is function of state traditions, social contexts, and political conjecture. For example, after a long period of time that confined the national day to a state function (Bolat, 2007), Turkey experienced an increased public interest in national day through the incorporation of popular culture into its programming (Öztürkmen, 2001) and the centenary was not immune to growing socio-political tensions and changing political aspirations (Arat & Pamuk, 2019). Each nation-state has its unique peculiarities in how its national days are forged. Considering that the current level of political polarization is the outcome of a two-decade-long conservative government, how national days are forged and what (and whom) they represent in countries that are (re)living their versions of political transformations are potentially lucrative areas of inquiry for future research.

9.4 Final Reflections

When I first started this research project, my primary objective was to get a deeper understanding about the processes in which the centenary was constructed as an intellectual and

social construct forged in the public sphere, and as an occasion that manifested itself in the public realm and public spaces of Turkey. Republic Day was the prime example of such days and had a presence in public life since the initial processes of nation-building after the founding of the republic. Public participation in various forms of national day celebrations has been an experience for most, if not all, people living in Turkey at some point in their lives and such experiences change with the political framework. The centenary was a case in point. The combination of the centenary's political significance and the socio-political divisions in which it was forged had a significant reflection in how different political actors conceptualized it in the public sphere.

The time that has passed after the centenary celebrations was marked with transformatory events that have challenged the governmental power and as a result, increased social conflicts, and roots of (some) of these issues can be found within the discursive construction of the centenary. While Turkey did not start its new century in the best of possible conditions, the outcomes of such tensions will be decisive for its future.

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Appendix A

Speeches by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2023 Election Period

	Date (DD-MM)	Title	URL
P79	28.05	Seçimin Ardından Külliye'de Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147335/secimin-ardindan-kulliye-de-yaptiklari-konusma
P78	27.05	Adnan Menderes'i Anma Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147336/adnan-menderes-i-anma-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P77	25.05	Güçlü Sanayi, Güçlü Türkiye İstanbul Buluşması Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147297/guclu-sanayi-guclu-turkiye-istanbul-bulusmasi-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P76	24.05	Hemşehri Dernekleri Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147288/hemsehri-dernekleri-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P75	24.05	Keçiören STK Temsilcileri ve Muhtarlar Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147287/kecioren-stk-temsilcileri-ve-muhtarlar-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P74	22.05	Büyük Rumeli Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147267/buyuk-rumeli-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P73	21.05	Defne Devlet Hastanesi Açılışı Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147258/defne-devlet-hastanesi-acilisi-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P72	20.05	Adıyaman'da Gençlerle Buluşma Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147257/adiyaman-da-genclerle-bulusma-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P71	20.05	Gençlerle Buluşma Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147256/genclerle-bulusma-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P70	19.05	İstanbul Modern'i Ziyaretlerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147240/istanbul-modern-i-ziyaretlerinde-yaptiklari-konusma
P69	19.05	Hemşehri Dernekleri Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147239/hemsehri-dernekleri-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P68	18.05	İstanbul Ulaşım Sektörü Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147238/istanbul-ulasim-sektoru-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P67	12.05	3. Türkiye Gençlik Zirvesi'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147181/3-turkiye-genclik-zirvesi-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P66	11.05	Hak-İş Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147148/hak-is-genel-kurulu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P65	10.05	Danıştay Başkanlığı'nın 155. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147112/danistay-baskanligi-nin-155-kurulus-yildonumu-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P64	8.05	45 Bin Öğretmen Atama Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/147071/45-bin-ogretmen-atama-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma

P63	2.05	Konya Karapınar Güneş Santrali, Bozkır Barajı ve Abdülhamit Han Caddesi ile Diğer Projelerin Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146972/konya-karapinar-gunes-santrali-bozkir-baraji-ve-abdulhamit-han-caddesi-ile-diger-projelerin-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P62	1.05	İstikbalin Yüzyılı Tanıtım Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146971/istikbalin-yuzyili-tanitim-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P61	1.05	7. Memur-Sen Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146970/7-memur-sen-genel-kurulu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P60	29.04	TEKNOFEST'i Ziyaretlerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146951/teknofest-i-ziyaretlerinde-yaptiklari-konusma
P59	28.04	Adana 15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146950/adana-15-temmuz-sehitler-koprusu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P58	27.04	Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali İlk Nükleer Yakıt Getirme Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/146902/akkuyu-nukleer-guc-santrali-ilk-nukleer-yakit-getirme-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P57	25.04	Devlet Üstün Fedakârlık Madalyası Tevcih Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145897/devlet-ustun-fedak-rlik-madalyasi-tevcih-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P56	25.04	Engelli Öğretmen Ataması Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145896/engelli-ogretmen-atamasi-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P55	24.04	SIRO Batarya Geliştirme ve Üretim Kampüsü Temel Atma Töreninde Yaptığı Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145884/siro-batarya-gelistirme-ve-uretim-kampusu-temel-atma-toreninde-yaptigi-konusma
P54	24.04	Bursa Gemlik'te Halka Hitapları	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145881/bursa-gemlik-te-halka-hitaplari
P53	23.04	Yeni Altay Tankı'nın Testler İçin TSK'ya Teslimi Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145864/-yeni-altay-tanki-nin-testler-icin-tsk-ya-teslimi-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P52	23.04	Akyazı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Spor Kompleksi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145861/akyazi-recep-tayyip-erdogan-spor-kompleksi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P51	23.04	Milli Eğitim Bakanı Mahmut Özer ve Beraberindeki Öğrencileri Kabulde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145857/milli-egitim-bakani-mahmut-ozer-ve-beraberindeki-ogrencileri-kabulde-yaptiklari-konusma
P50	22.04	Kahramanmaraş'ta Konteyner Kent Ziyaretinde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145856/kahramanmaras-ta-konteyner-kent-ziyaretinde-yaptiklari-konusma
P49	22.04	Gaziantep Nurdağı Belpınar Ve Mesthüyük Köyleri, Kahramanmaraş Türkoğlu Özbek Köyü Köy Evleri Anahtar Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145850/gaziantep-nurdagi-belpinar-ve-mesthuyuk-koyleri-kahramanmaras-turkoglu-ozbek-koyu-koy-evleri-anahtar-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P48	21.04	Restorasyonu Tamamlanan Sultanahmet Camii'nin Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145849/restorasyonu-tamamlanan-sultanahmet-camii-nin-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma

P47	20.04	Karadeniz Doğal Gazı Devreye Alma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145848/karadeniz-dogal-gazi-devreye-alma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P46	20.04	Enerji ve İklim Konulu Forum'da Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145847/enerji-ve-iklim-konulu-forum-da-yaptiklari-konusma
P45	19.04	Denizli'de İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145782/denizli-de-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P44	19.04	Denizli'de Halka Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145780/denizli-de-halka-hitaben-yaptiklari-konusma
P43	18.04	Eskişehir Gençlerle İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145769/eskisehir-genclerle-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P42	18.04	Eskişehir Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145765/eskisehir-toplu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P41	18.04	Afyonkarahisar'da Halka Hitaben Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145764/afyonkarahisar-da-halka-hitaben-yaptiklari-konusma
P40	17.04	Kur'an-ı Kerim-i Güzel Okuma Yarışması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145752/kur-an-i-kerim-i-guzel-okuma-yarismasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P39	17.04	Üsküdar'da Depremzedelerle İftar Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145749/uskudar-da-depremzedelerle-iftar-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P38	17.04	Fikirtepe Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi1. Etap Anahtar Teslimi ile 2. ve 3. Etaplarda Kentsel Dönüşüm Başlangıç Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145748/fikirtepe-kentsel-donusum-projesi1-etap-anahtar-teslimi-ile-2-ve-3-etaplarda-kentsel-donusum-baslangic-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P37	17.04	İstanbul Finans Merkezi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145747/-istanbul-finans-merkezi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P36	16.04	Şanlıurfa İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145745/sanliurfa-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P35	16.04	Şanlıurfa 897 Afet Konutu Temel Atma ve 659 Konut, 61 Dükkân Anahtar Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145740/sanliurfa-897-afet-konutu-temel-atma-ve-659-konut-61-dukk-n-anahtar-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P34	15.04	Kocaeli Şehir Hastanesi ve Yapımı Tamamlanan Diğer Projelerin Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145726/kocaeli-sehir-hastanesi-ve-yapimi-tamamlanan-diger-projelerin-toplu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P33	15.04	İmece Uydusu'nun Uzaya Fırlatma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145722/imece-uydusu-nun-uzaya-firlatma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P32	15.04	Kocaeli'nde Depremzedeler ile İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145738/kocaeli-nde-depremzedeler-ile-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P31	14.04	Diyarbakır'da İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145720/diyarbakir-da-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma

P30	14.04	Diyarbakır Deprem Konutları Temel Atma ve 1432 Konut ve 17 Dükkân Anahtar Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145719/diyarbakir-deprem-konutlari-temel-atma-ve-1432-konut-ve-17-dukk-n-anahtar-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P29	13.04	Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Malatya İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145683/cumhurbaskani-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan-in-malatya-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P28	13.04	Malatya Deprem Konutları Temel Atma ve 1442 Konut, 250 Köy Evi ile 47 Dükkân Anahtar Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145682/malatya-deprem-konutlari-temel-atma-ve-1442-konut-250-koy-evi-ile-47-dukk-n-anahtar-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P27	12.04	Depremde Bölgede Görev Alan Belediyeler, Arama Kurtarma Ekipleri ve Depremzedelerle İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145662/depremde-bolgede-gorev-alan-belediyeler-arama-kurtarma-ekipleri-ve-depremzedelerle-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P26	12.04	AKM-Gar-Kızılay Metrosu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145661/akm-gar-kizilay-metrosu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P25	10.04	TCG Anadolu Gemisi Teslim Töreni ve Yeni MİLGEM Fırkateynleri Sac Kesme Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145644/tcg-anadolu-gemisi-teslim-toreni-ve-yeni-milgem-firkateynleri-sac-kesme-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P24	9.04	İstanbul Pendik Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145643/istanbul-pendik-toplu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P23	8.04	Başakşehir-Çam ve Sakura Şehir Hastanesi Kayaşehir Metro Hattı Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145638/basaksehir-cam-ve-sakura-sehir-hastanesi-kayasehir-metro-hatti-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P22	8.04	Başakşehirli Romanlar Geleneksel İftar Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145642/basaksehirli-romanlar-geleneksel-iftar-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P21	7.04	Sağlık Çalışanları ile İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145631/saglik-calisanlari-ile-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P20	5.04	Emeklilerle İftar Buluşması Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145594/emeklilerle-iftar-bulusmasi-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P19	4.04	Büyükelçilerle İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145581/buyukelcilerle-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P18	3.04	Milletvekilleri ile İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145574/milletvekilleri-ile-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P17	3.04	TOGG'un Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145571/togg-un-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P16	2.04	İstanbul Bağcılar İftar Buluşması'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145562/istanbul-bagcilar-iftar-bulusmasi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P15	2.04	Bağcılar Toplu Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145561/bagcilar-toplu-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma

P14	1.04	Elazığ İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145560/elazig-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P13	1.04	Elazığ Afet Konutları Temel Atma ve Sosyal Konutlar Anahtar Teslim Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145559/elazig-afet-konutlari-temel-atma-ve-sosyal-konutlar-anahtar-teslim-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P12	31.03	Kilis'te İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145558/kilis-te-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P11	31.03	Gaziantep-Kilis Afet Konutları Temel Atma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145556/gaziantep-kilis-afet-konutlari-temel-atma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P10	28.03	İnsani Yardım Tugay Komutanlığı'nda Askerlerle İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/145457/insani-yardim-tugay-komutanligi-nda-askerlerle-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P9	27.03	Adıyaman İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144443/adiyaman-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P8	27.03	Adıyaman Yeni Afet Konutları Temel Atma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144442/adiyaman-yeni-afet-konutlari-temel-atma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma-
P7	26.03	Büyükçekmece Öğrenci Yurdu'nda Misafir Edilen Depremzedelerle İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144432/buyukcekmece-ogrenci-yurdu-nda-misafir-edilen-depremzedelerle-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P6	25.03	İlim Yayma Vakfı 52. Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144431/ilim-yayma-vakfi-52-genel-kurulu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma-
P5	24.03	Hatay'da İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma,	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144413/hatay-da-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma-
P4	24.03	İskenderun'da Deprem Konutları ve Yeni Devlet Hastaneleri Temel Atma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144430/iskenderun-da-deprem-konutlari-ve-yeni-devlet-hastaneleri-temel-atma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P3	23.03	Kahramanmaraş İftar Programı'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144398/kahramanmaras-iftar-programi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
P2	23.03	Pazarcık Depremi Sonrası 17 Bin 902 Afet ve Köy Konutu İlk Temel Atma Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144397/pazarcik-depremi-sonrasi-17-bin-902-afet-ve-koy-konutu-ilk-temel-atma-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
P1	19.03	Bandırma Bor Karbür Üretim Tesisi Açılış Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/144327/bandirma-bor-karbur-uretim-tesisi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma

Appendix B:

Speeches by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in the 2023 Election Period

	Date (DD-MM)	Title	URL
O47	25.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Adana'da: "Uyuşturucu Baronlarını Bu Topraklarda Yaşatmayacağım"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-adanada-uyusturucu-baronlarini-bu-topraklarda-yasatmayacagim
O46	23.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Hatay'da: "Sahtekarlık Yapandan Cumhurbaşkanı Olmaz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-hatayda-sahtekarlik-yapandan-cumhurbaskani-olmaz
O45	12.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Samsun'da: Sandığa Gidilecek, Oy Kullanılacak ve Bu Ülkeye Demokrasi Gelecek"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-samsunda-sandiga-gidilecek-oy-kullanilacak-ve-bu-ulkeye-demokrasi-gelecek
O44	12.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Ankara'da: "Bir Ağaç Gibi Tek ve Hür ve Bir Orman Gibi Kardeşçe Yaşayacağız"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-ankarada-bir-agac-gibi-tek-ve-hur-ve-bir-orman-gibi-kardesce-yasayacagiz
O43	11.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Sivas'ta: "Demir Çelik Fabrikasını Kamulaştırıp, Sivaslılara Tahsis Edeceğim"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-sivasta-demir-celik-fabrikasini-kamulastirip-sivaslilara-tahsis-edecegim
O42	11.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Bursa'da: "Sinan Ateş ve Gaffar Okkan'ın Katillerini Adalete Teslim Edeceğim "	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-bursada-sinan-ates-ve-gaffar-okkanin-katillerini-adalete-teslim-edecegim
O41	10.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Aydın'da: "Oyumuzun Birini Bile Çaldırmayacağız"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-aydinda-oyumuzun-birini-bile-caldirmayacagiz
O40	10.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Kütahya'da: "Yiğit Adamlar Taş Atmazlar"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-kutahyada-yigit-adamlar-tas-atmazlar
O39	9.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Bolu'da: "Gideceğiz, Oyumuzu Kullanacağız ve Bir Seferde Bitireceğiz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-boluda-gidecegiz-oyumuzu-kullanacagiz-ve-bir-seferde-bitirecegiz
O38	9.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Düzce'de: "Bay Kemal Eşittir Hak, Hukuk, Adalet"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-duzcede-bay-kemal-esittir-hak-hukuk-adalet
O37	9.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Sakarya'da: "Devlet Bakidir ve Kimsenin Malı Değildir"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-sakaryada-devlet-bakidir-ve-kimsenin-mali-degildir
O36	8.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Adana'da: "İster Beşli Çete Olun, İster Elli Beşli Çete; Hesabını Soracağım"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-adanada-ster-besli-cete-olun-ster-elli-besli-cete-hesabini-soracagim

O35	7.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Kırşehir'de: Orta Anadolu'yu Demiryollarıyla Mersin ve İskenderun'a Bağlayacağız	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-kirsehirde-orta-anadoluyu-demiryollariyla-mersin-ve-skenderuna-baglayacagiz
O34	7.05	13. Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Kırıkkale'de: Hiçbir Çocuğun Yatağa Aç Girmediği Bir Türkiye İnşa Edeceğim	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/13-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-kirikkalede-hicbir-cocugun-yataga-ac-girmedigi-bir-turkiye-nsa-edecegim
O33	7.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Antalya'da: Terör Örgütlerinden Medet Umar Hale Geldiler, Yazıklar Olsun	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-antalyada-teror-orgutlerinden-medet-umar-hale-geldiler-yaziklar-olsun
O32	6.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Erzincan'da: "Bunlarınki Mevsimlik Milliyetçilik…"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-erzincanda-bunlarinki-mevsimlik-milliyetcilik
O31	6.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, İstanbul'da: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletini Bir Kişiye Teslim Etmeyeceğiz	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-stanbulda-turkiye-cumhuriyeti-devletini-bir-kisiye-teslim-etmeyecegiz
O30	5.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Mersin'de: "5 Yılda 850 Bin Kişilik Yeni İstihdam Alanı Yaratacağız"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-mersinde-5-yilda-850-bin-kisilik-yeni-stihdam-alani-yaratacagiz
O29	5.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Muğla'da: "Tıpış Tıpış Ödeyecekler O Paraları, Göreceksiniz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-muglada-tipis-tipis-odeyecekler-o-paralari-goreceksiniz
O28	4.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Niğde'de: "Gençler, Sizin Hayalleriniz Bay Kemal'in Hedefi Olacak"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-nigdede-gencler-sizin-hayalleriniz-bay-kemalin-hedefi-olacak
O27	4.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Denizli'de: Polislere Sözüm Var, 100 Bin Güvenlik Görevlisi Alacağız	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-denizlide-polislere-sozum-var-100-bin-guvenlik-gorevlisi-alacagiz
O26	3.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Boyabat'ta: "Mutfakta Yangını Çıkaran Sensin, Söndürecek Olan Da Benim"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-boyabatta-mutfakta-yangini-cikaran-sensin-sondurecek-olan-da-benim
O25	3.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Ordu'da: "Darbe Değil Demokrasi, Demokrasi! Sandıktan Demokrasi Çıkacak!"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-orduda-darbe-degil-demokrasi-demokrasi-sandiktan-demokrasi-cikacak
O24	2.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Ağrı'da: "Onlardan Alacağız, Vatandaşa Vereceğiz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-agrida-onlardan-alacagiz-vatandasa-verecegiz
O23	2.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Van'da: "Kayyum Denen Garabet Uygulamayı Tümüyle Bitireceğiz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-vanda-kayyum-denen-garabet-uygulamayi-tumuyle-bitirecegiz
O22	1.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Zonguldak'ta: "Cumhurbaşkanı Olduğumda 5 Bin İşçi Alacağım"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-zonguldakta-cumhurbaskani-oldugumda-5-bin-sci-alacagim

O21	1.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhubaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Bartın'da: "Kul Hakkı Yemedim, Kul Hakkı Yedirmeyeceğim"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-bartinda-kul-hakki-yemedim-kul-hakki-yedirmeyecegim
O20	1.05	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Manisa'da: Çiftçiyi ve Üreticiyi Asla Ezdirmeyeceğiz	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-manisada-ciftciyi-ve-ureticiyi-asla-ezdirmeyecegiz
O19	30.03	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu İzmir'de: "Bu Seçimler Kucaklaşmak, Barışmayı Sağlama Seçimidir"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-zmirde-bu-secimler-kucaklasmak-barismayi-saglama-secimidir
O18	29.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Kayseri'de: Demiryolunu Kayseri'den Mersin'e, İskenderun'a Bağlayacağız	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-kayseride-demiryolunu-kayseriden-mersine-skenderuna-baglayacagiz
O17	29.04	CHP Lideri ve Millet İttifakı Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Isparta'da: "Artık Değişim Zamanı"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-millet-ttifaki-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-ispartada-artik-degisim-zamani
O16	28.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Giresun'da: "Sözüm Söz; 4 Doların Altına Asla Düşmeyecek Bu Fındık"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-giresunda-sozum-soz-4-dolarin-altina-asla-dusmeyecek-bu-findik
O15	28.04	Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Kocaeli'de: "Savunma Sanayii Milli Meseledir; Sağcısı, Solcusu, Ortacısı Olmaz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-kocaelide-savunma-sanayii-milli-meseledir-sagcisi-solcusu-ortacisi-olmaz
O14	27.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Balıkesir'de: "Bütün Garibanların Sahibi Bay Kemal Olacak"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-balikesirde-butun-garibanlarin-sahibi-bay-kemal-olacak
O13	27.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu, Tekirdağ'da: "Sen Kim, Milliyetçilik Kim!"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-tekirdagda-sen-kim-milliyetcilik-kim
O12	26.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Afyon'da: Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Çankaya Köşkü Var, Oraya Gideceğiz	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-afyonda-gazi-mustafa-kemal-ataturkun-cankaya-kosku-var-oraya-gidecegiz
O11	26.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Nevşehir'de: Ne Yaparsanız Yapın, Burnunuzdan Fitil Fitil Getireceğim!	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-nevsehirde-ne-yaparsaniz-yapin-burnunuzdan-fitil-fitil-getirecegim
O10	25.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Eskişehir'de: "Senden Çok Daha Güzelini, Çok Daha İyisini Yapacağız!"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-eskisehirde-senden-cok-daha-guzelini-cok-daha-yisini-yapacagiz
O9	25.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Burdur'da: "Birinci Turda Alacağız ve Türkiye'de Tarih Yazacağız"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-burdurda-birinci-turda-alacagiz-ve-turkiyede-tarih-yazacagiz
O8	24.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Ardahan'da: "Herkesin İşi, Herkesin Geliri Olacak"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-ardahanda-herkesin-si-herkesin-geliri-olacak

O7	24.04	CHP Genel Başkanı Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Göle'de: "Sizin Karnınız Toksa, Benim De Karnım Tok Olacak"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-golede-sizin-karniniz-toksa-benim-de-karnim-tok-olacak
O6	24.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Kars'ta: "Kayyum Uygulamasına Son Vereceğiz"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-karsta-kayyum-uygulamasina-son-verecegiz
O5	24.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Uşak'ta: "Onlar Beşli Çetelere Çalışıyor, Bay Kemal Sizin İçin Çalışacak"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-usakta-onlar-besli-cetelere-calisiyor-bay-kemal-sizin-cin-calisacak
O4	21.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Gölbaşı'nda: "Bay Kemal Bu Yola Baş Koydu, Hiçbir Güç Engelleyemez"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-golbasinda-bay-kemal-bu-yola-bas-koydu-hicbir-guc-engelleyemez
O3	21.04	CHP Lideri ve Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kılıçdaroğlu Besni'de: "Kul Hakkı Yiyene Oy Vermeyin, Size Hesap Verene Oy Verin"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-lideri-ve-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kilicdaroglu-besnide-kul-hakki-yiyene-oy-vermeyin-size-hesap-verene-oy-verin
O2	11.04	CHP Genel Başkanı ve Millet İttifakı Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, "Çanakkale Millet Buluşması"na Katıldı	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/chp-genel-baskani-ve-millet-ttifaki-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-canakkale-millet-bulusmasina-katildi
O1	6.03	Millet İttifakı Cumhurbaşkanı Adayı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: "Sevgili Halkım; Eyvallah, Başlıyoruz!"	https://chp.org.tr/haberler/millet-ttifaki-cumhurbaskani-adayi-kemal-kilicdaroglu-sevgili-halkim-eyvallah-basliyoruz

Appendix C:

Questions Included in the Frame Analysis

Frame	Question (Yes/No)
Commonality	Does the news story emphasize national unity? Does the news story employs use of written or visual information with nationalistic values?
Ostracism	Does the story suggest that society is not unified against the developments? Does the story imply that protesters and/or supporters of certain political views doesn't represent community at large? Does the story reflect disagreement between parties and social groups? Does the story classify groups with their ideological beliefs or racial identity? Does the story refer to two sides or more than two sides of the story? Does the story provide a human example and associate it with loss without mentioning of greater good? Does the story employ an expression of otherness?
Demonization	Does the story depict certain individuals/groups as evil? Does the story contain written or visual information that might generate feelings of outrage and hate?
Call to Action	Does the story make reference to collective experiences and symbols for mobilization of citizens? Does the story mention possible consequences if citizens won't answer to call to action? Does the story identify call to action as a call of duty for citizens?
Affirmation of Republican Values	Does the story refer to democracy, liberty and/or public's sovereignty? Does the story depict anti-government action as a threat to republican values? Does the story employs adjectives or adverbs that depict current administration as the defenders of republican values?
Attribution of Responsibility	Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem? Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the issue/problem? Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue? Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue-problem?
Mythicising	Does the story refer to a historical individual? Does the story refer to a historical group of people? Does the story depict responses to anti-government acts with a larger-than-life approach? Does the story refer to historical individuals as martyrs or veterans?
Idolization	Does the story refer to the performance or success of a contemporary individual? Does the story refer to the performance or success of a contemporary group of people (e.g., association, company, political group, etc.)? Does the story refer to the performance or success in recent or contemporary era? Does the story refer to contemporary individuals as martyrs or veterans?
Consequence	Is there a reference to consequences of pursuing a course of action? Is there a mention of political consequences? Is there a mention of social consequences? Is there a mention of economic consequences?
Morality	Does the story contain any moral message? Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets? Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?
Other	Does the story quote any individuals? If yes, who is being quoted? Does the story refer to a specific event about the centenary? If yes, where? Does the story refer to the events in Istanbul organized by the President's Office? Does the story refer to the Municipality's event in Maltepe? If the mentioned event is elsewhere in Istanbul, in which district?