

Black-Box Barriers Behind Registration-Based Encryption

by

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Author's Declaration

This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Statement of Contributions

This thesis is based on the paper “Lower Bounds on Assumptions Behind Registration-Based Encryption” co-authored by Mohammad Hajiabadi, Mohammad Mahmoody, Wei Qi and Sara Sarfaraz [HMQS23]. The aforementioned paper appeared at the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC) in November 2023. The copyright for [HMQS23] is held by the IACR. ©IACR 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48618-0_11.

Sarfaraz is the sole author of all differences between this work and [HMQS23]. Authorship is as follows.

- Sarfaraz authored the abstract.
- Hajiabadi, Mahmoody, and Sarfaraz were the primary authors of Chapter 1: Introduction and Chapter 3: Technical Overview.
- Chapter 2: Preliminaries consists of standard definitions. Adaptations and elaborations of the definitions were authored by Sarfaraz.
- Chapter 4: Impossibility of PKCom from TDPs and Chapter 5: Impossibility of PKCom in Shoup’s Generic Group Model contain Lemma 1 that was adapted from [Zha22] by Mahmoody and Qi. The remaining content of these chapters was authored by Sarfaraz with guidance from Hajiabadi.

Abstract

Registration-Based Encryption (RBE) [GHMR18] is a cryptographic primitive designed to achieve the functionalities of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [BF01] while avoiding the key-escrow problem. In an RBE system, participants generate their own secret and public keys and register their public keys with a transparent entity known as the Key Curator (KC), who does not possess any secret information. The KC’s role is limited to managing the public keys without any secret information, effectively eliminating the central key management issues inherent in IBE.

Early constructions of RBE relied on non-black-box techniques, incorporating advanced cryptographic primitives such as indistinguishability obfuscation [GHMR18] or garbled circuits [GHM⁺19]. However, non-black-box constructions often face practical inefficiencies. Recent works [GKMR23, HLWW23] have shown that black-box constructions of RBE are achievable, though these constructions often involve a relaxed model where the Common Reference String (CRS) can grow with the number of registered users.

This work investigates the minimal assumptions needed for black-box constructions of RBE. Specifically, we explore whether it is possible to construct RBE schemes using assumptions comparable to those used in public-key encryption or algebraic assumptions that hold in the generic group model.

In our work, we present the first black-box separation results for RBE that extend beyond the implications of the known relationship between RBE and public-key encryption. We demonstrate that neither trapdoor permutations nor generic group model, including Shoup’s model, are sufficient on their own to serve as the basis for constructing RBE schemes. Furthermore, we demonstrate that even a relaxed version of RBE, where all keys are registered and compressed simultaneously, cannot be constructed using these primitives in a black-box manner.

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List of Abbreviations

ABE Attribute Based Encryption [3](#), [5](#)

CCA Chosen ciphertext Attack [4](#)

CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman [2](#), [4](#)

CL-PKE Certificateless Public Key Encryption [2](#)

CRS Common Reference String [3](#), [4](#), [6](#), [7](#), [11](#), [15](#), [18](#), [38](#)

DDH Decisional Diffie-Hellman [4](#), [6](#)

FE Functional Encryption [3](#)

GGM Generic Group Model [4](#), [6](#), [7](#), [13](#), [14](#), [19](#), [20](#), [48](#)

IBE Identity-Based Encryption [1–7](#), [14](#), [15](#), [20](#)

KC Key Curator [2](#), [4](#), [5](#)

KGC Key Generation Center [2](#)

LWE Learning With Errors [2](#)

OT Oblivious Transfer [6](#)

OWF One-Way Function [14](#)

PIR Private Information Retrieval [6](#)

PKCom Public Key Compression Scheme [4–7](#), [10–17](#), [19](#), [21](#), [24](#), [40](#), [48](#), [51](#), [56](#), [58–60](#)

PKE Public-Key Encryption [1](#), [3](#), [4](#), [6](#)

PKG Private Key Generator [2](#)

PKI Public-key Infrastructure [1](#)

PPT Probabilistic Polynomial Time [8](#), [9](#), [11](#), [12](#), [43](#)

RBE Registration-Based Encryption [2–7](#), [10](#), [11](#), [13](#), [15](#), [20](#)

TDP Trapdoor Permutation [4](#), [9](#), [13–15](#), [21](#), [23](#), [30](#), [38](#)

Chapter 1

Introduction

Cryptography is the foundation of secure communication in the digital age, enabling confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in data exchanges. Cryptography provides the means necessary to protect sensitive information from unauthorized access, ensuring that only intended recipients can read the content of a message. As digital interactions have become widespread, the need for robust encryption techniques has significantly increased. Encryption, at its core, transforms information in a way that only those with the correct decryption key can access the original data. Over the decades, a variety of encryption schemes have been developed, each addressing different security needs and challenges.

One of the most significant advancements in this area has been the development of [Public-Key Encryption \(PKE\)](#) [[DH22](#), [GM82](#), [RSA78](#)]. [PKE](#) allows for secure communication between two parties without needing any prior shared secrets. In [PKE](#), each party has a pair of keys: a public key, which can be shared with anyone, and a private key, which is kept secret. The security of this system relies on the difficulty of deriving the private key from the public key. However, for [PKE](#) to work, one party must first obtain the other party's public key. Achieving this often involves setting up a [Public-key Infrastructure \(PKI\)](#) along with the involvement of various certification authorities, which can complicate the implementation and management of [PKE](#) systems.

[Identity-Based Encryption \(IBE\)](#) initially proposed by Shamir [[Sha84](#)] and later realized using pairings by Boneh and Franklin [[BF01](#)], was a significant innovation, offering a more streamlined approach to [PKI](#). Unlike traditional [PKE](#) systems, where each user must generate a pair of keys and distribute their public key, [IBE](#) simplifies this process by allowing a user's public key to be derived from an easily recognizable identity, such as an email address. This innovation eliminated the need for a large public-key directory,

making encryption more accessible and easier to manage on a large scale. However, while [IBE](#) offers practical advantages, it also introduces a critical vulnerability known as the key-escrow problem.

In [IBE](#) systems, a trusted third party, known as the [Private Key Generator \(PKG\)](#), is responsible for generating and distributing private keys to users. This centralization presents a significant security risk, as the [PKG](#) possesses a master secret key—essentially a universal trapdoor that allows it to decrypt any message encrypted under the system’s public parameters. The potential for abuse or compromise of this master secret key undermines the privacy guarantees that encryption is supposed to provide, making the key-escrow problem a significant drawback of [IBE](#).

To address this vulnerability, [Registration-Based Encryption \(RBE\)](#) [[GHMR18](#)] was proposed as a solution that retains the benefits of [IBE](#) while mitigating the risks associated with key escrow. In an [RBE](#) system, users independently generate their own secret and public keys, thereby removing the need for a centralized authority like the [PKG](#) to hold any secret information. Users then register their public keys with a transparent entity known as the [Key Curator \(KC\)](#). The [KC](#)’s role is limited to accumulating and compressing these registered public keys in an efficient manner, which enhances both the security and scalability of the system. Unlike the [PKG](#), the [KC](#) does not have the capability to decrypt any messages, thereby eliminating the key-escrow problem inherent in [IBE](#).

Several other approaches have also aimed to eliminate the key-escrow problem in [IBE](#), one of which is [Certificateless Public Key Encryption \(CL-PKE\)](#) [[ARP03](#)]. This scheme removes the need for traditional certificates by using a [Key Generation Center \(KGC\)](#) to generate part of the user’s private key, while the user generates the other part. However, unlike [RBE](#), where the [KC](#) is entirely transparent and does not handle any secret information, this method still requires some level of trust in the [KGC](#) and relies on secure channels for delivering partial private keys to the users. Additionally, the encryption process in [CL-PKE](#) involves access to both the user’s public key and identity, adding to the complexity of the system compared to [RBE](#).

The work of [[GHMR18](#)] demonstrated how to construct [RBE](#) schemes by leveraging indistinguishability obfuscation [[BGI⁺12](#), [GGH⁺13](#)] and somewhere statistically binding hash functions [[HW15](#)]. Later, [[GHM⁺19](#)] showed how to base RBE on standard assumptions such as [Learning With Errors \(LWE\)](#), [Computational Diffie-Hellman \(CDH\)](#), or Factoring. [[GV20](#)] constructed verifiable [RBE](#), where the [KC](#) can give succinct proof for the existence/non-existence of users in the system. In [[WLW⁺23](#)], blockchain was used to construct transparent [RBE](#), making the system even more decentralized by letting the individual participants instead of the [KC](#) manage the keys. Inspired by [RBE](#), more advanced

primitives were defined and constructed, including registered [Attribute Based Encryption \(ABE\)](#) [HLWW23] and registered [Functional Encryption \(FE\)](#) [DP23, FFM⁺23].

In cryptographic constructions, the distinction between black-box and non-black-box approaches is fundamental. Black-box constructions treat cryptographic primitives as “black boxes,” meaning the internal details of these primitives are not needed to understand or implement the construction. This allows for simpler and more versatile designs. In contrast, non-black-box constructions depend on the internal details of the primitives, which can lead to more complex and often less practical designs.

The initial constructions of [RBE](#) were all *non-black-box*, in the sense that implementing them required knowing the implementation details of *at least* one of the primitives that were used in those constructions. This was due to use of code obfuscation [GHMR18] and/or garbled circuits [GHM⁺19] inside which group operations were used in non-black-box way. This was an undesired state of affairs, as non-black-box constructions are more likely to be inefficient for practical use, and indeed [RBE](#) is yet to become practical enough for real world deployment. This is in contrast with the closely-related primitive of [IBE](#) for which *black-box* constructions from pairing-based assumptions on bilinear maps exist [BF01, BB04].

More recently, the works of [GKMR23, HLWW23] showed how to achieve *black-box* constructions of [RBE](#), provided that it is *relaxed* so that the [Common Reference String \(CRS\)](#) can grow as a function of the total number of registered identities.¹ These works suggest that perhaps even standard [RBE](#) could at some point be realized based on well-founded assumptions in a *black-box* manner. In the meantime, in this work, we focus on a tightly related question: if we could base [RBE](#) on black-box assumptions, how simple do those assumptions need to be? In particular, *what are the black-box minimal assumptions for constructing RBE?* To answer this question, we also need to understand the *black-box barriers* that arise against building [RBE](#) from the *more desirable* type of assumptions. In particular, prior to our work, it was not known whether [RBE](#) can be solely based on the assumption that [PKE](#) exists.² Moreover, it was not known whether simpler algebraic assumptions than those on bilinear maps (e.g., assumptions that hold in the generic group model) may suffice for [RBE](#) in a black-box way. We emphasize that although it is known how to bootstrap [RBE](#) to [IBE](#) [BLSV18, DG17], black-box separations known for [IBE](#) [BPR⁺08] do not automatically carry over to [RBE](#), as the bootstrapping is non-black-box.

¹The work of [HLWW23] further generalizes the primitive to *attribute-based* encryption and constructs registered ABE, while further relaxing the primitive and allowing *interactive* registration.

²Note that [PKE](#) is indeed necessary for [RBE](#) in a black-box way.

1.1 Our Results

One approach to study the black-box complexity of [RBE](#) is to study the possibility of constructing it in idealized models that provide [PKE](#) or simple algebraic assumptions for free. In particular, the random [Trapdoor Permutation \(TDP\)](#) oracle model provides ([Chosen ciphertext Attack \(CCA\)](#)-secure) [PKE](#) (among other primitives such as collision-resistant hashing) as a black-box. Moreover, the generic group model ([Generic Group Model \(GGM\)](#)) [[Sho97](#), [Mau05](#)] is an idealized model in which assumptions such as hardness of discrete logarithm, [CDH](#), and even [Decisional Diffie-Hellman \(DDH\)](#) hold. Hence, it is a very natural model for studying the possibility of realizing [RBE](#) from those assumptions, which is the approach that we pursue as well.

In this work, we prove the first non-trivial black-box separations about the complexity of [RBE](#). In particular, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 1 (Main results – informal). *There is no black-box construction of [RBEs](#) in either of the idealized models of random trapdoor permutations ([TDPs](#)) or Shoup’s generic group model. Our impossibility results hold even if the [CRS](#) in [RBE](#) can grow (polynomially) with the number of registered identities.*

In particular, what we prove is that there is no construction of [RBEs](#) whose security is *solely* based on the idealized models stated in [Theorem 1](#). We do so by proving that such schemes can be broken by a polynomial-query attacker. This is sufficient for ruling out a fully black-box construction [[RTV04](#)]. Ruling out constructions of [RBE](#) in the idealized model of [TDPs](#) would also rule out using any primitive $\mathcal{P}$ (or rather sets of primitives) that can be constructed from [TDP](#) oracles in a black-box way (e.g., collision-resistant hash functions and public-key encryption). Ruling out [RBE](#) in the [GGM](#) would also prove a black-box separation from concrete assumptions that hold in this model (e.g., [DDH](#)).

In [Chapter 3](#), we give an in-depth technical overview of the proof of [Theorem 1](#). However, here we present some high level discussions about [Theorem 1](#) and why it does not follow from previous separations known for [IBE](#).

Public-key compression. We prove [Theorem 1](#) by demonstrating a more general result about a primitive that is *weaker* than [RBE](#) and yet is black-box implied by [RBE](#); we refer to that primitive as [Public Key Compression Scheme \(PKCom\)](#). [PKCom](#) can be thought of as a *static* variant of [RBE](#). In [PKCom](#) a polynomial number of identities who have generated their own public and secret keys all arrive *at the same time*. Then, they send their public-keys $\mathbf{pk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{pk}_n$ to be compressed by the [KC](#) in “one shot”. Then, the compressed public

parameter $\mathbf{pp}$ is broadcast by the $\mathbf{KC}$ to the registered identities and can be used similarly to the public parameter of $\mathbf{IBE}$ to privately encrypt messages to registered identities. When it comes to decryption, all parties will have access to each other’s *public* keys as well as their own secret key, but of course they do not have access to each others’ secret keys. A very closely related primitive to $\mathbf{PKCom}$ (called *slotted registered ABE*, as a generalization of $\mathbf{IBE}$) is also introduced in [HLWW23] and is shown to be black-box equivalent to $\mathbf{RBE}$. However, our primitive is still weaker, as it works with the fixed identities set $\{1, 2, \dots\}$ rather than arbitrary strings. These limitations make our impossibility result stronger.

Main challenge for proving separations for $\mathbf{RBE}$. By now, multiple black-box separations are known for assumptions behind $\mathbf{IBE}$. Boneh et al. [BPR⁺08] proved that $\mathbf{IBE}$ cannot be black-box constructed from random trapdoor permutations, and the works of [PRV12, Zha22] showed that $\mathbf{IBE}$ cannot be built in what is known as Shoup’s generic group model [Sho97].³ However, we emphasize that, none of these works imply a separation for *registration* based encryption (and its relaxation $\mathbf{PKCom}$). Below, we first describe the similarities between the two settings, and then we describe the major difference between them.

The core reason underlying both impossibilities for $\mathbf{IBE}$ and ours for $\mathbf{RBE}$ is that a compact public parameter ($\mathbf{pp}$) cannot encode enough information for securely encrypting to more than an a priori bounded number of identities. However, when it comes to $\mathbf{RBE}$, there is a big difference that makes the previous $\mathbf{IBE}$ separation techniques come short. The $\mathbf{IBE}$ separation proofs [BPR⁺08, Zha22] proceed by crucially relying on the bounded *running time* of the setup algorithm: in an $\mathbf{IBE}$ scheme, the setup algorithm, which generates $(\mathbf{pp}, \mathbf{msk})$, makes a *fixed* polynomial q number of $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk})$ (trapdoor) queries to its oracle. So, if one corrupts a sufficiently larger-than- q number of random identities and extracts their dedicated trapdoors (say by repeated decryptions), the attacker will then recover all the needed trapdoors and can decrypt the challenge ciphertext of a non-corrupted identity as well. This “combinatorial” argument, however, completely breaks down when we move to $\mathbf{RBE}$. Indeed the *running time* of generating a public parameter of an n -user $\mathbf{RBE}$ *grows* with the parameter n itself, because this public parameter is generated through n registration steps. Therefore, the “setup” procedure (as analogous to $\mathbf{IBE}$) that generates the public parameter might be asking n or more trapdoor queries.

³More specifically, [PRV12] claimed the result in a model that is a mixture of Maurer’s [Mau05] and Shoup’s [Sho97] models. Then, [SGS21] proved (a tight) separation in Maurer’s model, and finally, [Zha22] proved the separation of $\mathbf{IBE}$ in Shoup’s model.

Compression techniques. To get around the above challenge, we introduce new compression techniques to prove exactly that a short **pp** still cannot encode enough information for all n users, *regardless* of how much time it takes to generate it (see more on this in the technical overview). In fact, our new compression tool, stated in Lemma 2, (i.e., a bounded-size message/**pp** cannot compress too many trapdoors no matter how long it takes to generate it) proves a basic and intuitive fact that could potentially find other applications beyond **RBE**. For starters, it already allows us to rule out black-box construction of “leveled” **IBE**, where the number of users n is known during setup and the setup time is allowed to grow with n while the **pp** is compact, from the **GGM**. None of the previous **IBE** separation techniques allows for proving such an impossibility.

Shoup’s GGM vs. Maurer’s GGM. In Shoup’s **GGM** [Sho97] group elements do have (random-looking) representations. Therefore, impossibility results in this model imply further black-box separations (e.g., from public-key encryption). However, these corollaries do not automatically follow from results that the primitive is impossible in Maurer’s model [Mau05], in which group operations are outsourced to a black-box oracle. In fact, proving the impossibility of a primitive X in Maurer’s model does not even imply that X is black-box impossible from **PKE**. In particular, some impossibility results in Maurer’s **GGM** *cannot* be extended to Shoup’s model; e.g., [RSS20] ruled out sequential (delay) functions in Maurer’s generic group, while such functions can be obtained from random oracles, which in turn can be obtained in Shoup’s model. As another example, there exists natural **DDH**-based constructions of primitives such as rate-1 **Oblivious Transfer (OT)** and **Private Information Retrieval (PIR)** in Shoup’s model [DGI⁺19], yet these primitives can be proved impossible in Maurer’s group. Thus, proving an impossibility in Shoup’s model gives the stronger and more meaningful impossibility. See [Zha22] for more discussion on this topic.

Limits of RBE in Maurer’s GGM. For the reasons above, in this work we aim for proving impossibility of **RBE** (and **PKCom**) in Shoup’s **GGM**. Having said that, we first show that a separation of **RBE/PKCom** in Maurer’s **GGM** *can* indeed be proved as well. Our starting point for showing this barrier is the work of [SGS21] that ruled out *identity* based encryption in Maurer’s **GGM**. Despite focusing on **IBE**, their proof does *not* care about the exact running time that it takes to generate the public parameter, and it only relies on the *number* of group elements that are explicitly planted in the public parameter. This makes their result general enough to be basically applicable to our **PKCom** as well, if one opens up their proof to adapt it to **RBE**. One limitation of this result, however, is that it does not allow **CRS** to be present, and we particularly would like

to even allow our PKCom (and RBE) schemes to have CRS that can *grow* with the number of identities. Such extensions would make our impossibility result *complement* the recent positive (black-box) results of [GKMR23, HLWW23] in which hardness assumptions in pairing-based groups are used to construct RBEs with polynomially long CRS. The follow-up works of [DHH⁺21, CFGG22] further generalized the initial impossibility of [SGS21] to the point that we could use their results to formally obtain an impossibility of from Maurer’s GGM as corollary, even with polynomially long CRS. The reason is that RBEs, just like IBEs, can be used to obtain signature schemes using the so-called Naor’s trick,⁴ and the works of [DHH⁺21, CFGG22] do indeed rule out the existence of digital signatures for a polynomially large message space in Maurer’s GGM, even if the scheme has a polynomially long CRS.

⁴This is done by interpreting the decryption keys as signatures over the identity’s names interpreted as messages.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

Notation. Throughout this work, κ denotes the security parameter. $\text{negl}(x)$ denotes a negligible function in x , that is, a function that tends to zero faster than inverse of any polynomial in x . We use the acronym **PPT** to refer to “probabilistic polynomial time”. For an integer n , $[n] := \{1, \dots, n\}$. For a positive integer $N \in \mathbb{N}$, we write $\mathbb{Z}_N$ to denote the integers modulo N . We write $x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$ (resp., $x \leftarrow D$) to denote picking an element uniformly at random from a set $\mathcal{S}$ (resp., a distribution D). $\Pr[E; D]$ denotes the probability of E where D is random space/process over which E is defined. In general, we use $*$ as a placeholder for an arbitrary value. For example, $(x, *, *)$ is a 3-tuple where the first value is x and the second and third values are arbitrary. For a function f , $f(*)$ denotes the range of f (we let the context clarify whether $f(*)$ refers to a set or a single unspecified value). For an oracle $O = (\mathbf{q}_1, \dots, \mathbf{q}_n)$ consisting of n different types of queries, we use $(x \xrightarrow[\mathbf{q}_i]{} y)$ to denote a query of type $\mathbf{q}_i$ where the input is x and the output is y . Note that both x and y can be tuples. If $\mathbf{O}$ is an oracle and $\mathcal{A}$ is an algorithm, then $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{O}}(x)$ denotes running $\mathcal{A}$ on input x with access to $\mathbf{O}$. $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{O}}(x)$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{O}}(x) \rightarrow y$ denote assigning the output of $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{O}}(x)$ to variable y . Finally, we explain our use of $\subset$ in this work. (Note that $\subseteq$ is used in a similar way.) Since a function is formally defined as a relation, which is a set, when we write $f \subset g$ for two functions f, g , we mean f (viewed as a relation) is a subset of g (also viewed as a relation). This implies that the domain of f is a subset of the domain of g and it is defined similarly on those points. For two n -tuples $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and $y = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$, $x \subset y$ if and only if $x_i \subset y_i$ for every $i \in [n]$. Since an oracle can be viewed as an n -tuple of functions, the notation $O' \subset O$ is well-defined for two oracles O, O' .

Here, we recall the definition of trapdoor permutations. The following definition is taken from [Haj18].

Definition 1 (Trapdoor Permutation). Let $w = w(\kappa)$ be an arbitrary polynomial. A family of trapdoor permutations (*TDP* in short) consists of four *PPT* algorithms $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ defined as follows.

- $\mathbf{g}(1^\kappa)$: The key generation algorithm $\mathbf{g}$ takes as input a security parameter and outputs a pair $(\mathbf{ik}, \mathbf{tk})$ of index/trapdoor keys.
- $\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{ik}; R)$: The sampling algorithm $\mathbf{s}$ takes as input an index key $\mathbf{ik}$ and randomness $R \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and outputs an element $x \in \{0, 1\}^w$. We use $\text{Dom}_{\mathbf{ik}}$ to denote the set of values x which are outputted by $\mathbf{s}(\mathbf{ik}, *)$.
- $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, x)$: The evaluation algorithm $\mathbf{e}$ takes as input an index key $\mathbf{ik}$ and an element $x \in \{0, 1\}^w$ and outputs $y \in \{0, 1\}^w \cup \{\perp\}$.
- $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, y)$: The inversion algorithm $\mathbf{d}$ takes as input a trapdoor key $\mathbf{tk}$, and an element $y \in \{0, 1\}^w$ and outputs $x \in \{0, 1\}^w \cup \{\perp\}$.

We require the following properties:

- **Correctness.** For any valid index key $\mathbf{ik}$, the function $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, *)$ induces a permutation over $\text{Dom}_{\mathbf{ik}}$. Moreover, we have $\Pr[\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, \mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, x)) = x] = 1$, where $(\mathbf{ik}, \mathbf{tk}) \leftarrow \mathbf{g}(1^\kappa)$, $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and $x := \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{ik}; R)$.
- **One-wayness.** For any *PPT* adversary, $\mathcal{A}$, we have $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{ik}, y) = \mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, y)] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where $(\mathbf{ik}, \mathbf{tk}) \leftarrow \mathbf{g}(1^\kappa)$, $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and $y := \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{ik}; R)$.

Our second impossibility result relies on Shoup's Generic Group Model and restricted signatures. To begin, we revisit Shoup's Generic Group Model [Sho97]. The following definitions are taken directly from [Zha22].

Definition 2 (Shoup's Generic Group Model [Sho97]). Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ be a positive integer and let $S = \{0, 1\}^w$ be a set of strings where $w \geq \log p + \kappa$. A random injection $\mathbf{label} : \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow S$ is chosen, which we will call the labeling function. All parties have access to the oracle $\mathbb{G}_{RR} = (\mathbf{label}, \mathbf{add})$, defined in the following way.

- **label:** The party submits $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and receives the label of x .
- **add:** The party submits $(\ell_1, \ell_2) \in S^2$. If there exists $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $\mathbf{label}(x_1) = \ell_1$ and $\mathbf{label}(x_2) = \ell_2$, then the party receives $\mathbf{label}(x_1 + x_2)$. Otherwise, the party receives $\perp$.

Note that **label** completely determines **add** and thus also determines the whole oracle.

Definition 3 (Restricted Signature [Zha22]). A restricted signature scheme relative to an oracle $\mathbf{O}$ consists of a tuple of oracle algorithms $(\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Sig}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Ver}^{\mathbf{O}})$ working as follows:

- **Key generation.** $\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa)$ takes as input the security parameter and outputs a signing key, sk , and a verification key, vrk .
- **Signing.** $\text{Sig}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{sk}, m)$ takes as input a signing key and a message and outputs the signature σ .
- **Verification.** $\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma)$ takes as input a verification key, a message and a signature and outputs 1 if the signature is accepted and 0 otherwise.

We require the following properties to hold:

- **δ -Correctness:** $\Pr[\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = 1 : m \leftarrow \$, (\text{sk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa), \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{sk}, m)] \geq \delta$.
- **Restricted Structure:** $\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{vrk}, m), \sigma)$, where Ver0 is the first phase of the verification and is independent of σ , and Ver1 is the second phase of the verification and is independent of $\mathbf{O}$.
- **Zero-random message security:** For any query-bounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = 1 : m \leftarrow \$, (\text{sk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa), \sigma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{O}}(\text{pk}, m)] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

2.1 Public Key Compression

In this section, we define **PKCom** which is an special case of **RBE** [GHMR18]. This primitive allows n identities $\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_n$ to independently sample their public/secret key pairs $(\text{pk}_1, \text{sk}_1), \dots, (\text{pk}_n, \text{sk}_n)$ and then broadcast $(\text{id}_1, \text{pk}_1), \dots, (\text{id}_n, \text{pk}_n)$. There is then a compression algorithm **Com** that compresses all these public keys into a short public parameter **pp**. This **pp** together with id_i can be used to encrypt to id_i . Finally, user id_i can use her secret key sk_i and the set of all public keys $\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n$ to decrypt any message encrypted to her. In **RBE**, a user needs only a short public “decryption-update” string to be able to perform decryption. But since we aim to prove a lowerbound, by allowing the decryption algorithm to take in all of $\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n$, our impossibility results will become

only stronger. Also, we assume the n identities are $\{\text{id}_1 = 1, \dots, \text{id}_n = n\}$ for simplicity, and state the scheme for a *key encapsulation* variant; again, both of these will only make our impossibility results stronger.

Definition 4 (Public Key Compression). A public key compression scheme (*PKCom* in short) consists of *PPT* algorithms $(\text{CRS}, \text{Key}, \text{Com}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

- **CRS generation.** $\text{CRS}(1^\kappa, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{crs}$ is a randomized algorithm that takes in a security parameter κ and an integer n (the number of parties), and outputs a *CRS* crs of length $\text{poly}(\kappa, n)$. We allow crs to grow polynomially with the number of users.
- **Key generation.** $\text{Key}(1^\kappa, \text{crs}) \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ is a randomized algorithm that takes in 1^κ and crs and outputs a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk) .
- **Key compression.** $\text{Com}(\text{crs}, \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \rightarrow \text{pp}$ takes in the security parameter, the crs , a list of public keys $\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, and deterministically outputs pp as the compressed public key.
- **Encryption.** $\text{Enc}(\text{pp}, \text{id}) \rightarrow (m, \text{ct})$ takes in pp , a recipient identity $\text{id} \in [n]$, and outputs a random $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and a corresponding ciphertext ct .
- **Decryption.** $\text{Dec}(\text{id}, \text{sk}, \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow m$ takes in an identity $\text{id} \in [n]$, a secret key sk , public keys $\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, a ciphertext ct , and outputs a plaintext m or a special symbol $\perp$.

Note that unlike *RBE*, our encryption algorithm, Enc , does not take a message as input. However, it is straightforward to see that any message, such as $m' \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, can be encrypted using Enc . This can be done by running $(m, \text{ct}) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, \text{id})$ and setting the ciphertext as $c = (\text{ct}, m \oplus m')$.

We require completeness, compactness, and security, as defined next.

Definition 5 (Completeness and compactness of *PKCom*). Completeness and compactness are defined as follows:

- **Completeness.** The decryption algorithm recovers the plaintext with all but negligible probability. For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any $i \in [n]$, $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{CRS}(1^\kappa, n)$, $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\kappa, \text{crs})$, $(m, \text{ct}) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, \text{id})$, it holds that $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{crs}, \text{id}, \text{sk}_i, \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{ct}) = m] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\kappa)$.

- **Compactness of public parameters.** *There exists a fixed polynomial poly such that for all n and pp formed as above, $|\text{pp}| = o(n)\text{poly}(\kappa)$. We require sub-linear compactness, making our impossibility results stronger.*

Definition 6 (Security of [PKCom](#)). *For any interactive [PPT](#) adversary $\mathcal{A}$, consider the following game $\text{SecPKCom}_{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ between $\mathcal{A}$ and a challenger $\mathcal{C}$.*

1. **Initialization.** $\mathcal{C}$ samples $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{CRS}(1^\kappa, 1^n)$ and sends crs to $\mathcal{A}$.
2. $\mathcal{A}$ sends $(h \in [n], \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus \{h\}})$ to $\mathcal{C}$.
3. $\mathcal{C}$ samples $(\text{pk}_h, \text{sk}_h) \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\kappa, \text{crs})$, $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{crs}, \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ and $(\text{ct}, m) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, h)$. It sends $(\text{pk}_h, \text{pp}, \text{ct})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a message m' and wins the game if $m = m'$.

A [PKCom](#) scheme is secure if $\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{SecPKCom}_{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)] < \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$ for any [PPT](#) adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

Note that we are making the security notion weaker (the adversary's job is more difficult); our impossibility results separates this weak notion of security, hence making our results stronger.

Chapter 3

Technical Overview

We prove that public-key compression schemes cannot be built in a black-box way from [TDPs](#) or in the Shoup generic group. Since [RBE](#) and [PKCom](#) are black-box equivalent, our impossibility results will also apply to [RBE](#).¹

We prove our two impossibility results by showing that relative to a random [TDP](#) oracle or a [GGM](#) oracle with explicit random labels (i.e., Shoup’s model [[Sho97](#)]), [PKCom](#) cannot exist so long as its security is solely based on the oracle model. More specifically, we show that any purported [PKCom](#) construction relative to either a random [TDP](#) oracle or a [GGM](#) oracle can be broken by an adversary who makes a polynomial number of queries, while the adversary can do unbounded amount of computation independent of the oracle.

Outline. We follow the approach of Zhandry [[Zha22](#)] for proving our impossibility results. Zhandry proved that a special type of signature schemes, simply called *restricted* signatures, defined in an oracle model, cannot be realized relative to any oracles. Thus, to prove an impossibility of a primitive X relative to an oracle O , it suffices to show how to black-box transform any purported construction of X relative to O into a restricted signature relative to O without losing correctness and security.² The rest follows by the impossibility of restricted signatures.

A restricted signature scheme relative to an oracle O has the normal algorithms $(\text{Gen}^O, \text{Sig}^O, \text{Ver}^O)$ of a signature scheme, but the verification algorithm Ver^O is restricted in the following way:

¹The fact that [RBE](#) black-box implies [PKCom](#) is straightforward, due to [PKCom](#) being a special case. The converse is also true and is proved in [[HLWW23](#)].

²By security, here we refer to security against unbounded poly-query adversaries.

$\text{Ver}^O(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, m), \sigma)$, where Ver1 makes no oracle calls and vrk, m, σ denote the verification key, message and signature, respectively. That is, the verification algorithm is restricted in that all oracle queries may be made prior to seeing the signature σ , and upon seeing σ no further queries are permitted. Zhandry proved that no restricted signatures exist relative to any oracle O by showing that any such construction can be broken by an adversary that makes a polynomial number of queries to O . As an example of a non-restricted scheme, consider Lamport’s signatures from [One-Way Function \(OWF\)](#)s f . In that construction, σ corresponds to [OWF](#) pre-images, while vrk correspond to [OWF](#) image values. To verify a signature σ , one will check a number of image values against their corresponding pre-images by calling f , making the construction inherently non-restricted, as expected.

Zhandry proved that certain impossibility results, such as the impossibility of [IBE](#) from [GGM](#) [[SGS21](#), [PRV12](#), [BPR⁺08](#)], may be proved more naturally using the restricted signatures methodology. In particular, Zhandry showed that one can black-box transform any [IBE](#) construction IBE^{GGM} relative to a [GGM](#) oracle into a restricted signature $\mathcal{E}^{\text{GGM}}$, while preserving its correctness and security.

Target restricted signatures. For our impossibility results, we would need to further modify the notion of restricted signatures and work with a primitive which we call *target-restricted* signatures. A target restricted signature is defined over a message space $[n] = \{1, \dots, n\}$ (think of n as the number of [PKCom](#) users), where the verification algorithm is restricted as it is in restricted signatures, but correctness and security only hold with respect to a random target message chosen as $h \leftarrow [n]$, where the verification and signing keys in turn may depend on h . That is, $\text{Gen}^O(1^n, h \in [n])$ outputs a pair of keys (vrk, sgk) , and we require that the following holds. (a) δ -target correctness: for a signature σ derived for the target message h as $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig}^O(\text{sgk}, h)$ we have $\text{Ver}^O(\text{vrk}, h, \sigma) \geq \delta$, where Ver^O is restricted as above. (b) Zero-time unforgeability: given vrk (derived based on a random $h \leftarrow [n]$) and h , no poly-query adversary can forge a signature on h ([Definition 9](#)). We show that Zhandry’s proof with almost no modifications also shows that target restricted signatures for non-negligible δ ’s are impossible.

Transformation. After establishing the notion of target-restricted signatures, the bulk of our technical work is as follows. For a [TDP/GGM](#) oracle O , we show how to black-box transform a purported [PKCom](#) construction PKCom^O into a δ -correct target restricted signatures, where δ is non-negligible. This is where our new compression techniques come into play. Below, we first go over more details of our techniques for the case of [TDP](#) oracle,

as it captures most of the challenges.

Warm-up: restricted oracle calls. As a warm-up, first let us consider the case where the **TDP** oracles $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ are used by the **PKCom** scheme $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$, in a special case as $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}} := (\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}})$, where **Key** is the (public and secret) key generation algorithm, **Com** is the key compression algorithm, **Enc** is the encryption algorithm, and **Dec** is the decryption algorithm. Moreover, assume we do not have a **CRS**. This setting is already non-trivial, and helps us get our main insights across. The **TDP** oracles are defined randomly while inducing a permutation over the message space $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ (Definition 7). Our goal is to black-box transform such $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ constructions into a restricted signature relative to $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ with comparable correctness and security.

Non-restricted signatures from **PKCom.** A **PKCom** scheme over identities $[n]$ naturally induces a signature scheme using Naor’s trick (that applies to **IBE** schemes but can be adapted to **RBE** as well). In that transformation, the secret keys of an identity are kept as the signature for that identity’s string. The verification then proceeds by testing the quality of the decryption key (as the signature) through repeated encryption and decryptions. This scheme is clearly *not* restricted. Below, we first describe construction that is a modification of Naor’s trick construction which is still *not* restricted. However, our scheme has the benefit that we can make it restricted with more modifications which we will explain below. Let $(\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}})$ be the purported **PKCom** scheme relative to a **TDP** oracle $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. A verification/signature key pair $(\text{vrk}, \text{sgk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^O(1^n, h \in [n])$ on a target message $h \in [n]$ is obtained as follows: generate n public/secret key pairs $\{(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)\}_{i \in [n]}$ by running $\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}(1^\kappa)$, and let QGen_i denote the set of query-answer (Q-A for short) pairs obtained for generating $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$. Let $\text{pp} := \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}}(\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n)$. Output $\text{vrk} := (\text{pp}, \{\text{QGen}_i\}_{i \neq h})$ and $\text{sgk} := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.³ A signature on h is $(\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$. Define $\text{Ver}^O(\text{vrk}, h, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}^O(\text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, h), \sigma)$ as follows: $\text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, h)$ generates a random ciphertext c for a random message m relative to identity h as $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\text{pp}, h, m)$, lets QEnc contain the Q-A pairs (which are only of **e**-type), and outputs (m, c) .⁴ Then, Ver1^O , given $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$ and (m, c) , simply decrypts $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}}(\text{sk}_h, c)$ and outputs 1 iff the decryption outputs m . The signature is correct, and is also secure: if an adversary can forge a signature on a target message h , it can also decrypt ciphertexts for that target index h under the **PKCom** scheme. (Under the **PKCom** scheme, the adversary can have the secret keys

³The Q-A sets QGen_i ’s will not be used in this simple construction, but later one they will be used when we make the signature restricted.

⁴Again, the set QEnc will not be used in this (flawed) construction, but will be used later when we discuss the fixes.

for all but the target index, since the public keys for all non-target indices are submitted by the adversary itself. Thus, a [PKCom](#) adversary can sample $\mathbf{vrk}$ itself.) The signature, however, is not restricted because Ver1^O makes queries in order to decrypt.

Making the signature restricted. A first (naive) idea in making Ver1 oracle-free is to have Ver0^O pass QEnc , in addition to $(\mathbf{vrk}, m, c)$, onto Ver1 , and let $\text{Ver1}((\mathbf{vrk}, m, c, \text{QEnc}), \sigma)$, where $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$, decrypt $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{sk}_h, c)$ while using QEnc and $\{\text{QGen}_i\}$ as hints, and respond to queries whose answers cannot be determined based on these hints with random values. In more detail, for an emerged query (which can only be of $\mathbf{d}$ -type) $\mathbf{qu} := ((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ during $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{sk}_h, c)$ if both of the following hold then respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x :

- (a) There exists a Q-A pair $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \cup_i \text{QGen}_i$ for some $\mathbf{ik}$; and
- (b) there exists $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$ for some x .

Otherwise (i.e., if at least one of the above does not hold), pick a random answer. We claim we have correctness. This is because $(\mathbf{pk}_i, \mathbf{sk}_i)$ pairs are all generated honestly by running $\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}$, with $\{\text{QGen}_i\}$ being their underlying Q-A pairs, and that all of $\mathbf{d}$ queries during Dec are responded to consistently with those of $\{\text{QGen}_i\}$ and QEnc .

However, we cannot reduce the security of the signature to that of the original [PKCom](#) (so to argue security). For example, suppose the [PKCom](#)'s user public-secret key pairs $(\mathbf{pk}_i, \mathbf{sk}_i)$ are simply random index/trapdoor key pairs $(\mathbf{ik}_i, \mathbf{tk}_i)$ generated by calling $\mathbf{g}$ (i.e., $\mathbf{pk}_i = \mathbf{ik}_i$). An adversary $\mathcal{A}$ may then forge a signature as $\sigma' := (\tilde{\mathbf{tk}}_h, (\tilde{\mathbf{tk}}_h \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}_h))$, where $\tilde{\mathbf{tk}}_h$ is just a ‘junk’ value. By Conditions (A) and (b) above, $\text{Ver1}((\mathbf{vrk}, m, c, \text{QEnc}), \sigma')$ will always decrypt c to m , outputting 1. But the forger $\mathcal{A}$ has not done anything clever, so we cannot use it in a reduction to break the security of $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$. The reason we cannot prove a security reduction (for arguing the signature is as secure as the base [PKCom](#)) is that the verification provides ‘free lunch’ to a forger: inverting images with respect to an $\mathbf{ik}_h$ whose trapdoor key may not be known to the forger.

Compression to the rescue. So far, we have not used the fact that $\mathbf{pp}$ is compact (of size $\ll n$), so it is not a surprise we cannot establish a security reduction from the signature to the [PKCom](#). In other words, by plugging in a trivial [PKCom](#) scheme whose $\mathbf{pp}$ contains all public keys, we get a restricted signature against which there exists a generic attack,

but the base **PKCom** is secure! We should use the fact that $|\mathbf{pp}|$ is compact in order to avoid giving free lunch to a forger in the above sense. Call an $\mathbf{ik}$ valid if $\mathbf{ik} \in \mathbf{g}(\cdot)$. Assume $\mathbf{g}$ is sufficiently length increasing so the only way to produce a valid $\mathbf{ik}$ is to call $\mathbf{g}$ on a preimage. Our main idea is as follows: letting $\mathbf{QGen}_i$ be as above (all formed honestly), there must exist an index $h \in [n]$ such that the set of all valid $\mathbf{ik}$'s that emerge as $((\mathbf{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?)$ queries during a random **PKCom** encryption $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, h, *)$ to index h are a subset of those $\mathbf{ik}$'s for which we have $(* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i$. Call this Condition **cover**. We will show in a moment why this condition holds, but let us sketch how to modify $\text{Ver}^O(\mathbf{vrk}, h, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^O(\mathbf{vrk}, h), \sigma)$ in light of this fact. First, $\text{Ver0}^O(\mathbf{vrk}, h)$ outputs $(m, c, \mathbf{QEnc})$, as before. Now $\text{Ver1}((\mathbf{vrk}, m, c, \mathbf{QEnc}), \sigma)$, where $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \mathbf{QGen}_h)$, proceeds exactly as before, except in response to a query $\mathbf{qu} := ((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, Condition (a) above will change to

(A) there exists a Q-A pair $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i$ for some $\mathbf{ik}$.

Now correctness still holds, thanks to Condition **cover**. (Any $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y)$ for a valid $\mathbf{ik}$ has a matching trapdoor key $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i$. All other decryption queries may be responded to randomly, without creating inconsistencies.) We should now have security (at least intuitively), because we do not provide free lunch to a forger anymore: Ver1 inverts images only for $\mathbf{ik}$'s already covered in $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i$, but this information is already available to the adversary itself (as part of $\mathbf{vrk}$). Making this intuition formal, however, requires some delicate reasoning, which we skip here.

Proving condition cover via a compression technique. Recall that $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, *, *)$ only calls $\mathbf{e}$, and the only information it gets regarding $\mathbf{g}$ is via $\mathbf{pp}$ which in turn has size $\ll n$. It is not hard to see if Condition **cover** does not hold, then by performing random encryptions for all indices $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, 1, *), \dots, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, n, *)$, we will end up calling $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, *)$ upon at least n different valid $\mathbf{ik}$'s. To see this let $\mathbf{Q}_i$ contain any $\mathbf{ik}$ such that $(* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \mathbf{QGen}_i$. If $\overline{\text{cover}}$ holds, during $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, u, *)$, for any $u \in [n]$, we will make a query $((\mathbf{ik}_u, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?)$ for a valid $\mathbf{ik}_u$ where $\mathbf{ik}_u \notin \cup_{i \neq u} \mathbf{QGen}_i$. We claim all $\mathbf{ik}_i$ are distinct, so we will have n distinct valid $\mathbf{id}_i$'s. Assume the contrary and that $\mathbf{ik}_1 = \mathbf{ik}_2$. We know both $\mathbf{ik}_1, \mathbf{ik}_2 \in \cup_i \mathbf{Q}_i$, because a valid $\mathbf{ik}$ cannot come out of thin air. We also know $\mathbf{ik}_1 \notin \cup_{i \neq 1} \mathbf{Q}_i$, and so $\mathbf{ik}_1 \in \mathbf{Q}_1 \setminus \cup_{i \neq 1} \mathbf{Q}_i$. So, if $\mathbf{ik}_1 = \mathbf{ik}_2$, then $\mathbf{ik}_2 \in \mathbf{Q}_1 \setminus \cup_{i \neq 1} \mathbf{Q}_i$, but this contradicts the fact that $\mathbf{ik}_2 \notin \cup_{i \neq 2} \mathbf{Q}_i$.

Theorem 2 (Compression, informal). *Let $\mathbf{pp}$ be any advice string of size $\ll n$ generated based on $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. For any poly-query adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp})$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ can output a list $\mathbf{L}$ of $\mathbf{ik}$'s satisfying the following two conditions is negligible: (a) $\mathbf{L}$ has at least n distinct valid $\mathbf{ik}$'s, and (b) no $\mathbf{ik}$ in $\mathbf{L}$ was generated as a result of a $\mathbf{g}$ query by $\mathcal{A}$ itself.*

We show if there exists an adversary in the sense of the above theorem, then one can compress the oracle $\mathbf{g}$. We prove this via Gennaro-Trevisan style compression techniques [GT00], later generalized by Haitner *et al.* [HHR07]. In our theorem description, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ does not need to know which of the n $\mathbf{ik}$'s are valid: as long as at least n of them are valid we will prove a compression. Our theorem description holds even if the adversary makes an exponential number of queries (for a carefully selected exponential). We believe this technique employed within black-box separations might find other applications.

Allowing a CRS. We will now sketch how things will be different, still in the limited-access setting $(\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}})$, by allowing in a CRS. Suppose the CRS is generated as $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{CRS}(1^\kappa, 1^n)$, and is used in key generation $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}}(\text{crs})$. Let us first explain what will go wrong if we leave the above approach unmodified. Recall that $\text{Ver1}((m, c, \text{QEnc}), \sigma)$, where $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$, decrypts $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{sk}_h, c)$ and handles a query $\text{qu}: ((\mathbf{tk}, c) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ via Conditions (A) and (b) above. We were able to argue correctness because for some index h with all but negligible probability, all valid $\mathbf{ik}$'s upon which we have a query $((\mathbf{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?)$ must have been collected in $\cup_i \text{QGen}_i$. However, this fact breaks down in the CRS case, because $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, h, *)$ might call $\mathbf{e}$ upon an $\mathbf{ik}$ that comes from crs , and whose trapdoor key is not collected in any of $\cup_i \text{QGen}_i$. Thus, responding to inversion queries relative to $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, *)$ with random values during decryption will create an inconsistency, destroying correctness. Since we aim to argue correctness, suppose $(\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$ were generated honestly. Our solution is based on the following intuition: If a query $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, where $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk}) = \mathbf{ik}$, emerges during decryption of a random encryption relative to $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, h, *)$ with good probability, then by choosing many $(\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$ and forming random encryptions as $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{e}}(\mathbf{pp}, h, *)$ and decrypting them back (all using the real oracles) we should collect these $\mathbf{tk}$ values. This encrypt-decrypt process will be performed by $\text{Gen}^O(1^n, h \in [n])$ (the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme) and all the Q-A pairs are appended to a list $\mathbf{T}$, put in the final $\mathbf{vrk}$. Back to the above discussion, $\text{Ver1}((m, c, \text{QEnc}), \sigma)$ will decrypt $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{sk}_h, c)$ as per QEnc if (I) and (b) holds, where (b) is as above and (I) is as follows.

- (I) There exists a Q-A pair $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \mathbf{T} \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i$ for some $\mathbf{ik}$.

The proof of security is similar to the previous case, based on the intuition illustrated before.

Finally, for the general case in which oracle access is unrestricted (e.g., $\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$) we define the notion of ‘free lunch’ (which might make room for forgeries) as inversions $\mathbf{e}^{-1}(\mathbf{ik}, *)$, where $(* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik})$ never appears in $\text{QGen}_{i \neq h}$, nor in any safe lists (e.g., $\mathbf{T}$ as explained above, or any $\mathbf{ik}$ such that $(* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik})$ is generated during $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp}, h, *)$). The chief challenge is to strike a delicate balance during the decryption performed by $\text{Ver1}((m, c, \text{QEnc}), \sigma)$ in between not overtly answering all $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, y)$ queries as per QEnc (which will violate security) and not answering any queries at all (which will destroy correctness). The main techniques for establishing such a balance were sketched above, but the whole analysis for the general case requires more involved reasoning.

Impossibility in Shoup’s GGM. We now describe how to derive a restricted signature scheme $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}$ from a $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}$ construction $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}$, where the oracle $\mathbb{G}_{RR} := (\mathbf{label}, \mathbf{add})$ comes with a labeling oracle $\mathbf{label}$ producing labels for exponents in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ (where p is the order of the group) and $\mathbf{add}$ adds two labels. We assume $\mathbf{label}$ produces labels of sufficiently large length, so that producing a label without calling $\mathbf{label}$ or $\mathbf{add}$ is effectively impossible. The general methodology is as follows, but we need some additional ideas to deal with the algebraic structure imposed by groups. To illustrate our core ideas suppose we have no $\mathbf{crs}$ and that $\mathbf{Com}$ makes no $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ queries, so the $\text{PKCom}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}$ construction is as $(\text{Key}_{RR}^{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbf{Com}, \text{Enc}_{RR}^{\mathbb{G}}, \text{Dec}_{RR}^{\mathbb{G}})$. Assume wlog all algorithms only have access to $\mathbf{add}$ (access to $\mathbf{label}$ can be simulated by including the generator as part of every input). The algorithms $\text{Gen}_{RR}^{\mathbb{G}}$ and $\text{Sig}_{RR}^{\mathbb{G}}$ and $\text{Ver0}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\mathbf{vrk}, h)$ are defined exactly as before. A naive idea for $\text{Ver1}(\mathbf{vrk}, m, \sigma)$, where $\sigma := ((\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h))$, is to answer to an $\mathbf{add}$ query $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{add}} ?)$ according to what can be inferred from the collective set of Q-A pairs in $\cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc}$. Namely, consider a matrix M with columns labeled according to labels present in output responses to queries in $\cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc}$. A given Q-A pair $((\ell, \ell') \xrightarrow{\mathbf{add}} \ell'')$ in $\cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc}$ is embedded into the matrix M by adding a row, which has a 1 on the ℓ -labeled column, a 1 on the ℓ' labeled column and a -1 on the ℓ'' -labeled column. For brevity, we denote such a row with $x_\ell + x_{\ell'} - x_{\ell''}$. Having formed this matrix M , suppose Ver1 given a query $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{add}} ?)$ checks if an answer is present in M : namely, if there exists a label ℓ^* such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*} \in \text{Span}(M)$, where Span denotes row span; if so, respond with ℓ^* , otherwise with a random label. This restricted signature scheme is correct (similarly to how we argued before), but is not secure in the sense of having a security reduction from the signature to the base PKCom . We will now establish a balancing act (in the

sense of before) as follows. Call a label **Known** if $\text{label}^{-1}(\ell)$ (its discrete log) is recoverable given $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc}$. For **GGMs**, we will prove a compression theorem (stated later), which as a consequence implies the following **covering** condition: with all but negligible probability, there exists an index h such that during a random encryption $\text{Enc}^{\text{add}}(\text{pp}, h, *)$, if there exists a Q-A pair $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell^*)$ such that $\ell^* \neq \perp$, then $\ell_1, \ell_2 \in \text{Known}$. That is, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, ℓ_b is either already a label in $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i$, or is obtained via a sequence of **add** operations on labels with known discrete logs. With this intuition mind, Ver1 simulates the response to an **add** query $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} ?)$ as follows: if there exists a **Known** label ℓ^* such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*} \in \text{Span}(M)$, where **Span** denotes row span; if so, respond with ℓ^* , else with a random label. This relaxation enables us to prove that no security is lost in the process. Finally, we derive the **covering** condition above from a compression lemma that we develop and prove in **GGMs**, which states given a short advice string pp , one can extract a bounded number of valid ℓ labels (those in the output of **label**).

Theorem 3 (Informal). *Let pp be any advice string of size $\ll n$ generated based on $(\text{label}, \text{add})$. For any poly-query adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\text{label}, \text{add}}$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ can output a list $\mathbf{L}$ of ℓ 's satisfying the following two conditions is negligible: (a) $\mathbf{L}$ has at least n distinct valid ℓ 's, and (b) no ℓ in the list was generated as a result of a **label** or a **add** query.*

All the statements mentioned after Theorem 2 also hold for Theorem 3. The proof of this is based on a generalization of the Gennaro-Trevisan compression techniques [GT00] to the **GGM** setting. The **GGM** setting, due to its algebraic nature, makes the compression argument more delicate and challenging. Our techniques may be of independent interest.

Why going through restricted signature instead of a direct proof. Even though we could write a direct proof that avoids going through the notion of restricted signatures, by using this approach we also get the benefits of the proof of [Zha22] for free. In particular, a direct proof would involve the high-level approach of (1) learning useful information about the oracle, (2) doing a reverse sampling of the keys and faking a partial oracle to be used for decrypting the challenge, and (3) analyzing the attack through careful hybrids. However, using the restricted signature approach allows us to have a more modular proof. In particular, with this approach Step (2) above would not be needed; all we do is a black-box reduction between **RBE** and restricted signatures, and the attack on **RBE** follows from the poly-query attack on the signatures that is transformed into an attack on **RBE** through the black-box reduction between them. In addition to simplicity and modularity, as a bonus we could also better explain the new challenges that arise for our separation proof for **RBE**, in comparison with **IBE**, and how we resolve them.

Chapter 4

Impossibility of PKCom from TDPs

In this chapter, we show that there exists an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ relative to which [TDPs](#) exists but [PKCom](#) does not. We define a distribution on [TDP](#) oracles as follows.

Definition 7. We define an oracle distribution Ψ whose samples are oracles of the form $\mathbf{O} = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. The distribution is parameterized over a security parameter κ , but we keep it implicit for better readability.

- $\mathbf{g}: \{0, 1\}^\kappa \mapsto \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa}$ is a random injective length-tripling function, mapping a trap-door key to an index key.
- $\mathbf{e}: \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa} \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \mapsto \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ is a random function under the following condition: for all $\mathbf{ik} \in \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa}$, the function $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, \cdot)$ is a permutation.
- $\mathbf{d}: \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \mapsto \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ is the inversion oracle, where $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, y)$ outputs $x \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ iff $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk}), x) = y$.

Definition 8 (Validity of partial oracles). We say a partial oracle $\mathbf{O}'$ (defined only on a subset of all points) is Ψ -valid if for some $\mathbf{O} \in \text{Supp}(\Psi) : \mathbf{O}' \subseteq \mathbf{O}$, where Supp denotes the support of a distribution. We say an oracle $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ is [TDP](#)-valid if it satisfies [TDP](#)'s perfect correctness as defined in [Definition 1](#). A partial [TDP](#)-valid oracle is one which is a subset of a [TDP](#)-valid oracle (i.e., a triple (g, e, d) that satisfies [TDP](#) correctness, but which may not be in the support of Ψ). Note that any Ψ -valid oracle is [TDP](#)-valid as well but the converse is not true. We say a partial oracle $\mathbf{O}'$ is [TDP](#)-consistent with a set of Query/Answer (Q -A in short) pairs $\mathbf{S}$ if $\mathbf{O}' \cup \mathbf{S}$ is [TDP](#)-valid.

4.1 Oracle-Based Target-Restricted Signatures

Toward proving our impossibility results, inspired by [Zha22], we define the notion of oracle-aided target-restricted signatures. The signature's message space is $[n]$, and we require correctness and security to hold with respect to a single, random target point, based on which signing and verification keys are generated. We first present the definition and then compare it to that of [Zha22], as reviewed in Definition 3.

Definition 9 (Target-restricted signatures [Zha22]). *Let $n = \text{poly}(\kappa)$. An n -target restricted signature scheme $(\text{Gen}^{\text{O}}, \text{Sig}^{\text{O}}, \text{Ver}^{\text{O}})$ relative to an oracle O is defined as follows. $\text{Gen}^{\text{O}}(1^\kappa, m) \rightarrow (\text{sgk}, \text{vrk})$: takes in a security parameter and a target message $m \in [n]$, and outputs a signing key sgk and a verification key vrk . The other algorithms are defined as in standard signature schemes. We require the following properties:*

- **δ -target correctness:**

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}^{\text{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \text{Sig}^{\text{O}}(\text{sgk}, m)) = 1; m \leftarrow [n], (\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\text{O}}(1^\kappa, m)] \geq \delta,$$

where the probability is taken over $m \leftarrow [n]$, $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\text{O}}(1^\kappa, m)$ and the random coins used by Sig^{O} and Ver^{O} .

- **Restricted structure:** We have $\text{Ver}^{\text{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^{\text{O}}(\text{vrk}, m), \sigma)$, where Ver0 is the first phase of the verification and is independent of σ , and Ver1 is the second phase of the verification and makes no oracle calls.
- **Zero-time unforgeability:** For any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}^{\text{O}}(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = 1; m \leftarrow [n], (\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\text{O}}(1^\kappa, m), \sigma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{O}}(\text{vrk}, m)] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

As outlined in Definition 3, Zhandry [Zha22] introduced oracle-based restricted signatures, where signing and verification keys should work for all messages, and proved such signatures are impossible relative to any oracle. Namely, there exists an adversary that can forge a signature by making at most a polynomial number of queries to the oracle, and by performing possibly exponential-time computations independent of the oracle. In the setting of [Zha22] the message space is of exponential size, but in our setting the message space is $[n]$ and the verification key is allowed to grow with $[n]$. These differences are useful for our setting as we will derive the existence of *target*-restricted signatures during our impossibility proofs. Despite these differences, the following lemma shows that Zhandry's proof, that restricted signatures do not exist, extends almost immediately to our target-restricted setting.

Lemma 1 (Adapted from Lemma 7.4 in [Zha22]). *Let $1 \geq \delta > 0$ and O be an oracle. For any target-restricted signature Λ relative to O that has δ target correctness according to Definition 9, there exists a computationally unbounded adversary which makes only polynomially many queries to O that breaks Λ with advantage at least $\delta^3/100$.*

The proof of the above lemma is basically the same as the proof of Lemma 7.4 in [Zha22]. At a high level, the proof crucially relies on the restricted structure of the verification algorithm. The key idea of the proof is that since $\text{Ver}^O(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, m), \sigma)$, a computationally unbounded adversary can first compute an intermediate value $v = \text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, m)$ by itself and then brute force search over the circuit $\text{Ver1}(v, \cdot)$ for a valid signature σ satisfying $\text{Ver1}(v, \sigma) = 1$. Since target-restricted signatures also have the same restricted structure of verification algorithm, the same proof works. For sake of completeness, in Appendix A we include a full of Lemma 1, which is heavily based on that of [Zha22] and is simply adapted to our setting.

Equipped with Lemma 1, we show any TDP-oracle-based PKCom may be transformed into an oracle-based target-restricted signatures, hence obtaining an impossibility result. As a warm-up and to show our core techniques, we first present this transformation for the CRS-free case in Section 4.2 and then present the transformation for schemes with CRS in Section 4.3.

4.2 Impossibility of CRS-free PKCom from TDP

We first present the transformation to target-restricted signatures for the case in which the PKCom does not have a CRS. Recall the notions of correctness and security of PKCom given in Definition 4. These notions are defined analogously relative to any fixed oracle $O = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$.

Theorem 4. *For $\epsilon := \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}} := (\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}})$ be a $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct PKCom scheme with respect to a random TDP oracle $O = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. Suppose a public parameter $\mathbf{pp}$ under $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ satisfies $|\mathbf{pp}| \leq \frac{(n-2)|\mathbf{ik}|}{2}$, where n is the number of users and $\mathbf{ik}$ is a base index key (recall $|\mathbf{ik}| = 3\kappa$, Definition 7). Then, there exists a $(1 - \epsilon)^{\frac{(1-2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}}$ -correct target-restricted signature scheme relative to $O = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$.*

Note 1. *For all oracle algorithms $A^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ considered throughout, we assume whenever a Q-A $((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} x)$ is made by $A^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$, two dummy queries $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ and $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?)$ are subsequently made, where $\mathbf{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk})$. Thus, whenever $((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} x)$ is in A 's Q-A list, so*

are $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik})$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y)$. Moreover, for any A as above, we assume whenever two Q - A pairs $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y)$ are made first, then no subsequent query $((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ is ever made.

Bluebird view of the proof of Theorem 4. We show how to transform PKComs into target restricted signatures. This is given in Construction 1. The construction is similar to Lamport’s signatures from OWFs, adapted to the PKE setting. That is, we generate n public keys $\{\text{pk}_i\}$, put all public keys and all secret keys except the target (h th) one in the verification key. The signature σ on $h \in [n]$ is a secret key for pk_h . The verification function will encrypt a random message m relative to h (performed inside Ver0), and decrypts the ciphertext c inside Ver1 using a signature $\sigma := \text{sk}_h$ to see if it gets m back. First, it is clear that Ver0 can be performed before seeing σ . The most major step is to make sure Ver1 can decrypt c without making queries. To this end, we equip the verification key with Q - A pairs underlying $\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \neq h}$ (called QGen_i in the construction), and we also let Ver0 pass on all Q - A pairs (called QEnc in the construction) underlying c to Ver1. The algorithm Ver1 simulates responses to its queries using these sets. The main difficulty is to define the simulated decryption in such a way that we can establish both correctness and security. (For example, letting Ver1 invert any $\mathbf{d}(\text{tk}, y)$ that is “captured” by QEnc and sk_h will make the scheme forgeable, as a forger can cook up some fake sk_h that might pass the test.)

Target-Restricted Signature Construction

We now present our Target-Restricted Signatures construction. In the next sections we argue its correctness and security based on those of the base [PKCom](#).

Construction 1 (Target-restricted signatures from PKCom). *Suppose we are given a PKCom scheme $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}} := (\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}})$. We build an n -target-restricted signature scheme as follows. We assume all the algorithms satisfy the assumption in Note 1.*

- $\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa, h)$ where $h \in [n]$ is the message to be signed. For $i \in [n]$ let $\text{QGen}_i = \emptyset$.
 1. For $j \in [n]$, run $\text{Key}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j)$, and add all $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ Q - A pairs to QGen_j .¹

¹We do not keep track of $\mathbf{d}$ queries because of Note 1.

2. Run $\text{Com}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{pk}_n) \rightarrow \mathbf{pp}$ and add all $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ Q - A pairs to QCMP .
 3. Return $\mathbf{vrk} = ((\mathbf{pk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{pk}_n), \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP})$, $\mathbf{sgk} = (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.
- $\text{Sig}(\mathbf{sgk}, h) \rightarrow \sigma$: For $\mathbf{sgk}$ as above, return $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.
 - $\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{vrk}, \sigma, h) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^{\mathbf{O}}(\mathbf{vrk}, h), \sigma)$: Parse $\mathbf{vrk} := ((\mathbf{pk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{pk}_n), \mathbf{S})$ and $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.
 1. $\text{Ver0}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{vrk}, h) \rightarrow \alpha$: Run $(m', c') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp}, h)$ η times and record all Q - A pairs in a set Aux . Run $(m, c) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp}, h)$ and let QEnc be the set of all Q - A pairs made to $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$. Return $\alpha := (\mathbf{vrk}, h, m, c, \text{QEnc}, \text{Aux})$.
 2. $\text{Ver1}(\alpha, \sigma)$: Retrieve QEnc , Aux and $\mathbf{S}$ from α . (Recall $\mathbf{S} = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP}$ is in $\mathbf{vrk}$.) Parse $\sigma := (\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$. Let $\text{All} = \mathbf{S} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QGen}_h$. Run $\text{DecSim}(h, \mathbf{sk}_h, \{\mathbf{pk}_i\}, c, \text{All})$, which simulates the execution of $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}}(h, \mathbf{sk}_h, \{\mathbf{pk}_i\}, c)$ by rendering queries via All , as follows:
 - (a) For a given $\mathbf{g}$ or $\mathbf{e}$ query, if the answer is already provided in All , reply with that answer; else, with a random string z of appropriate length. In case of answering with a random response, add the Q - A pair to Fake (initially an empty set).²
 - (b) For a query $\mathbf{qu} := ((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, if $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QGen}_h \setminus (\mathbf{S} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc})$ and $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$ for some $\mathbf{ik}$ and x , respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with a random $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. Else if $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{All} \cup \text{Fake}$ for some $\mathbf{ik}$, and $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All} \cup \text{Fake}$ for some x , respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x . Else, respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with a random $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$.³

Letting m' be the output of DecSim , output 1 if $m' = m$ and 0 otherwise.

Proof Overview. Our goal is to show that Construction 1 provides both correctness and security. We first discuss correctness. For that we have to argue that if $(\mathbf{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$ are produced honestly, then DecSim run by Ver1 will output m with high probability. For this we have to argue that DecSim responds to all $\mathbf{g}$, $\mathbf{e}$ and $\mathbf{d}$ queries consistently with how they were responded to before (if ever). For example, if a query $\mathbf{qu}$ was previously asked during the generation of, say, $\mathbf{pk}_i$, if the same query is asked again by DecSim , it should receive

²Duplicate queries will be replied to with the same random response.

³By Note 1, any decryption query is followed by two subsequent $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$ dummy queries. In the last case where a random response r for $(\mathbf{tk}, y)$ is generated, we reply to the subsequent dummy $\mathbf{e}$ query with y .

the same response. It is easy to see that this is the case for both $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$ queries $\mathbf{qu}$. In particular, in Step 2a of Construction 1 we check if $\mathbf{qu}$ is in $\mathbf{All}$, which contains all Q-A pairs up to that point. The challenging case is when $\mathbf{qu}$ is a $\mathbf{d}$ query: Step 2b Construction 1 responds to $\mathbf{d}$ queries only in some special cases: in other cases it gives a random response. One scenario in which this happens is when (a) a Q-A pair $((\ast \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik})) \in \mathbf{QGen}_h$; and (b) $((\mathbf{ik}, \ast) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?) \in \mathbf{QEnc}$ and (c) $((\ast \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik})) \notin \cup_i \mathbf{QGen}_{i \neq h} \cup \mathbf{QCMP} \cup \mathbf{QEnc}$. This means that $\mathbf{pp}$ brings some $\mathbf{ik}$ information from index h (more specifically, from $\mathbf{pk}_h$). We will prove that the probability that this happens is small; our proof makes use of the fact that $|\mathbf{pp}|$ is compact. In particular, given $\mathbf{pp}$, for at least one index i , $\mathbf{pp}$ cannot bring $\mathbf{ik}$ information about $\mathbf{pk}_i$ that is not present in any other $\mathbf{pk}_j$'s. We present and prove the compression statement in Lemma 2. This statement is of independent interest and may find applications in some other impossibility results. Proposition 1 will then make use of this compression theorem to formalize and prove the above statement that $\mathbf{pp}$ loses ‘ $\mathbf{ik}$ -information’ for some index i . Finally, Lemma 3 uses this proposition to give the correctness proof.

Compression Lemma for TDP Oracles

We present the compression lemma below.

Lemma 2. *Let $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow z$ be an arbitrary algorithm (not necessarily poly-query) that outputs a string z while calling $\mathbf{O} = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. Let $w := \lceil \frac{2|z|}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$. Let $\mathcal{B}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(z)$ be an adversary that takes as input z , makes at most $2^\kappa - w$ queries to $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{d}$ (in total), and an unlimited number of queries to $\mathbf{e}$, and outputs a set $\mathbf{Chal} = \{\mathbf{ik}_1, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_t\}$, where $w \leq t \leq 2^{\kappa/3}$. Also, assume $\mathbf{B}$ satisfies the assumptions in Note 1. Let $\mathbf{Q}$ be the set of all queries/responses made by $\mathcal{B}$. We say $\mathbf{Chal}$ is non-trivial if for no $i \in [t]$, $((\ast \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}_i)) \in \mathbf{Q}$. We say the event **Success** holds if (i) all index keys in $\mathbf{Chal}$ are different, (ii) $\mathbf{Chal}$ is non-trivial and (iii) for at least w indices $i_1, \dots, i_w \in [t]$, $\mathbf{ik}_{i_j} \in \mathbf{g}(\ast)$ for $j \in [w]$.*

We then have $\Pr[\mathbf{Success}] \leq 2^{-\kappa/2}$, where the probability is taken over $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}) \leftarrow \Psi$ and the random coins of $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$.

Proof 1. Assume wlog that both $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are deterministic. We will prove the lemma for any fixing of the oracle $\mathbf{e}$ (note that the oracles $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$ are independent), obtaining a stronger result.

Since both $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are deterministic, for any fixed oracle $\mathbf{g}$ (in addition to $\mathbf{e}$ already fixed) the event **Success** either holds or not; i.e., the probability of **Success** is either zero or

one with respect to any fixed $\mathbf{g}$. Let $K = 2^\kappa$. We prove that any fixed oracle $\mathbf{g}$ for which **Success** holds can be uniquely described with

$$f := \log \left(2^{|z|} \binom{K}{w} w! \binom{t}{w} \frac{(K^3 - w)!}{(K^3 - K)!} \right) \quad (4.1)$$

bits. This means that there exists at most 2^f different **Successful** oracles. Using the inequalities $(a/b)^b \leq \binom{a}{b} \leq (ae/b)^b$, the fraction of $\mathbf{g}$ oracles for which **Success** holds is at most the following.

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{2^f}{\text{number of } L \text{ oracles}} \\ & \leq \frac{2^{|z|} \binom{K}{w} w! \binom{t}{w} \frac{(K^3 - w)!}{(K^3 - K)!}}{\frac{K^3!}{(K^3 - K)!}} = \frac{2^{|z|} \binom{K}{w} \binom{t}{w}}{\binom{K^3}{w}} \\ & \leq \frac{2^{|z|} \left(\frac{Ke}{w}\right)^w \left(\frac{te}{w}\right)^w}{\left(\frac{K^3}{w}\right)^w} = 2^{|z|} \left(\frac{e^2 t}{K^2 w}\right)^w \leq 2^{|z|} w! \left(\frac{8 \times 2^{\kappa/3}}{2^{2\kappa} w}\right)^w \\ & \leq 2^{|z|} \left(\frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa} w}\right)^w \quad (\text{because } \frac{8 \times 2^{\kappa/3}}{2^{2\kappa}} \leq \frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa}} \text{ for large } \kappa) \\ & \leq 2^{|z|} \left(\frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa}}\right)^w = \frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa w - |z|}} \leq \frac{1}{2^{\kappa/2}}. \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality follows from $\frac{3}{2}kw - |z| \geq k/2$ implied by $w \geq \frac{2|z|}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3}$.

We now prove Equation 4.1. Fix a **Successful** oracle $\mathbf{g}$. Let $\mathbf{Chal} = \{\mathbf{ik}_1, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_t\}$ and wlog assume $\mathbf{ik}_1 <_{\text{lex}} \mathbf{ik}_2 <_{\text{lex}} \dots <_{\text{lex}} \mathbf{ik}_t$, where $<_{\text{lex}}$ denotes lexicographical ordering. Let $(\mathbf{ik}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_{i_w})$ be the w lexicographically smallest elements in $\mathbf{Chal}$ that have a pre-image under $\mathbf{g}$, and let $(\mathbf{tk}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{tk}_{i_w})$ be their pre-images. By Condition (iii) of the lemma such a sequence exists. Let $\mathbf{Chal}_x := (\mathbf{tk}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{tk}_{i_w})$. Let $\mathbf{U}$ be the set of trapdoor keys $\mathbf{tk}$ such that $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ was queried by $\mathcal{B}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(z)$. By definition, for any **Successful** $\mathbf{g}$, we have $\mathbf{U} \cap \mathbf{Chal}_x = \emptyset$, and hence $\mathbf{U} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$.

Given $\mathcal{B}$ we claim that any **Successful** oracle $\mathbf{g}$ can be fully described by z , $\mathbf{Chal}_x$, the index set $\{i_1, \dots, i_w\}$ and the output of $\mathbf{g}$ on all input points in $\{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$. Indeed, for any $\mathbf{tk} \notin \mathbf{Chal}_x$, the value $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk})$ is already given. We determine the $\mathbf{g}$ outputs on inputs in $\mathbf{Chal}_x$ as follows: Run $\mathcal{B}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(z)$ to get $\mathbf{Chal}$. We first explain how to reply to $\mathcal{B}$ queries using the provided information.

1. Answering $\mathbf{g}$ queries of $\mathcal{B}$: Since $\mathbf{U} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$ (recall that $\mathbf{U}$ contains the set of $\mathcal{B}$'s queries to $\mathbf{g}$) and that $\mathbf{g}$ is fully determined on $\{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$, we can successfully answer all of $\mathcal{B}$'s $\mathbf{g}$ queries.

2. Answering $\mathbf{e}$ queries of $\mathcal{B}$: the oracle $\mathbf{e}$ is fixed and independent of $\mathbf{g}$.
3. Answering $\mathbf{d}$ queries: for any query $((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, by Note 1, $\mathbf{tk} \in \mathcal{U}$, and hence $\mathbf{tk} \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathcal{Chal}_x$. Thus, the value of $\mathbf{ik} := \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk})$ can be determined via the provided information. Once $\mathbf{ik}$ is known, since $\mathbf{e}$ is also known, we can compute $\mathbf{d}(\mathbf{tk}, y)$.

Thus, the set $\mathcal{Chal}$ can be retrieved. After that, sort its elements lexicographically to get $(\mathbf{ik}_1, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_t)$, and use the provided indices $(i_1, \dots, i_w)$ to retrieve $(\mathbf{ik}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_{i_w})$. Assuming $\mathcal{Chal}_x = (\mathbf{tk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{tk}_w)$ we have $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{tk}_h) = \mathbf{ik}_{i_h}$ for $h \in [w]$. Thus, $\mathbf{g}$ can be reconstructed on inputs in $\mathcal{Chal}_x$, and hence on all inputs.

We now count f the number of bits sufficient to describe $\mathcal{Chal}_x$, the index set $\{i_1, \dots, i_w\}$ and the output of $\mathbf{g}$ on all of $\{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathcal{Chal}_x$. We can describe the ordered set $\mathcal{Chal}_x$ with $\log(\binom{K}{w} w!)$ bits. For describing the (unordered) index set $\{i_1, \dots, i_w\}$, note that all the indices are distinct and each is in $[t]$. Thus, we can describe the index set with $\log \binom{t}{w}$ bits. Finally, we can describe the function $\mathbf{g} : \{0, 1\}^\kappa \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa}$ on $\{0, 1\}^\kappa \setminus \mathcal{Chal}_x$ with $\log \frac{(K^3 - w)!}{(K^3 - K)!}$ bits. Equation 4.1 now follows.

Proof of Correctness

We now use the compression theorem (Lemma 2) to argue correctness. As explained before (in the proof overview), the goal is to show that $\mathbf{pp}$ will lose information, about at least one of the $\mathbf{pk}_i$'s in the sense below. We first start with some notations.

Definition 10. *We define some notations based on Construction 1.*

1. For $\mathbf{vrk} := (\mathbf{pk}_1, \dots, \mathbf{pk}_n, \dots)$, let Pub_i for $i \in [n]$ be the set of index keys underlying $\mathbf{pk}_i$; i.e., $\mathbf{ik} \in \text{Pub}_i$ iff $(*) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik} \in \mathcal{QGen}_i$
2. For $i \in [n]$ let the random variable Que_i be the set of all Q - A pairs during a random execution of $\text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp}, i)$. Let PubC_i be the set of all $\mathbf{ik}$ such that (a) $\mathbf{ik} \in \mathbf{g}(*)$, (b) $((\mathbf{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} *) \in \text{Que}_i$ and (c) $(*) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik} \notin \text{Que}_i$. Let H_i be the set of all $\mathbf{ik}$ such that (a) $((\mathbf{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} *) \in \text{Que}_i$ and (b) $(*) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik} \notin \text{Que}_i$ (i.e., same as PubC_i except it does not need $\mathbf{ik}$ to be valid). Note that $\text{PubC}_i \subseteq \text{H}_i$.

3. Recalling $\mathbf{QEnc}$ from Construction 1 let $\mathbf{PubC}$ contain all $\mathbf{ik}$ such that (a) $\mathbf{ik} \in \mathbf{g}(\ast)$, (b) $((\mathbf{ik}, \ast) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} \ast) \in \mathbf{QEnc}$, and (c) $(\ast \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \notin \mathbf{QEnc}$. Note that $\mathbf{PubC}$ and $\mathbf{PubC}_h$ are identically distributed.

The following lemma shows that with high probability there exists an index $i \in [n]$ such that during a random execution of $\mathbf{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\mathbf{pp}, i)$ the set of valid $\mathbf{ik}$'s that were not generated in response to $\mathbf{g}$ queries during the same $\mathbf{Enc}$ execution and upon which $\mathbf{e}(\mathbf{ik}, \ast)$ is called, is a subset of $\cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{Pub}_j$. If this index i happens to be challenge index in Construction 1 (meaning $h = i$), then the simulated decryption $\mathbf{DecSim}$ performed by $\mathbf{Ver1}$ will succeed with high probability.

Proposition 1. Suppose $\lceil 2 \frac{|\mathbf{pp}|}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil \leq n$. For random variables as in Definition 10

$$\Pr[\exists i : (\mathbf{Pub}_i \cap \mathbf{PubC}_i) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{Pub}_j] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}.$$

Proof 2. We use notation from Definition 10. Let $t = |\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{H}_i|$ be the number of distinct index keys in $\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{H}_i$ and let $w = \lceil 2 \frac{|\mathbf{pp}|}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$. Let $q = |\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{PubC}_i|$, and recall all index keys in $\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{PubC}_i$ are valid. Since for $i \in [n]$, $\mathbf{PubC}_i \subseteq \mathbf{H}_i$, then $\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{PubC}_i \subseteq \cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{H}_i$. Therefore, based on Lemma 2, $\Pr[q \geq w] \leq 2^{-\kappa/2}$. To see why the former claim holds, view $\mathbf{pp}$ in Construction 1 as z in Lemma 2 and view $\cup_{i=1}^n \mathbf{H}_i$ as $\mathbf{Chal}$. Let $\mathbf{Small}$ be the event that $q < n$. Since, $w = \lceil 2 \frac{|\mathbf{pp}|}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil \leq n$, $\Pr[\mathbf{Small}] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}$.

We now show assuming $\mathbf{Small}$ holds, there exists an index $i \in [n]$ such that $(\mathbf{Pub}_i \cap \mathbf{PubC}_i) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{Pub}_j$. Suppose not. Then, for all $f \in [n]$, there exists a key $\mathbf{ik}_f$ such that $\mathbf{ik}_f \in \mathbf{Pub}_f \cap \mathbf{PubC}_f$ but $\mathbf{ik}_f \notin \cup_{j \neq f} \mathbf{Pub}_j$. We claim that $\mathbf{ik}_1, \mathbf{ik}_2, \dots, \mathbf{ik}_n$ are distinct values, and since for all j , $\mathbf{ik}_j \in \mathbf{PubC}_j$, the event $\overline{\mathbf{Small}}$ holds, a contradiction. If for two different indices $j, k \in [n]$, $\mathbf{ik}_j = \mathbf{ik}_k$, then $\mathbf{ik}_k \in \mathbf{Pub}_j$ since $\mathbf{ik}_j \in \mathbf{Pub}_j \cap \mathbf{PubC}_j$. This contradicts the assumption that $\mathbf{ik}_k \notin \cup_{j \neq k} \mathbf{Pub}_j$. The bound of the lemma now follows.

The following proposition shows that if the index h was guessed correctly (i.e., it is the index that $\mathbf{pp}$ loses information about in the sense of the above lemma), then the simulated decryption of $\mathbf{DecSim}$ outputs the correct plaintext with high probability.

Proposition 2. Assuming

$$(\mathbf{Pub}_h \cap \mathbf{PubC}) \subseteq \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{Pub}_i, \tag{4.2}$$

the probability that the algorithm $\mathbf{Ver}$ (Construction 1) does not output the correct bit is at most $2^{-2\kappa/3}$.

Proof 3. First, note that in this proof, we assume the underlying PKCom scheme is perfectly correct (i.e., $\Pr[\text{Dec}^{\text{O}}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c) = m] = 1$ where $(m, c) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{O}}(\text{pp}, h)$). Therefore, proving that DecSim outputs the same plaintext as Dec^{O} will automatically result in Ver outputting the correct bit. Later, in Lemma 3, we consider the possibility that the base scheme is not perfectly correct.

Let QDec' be the set of all Q-A pairs made to $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ by DecSim inside Ver1 . Let

- $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_l$ be the responses in QDec' sampled uniformly at random to answer encryption queries and let $(\text{ik}_1, x_1), \dots, (\text{ik}_t, x_t)$ be the corresponding encryption queries.
- Let $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k$ be the responses in QDec' sampled uniformly at random to answer decryption queries, and let $(\text{tk}_1, y_1), \dots, (\text{tk}_t, y_t)$ be the corresponding decryption queries.

The output of Ver is $\perp$ only when $\mathsf{T} := \cup_j \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QComp} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{QDec}'$ is inconsistent in a **TDP** sense. Say a point $a \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ occurs in QEnc if it occurs as the input or output of an $\mathbf{e}$ or $\mathbf{d}$ query: $((*, a) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} *)$, $((*, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} a)$, $((*, a) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *)$ or $((*, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} a)$. First, assume all of α_i and β_j values are distinct. (This happens except with probability $\frac{\text{poly}(\kappa)}{2^\kappa}$.) Assuming this, we might have an inconsistency because the permutation structure is violated, namely when some α_i or β_j occurs in QEnc .⁴ The probability of this is also at most $\frac{\text{poly}(\kappa)}{2^\kappa}$. Thus, below assume all of α_i and β_j are distinct, and none of them occur in QEnc . (This happens with probability of at least $(1 - \frac{\text{poly}(\kappa)}{2^k})(1 - \frac{\text{poly}(\kappa)}{2^k}) \geq 1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}$ for a large enough κ .)

We might now have an inconsistency because a query response generated by DecSim might conflict with $\text{All} := \cup_j \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QComp} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc}$. We upperbound the probability of this below.

For a query $\mathbf{qu} := ((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ of DecSim , we might get an inconsistency if

1. for some ik , $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}$, and
2. $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$, and
3. $x \neq \tilde{x}$ where $\tilde{x}$ is the generated response for $\mathbf{qu}$ by DecSim .

⁴This case does not necessarily lead to an inconsistency, but we show it will, nonetheless, occur with small probability.

Call this event **Bad**. The event **Bad** indeed causes a conflict because $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}$ and $((\text{ik}, \tilde{x}) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$ will dictate a response x to a decryption query (tk, y) , but a random response $\tilde{x} \neq x$ was given. Assuming the hypothesis of the lemma (Equation 4.2) we show whenever Conditions 1 and 2 hold, we will have $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All} \setminus \text{QGen}_h$, and given that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$, Condition 3 would never hold. (See Step 2b of Ver1 in Construction 1.)

Suppose to the contrary $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \text{All} \setminus \text{QGen}_h$. Since $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}$ and $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All} \setminus \text{QGen}_h$ we conclude $\text{ik} \in \text{PubC}_h$ and $\text{ik} \notin \cup_{i \neq h} \text{PubC}_i$ (Definition 10). Moreover, $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \notin \cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ because otherwise Condition 3 would never occur. (See Step 2b of Ver1 in Construction 1.) Since $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$ and $\text{All} := \cup_j \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{Aux}$, we get $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$. Since we assumed $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \text{All} \setminus \text{QGen}_h$, we get $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \text{QEnc}$. Thus, $\text{ik} \in \text{PubC}$. We have established $\text{ik} \in \text{PubC}_h \cap \text{PubC}$, and $\text{ik} \notin \cup_{i \neq h} \text{PubC}_i$, contradicting Equation 4.2.

Lemma 3 (Correctness). *Suppose Π is the signature scheme defined in Construction 1 with oracle access of the form $(\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Sig}, \text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}})$ and the PKCom scheme underlying Π is $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct. Then, Π is $(1 - \epsilon)^{\frac{(1-2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}}$ -correct.*

Proof 4. Let **Success** be the event that the verification algorithm outputs the correct bit. In other words, if **Success_i** holds, we have: $\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{vrk}, i, \text{Sig}(\text{sgk}, i)) = 1$ where $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa, i)$. Finally, let **X** be the random variable denoting the message chosen to be signed. Also, let **Good** be the event that there exists $h \in [n]$ for which Proposition 1 holds. In other words, if **Good** happens, we have:

$$(\text{Pub}_h \cap \text{PubC}) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq h} \text{Pub}_j$$

Based on Proposition 1, $\Pr[\text{Good}] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Pi \text{ is correct}] &= \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success} | \mathbf{X} = i] \Pr[\mathbf{X} = i] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] \\ \Pr[\text{Success}_i] &= \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] + \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \overline{\text{Good}}] \Pr[\overline{\text{Good}}] \geq \\ &\Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] \geq (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \\ \Rightarrow \Pr[\Pi \text{ is correct}] &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] \geq \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \geq \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{1}{n}(1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_h | \text{Good}] \geq \frac{1}{n}(1 - 2^{-\kappa/2})(1 - \epsilon)(1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}) \geq (1 - \epsilon) \frac{(1 - 2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}$$

The above statement holds because the underlying PKCom scheme is $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct and based on 2, the algorithm DecSim outputs the same plaintext as the original Dec with probability of at least $1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}$. Therefore,

$$\Pr[\text{Success}_h | \text{Good}] \geq (1 - \epsilon)(1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3})$$

Proof of Security

Now, we prove zero-time unforgeability of Construction 1. We first present the following standard bound.

Lemma 4. *Let $X_1, \dots, X_{t+1}$ be independent, Bernoulli random variables, where $\Pr[X_i = 1] = p$, for all $i \leq t + 1$. Then*

$$\Pr[X_1 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge X_t = 0 \wedge X_{t+1} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{t}.$$

Proof 5.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[X_1 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge X_t = 0 \wedge X_{t+1} = 1] &= p \cdot \prod_{i=1}^t (1 - p) = p \cdot (1 - p)^t = t^t \cdot p \cdot \left(\frac{1-p}{t}\right)^t \\ &\leq t^t \cdot \left(\frac{p + t(\frac{1-p}{t})}{t+1}\right)^{t+1} = t^t \cdot \left(\frac{1}{t+1}\right)^{t+1} = \frac{1}{t+1} \cdot \left(\frac{t}{t+1}\right)^t = \frac{1}{t+1} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{t+1}\right)^t \leq \frac{1}{t+1} \leq \frac{1}{t} \end{aligned}$$

The first inequality holds due to the AM-GM inequality.

Lemma 5 (Security of Construction 1). *Construction 1 is zero-time unforgeable if the PKCom scheme is secure.*

Before delving in the proof, let us sketch the main challenges in the proof and how we overcome them.

Proof sketch of Lemma 5 Suppose $\mathcal{B}$ is successful in forging a signature in $\mathcal{E}^{\text{g.e.d}}$. We need to argue how to build an adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{B}, \text{g.e.d}}$ against PKCom. The adversary $\mathcal{B}$ forges a signature by presenting $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$. Since $\mathcal{B}$ forges a signature, we know that DecSim($h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c, (\text{S} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{QGen}_h)$) where S is defined as in 1, outputs the

correct plaintext for c . Thinking of c as a challenge ciphertext for $\mathcal{A}$, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ does not have QEnc so to be able to run

$$\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c, (S \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{QGen}_h)).$$

Instead, $\mathcal{A}$ has full access to all the oracles $\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}$. The reduction works by letting $\mathcal{A}$ run $\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c, (S \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{QGen}_h))$, but those queries which require knowledge of QEnc to be responded to, will be answered by consulting the real oracles $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. (Recall that DecSim does not have oracle access to $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$.) Our analysis will show that the entire distribution of all Q-A pairs underlying all public keys, ciphertexts and those that appear during decryption is indistinguishable in the two worlds: the first world is one where things are decrypted as per DecSim by using QEnc , and the second world is one where the real oracles $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ are used for decryption, as explained above. Let us highlight some of the challenges and how we overcome them.

Suppose that $\mathcal{B}$ makes a dummy query $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ for a random tk and puts (x, tk) in its forged secret key sk_h , where x is the first half of $\text{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$. Also, suppose the decryption algorithm on sk_h always call the query $\text{qu} := (\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$. Now assuming that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ is not a query in QEnc (which is likely as qu is chosen randomly), under DecSim this query is responded to with random (which is independent of x), while under the above strategy, of consulting the real oracle $\mathbf{g}$, we respond to with ik itself (whose first half equals x). Thus, the two distributions become distinguishable. To get around this, we use the oracles $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$ in a controlled way. Namely, we maintain a set of Q-A pairs collect , and if a given query is not answered in collect we then consult the real oracles $(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. To sample collect , we run $(c', *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{pp}, h)$ many times, each time recording the queries in a fresh local set QEnc' , and then run DecSim on sk_h and c' while using QEnc' for decryption. We collect all the Q-A pairs that occur during the executions of DecSim in the set collect . It can now be seen with this enhancement the above issue goes away: both worlds will respond to qu randomly.

Proof 6. We show how to transform an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the signatures into an adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ against PKCom.

1. $\mathcal{A}$ samples h , and for $i \in [n] \setminus \{h\}$, it samples $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\kappa)$ and collects the Q-A pairs in QGen_i . It then gives $h, (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \neq h}$ to the challenger to receive (pk_h, ct) .
2. $\mathcal{A}$ forms $\text{vrk} := (\{\text{pk}_i\}, \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP})$, where QCMP is the set of Q-A pairs made during $\text{Com}(\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n) \rightarrow \text{pp}$.

3. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\text{vrk}, h)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{ct}', *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{pp}, h)$ η times. In k th iteration, it records all queries in a set QEnc_k . It then runs $\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}', (\cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QEnc}_k))$, and records all queries in collect_k . Finally, it sets $\text{Aux} = \cup_{k=1}^{\eta} \text{QEnc}_k$ and $\text{collect} = \cup_{k=1}^{\eta} \text{collect}_k$.
5. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\text{DecSim}_0(\text{sk}'_h, h, \text{ct})$ which simulates the execution of $\text{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}}(h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct})$ by rendering queries via $\text{All}' = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{collect} \cup \text{Aux}$. For any $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ query, if already answered in $\text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}'$, use that answer; else, reply with calling the $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ oracle on the same query. For $\mathbf{qu} := ((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$:
 - (a) if for some ik and x
 - i. $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \setminus \text{collect}$, respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x .
 - ii. if $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \notin \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \setminus \text{collect}$, respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with random.
 - (b) Else, query the oracle on tk and let $\text{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$.
 - i. If for some x , $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{Aux}$, respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x .
 - ii. Else, if for some x , $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$, respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x .
 - iii. Else, query the oracle and respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with $\mathbf{d}(\text{tk}, y)$

Let $\text{All} := \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{Aux}$ where QEnc is the set of all Q-A pairs made during $(\text{ct}, *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, h; R)$. Also let QDec and QDec' be the set of Q-A pairs made by DecSim and DecSim_0 , respectively and let T be the set of all Q-A pairs made by $\mathcal{B}$ while forging $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h)$. Consider the following two distributions:

$$\mathbf{D} : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}, \text{T}, R, \text{Aux}, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h)$$

and

$$\mathbf{D}' : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}', \text{T}, R, \text{Aux}, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h).$$

Let $\gamma = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be the number of queries in $\text{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h$ and $\beta = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be the maximum number of queries asked in a random execution of DecSim . Let $\eta = \gamma \cdot \beta$. For each key

pair $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \mathsf{T} \cup \mathsf{QGen}_h$, we define $\eta + 1$ variables as below: For $1 \leq i \leq \eta$, let X_i be a Bernoulli variable that equals 1 when $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ appears in i th iteration of collecting queries in `collect` at step 4 above and 0 otherwise. Also, let $X_{\eta+1} = 1$ if $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ appears in execution of $\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}, \text{All} \cup \mathsf{QGen}'_h)$ while running Ver_1 and 0 otherwise. $X_1, \dots, X_{\eta+1}$ are independent and have the same probability of being 1. This is because all X_i , for $1 \leq i \leq \eta$, are output of the same randomized experiment and $X_{\eta+1}$ can also be seen as a result of the same experiment. Let QDec_{key} be the set of all tk such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ is queried in execution of $\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}, \text{All} \cup \mathsf{QGen}'_h)$ while running Ver_1 . Also, let collect_{key} be the set of all tk such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \text{collect}$.

Therefore, based on Lemma 4, for any key pair $(\text{tk} \rightarrow \text{ik}) \in \mathsf{T} \cup \mathsf{QGen}_h$,

$$\Pr[\text{tk} \in \mathsf{QDec}_{key} / \text{collect}_{key}] = \Pr[X_1 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge X_\eta = 0 \wedge X_{\eta+1} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{\eta}. \quad (4.3)$$

Therefore, the probability that for some $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \mathsf{QDec}$, $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \text{collect}$ but $\mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$ is queried while running Ver_1 is at most $\frac{\gamma}{\eta}$ where $\gamma = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ is the number of queries in $\mathsf{T} \cup \mathsf{QGen}_h$. Thus, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, for any key pair $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in (\mathsf{T} \cup \mathsf{QGen}_h) \cap \mathsf{QDec}$, we also have $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{collect}$.

Suppose the decryption algorithm makes no duplicate queries. We first prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{g}$ type queries, both distributions are the same. Suppose not and let $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ be the first query for which DecSim and DecSim_0 will answer differently and make the distributions different. $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ cannot be present in $\mathsf{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}'$ because otherwise both DecSim and DecSim_0 would answer with the same response. Also, $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ cannot appear in QEnc because otherwise DecSim will answer according to QEnc and DecSim_0 will query the oracle which results in DecSim and DecSim_0 answering with the same response as the oracle is correct. That means that $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \mathsf{T} \cup \mathsf{QGen}_h$ but based on the above conclusion, since $\text{tk} \in \mathsf{QDec}_{key}$ with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ has been collected in `collect`, therefore $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \text{All}'$ which is a contradiction.

Now, we can similarly prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{e}$ type queries, both distributions are the same. Suppose not and let $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} ?)$ be the first query for

which DecSim and DecSim_0 will answer differently and make the distributions different. $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *)$ cannot be in $\text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}' \cup \text{QEnc}$ because otherwise both DecSim and DecSim_0 will answer with the same response. That means that $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *) \in \text{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h$.

Similar to 4.3, we can prove that with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, for any pair (ik, x) where $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *) \in (\text{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h) \cap \text{QDec}$, we also have $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *) \in \text{collect}$.

Therefore, since $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *) \in \text{QDec}$ with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *)$ has been collected in collect . Thus, $((\text{ik}^*, x^*) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} *) \in \text{All}'$ which is a contradiction.

We finally prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{d}$ type queries, both distributions are the same. Let $\mathbf{qu} := ((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ be the first decryption query that makes the distributions different. Recall that $\text{All} = \text{QCMP} \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{Aux}$. There are five cases:

1. There exists a ik such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h$ and there exists x such that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCMP}$: In this case, both distributions will answer with x .
2. There exists a ik such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h)$ and there exists x such that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{All}$: In this case DecSim will respond with x and DecSim_0 will first query the oracle on tk to get $\text{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$. Now, there are two possible cases: $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ or $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux})$. In the first case, if $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \notin \text{collect}$, DecSim_0 will query the oracle and since the oracle is correct and queries in $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ are all generated by the oracle, the answer of DecSim_0 will also be x . If $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$, and because in the collection of queries in collect , $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ is consulted, $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$ and the response of DecSim_0 will be x as well.

Now, suppose that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$. Similar to the previous case, if $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \notin \text{collect}$, DecSim_0 will query the oracle and respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x . Now suppose that i is the smallest index such that $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{collect}_i$. For any pair (ik, y) that $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{collect}_i$, we define η variables as follows: For $1 \leq j \neq i \leq \eta$, let Y_j be a Bernoulli variable that equals 1 when $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}_j$ as defined in step 4 above and 0 otherwise. Also, let $Y_i = 1$ if $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\text{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$ and 0 otherwise. $Y_1, \dots, Y_\eta$ are independent and have the same probability of being 1. This is because

all Y_j , for $1 \leq j \neq i \leq \eta$, are output of the same randomized experiment and Y_i can also be seen as a result of the same experiment. Now, based on Lemma 4, for any pair (ik, y) that $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{collect}_i$, we have:

$$\Pr[(ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \notin \cup_{j \neq i} \text{QEnc}_j \wedge ((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QEnc}] =$$

$$\Pr[Y_0 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge Y_i = 1 \wedge \dots \wedge Y_\eta = 0] \leq \frac{1}{\eta - 1}.$$

Therefore, the probability that for some (ik, y) that $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{collect}_i$, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \notin \cup_{j \neq i} \text{QEnc}_j$ but $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QEnc}$ is at most $\frac{\beta}{\eta - 1}$ where $\beta = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ is an upper bound on the number of queries in collect_i . $\eta = \gamma \cdot \beta$; thus, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\gamma - 1}$, we must have $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \cup_{j \neq i} \text{QEnc}_j$. Since all queries in $\cup_{j \neq i} \text{QEnc}_j$ are based on the oracle and the oracle is correct, and because $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QEnc}$, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \cup_{j \neq i} \text{QEnc}_j$. Therefore, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{Aux}$ and that is a contradiction.

3. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow[g]{} ik) \in \text{QGen}'_h \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc})$ and there exists no x such that $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QGen}'_h \cup \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP}$: In this case, both distributions will answer with a random response.
4. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow[g]{} ik) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP}$ but for no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}$: In this case, both DecSim and DecSim_0 will answer with a random response.
5. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow[g]{} ik) \in \text{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h)$ but for no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}$: In this case, DecSim will answer with a random response and we claim that DecSim_0 will also respond randomly. First, note that, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y)$ must appear in $\text{QGen}_h \cup \text{T}$ because otherwise there is no way for a distinguisher who only has access to the two distributions to differentiate between the random and true response. Similar to 4.3, we can prove that with probability at least $\frac{1}{\beta}$, for any pair (ik, y) where $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in (\text{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h) \cap \text{QDec}$, we also have $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{collect}$. Therefore, since $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y) \in \text{QDec}$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\beta}$, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow[e]{} y)$ has been collected in collect . Suppose that

$((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y)$ has been asked for the first time in the i th iteration of 4. For no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{Aux}$ because otherwise $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{All}$ and DecSim would have answered with x instead of a random response. Therefore, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \text{QEnc}_i$. Also, since $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{All}$, in the i th iteration of collecting the set collect , DecSim must have answered the query $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} *)$ with a random response like r . Now because $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} r) \in \text{collect}$, DecSim_0 will respond to qu with r . Therefore, both responses by DecSim and DecSim_0 are generated randomly.

4.3 TDP-Impossibility of PKCom with CRS

We will now present the transformation to target-restricted signatures assuming that PKCom has [CRS](#). Recall the notions of correctness and security of PKCom given in Definition 4.

Theorem 5. For $\epsilon := \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{O}} := (\text{CRS}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Key}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}})$ be a $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct PKCom scheme with respect to a random [TDP](#) oracle $\mathbf{O} = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$. Suppose a public parameter pp under $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ satisfies $|\text{pp}| \leq \frac{(n-2)|\text{ik}|}{2}$, where n is the number of users and ik is a base index key (recall $|\text{ik}| = 3\kappa$, Definition 7). Also, let α be the number of queries made by $\text{CRS}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa, 1^n)$ to the oracle $\mathbf{O}$. Then, there exists a $(1 - \epsilon)(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha})^{\frac{(1-2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}}$ -correct target-restricted signature scheme relative to $\mathbf{O} = (\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d})$.

We will introduce the construction in Construction 2 and subsequently demonstrate its correctness and security in this section.

Construction 2. We construct a n -target-restricted signature scheme from any PKCom scheme $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbf{O}} = (\text{CRS}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Key}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{O}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}})$. The construction is parameterized over an integer s , which will be parameterized later; this parameter will only affect the size of the verification key. We assume all the algorithms satisfy the assumption in Note 1.

- $\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa, h) \rightarrow (\text{sgk}, \text{vrk})$ where $h \in [n]$ is the message to be signed:
 1. Run $\text{CRS}^{\mathbf{O}}(1^\kappa, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{crs}$ and let QCRS be the set of all Q - A pairs made to $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$.⁵

⁵We do not keep track of $\mathbf{d}$ queries because of Note 1.

Algorithm 1 SampleKeys

Require: $s, h \in [n]$, crs , $\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \neq h}$

$K \leftarrow \emptyset$

$j \leftarrow 0$

while $j < s$ **do**

$j \leftarrow j + 1$

$(\text{pk}_h, \text{sk}_h) \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\kappa, \text{crs})$

$\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{crs}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_h, \dots, \text{pk}_n)$

$(m, \text{ct}) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, h)$

 run $\text{Dec}(\text{crs}, \text{sk}_h, \text{ct})$:

for $\text{qu} = \text{d}(\text{tk}, y)$ **do**:

$\text{ik} \leftarrow \text{g}(\text{tk})$

 add (tk, ik) to K

end for

end while

return K

2. For $1 \leq j \leq n$, run $\text{Key}^O(1^\kappa, \text{crs}) \rightarrow (\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j)$. Let QGen_j be the set of all Q - A pairs made to g and e .
 3. Run $\text{Com}^O(\text{crs}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n) \rightarrow \text{pp}$ and let QCMP be the set of all Q - A pairs made to g and e .
 4. Run $\text{SampleKeys}(s, \text{crs}, h, \{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \neq h})$ as defined in Algorithm 1 to obtain a set K .
 5. Return $\text{vrk} = ((\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n), \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup K)$, $\text{sgk} = (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h, \text{QCRS})$.
- $\text{Sig}(\text{sgk}, h) \rightarrow \sigma$: For sgk as above, return $\sigma = (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h, \text{QCRS})$.
 - $\text{Ver}^{\text{g}, \text{e}, \text{d}}(\text{vrk}, \sigma, h) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, h), \sigma)$: Parse $\text{vrk} := ((\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n), S)$ and $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h, \text{QCRS})$.
 1. $\text{Ver0}^{\text{g}, \text{e}, \text{d}}(\text{vrk}, h) \rightarrow \alpha$: Run $(m', c') \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{g}, \text{e}, \text{d}}(\text{pp}, h)$ η times and record all Q - A pairs in a set Aux . Run $(m, c) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\text{g}, \text{e}, \text{d}}(\text{pp}, h)$ let QEnc be the set of all Q - A pairs made to g and e . Return $\alpha := (\text{vrk}, h, m, c, \text{QEnc}, \text{Aux})$.
 2. $\text{Ver1}(\alpha, \sigma)$: Retrieve QEnc , Aux and S from α . (Recall $S = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup K$ is in vrk .) Parse $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h, \text{QCRS})$. Let $\text{All} = S \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$. Run $\text{DecSim}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c, \text{All})$, which simulates the execution of $\text{Dec}^O(\text{crs}, h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c)$ by rendering queries via All , as follows:

- (a) For a given $\mathbf{g}$ or $\mathbf{e}$ query, if the answer is already provided in **All**, reply with that answer; else, with a random string z of appropriate length. In case of answering with a random response, add the Q-A pair to **Fake** (initially empty).⁶
- (b) For a given query $\mathbf{qu} := ((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, if for some $\mathbf{ik}$, $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in (\mathbf{All} \cup \mathbf{Fake}) / (\mathbf{QGen}_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS})$ and $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} c) \in \mathbf{All}$ for some x , respond to the query with x . Else, if for some $\mathbf{ik}$, $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \mathbf{QGen}_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}$ and $((\mathbf{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in (\mathbf{All}/\mathbf{QEnc}) \cup \mathbf{Fake}$ for some x , respond to the query with x . Else, respond to the query with a random value $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$.

Letting m' be the output of **DecSim**, output 1 if $m' = m$ and 0 otherwise.

Proof of Correctness

Similar to the CRS-free case, we use the compression theorem (Lemma 2) and Proposition 1 to argue correctness. We use the notations defined in 10.

Proposition 3. *Suppose*

$$(\mathbf{Pub}_h \cap \mathbf{PubC}) \subseteq \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{Pub}_i. \quad (4.4)$$

*Then by setting $s = \alpha^2$, where α is the number of queries made by $\mathbf{CRS}(1^\kappa, 1^n)$, the probability that the algorithm **Ver** (Construction 2) outputs the correct bit is at least $(1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3})(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha})$.*

Proof 7. The proof follows a similar structure to that Proposition 2. As with the previous proof, we assume the underlying **PKCom** scheme is perfectly correct. (i.e., $\Pr[\mathbf{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}}(h, \mathbf{sk}_h, \{\mathbf{pk}_i\}, c) = m] = 1$ where $(m, c) \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}^{\mathbf{O}}(\mathbf{pp}, h)$). Therefore, proving that **DecSim** outputs the same plaintext as $\mathbf{Dec}^{\mathbf{O}}$ will automatically result in **Ver** outputting the correct bit. Later, in Lemma 6, we consider the possibility that the base scheme is not perfectly correct.

For α_i, β_j defined in Proposition 2, we can use the same arguments to prove that with probability at least $1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}$, α_i and β_j are distinct, and none of them occur in **QEnc**.

An inconsistency may occur if the response to some query is incorrect according to what is entailed by $\mathbf{All} = \cup_j \mathbf{QGen}_j \cup \mathbf{QCMP} \cup \mathbf{QCRS} \cup \mathbf{QEnc} \cup \mathbf{K}$.

All $\mathbf{g}$ and $\mathbf{e}$ type queries will be answered according to **All**. Thus, we will not run into any inconsistency.

⁶Duplicate queries will be replied to with the same random response.

For a query $\mathbf{qu} := ((\mathbf{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$, we might run into an inconsistency if

1. for some $\mathbf{ik}$, $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{All}$, and
2. $((\mathbf{ik}, \tilde{x}) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$, and
3. $\tilde{x} \neq x$ where x is the generated response for $\mathbf{qu}$ by DecSim .

Call this event **Bad**. The event **Bad** indeed causes a conflict because $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{All}$ and $((\mathbf{ik}, \tilde{x}) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$ will dictate a response $\tilde{x}$ to a decryption query $(\mathbf{tk}, y)$, but a random response $x \neq \tilde{x}$ was given.

We must have $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \notin \text{All}/(\text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS})$, because otherwise a random response would not have been generated. Therefore, $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$. If $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QGen}_h$, then based on Equation 4.4 we will not run into any inconsistencies as proved in the Proposition 2.

Let **Fail** be the event that $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QCRS}$, $((\mathbf{ik}, \tilde{x}) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$, and $\tilde{x} \neq x$. Note that **Fail** happens if $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QCRS}/\mathbf{K}$ because otherwise a random response would have not been generated. For each key pair $(\mathbf{tk} \rightarrow \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QCRS}$, we define $s+1$ variables as below: For $1 \leq i \leq s$, let X_i be a Bernoulli variable that equals 1 when $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *)$ appears in i th iteration of Algorithm 1 and 0 otherwise. Also, let $X_{s+1} = 1$ if $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *)$ appears in execution of $\text{Dec}(h, \mathbf{sk}_h, \{\mathbf{pk}_i\}, c, \text{All})$ while running Ver_1 and 0 otherwise. $X_1, \dots, X_{s+1}$ are independent and have the same probability of being 1. This is because all X_i , for $1 \leq i \leq s$, are output of the same randomized experiment and X_{s+1} can also be seen as a result of the same experiment. Let **DQ** be the set of all $\mathbf{tk}$ such that $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *)$ is queried in execution of $\text{DecSim}(h, \mathbf{sk}_h, \{\mathbf{pk}\}_i, c, \text{All})$ while running Ver_1 and let $\mathbf{K}_{\text{key}}$ be set of all $\mathbf{tk}$ such that $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *) \in \mathbf{K}$. (Note that $((\mathbf{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *) \in \mathbf{K}$ indicates that $(\mathbf{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \mathbf{ik}) \in \mathbf{K}$ based on 1.)

Therefore, based on Lemma 4, we can conclude that for any key pair $(\mathbf{tk} \rightarrow \mathbf{ik}) \in \text{QCRS}$,

$$\Pr[\mathbf{tk} \in \text{DQ}/\mathbf{K}_{\text{key}}] = \Pr[X_1 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge X_s = 0 \wedge X_{s+1} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{s}$$

which is negligible for sufficiently large s .

Therefore, the probability that for some $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{QCRS}$, $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \mathbf{K}$ but $((\text{tk}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} *)$ is queried while running Ver_1 is at most $\frac{\alpha}{s}$ where $\alpha = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ is the number of queries made to the oracle by Com to output crs . Let $s = \alpha^2$. Thus, Fail occurs with probability at most $\frac{1}{\alpha}$.

As a result, the algorithm Ver outputs the correct bit with probability of at least $(1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3})(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha})$. The proof is now complete.

Lemma 6. *Suppose Π is the signature scheme defined in Construction 2 with oracle access of the form $(\text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}, \text{Sig}, \text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}})$ and the PKCom scheme underlying Π is $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct. Then, Π is $(1 - \epsilon)(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha})(\frac{1 - 2^{-\kappa/3}}{n})$ -correct.*

Proof 8. Let Success be the event that the verification algorithm outputs the correct bit. In other words, if Success_i holds, we have: $\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{vrk}, i, \text{Sig}(\text{sgk}, i)) = 1$ where $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa, i)$. Let $\mathbf{X}$ be the random variable denoting the message chosen to be signed. Also, let Good be the event that there exists $h \in [n]$ for which Proposition 1 holds. In other words, if Good happens, for some $h \in [n]$, we have:

$$(\text{Pub}_h \cap \text{PubC}) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq h} \text{Pub}_j$$

Based on Proposition 1, $\Pr[\text{Good}] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Pi \text{ is correct}] &= \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success} | \mathbf{X} = i] \Pr[\mathbf{X} = i] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] \\ \Pr[\text{Success}_i] &= \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] + \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \overline{\text{Good}}] \Pr[\overline{\text{Good}}] \geq \\ &\Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] \geq (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \\ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] &\geq \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \geq \\ \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_h | \text{Good}] &\geq \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) (1 - \epsilon) (1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}) (1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}) \geq (1 - \epsilon) (1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}) \frac{(1 - 2^{-\kappa/3})}{n} \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Security

Lemma 7. *Construction 2 is zero-time unforgeable if the PKCom scheme is secure.*

Proof 9. Let $\mathcal{B}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ be a PPT adversary such that $\Pr[\text{Ver}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{vrk}, h, \sigma) = 1 \text{ where } \sigma \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^O(\text{vrk}, h)]$ is non-negligible, where $h \leftarrow [n]$, and $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(1^\kappa, h)$. We construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{B}, \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}$ to win the security game in Definition 4 with non-negligible advantage performing the following steps:

1. $\mathcal{A}$ receives crs from its challenger, samples h , and for $i \in [n] \setminus \{h\}$, it samples $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Key}(1^\kappa, \text{crs})$ and collects the Q-A pairs in QGen_i . It also runs 1 to obtain a set K . It then gives $h, (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \neq h}$ to the challenger to receive (pk_h, ct) .
2. $\mathcal{A}$ forms $\text{vrk} := (\{\text{pk}_i\}, \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{K})$, where QCMP is the set of Q-A pairs made during $\text{Com}(\text{crs}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n) \rightarrow \text{pp}$.
3. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h, \text{QCRS}') \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\text{vrk}, h)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{ct}', *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{d}}(\text{pp}, h) \eta$ times. In k th iteration, it records all queries in a set QEnc_k . It then runs $\text{DecSim}(\text{crs}, h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}', (\cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}' \cup \text{K} \cup \text{QEnc}_k))$, and records all queries in collect_k . Finally, it sets $\text{Aux} = \cup_{k=1}^\eta \text{QEnc}_k$ and $\text{collect} = \cup_{k=1}^\eta \text{collect}_k$.
5. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\text{DecSim}_0(\text{crs}, \text{sk}'_h, h, \text{ct})$ which simulates the execution of $\text{Dec}^O(h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct})$ by rendering queries via $\text{All}' = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{collect} \cup \text{K} \cup \text{Aux}$. For any $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ query, if already answered in $\text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$, use that answer; else, reply with calling the $\mathbf{g}/\mathbf{e}$ oracle on the same query. For $\text{qu} := ((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$:
 - (a) if for some ik and x ,
 - i. $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}' \setminus \text{collect}$, respond to qu with x .
 - ii. if $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$ and $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \notin \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}' \setminus \text{collect}$, respond to qu with random.
 - (b) Else, query the oracle on tk and let $\text{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$.
 - i. If for some x , $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{Aux}$, respond to qu with x .
 - ii. Else, if for some x , $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$, respond to qu with x .
 - iii. Else, query the oracle and respond to qu with $\mathbf{d}(\text{tk}, y)$

Let QEnc be the set of all Q-A pairs made during $(\text{ct}, *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, h; R)$ and let $\text{All} := \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc}$. Also let QDec and QDec' be the set of Q-A

pairs made by DecSim and DecSim_0 , respectively and let T be the set of all Q-A pairs made by $\mathcal{B}$ while forging $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h)$. Consider the following two distributions:

$$\mathsf{D} : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QCRS}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}, \mathsf{T}, \text{Aux}, R, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h, \text{QCRS}')$$

and

$$\mathsf{D}' : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QCRS}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}', \mathsf{T}, \text{Aux}, R, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h, \text{QCRS}').$$

Let $\gamma = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be the number of queries in $\mathsf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$ and $\beta = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ be the maximum number of queries asked in a random execution of DecSim . Let $\eta = \gamma \cdot \beta$. For each key pair $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \mathsf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$, we define $\eta+1$ variables as below: For $1 \leq i \leq \eta$, let X_i be a Bernoulli variable that equals 1 when $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ appears in i th iteration of collecting queries in `collect` at step 4 above and 0 otherwise. Also, let $X_{\eta+1} = 1$ if $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ appears in execution of $\text{DecSim}(\text{crs}, h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}, \text{All} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}')$ while running Ver_1 and 0 otherwise. $X_1, \dots, X_{\eta+1}$ are independent and have the same probability of being 1. This is because all X_i , for $1 \leq i \leq \eta$, are output of the same randomized experiment and $X_{\eta+1}$ can also be seen as a result of the same experiment. Let QDec_{key} be the set of all tk such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ is queried in execution of $\text{DecSim}(\text{crs}, h, \text{sk}'_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, \text{ct}, \text{All} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}')$ while running Ver_1 . Also, let $\text{collect}_{\text{key}}$ be the set of all tk such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \text{collect}$.

Therefore, based on Lemma 4, for any key pair $(\text{tk} \rightarrow \text{ik}) \in \mathsf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$,

$$\Pr[\text{tk} \in \text{QDec}_{\text{key}} / \text{collect}_{\text{key}}] = \Pr[X_1 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge X_\eta = 0 \wedge X_{\eta+1} = 1] \leq \frac{1}{\eta}. \quad (4.5)$$

Therefore, the probability that for some $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{QDec}$, $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \notin \text{collect}$ but $\mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$ is queried while running Ver_1 is at most $\frac{\gamma}{\eta}$ where $\eta = \gamma \cdot \beta$ and $\gamma = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ is the number of queries in $\mathsf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$. Thus, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, for any key pair $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in (\mathsf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}) \cap \text{QDec}$, we also have $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{collect}$.

Suppose the decryption algorithm makes no duplicate queries. Similar to 6, we first prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{g}$ type queries, both distributions are the same. Suppose not and let $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} ?)$ be the first query for which DecSim and DecSim_0 will answer differently and make the distributions different. $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \notin \text{All}' \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$ because

otherwise both DecSim and DecSim_0 would answer with the same response. Also, $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \notin \text{QEnc}$ because otherwise DecSim will answer according to QEnc and DecSim_0 will query the oracle which results in both answering with the same response as the oracle is correct. That means that $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \mathbf{T} \cup \text{QGen}_h \cup \text{QCRS}$ but based on the above conclusion, since $\text{tk} \in \text{QDec}_{key}$ with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\beta}$, $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *)$ has been collected in collect , therefore $(\text{tk}^* \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} *) \in \text{All}'$ which is a contradiction.

Similar to 6, we can prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{e}$ type queries, both distributions are the same.

We finally prove that with high probability, for all $\mathbf{d}$ type queries, both distributions are the same. Let $\mathbf{qu} := ((\text{tk}, y) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{d}} ?)$ be the first decryption query that makes the distributions different. Recall that $\text{All} = \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux} \cup \text{QEnc}$. There are five cases:

1. There exists a ik such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$ and there exists x such that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}'$: In this case, both distributions will answer with x .
2. There exists a ik such that $(\text{tk} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{g}} \text{ik}) \in \text{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}')$ and there exists x such that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{All}$: In this case DecSim will respond with x and DecSim_0 will first query the oracle on tk to get $\text{ik} = \mathbf{g}(\text{tk})$. Now, there are two possible cases: $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ or $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux})$. In the first case, if $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \notin \text{collect}$, DecSim_0 will query the oracle and since the oracle is correct and queries in $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ are all generated by the oracle, the answer of DecSim_0 will also be x . If $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$, and because in the collection of queries in collect , $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{Aux}$ is consulted, $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}$ and the response of DecSim_0 will be x as well. Now, suppose that $((\text{ik}, x) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}$. Similar to the previous case, if $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \notin \text{collect}$, DecSim_0 will query the oracle and respond to $\mathbf{qu}$ with x . Now suppose that i is the smallest index such that $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}_i$. For any pair (ik, y) that $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{collect}_i$, we define η variables as follows: For $1 \leq j \neq i \leq \eta$, let Y_j be a Bernoulli variable that equals 1 when $((\text{ik}, *) \xrightarrow{\mathbf{e}} y) \in \text{QEnc}_j$ as defined in step 4

above and 0 otherwise. Also, let $Y_i = 1$ if $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QEnc}$ and 0 otherwise. $Y_1, \dots, Y_\eta$ are independent and have the same probability of being 1. This is because all Y_j , for $1 \leq j \neq i \leq \eta$, are output of the same randomized experiment and Y_i can also be seen as a result of the same experiment. Now, based on Lemma 4, for any pair (ik, y) that $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{collect}_i$, we have:

$$\Pr[((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{QEnc}_j \wedge ((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QEnc}] =$$

$$\Pr[Y_0 = 0 \wedge \dots \wedge Y_i = 1 \wedge \dots \wedge Y_\eta = 0] \leq \frac{1}{\eta - 1}.$$

Therefore, the probability that for some (ik, y) that $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{collect}_i$, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{QEnc}_j$ but $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QEnc}$ is at most $\frac{\beta}{\eta - 1}$ where $\beta = \mathbf{poly}(\kappa)$ is an upper bound on the number of queries in $\mathbf{collect}_i$. $\eta = \gamma \cdot \beta$; thus, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{\gamma - 1}$, we must have $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{QEnc}_j$. Since all queries in $\cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{QEnc}_j$ are based on the oracle and the oracle is correct, and because $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QEnc}$, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \cup_{j \neq i} \mathbf{QEnc}_j$. Therefore, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{Aux}$ and that is a contradiction.

3. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow{g} ik) \in \mathbf{QGen}'_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}' \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \mathbf{QCMP} \cup \mathbf{QEnc})$ and there exists no x such that $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \mathbf{QCMP} \cup \mathbf{QGen}'_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}'$: In this case, both distributions will answer with a random response.
4. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow{g} ik) \in \cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \mathbf{QCMP}$ but for no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QGen}'_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}' \cup \mathbf{All}$: In this case, both $\mathbf{DecSim}$ and $\mathbf{DecSim}_0$ will answer with a random response.
5. There exists a ik such that $(tk \xrightarrow{g} ik) \in \mathbf{QEnc} \setminus (\cup_{i \neq h} \mathbf{QGen}_i \cup \mathbf{K} \cup \mathbf{QCMP} \cup \mathbf{QGen}'_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}')$ but for no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \mathbf{QGen}'_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}' \cup \mathbf{All}$: In this case, $\mathbf{DecSim}$ will answer with a random response and we claim that $\mathbf{DecSim}_0$ will also respond randomly. First, note that, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y)$ must appear in $\mathbf{QGen}_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS} \cup \mathbf{T}$ because otherwise there is no way for a distinguisher who only has access to the two distributions to differentiate between the random and true response. Similar to 4.5, we can prove that with probability at least $\frac{1}{\beta}$, for any pair (ik, y) where $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in (\mathbf{T} \cup \mathbf{QGen}_h \cup \mathbf{QCRS}) \cap$

QDec, we also have $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{collect}$. Therefore, since $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{QDec}$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\beta}$, $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y)$ has been collected in **collect**. Suppose that $((ik, *) \xrightarrow{e} y)$ has been asked for the first time in the i th iteration of 4. For no x , $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{Aux}$ because otherwise $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \in \text{All}$ and DecSim would have answered with x instead of a random response. Therefore, $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \text{QEnc}_i$. Also, since $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} y) \notin \text{QGen}'_h \cup \text{QCRS}' \cup \text{All}$, in the i th iteration of collecting the set **collect**, DecSim must have answered the query $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} *)$ with a random response like r . Now because $((ik, x) \xrightarrow{e} r) \in \text{collect}$, DecSim₀ will respond to **qu** with r . Therefore, both responses by DecSim and DecSim₀ are generated randomly.

Chapter 5

Impossibility of PKCom in Shoup's Generic Group Model

In this section, we show that there exists a Shoup's **GGM** oracle relative to which **PKCom** does not exist.

Recall Shoup's Generic Group Model from Definition 2. Throughout this section, we will assume that $p \in [2^\kappa, 2^{\kappa+1}]$ and $S = \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa}$.

Lemma 8. *Let $\mathcal{A}^{\text{label}, \text{add}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow z$ be an arbitrary algorithm (not necessarily poly-query) that outputs a string z while calling $\mathbb{G}_{RR} = (\text{label}, \text{add})$. Let $\mathcal{B}^{\text{label}, \text{add}}(z)$ be an adversary that takes as input the advice z , makes at most u queries to **label** and **add** in total, and outputs a set of labels $\text{Chal} = \{\ell_1, \dots, \ell_t\}$ where $t = 2^{\kappa/3}$. Let $w := \lceil \frac{2(|z|+u)}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$. Let Q be the set of all labels that appear in the responses to the queries made by $\mathcal{B}$. We say the event **Success** holds if (i) all ℓ_i 's are different, (ii) for no $i \in [t]$, $\ell_i \in Q$, and (iii) for at least w indices $i_1, \dots, i_w \in [t]$, $\ell_{i_j} \in \text{label}^*$ for $j \in [w]$. We then have $\Pr[\text{Success}] \leq 2^{-\kappa/2} = \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where the probability is taken over $L \leftarrow \Psi$ and the random coins of $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$.*

Proof 10. The proof of Lemma 8 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 2. Let $s = |\mathcal{S}| = 2^{3\kappa}$. Assume wlog that both $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are deterministic. We prove that any fixed labeling function **label** for which **Success** holds can be uniquely described with

$$f := \log \left(2^{|z|} \binom{p}{w} w! \binom{t}{w} \frac{(s-w)!}{(s-p)!} 2^u w! \right) \quad (5.1)$$

bits.

This means that there exists at most 2^f different **Successful** oracles. Using the inequalities $(a/b)^b \leq \binom{a}{b} \leq (ae/b)^b$, the fraction of **g** oracles for which **Success** holds is at most

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{2^f}{\text{number of } L \text{ oracles}} &\leq \frac{2^{|z|+u} w! \binom{p}{w} w! \binom{t}{w} \frac{(s-w)!}{(s-p)!}}{\frac{s!}{(s-p)!}} = \frac{2^{|z|+u} w! \binom{p}{w} \binom{t}{w}}{\binom{s}{w}} \\
&\leq \frac{2^{|z|+u} w! \left(\frac{pe}{w}\right)^w \left(\frac{te}{w}\right)^w}{\left(\frac{s}{w}\right)^w} = 2^{|z|+u} w! \left(\frac{e^2 tp}{sw}\right)^w \leq 2^{|z|+u} w! \left(\frac{16 \times 2^{\kappa/3}}{2^{2\kappa} w}\right)^w \\
&\leq 2^{|z|+u} w! \left(\frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa} w}\right)^w \quad \text{because } \frac{16 \times 2^{\kappa/3}}{2^{2\kappa}} \leq \frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa}} \text{ for large } \kappa \\
&\leq 2^{|z|+u} \left(\frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa}}\right)^w = \frac{1}{2^{(3/2)\kappa w - |z| - u}} \leq \frac{1}{2^{\kappa/2}},
\end{aligned}$$

as desired. The last inequality follows from $\frac{3}{2}kw - |z| - u \geq k/2$, in turn obtained from $w \geq \frac{2(|z|+u)}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3}$.

We now prove Equation 5.1. Fix a **Successful** labelling function **label**. Let **Chal** = $\{\ell_1, \dots, \ell_t\}$ and wlog assume $\ell_1 <_{\text{lex}} \ell_2 <_{\text{lex}} \dots <_{\text{lex}} \ell_t$, where $\leq_{\text{lex}}$ denotes lexicographical ordering. Let $(\ell_{i_1}, \dots, \ell_{i_w})$ be the w lexicographically smallest elements in **Chal** that have a pre-image under **label**, and let $(x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_w})$ be their pre-images. Let $\text{Chal}_x := \{x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_w}\}$.

We say a query to **add** is *new* for $\mathcal{B}$ if it satisfies the following requirements: (1) the answer to this query is not $\perp$; (2) at least one of the input labels has not been input to queries to **add** made by $\mathcal{B}$ before and the label belongs to **Chal**. Such labels are called *new* labels. Let **New** be the list of pre-images to the new labels in the order as they appear in the queries. Let v be a bit string of length u that records the new queries of $\mathcal{B}$ such that the i th bit of v is 1 if and only if the i th query made by $\mathcal{B}$ is a *new add* query.

Given $\mathcal{B}$ we claim that any **Successful** labeling function **label** can be fully described by z , Chal_x , the index set $\{i_1, \dots, i_w\}$, v , **New** and the outputs of **label** on all input points in $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \text{Chal}_x$. Indeed, for any $x \notin \text{Chal}_x$, the value **label**(x) is already given. We determine the labels of $x \in \text{Chal}_x$ as follows: run $\mathcal{B}^{\text{label}, \text{add}}(g, z)$ to get **Chal**. We first explain how to reply to $\mathcal{B}$'s queries using the provided information.

1. Answering **label** queries of $\mathcal{B}$: By condition (ii), we know the answer does not appear in **Chal**, which means the input of the query does not appear in Chal_x . Since **label** is completely determined on $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \text{Chal}_x$, we can successfully answer such queries.

2. Answering **add** queries of $\mathcal{B}$: First note that by assumption, if the answer to the query is not $\perp$, then its pre-image must be in $\mathbf{Chal}_x$, which means we can answer correctly assuming we know the pre-images to the input labels. In the following, we show how to find pre-images with the provided information. Using v , one can tell if the query is new.

- Suppose the query is new. We then know both of the input labels are valid.
 - If one of the labels has pre-image in $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$ or has been seen before, we can retrieve the pre-image of the other label in **New**.
 - Otherwise, it must be the case that both labels are new and we can retrieve the pre-images in **New**.
- Suppose the query is not new.
 - If the answer query to this query is not $\perp$, it must be the case that the labels either have pre-images in $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$ or have been seen before, we can answer the queries directly.
 - Otherwise, it must be the case that the answer to this query is $\perp$.

Thus, the set $\mathbf{Chal}$ can be retrieved. Once $\mathbf{Chal}$ is retrieved, sort its elements to get $(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_t)$ and use the provided $(i_1, \dots, i_w)$ to retrieve $(\ell_{i_1}, \dots, \ell_{i_w})$. Assuming $\mathbf{Chal}_x = (x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_w})$, we have $\mathbf{label}(x_{i_h}) = \ell_{i_h}$ for $h \in [w]$.

We now count f the number of bits required to describe $\mathbf{Chal}_x$, the indices $\{i_1, \dots, i_w\}$ and $\mathbf{label}$'s outputs on all of $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$. We can describe the sorted set $\mathbf{Chal}_x$ with $\log\left(\binom{p}{w}w!\right)$ bits. We can describe the index set with $\log\left(\binom{t}{w}\right)$ bits. We can describe the function $\mathbf{label}$ on $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \mathbf{Chal}_x$ with $\log\frac{(s-w)!}{(s-p)!}$ bits. The string v has length u . The list **New** can be described with $\log w!$ bits because we can choose a permutation of the w pre-images whose initial items form the list **New**.

Similar to Section 4.2, we introduce a transformation to target-restricted signatures. We begin with some notations.

Definition 11. Let x_ℓ be the variable that is either $\perp$ or x where x is the element in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ whose label is ℓ . If ℓ is invalid label, then x_ℓ is $\perp$.

Definition 12. Suppose $\mathbf{Q}$ is a set of group operation (Q - A pairs). We define $\mathbf{Eq}(\mathbf{Q})$ to be the set of homogeneous linear equations that are directly implied by $\mathbf{Q}$. In other words, for a query $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} \ell_3) \in \mathbf{Q}$, if $\ell_3 \neq \perp$, we add to $\mathbf{Eq}(\mathbf{Q})$ the equation $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell_3} = 0$.

Definition 13. For a set of Q - A pairs, Q , define $\text{Var}(Q)$ to be the set of all labels $\ell \neq \perp$ such that $((*, *) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in Q$.

Definition 14. Let LS be the set of all possible labels $\ell \in S = \{0, 1\}^{3\kappa}$ such that $\ell = \text{label}(x)$ for some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Also, let $v = \text{label}(1)$.

Definition 15 (Updating the Known function). Let $\text{Known} : \text{LS} \mapsto \{\top, \perp\}$ be a function over the set of all possible labels. Given a list L of **add** Q - A pairs, update $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(L)$ as follows. Do the following until no further updates are possible: if there exists $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell_3) \in L$ such that $\text{Known}(\ell_1) = \top$ or $\text{Known}(\ell_2) = \top$, update $\text{Known}(\ell_3) = \top$.

Theorem 6. For $\epsilon := \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}} := (\text{Key}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}})$ be a $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct **PKCom** scheme in the RR generic group model. Suppose a public parameter pp under $\mathcal{E}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}$ satisfies $|\text{pp}| \leq \frac{(n-2)|\ell|}{2}$, where n is the number of users and ℓ is a base label (recall $|\ell| = 3\kappa$, Definition 2). Then, there exists a $(1 - \epsilon)^{\frac{(1-2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}}$ -correct target-restricted signature scheme in the same model.

Construction 3. Let $(\text{Key}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Com}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Enc}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}, \text{Dec}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}})$ be a **PKCom** scheme. We will assume all queries made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ are **add** queries since **label** queries can be answered using **add** queries given $v = \text{label}(1)$. We construct a target-restricted signature scheme defined over messages in $[n]$ from the **PKCom** scheme. We let $\text{Known} : \text{LS} \rightarrow \{\perp, \top\}$, initially set to $\text{Known}(v) = \top$, and $\perp$ for all other labels.

- $\text{Gen}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(1^\kappa, h) \rightarrow (\text{sgk}, \text{vrk})$ where $h \in [n]$ is the message to be signed. For $i \in [n]$ let $\text{QGen}_i = \emptyset$.
 1. For $1 \leq j \leq n$, run $\text{Key}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j)$ and add all Q - A pairs made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ to QGen_j .
 2. Run $\text{Com}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n) \rightarrow \text{pp}$ and let QCMP be the set of all Q - A pairs made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$.
 3. Update $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP})$ (Definition 15).
 4. Return $\text{vrk} = ((\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n), \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP}, \text{Known}, v)$, $\text{sgk} = (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.
- $\text{Sig}(\text{sgk}, h) \rightarrow \sigma$: For sgk as above, return $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.
- $\text{Ver}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{vrk}, \sigma, h) = \text{Ver1}(\text{Ver0}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{vrk}, h), \sigma) : \text{Parse}$
 $\text{vrk} := ((\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n), A, \text{Known}, v)$ and $\sigma := (\text{sk}_h, \text{QGen}_h)$.

1. $\text{Ver0}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{vrk}, h) \rightarrow \alpha := (\text{vrk}, h, m, c, \text{QEnc})$, where $(m, c) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{pp}, h)$ and QEnc is the set of all Q - A pairs made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$.
2. $\text{Ver1}(\alpha, \sigma)$: Retrieve QEnc , $\mathbf{A}$ and Known from α . Recall $\mathbf{A} = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP}$. Let $\text{All} = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc}$. Update $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\text{All})$. Run DecSim which simulates the execution of $\text{Dec}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c)$ by rendering queries via $(\text{All}, \text{QGen}_h)$, as follows: Initialize two sets $\mathbf{E} = \text{Eq}(\text{All})$ and $\mathbf{V} = \text{Var}(\text{All})$. For a given query $\text{add}(\ell_1, \ell_2)$ do the following:
 - (a) If $\ell_1 \notin \mathbf{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$ or $\ell_2 \notin \mathbf{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$, respond to the query with $\perp$.
 - (b) Else if both $\ell_1, \ell_2 \in \mathbf{V}$, if there exists $\ell \in \mathbf{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$ such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_\ell \in \text{Span}(\mathbf{E} \cup \text{Eq}(\text{QGen}_h))$, return ℓ . If no such an ℓ is found, respond with a random label ℓ' , add $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'}$ to $\mathbf{E}$ and add ℓ' to $\mathbf{V}$. Also, set $\text{Known}(\ell') = \top$.
 - (c) Else if there exists a label ℓ such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'} \in \text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\text{QCMP} \cup_i \text{QGen}_i))$, return ℓ ;
 - (d) Else, if there exists a label ℓ such that $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$ and $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_\ell \in \text{Span}(\mathbf{E} \cup \text{Eq}(\text{QGen}_h))$, return ℓ . Else, respond with a random label ℓ' , add $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'}$ to $\mathbf{E}$, and add ℓ' to $\mathbf{V}$. Also, set $\text{Known}(\ell') = \top$.

Let m' be the output of DecSim , output 1 if $m = m'$ and 0 otherwise.

Definition 16. We define some notations based on Construction 3.

1. For $i \in [n]$ let the random variable Qu_i be the set of all Q - A pairs during a random execution of $\text{Enc}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{pp}, i)$. Let Q_i be the set of all labels ℓ such that (a) $(\text{add}(\ell, *) \rightarrow *) \in \text{Qu}_i$ or $(\text{add}(*, \ell) \rightarrow *) \in \text{Qu}_i$ and (b) $\ell \notin \text{Var}(\text{Qu}_i)$. Let VQ_i be the set of all labels ℓ such that (a) $\ell \in \text{Q}_i$ and (b) $\ell \in \text{label}(*)$. Note that $\text{VQ}_i \subseteq \text{Q}_i$.
2. Recalling QEnc from Construction 3 let VQ contain all labels ℓ such that (a) $\ell \in \text{label}(*)$, (b) $(\text{add}(\ell, *) \rightarrow *) \in \text{QEnc}$ or $(\text{add}(*, \ell) \rightarrow *) \in \text{QEnc}$, and (c) $\ell \notin \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$. Note that VQ and VQ_h are identically distributed.
3. Recalling QGen_i from Construction 3 let V_i contain all labels ℓ such that $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$.
4. Recalling QCMP from Construction 3 we construct VCMP_i in an inductive way. First, add to VCMP_i all labels ℓ such that there exists $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in \text{QCMP}$ where $\ell_1 \in \text{V}_i$ and $\ell_2 \in \text{V}_i$. Then, as long as there exist $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in \text{QCMP}$ where $\ell_1 \in (\text{VCMP}_i \cup \text{V}_i)$ and $\ell_2 \in (\text{VCMP}_i \cup \text{V}_i)$, add ℓ to VCMP_i .

Proof of Correctness

Proposition 4. Suppose $n \geq \lceil \frac{2(|\mathbf{pp}|+u)}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$ where u is the total number of queries made by $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pp}, *)$ to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$. For random variables as in Definition 16

$$\Pr[\exists i : ((V_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i) \cap \text{VQ}_i) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq i} (V_j \cup \text{VCMP}_j)] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}.$$

Proof 11. We use notation from Definition 16. Let $t = |\cup_{i=1}^n Q_i|$ be the number of distinct labels in $\cup_{i=1}^n Q_i$ and let $w = \lceil \frac{2(|\mathbf{pp}|+u)}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$. Let $q = |\cup_{i=1}^n \text{VQ}_i|$ be the number of distinct labels in $\cup_{i=1}^n \text{VQ}_i$ and recall all labels in $\cup_{i=1}^n \text{VQ}_i$ are valid. Since for $i \in [n]$, $\text{VQ}_i \subseteq Q_i$, then $\cup_{i=1}^n \text{VQ}_i \subseteq \cup_{i=1}^n Q_i$.

Based on Lemma 8, $\Pr[q \geq w] \leq 2^{-\kappa/2}$. To see why the former claim holds, view $\mathbf{pp}$ in Construction 3 as z in Lemma 8 and view $\cup_{i=1}^n Q_i$ as Chal . Let Small be the event that $q < n$. Since $n \geq \lceil \frac{2(|\mathbf{pp}|+u)}{3\kappa} + \frac{1}{3} \rceil$, $\Pr[\text{Small}] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}$.

We now show assuming Small holds, there exists an index $i \in [n]$ such that $((V_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i) \cap \text{VQ}_i) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq i} (V_j \cup \text{VCMP}_j)$. Suppose not. Then, for all $k \in [n]$, there exists a label ℓ_k such that $\ell_k \in ((V_k \cup \text{VCMP}_k) \cap \text{VQ}_k)$ but $\ell_k \notin \cup_{i \neq k} (V_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i)$. We claim $\ell_1, \dots, \ell_n$ are distinct labels, and since for all i , $\ell_i \in \text{VQ}_i$, the event Small holds, a contradiction. If for two different indices $j, k \in [n]$, $\ell_j = \ell_k$, then $\ell_k \in V_j \cup \text{VCMP}_j$ since $\ell_j \in (V_j \cup \text{VCMP}_j) \cap \text{VQ}_j$. This contradicts the assumption that $\ell_k \notin \cup_{i \neq k} (V_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i)$. The bound of the lemma now follows.

Proposition 5. Let $\ell \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(1^\kappa)$ be an arbitrary poly-query algorithm that takes in the security parameter 1^κ , and outputs a label ℓ . Let Q' be the set of all labels generated by calling $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ during $\mathcal{A}$'s execution. Then,

$$\Pr[\ell \notin Q' \wedge \ell \in \text{label}(*)] \leq 2^{-2\kappa}.$$

Proof 12. Suppose that $\mathcal{A}$ checks r labels using the oracle before outputting the final guess. Recalling the definition of **add** from 2, note that $\mathcal{A}$ can check validity of a label ℓ_1 by querying **add**(ℓ_1, ℓ_1) and if the response was not $\perp$, it can conclude that ℓ' is valid. Since $\mathcal{A}$ is a poly-query algorithm, $q = |Q'| + r = \text{poly}(\kappa)$. Since $\text{label} : \mathbb{Z}_p \mapsto S$ and $p = 2^\kappa$, there are at most 2^κ valid labels. Let Bad_i for $1 \leq i \leq t$ be the event that the i th label that is checked by the adversary is not valid. Then, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$'s final guess is valid is:

$$1 - \Pr[\text{Bad}_{r+1}] = 1 - \frac{2^{3\kappa} - 2^\kappa - r}{2^{3\kappa} - q} \prod_{i=1}^r \Pr[\text{Bad}_i] < 1 - \left(\frac{2^{3\kappa} - 2^\kappa - r}{2^{3\kappa} - q} \right)^{r+1}$$

$$\leq \left(1 - \frac{2^{3\kappa} - 2^\kappa - r}{2^{3\kappa} - q}\right) \sum_{i=1}^r \left(\frac{2^{3\kappa} - 2^\kappa - r}{2^{3\kappa} - q}\right)^i$$

For sufficiently large κ , $\frac{2^{3\kappa} - 2^\kappa - r}{2^{3\kappa} - q} < 1$. Therefore,

$$1 - \Pr[\text{Bad}_{r+1}] < \frac{2^\kappa - |Q'|}{2^{3\kappa} - q} \cdot r$$

For sufficiently large κ ,

$$\frac{2^\kappa - |Q'|}{2^{3\kappa} - q} \cdot r \leq 2^{-2\kappa}$$

Therefore, for sufficiently large κ , $\Pr[\ell \in Q' \wedge \ell \in \text{label}(*)]$ is bounded by $2^{-2\kappa}$.

Lemma 9. Suppose we update $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc})$. Then, assuming

$$((V_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h) \cap \text{VQ}) \subseteq \cup_{i \neq h} (V_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i), \quad (5.2)$$

with probability at least $1 - \text{poly}(\kappa) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$ for any label that $\ell \in \text{Var}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc})$ but $\ell \notin \text{VCMP}_h$, $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$.

Proof 13. Suppose there exists a label $\ell \in \text{Var}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc})$ such that $\ell \notin \text{VCMP}_h$ and $\text{Known}(\ell) = \perp$. There are three cases:

- $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$ where $i \neq h$: Let ℓ be the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$ such that $\text{Known}(\ell) = \perp$. $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$; thus, as per Definition 13, there exists a Q-A pair $((\ell_x, \ell_y) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in \text{QGen}_i$. Therefore $\text{Known}(\ell_x) = \perp$ and $\text{Known}(\ell_y) = \perp$ because otherwise $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$. Since ℓ is the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$ whose $\text{Known} = \perp$, we must have $\ell_x \notin \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i) \wedge \ell_y \notin \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$. Moreover, ℓ_x, ℓ_y must be valid because otherwise, $\ell = \perp$ and $\ell \notin \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$. Based on Proposition 5, the probability that $\ell_x \notin \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i) \wedge \ell_y \notin \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$ but ℓ_x, ℓ_y are valid is at most $2^{-4\kappa}$.
- $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QCMP}) \wedge \ell \notin \text{VCMP}_h$: Let ℓ be the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QCMP})$ such that $\text{Known}(\ell) = \perp$ and $\ell \notin \text{VCMP}_h$. $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QCMP})$; thus, as per Definition 13, there exists a Q-A pair $((\ell_x, \ell_y) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in \text{QCMP}$. Therefore $\text{Known}(\ell_x) = \perp$ and $\text{Known}(\ell_y) = \perp$ because otherwise $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$. Thus, ℓ_x and ℓ_y cannot be in $\cup_{i \neq h} \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_i)$ because otherwise they will be known with probability $1 - 2^{-4\kappa}$ based on the previous case. Since ℓ is the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QCMP})$ whose $\text{Known} = \perp$ and is not in VCMP_h , we must have $(\ell_x \notin \text{Var}(\text{QCMP}) \text{ or } \ell_x \in \text{VCMP}_h)$

and $(\ell_y \notin \text{Var}(\text{QCMP}) \text{ or } \ell_y \in \text{VCMP}_h)$. Moreover, ℓ_x, ℓ_y must be valid because otherwise, $\ell = \perp$ and $\ell \notin \text{Var}(\text{QCMP})$. If both $\ell_x, \ell_y \in \text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h$, then $\ell \in \text{VCMP}_h$. Therefore, at most one of ℓ_x, ℓ_y can be in $\text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h$ and at least one of ℓ_x, ℓ_y must not be in $\text{Var}(\text{QCMP} \cup \text{QGen}_h)$. Thus, at least one of ℓ_x, ℓ_y must not be in $\text{Var}(\text{QCMP} \cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i)$. Based on Proposition 5, the probability that this case happens is at most $2^{-2\kappa} + 2^{-4\kappa}$ which is bounded by $2^{-\kappa+1}$.

- $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$: Let ℓ be the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$ such that $\text{Known}(\ell) = \perp$. $\ell \in \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$; thus, as per Definition 13, there exists a Q-A pair $((\ell_x, \ell_y) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell) \in \text{QEnc}$. Therefore $\text{Known}(\ell_x) = \perp$ and $\text{Known}(\ell_y) = \perp$ because otherwise $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$. Since ℓ is the first label in $\text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$ whose $\text{Known} = \perp$, we must have $\ell_x \notin \text{Var}(\text{QEnc}) \wedge \ell_y \notin \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$. Moreover, ℓ_x, ℓ_y must be valid because otherwise, $\ell = \perp$ and $\ell \notin \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$. Based on 5.2, if $\ell_x \in \text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h$, then $\ell_x \in \cup_{i \neq h} \text{V}_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i$ and based on the two previous cases, $\text{Known}(\ell_x) = \top$ with probability $1 - 2^{-2\kappa}$. Therefore, $\ell_x \notin \text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h$. The same argument holds for ℓ_y . Thus, both of ℓ_x, ℓ_y are not in $\text{Var}(\text{QCMP} \cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QEnc})$. Thus, based on Proposition 5, the probability that ℓ_x, ℓ_y are valid labels is at most $2^{-4\kappa}$. Therefore, the probability that this case happens is at most $2^{-2\kappa+1}$.

Therefore, with probability at least $1 - \text{poly}(\kappa) \cdot 2^{-2\kappa}$, for any label that $\ell \in \text{Var}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc})$ but $\ell \notin \text{VCMP}_h$, $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$.

Proposition 6. *Assuming*

$$((\text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h) \cap \text{VQ}) \subseteq \cup_{i \neq h} (\text{V}_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i), \quad (5.3)$$

the probability that the algorithm Ver (Construction 3) doesn't output the correct bit is at most $1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}$.

Definition 17 (Inconsistency). *Suppose Se is a set of Q-A pairs. We say a Q-A pair $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell')$ is inconsistent with Se if one the following happens:*

- **Inconsistent₁**: *This case happens if Q-A pairs in Se imply that $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \perp)$ while $\ell' \neq \perp$. In other words, Inconsistent₁ happens if:*
 1. $\ell_1 \notin \text{Var}(\text{Se})$ or $\ell_2 \notin \text{Var}(\text{Se})$. Let $b \in \{1, 2\}$ be an index where $\ell_b \notin \text{Var}(\text{Se})$.
 2. There exists a Q-A pair $((\ell_b, \tilde{\ell}) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \perp) \in \text{Se}$ or $((\tilde{\ell}, \ell_b) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \perp) \in \text{Se}$ where $\tilde{\ell} \in \text{Var}(\text{Se})$ or $\tilde{\ell} = \ell_j$ where $j = 1$ or $j = 2$.

3. $\ell' \neq \perp$.

- **Inconsistent₂**: This case happens if Q-A pairs in **Se** imply that $((\ell_1, \ell_2) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell^* \neq \perp)$ while $\ell' \neq \ell^*$. In other words, **Inconsistent₂** happens if:

1. $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*} \in \text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\text{Se}))$.
2. $\ell' \neq \ell^*$.

Claims for Correctness. We assume the underlying **PKCom** scheme is perfectly correct. (i.e., $\Pr[\text{Dec}^{\text{GRR}}(h, \text{sk}_h, \{\text{pk}_i\}, c) = m] = 1$ where $(m, c) \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{RR}}^{\text{G}}(\text{pp}, h)$). Therefore, proving that **DecSim** outputs the same plaintext as $\text{Dec}_{\text{RR}}^{\text{G}}$ will automatically result in **Ver** outputting the correct bit. Later, in Lemma 10, we consider the possibility that the base scheme is not perfectly correct.

Suppose $\text{qu} = \text{add}(\ell_1, \ell_2)$ is the first query inside **DecSim** whose response creates an inconsistency as per Definition 17. Let ℓ' be the response generated by **DecSim** and view $(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$ where **T** is the previous set of Q-A pairs in **DecSim** as **Se** in Definition 17.

- If qu results in **Inconsistent₁**, then we must have $\ell_j \notin \text{Var}(\cup \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$ where $j = 1$ or $j = 2$.

we must also have $\ell' \neq \perp$ because otherwise we would not run into an inconsistency. Considering the **DecSim** procedure in answering queries, $\ell' \neq \perp$ if and only if $\ell_1 \in \text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$ and $\ell_2 \in \text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$. It is easy to see that $\text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h) = \text{Var}(\cup \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$ which contradicts $\ell_j \in (\text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h))$ for $j = 1, 2$. Therefore, **Inconsistent₁** does not happen.

- If qu results in **Inconsistent₂**, then:

1. $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*}$ must be in $\text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}))$.
2. $\ell' \neq \ell^*$.

First we argue that in order for **Inconsistent₂** to occur, we must have:

$$\ell^* \in \text{Var}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$$

Let's call this condition **Cond**. Suppose not. Then, there is no Q-A pair such that

$$((*, *) \xrightarrow{\text{add}} \ell^*) \in \cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}.$$

Thus, there must be a query $((\ell^*, *) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} l_y) \in \cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}$ or $((*, \ell^*) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} l_y) \in \cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}$ because otherwise $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*}$ could have not been in $\text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}))$. Since $\ell^* \notin \text{Var}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$, Proposition 5 implies that ℓ^* is invalid with probability $1 - 2^{-2\kappa}$. Therefore, $l_y = \perp$ with probability $1 - 2^{-2\kappa}$. Since equations containing $\perp$ will not be added to the $\text{Eq}(\ast)$, no equation containing x_{ℓ^*} will be added to $\text{Eq}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T})$ which contradicts $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell^*} \in \text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\cup_{i=1}^n \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}))$. Therefore, if **Cond** does not hold, the probability that **qu** causes **Inconsistent₂** is at most $2^{-2\kappa}$.

Now, suppose there exist a Q-A pair $((\ell'_1, \ell'_2) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} \ell^*) \in \cup \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc} \cup \text{T}$. We consider all possible cases:

1. $\ell^* \in \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$: Suppose $((\ell'_1, \ell'_2) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} \ell^*) \in \text{QEnc}$. If both $\ell_1, \ell_2 \in \text{V}$, then considering Condition 1, by Item 2b of DecSim, $\ell' = \ell^*$. Else, we claim that $\text{Known}(\ell^*) = \top$; thus, considering Condition 1, by Item 2d of DecSim, $\ell' = \ell^*$. If $\text{Known}(\ell^*) = \perp$, then $\text{Known}(\ell'_1) = \perp$ and $\text{Known}(\ell'_2) = \perp$. Recall updating **Known** in 2 and 3. Based on Lemma 9, if $\ell'_1 \in \text{Var}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc}) \setminus \text{VCMP}_h$, with probability $1 - \text{poly}(\kappa).2^{-2\kappa}$, we must have $\text{Known}(\ell'_1) = \top$. Suppose $\ell'_1 \notin \text{Var}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{QEnc}) \setminus \text{VCMP}_h$, thus there are two possible cases:
 - (a) $\ell'_1 \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h) \cup \text{VCMP}_h$: Considering Definition 16, $\ell'_1 \in (\text{V}_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h) \cap \text{VQ}$ but $\ell'_1 \notin \cup_{i \neq h} (\text{V}_i \cup \text{VCMP}_i)$ (because otherwise based on our updating in 3, $\text{Known}(\ell'_1) = \top$) which contradicts Equation 5.3.
 - (b) $\ell'_1 \notin \text{Var}(\text{All} \cup \text{QGen}_h)$: ℓ'_1 must be valid because otherwise $\ell^* = \perp$ and **qu** could not have caused **Inconsistent₂**. Thus, by Proposition 5, the probability of this case happening is at most $2^{-2\kappa}$.

Therefore, the probability that $\text{Known}(\ell'_1) = \perp$ and $\text{Known}(\ell'_2) = \perp$ is at most $(\text{poly}(\kappa).2^{-2\kappa})^2 = \text{poly}(\kappa).2^{-4\kappa}$. Thus, the probability that $\ell^* \in \text{Var}(\text{QEnc})$ and $\text{Known}(\ell^*) = \perp$ is bounded by $2^{-3\kappa}$.

2. $\ell^* \in \text{Var}(\cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP})$: Suppose $((\ell'_1, \ell'_2) \xrightarrow[\text{add}]{} \ell^*) \in \cup_i \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP}$. If $\ell_1 \in \text{V} \wedge \ell_2 \in \text{V}$, considering Condition 1 above, Item 2b of DecSim, implies that $\ell' = \ell^*$. Else, if $\ell_1 \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$ or $\ell_2 \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$, considering Condition 1 above, Item 2c of DecSim, implies that $\ell' = \ell^*$.
3. $\ell^* \in \text{Var}(\text{T})$: Since $\ell^* \notin \text{Var}(\text{All} \cup \text{QGen}_h)$, ℓ^* must be one of the labels that are randomly generated by DecSim. Therefore, based on the definition of DecSim,

$\text{Known}(\ell^*) = \top$. Thus, if $\ell_1 \in \mathbf{V} \wedge \ell_2 \in \mathbf{V}$, considering Condition 1 above, Item 2b of DecSim, implies that $\ell' = \ell^*$ and if $\ell_1 \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$ or $\ell_2 \in \text{Var}(\text{QGen}_h)$, considering Condition 1 above, Item 2c of DecSim, implies that $\ell' = \ell^*$.

Thus, if Cond holds, the probability that **qu** causes **Inconsistent**₂, is at most $2^{-3\kappa}$. Therefore, Ver doesn't output the correct bit with probability at most $\text{poly}(\kappa) \cdot (2^{-3\kappa} + 2^{-2\kappa}) \leq 2^{-2\kappa/3}$.

Lemma 10. *Suppose Π is the signature scheme defined in Construction 3 with oracle access of the form $(\text{Gen}^{\text{GRR}}, \text{Sig}, \text{Ver}^{\text{GRR}})$ and the **PKCom** scheme underlying Π is $(1 - \epsilon)$ -correct. Then, Π is $(1 - \epsilon) \frac{(1 - 2^{-\kappa/3})}{n}$ correct.*

Proof 14. Let **Success** be the event that the verification algorithm outputs the correct bit. In other words, if **Success**_{*i*} holds, we have: $\text{Ver}^{\text{GRR}}(\text{vrk}, \text{Sig}(\text{sgk}, i), i) = 1$ where $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\text{GRR}}(1^\kappa, i)$. Finally, let **X** be the random variable denoting the message chosen to be signed. Also, let **Good** be the event that there exists $h \in [n]$ for which Proposition 4 holds. In other words, if **Good** happens, for some $h \in [n]$ we have:

$$((V_h \cup \text{VCMP}_h) \cap \text{VQ}) \subseteq \cup_{j \neq h} (V_j \cup \text{VCMP}_j)$$

Based on Proposition 4, $\Pr[\text{Good}] \geq 1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Pi \text{ is correct}] &= \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \mathbf{X} = i] \Pr[\mathbf{X} = i] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] \\ \Pr[\text{Success}_i] &= \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] + \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \overline{\text{Good}}] \Pr[\overline{\text{Good}}] \geq \\ &\Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \Pr[\text{Good}] \geq (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \\ \Rightarrow \Pr[\Pi \text{ is correct}] &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i] \geq \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{Success}_i | \text{Good}] \geq \\ &\frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) \Pr[\text{Success}_h | \text{Good}] \geq \frac{1}{n} (1 - 2^{-\kappa/2}) (1 - \epsilon) (1 - 2^{-2\kappa/3}) \geq (1 - \epsilon) \frac{(1 - 2^{-\kappa/3})}{n} \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Security

Lemma 11 (Security of Construction 3). *Construction 3 is zero-time unforgeable if the **PKCom** scheme is secure.*

Proof 15. We show how to transform an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the signatures into an adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{B}, \mathbb{G}_{RR}}$ against PKCom.

1. $\mathcal{A}$ samples h , and for $i \in [n] \setminus \{h\}$, it samples $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Key}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(1^\kappa)$ and collects the Q-A pairs made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ in QGen_i . It then gives $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \neq h}$ to the challenger to receive (pk_h, ct) .
2. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\text{Com}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_n)$ and adds all Q-A pairs made to $\mathbb{G}_{RR}$ to QCMP. Then, $\mathcal{A}$ updates $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QCMP})$ forms $\text{vrk} := (\{\text{pk}_i\}, \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP}, \text{Known}, v)$, where $v = \text{label}(1)$.
3. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\text{vrk}, h)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $(\text{ct}', *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^{\mathbb{G}_{RR}}(\text{pp}, h)$ η times, each time recording the queries in a set QEnc' , and then runs DecSim while using QEnc' , records all queries in collect and updates $\text{Known} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\text{collect})$.
5. $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\text{DecSim}_0(\text{sk}'_h, h, \text{ct})$: Let $\text{All}' = \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP} \cup \text{collect}$ and let $\text{E} = \text{Eq}(\text{All}')$ and $\text{V} = \text{Var}(\text{All}')$. For a query $\text{qu} := \text{add}(\ell_1, \ell_2)$:
 - (a) if $\ell_1 \notin \text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}'_h)$ or $\ell_2 \notin \text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}'_h)$, respond to qu with $\text{add}(\ell_1, \ell_2)$.
 - (b) if $\ell_1 \in \text{V}$ and $\ell_2 \in \text{V}$ if there exists $\ell \in \text{V} \cup \text{Var}(\text{QGen}'_h)$ such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_\ell \in \text{Span}(\text{E} \cup \text{Eq}(\text{QGen}'_h))$, return ℓ . If no such an ℓ is found, respond with a random label ℓ' , add $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'}$ to E and add ℓ' to V . Also, set $\text{Known}(\ell') = \top$.
 - (c) Else if there exists a label ℓ such that $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'} \in \text{Span}(\text{Eq}(\text{QCMP} \cup_{i \neq h} \text{QGen}_i \cup \text{QGen}'_h))$, return ℓ ;
 - (d) Else, if there exists a label ℓ such that $\text{Known}(\ell) = \top$ and $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_\ell \in \text{Span}(\text{E} \cup \text{Eq}(\text{QGen}'_h))$, return ℓ . Else, respond with a random label ℓ' , add $x_{\ell_1} + x_{\ell_2} - x_{\ell'}$ to E , and add ℓ' to V . Also, set $\text{Known}(\ell') = \top$.

Let $\text{All} := \cup_{j \neq h} \text{QGen}_j \cup \text{QCMP}$ and let QEnc be the set of all Q-A pairs made during $(\text{ct}, *) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pp}, h; R)$. Also let QDec and QDec' be the set of Q-A pairs made by DecSim and DecSim_0 , respectively and let T be the set of all Q-A pairs made by $\mathcal{B}$ while forging $(\text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h)$. Finally, we need to prove that with high probability, for all queries, the following distributions are the same:

$$\text{D} : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}, \text{T}, R, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h)$$

and

$$D' : (\text{QGen}_{j \in [n]} \cup \text{QCMP}, \{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \text{QEnc}, \text{ct}, \sigma, \text{QDec}', T, R, \text{sk}'_h, \text{QGen}'_h).$$

The proof follows exactly the same steps as 5 where the adversary against the [PKCom](#) uses its full oracle access to **add** to make up for its lack of access to **QEnc**.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Omitted Proofs

For sake of completeness, here we include a full of Lemma 1, which is heavily based on that of [Zha22] and is simply adapted to our setting.

of Lemma 1 - adapted from [Zha22]. Consider choosing an oracle O , a random m , and $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^O(1^\kappa, m)$, and then fixing them. We will say that σ is “good” if $\Pr[\text{Ver}^O(\text{vrk}, m, \sigma) = 1] \geq \delta/2$, where the probability is taken over the random coins of Ver . By correctness, with probability at least $\delta/2$ over m , $(\text{sgk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^O(1^\kappa, m)$, there will exist at least one good σ , namely the output of $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig}^O(\text{sgk}, \mathbf{m})$.

Suppose Ver0 was deterministic. Then we could compute $v \leftarrow \text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{m})$, and consider the oracle-free probabilistic circuit $C(\sigma) = \text{Ver1}(v, \sigma)$. Then an input σ is good if and only if $C(\sigma)$ accepts with probability at least $\delta/2$. Since C is oracle-free, we can brute-force search for such a σ , finding it with probability at least $\delta/2$. The forgery will then be (m, σ) , which is accepted by the challenger with probability $\delta/2$, giving an overall advantage $\delta^2/4$.

For a potentially randomized Ver0 , we have to work slightly harder. For a good σ , we have that $\Pr_{v \leftarrow \text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{m})}[\Pr[\text{Ver1}(v, \sigma) = 1] \geq \delta/4] \geq \delta/4$. Meanwhile, we will call a σ “bad” if $\Pr_{v \leftarrow \text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{m})}[\Pr[\text{Ver1}(v, \sigma) = 1] \geq \delta/4] \leq \delta/8$.

For a parameter t chosen momentarily, we let $v_1, \dots, v_t \leftarrow \text{Ver0}^O(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{m})$, and construct circuits $C_i(\sigma) = \text{Ver1}(v_i, \sigma)$. We then brute-force search for a σ such that $\Pr_{i \leftarrow [t]}[\Pr[C_i(\sigma) = 1] \geq \delta/4] \geq 3\delta/8$. By Hoeffding’s inequality, any good σ will be a solution with probability $1 - 2^{-\Omega(\delta^2 t)}$. Meanwhile, any bad σ will be a solution with probability $2^{-\Omega(\delta^2 t)}$. By setting t such that t/δ^2 is sufficiently longer than the bit-length of signatures, we can union bound over all bad δ , showing that there will be no bad solutions except with negligible probability.

We will therefore find a not-bad solution with probability at least $\delta/2 - \text{negl} \geq \delta/3$. In this case, with probability at least $\delta/8$ over the choice of v by the verifier, $\Pr[\text{Ver1}(v, \sigma) = 1] \geq \delta/4$. Hence, the overall success probability is at least $(\delta/3) \times (\delta/8) \times (\delta/4) \geq \delta^3/100$. $\square$