<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T19:41:08Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/16103" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/16103</identifier><datestamp>2025-03-26T23:34:10Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9924</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9930</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Goldberg, Ian</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="10e75553-d8e8-4acf-98b9-134924f47cdc" confidence="600">Komlo, Chelsea</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2020-08-07T16:32:54Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2020-08-07T16:32:54Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2020-08-07</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2020-07-27</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/16103</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Scaling anonymity networks offers unique security challenges, as&#xd;
attackers can exploit differing views of the network’s topology to&#xd;
perform epistemic and route capture attacks. Anonymity networks in&#xd;
practice, such as Tor, have opted for security over scalability by&#xd;
requiring participants to share a globally consistent view of all relays&#xd;
to prevent these kinds of attacks. Such an approach requires each user&#xd;
to maintain up-to-date information about every relay, causing the total&#xd;
amount of data each user must download every epoch to scale linearly&#xd;
with the number of relays. As the number of clients increases, more&#xd;
relays must be added to provide bandwidth, further exacerbating the&#xd;
total load on the network.&#xd;
&#xd;
In this work, we present Walking Onions, a set of protocols improving&#xd;
scalability for anonymity networks. Walking Onions enables constant-size&#xd;
scaling of the information each user must download in every epoch, even&#xd;
as the number of relays in the network grows. Furthermore, we show how&#xd;
relaxing the clients’ bandwidth growth from constant to logarithmic can&#xd;
enable an outsized improvement to relays’ bandwidth costs. Notably,&#xd;
Walking Onions offers the same security properties as current designs&#xd;
that require a globally consistent network view. We present two protocol&#xd;
variants. The first requires minimal changes from current onion-routing&#xd;
systems. The second presents a more significant design change, thereby&#xd;
reducing the latency required to establish a path through the network&#xd;
while providing better forward secrecy than previous such constructions.&#xd;
We evaluate Walking Onions against a generalized onion-routing anonymity&#xd;
network and discuss tradeoffs among the approaches.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">cryptography</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">privacy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">anonymity</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">Tor</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Master Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="discipline" lang="en">Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="grantor" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Master of Mathematics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Goldberg, Ian</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="affiliation1" lang="en">Faculty of Mathematics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="city" lang="en">Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="country" lang="en">Canada</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="province" lang="en">Ontario</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="typeOfResource" lang="en">Text</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
</dim:dim>
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