<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T21:53:39Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/16246" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/16246</identifier><datestamp>2025-03-26T23:36:07Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9936</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9949</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Jennewein, Thomas</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Lütkenhaus, Norbert</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="e2234901-97cb-4887-8d55-0abe4ed9af0c" confidence="600">Chaiwongkhot, Poompong</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2020-09-03T19:19:52Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2020-09-03T19:19:52Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2020-09-03</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2020-08-26</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/16246</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Information security becomes an inseparable part of our everyday life. An encryption&#xd;
method widely used today is public-key encryption. The security of this method is based on&#xd;
a hard to solve mathematical problems against an adversary with limited computational&#xd;
power. Such an assumption could be broken as our understanding of the mathematics&#xd;
being improved or new computation tools being developed. One such tool that poses a&#xd;
threat to the public key encryption is a quantum computer. As a result, a new encryption&#xd;
method with a new security assumption is required.&#xd;
Quantum key distribution is a point-to-point symmetric key distribution method with&#xd;
security based on the law of physics. In theory, the key generated by QKD is informationtheoretic secured. However, in practice, physical devices could have flaws or possess some&#xd;
behaviors deviated from the theoretical model. These imperfections could open security&#xd;
loopholes for an adversary to exploit, compromising the security. Thus the security verification and system characterization of practical implementation of QKD are necessary.&#xd;
The necessity of this verification is further emphasized as several QKD systems are being&#xd;
commercialized and used in several discrete communication links today.&#xd;
To extend this new encryption system’s practical implementation on a wider network&#xd;
scale requires a set of standards or common practices for developers and service providers&#xd;
to follow. This set of rules is set to ensure the compatibility of different device models in&#xd;
the network and ensure the security of each component in the system, which would affect&#xd;
the security of the system as a whole.&#xd;
To fulfill standardization and certification criteria, a record of best practice on security&#xd;
analysis, system design, device characterization, and security verification of QKD implementation is required. The research projects throughout my Ph.D. study contribute toward&#xd;
this practice. These studies also address some issues and provide possible solutions to the&#xd;
development of a standard for QKD. This thesis is a collection of six experimental studies&#xd;
on performance evaluation and security verification of different components of practical&#xd;
quantum key distribution systems.&#xd;
The first study is a comparison between the performance of the QKD system with&#xd;
quantum dot (QD) as a single-photon source and the performance of QKD with weakcoherent pulsed (WCP) source. The result shows that the QKD with QD could generate&#xd;
the key at higher channel loss than WCP QKD using the same laser source. This result&#xd;
shows the potential of QKD with a single-photon source as a candidate for secret key&#xd;
distribution over high channel loss, such as up-link satellite-based QKD.&#xd;
The second study is a theoretical study on the method to characterize the QKD system&#xd;
against the Trojan-horse attack being considered as a standard for the QKD system. The&#xd;
result shows a possible loophole of this method against a more powerful adversary than&#xd;
assumed in the previously proposed model. An improved version of characterization against&#xd;
a more general form of Trojan-horse attack has been proposed.&#xd;
The third experiment is on the information leakage from a free-space QKD receiver due&#xd;
to detector backflash, a photon produced by the detector upon detection. The result shows&#xd;
that the backflash photons carry the information of the ’clicked’ detector that could be&#xd;
transmitted back to the channel and discriminated by Eve. An experimental demonstration&#xd;
of this attack has been performed. Countermeasure both in theory and practical setup has&#xd;
been proposed.&#xd;
The next experiment is on the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial-mode&#xd;
detection efficiency mismatch attack on the free-space QKD system. We show that, by&#xd;
using a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and hologram created by Zernike polynomials, atmospheric turbulence with various strength covered from sea level to upper&#xd;
atmosphere can be experimentally emulated in the lab environment. We then use that&#xd;
setup to show the limit of the distance that Eve’s attack is successful. The theoretical&#xd;
limit of the attack distance also shown.&#xd;
In the fifth study, we use the SLM and Zernike polynomial holograms to characterize a&#xd;
free-space QKD system against spatial mode attack. The result shows that, with higherorder spatial modes and finer control of wavefront intensity distribution, Eve could bypass&#xd;
the countermeasure proposed in our previous study. We proposed a more robust version&#xd;
of countermeasure against spatial mode attack. The new countermeasure is verified by the&#xd;
SLM setup.&#xd;
The last study is on the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor (TES). The&#xd;
result shows that TES’s voltage response can be deterministically controlled by Eve using&#xd;
bright laser through the input channel. It also shows that the photon number result from&#xd;
TES can be controlled by Eve. An attack model exploiting this imperfection has been&#xd;
shown.&#xd;
In addition to the contribution to the standardization of the QKD system, I hope that&#xd;
the result of this thesis would emphasize the necessity of security verification of the QKD&#xd;
system and the verification of countermeasure and characterization method against more&#xd;
general attack model. Although the unconditional security, promised in theory, could not&#xd;
yet be achieved, this loop of hacking and patching should provide us information and insight&#xd;
on which security level could be claimed from the practical QKD devices implementing&#xd;
today.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">quantum key distribution</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">security verification</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Toward standardization of Quantum Key Distribution</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Doctoral Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Physics and Astronomy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="discipline" lang="en">Physics (Quantum Information)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="grantor" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Jennewein, Thomas</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Lütkenhaus, Norbert</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="affiliation1" lang="en">Faculty of Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="city" lang="en">Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="country" lang="en">Canada</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="province" lang="en">Ontario</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="typeOfResource" lang="en">Text</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
</dim:dim>
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