<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T14:51:41Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/17550" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/17550</identifier><datestamp>2025-03-26T23:35:26Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9936</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9949</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Lütkenhaus, Norbert</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="f830f513-c745-4be3-b4f0-a3e36a50b00d" confidence="600">Lin, Jie</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2021-09-27T18:38:00Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2021-09-27T18:38:00Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2021-09-27</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2021-09-21</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/17550</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be proved to be secure by laws of quantum mechanics. In this thesis, we review security proof methods in Renner&amp;apos;s framework and discuss numerical methods to calculate asymptotic and finite key rates. These methods are highly versatile and applicable to general device-dependent QKD protocols. We also discuss analytical tools that extend the applicability of these numerical methods. We then present the asymptotic security proof against collective attacks for a variant of the twin-field QKD protocol, which can overcome the repeaterless secret-key capacity bound. Our variant reduces the sifting cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as both signals and test states. We confirm the loss scaling of this protocol. Another important family of protocols that we investigate here are discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD protocols. They are interesting due to their experimental simplicity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks. Our security proof method can provide tight asymptotic key rates. We demonstrate that the postselection of data in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We analyze both untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios.  Our results in the trusted detector noise scenario show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors. Finally, we present several simple examples to illustrate our newly developed method for the numerical finite-key analysis against the most general attacks via the entropy accumulation theorem.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">quantum key distribution</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">security proof</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">numerical key rate calculation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">phase-matching measurement-device-independent</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">entropy accumulation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution: Methods and Applications</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Doctoral Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Physics and Astronomy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="discipline" lang="en">Physics (Quantum Information)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="grantor" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="embargo" qualifier="terms" lang="en">0</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Lütkenhaus, Norbert</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="affiliation1" lang="en">Faculty of Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="city" lang="en">Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="country" lang="en">Canada</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="province" lang="en">Ontario</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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