<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T20:55:26Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/18700" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/18700</identifier><datestamp>2025-03-26T23:32:59Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9924</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9930</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Asokan, N</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="ff2417ef-47b4-469d-a18a-61e33a48bce5" confidence="600">Ghorshi, Seyedeh Setareh</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2022-09-01T18:12:45Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2022-09-01T18:12:45Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2022-09-01</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2022-08-25</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/18700</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Memory corruption vulnerabilities in low-level languages such as C/C++ have been&#xd;
a problem in computer security for a long time. Accordingly, there has been a wide&#xd;
variety of proposed solutions for detecting or preventing memory corruption attacks. Due&#xd;
to the constantly evolving nature of such attacks and the importance of achieving high&#xd;
performance in most applications, no comprehensive solution has yet been developed to&#xd;
efficiently secure all data in the program memory and mitigate such attacks. Nevertheless,&#xd;
solutions that only protect critical data in memory provide a balance between security and&#xd;
efficiency that could be practical in many applications.&#xd;
Accordingly, we introduce SafeDS, an extension to the C++ standard library containers&#xd;
that provides secure design and implementation for three frequently-used data structures.&#xd;
We assume a powerful adversary with arbitrary read/write access to the memory but unable&#xd;
to access and modify reserved registers. Data integrity is ensured by SafeDS within the data&#xd;
structures in the presence of such adversary through calculating a Message Authentication&#xd;
Code (MAC) for each element, which can then be used to validate data when reading from&#xd;
the data structure.&#xd;
&#xd;
Our secure data structures are implemented as a part of the gcc-11.1.0 C++ Standard&#xd;
Library and are compatible with both ARM and x86 architectures. We use the Pointer&#xd;
Authentication (PA) hardware extension on ARM-v8 and Intel AES-NI instruction set to&#xd;
calculate MACs on ARM and x86 architectures, respectively.&#xd;
By testing our prototype against applications that use the data structure APIs in the&#xd;
C++ standard library, such as OpenCV, we show that switching to the secure version of&#xd;
data structures requires minimal changes to the applications’ original source code. Our&#xd;
secure data structures use a Merkle tree to securely store one MAC for each instance&#xd;
of them in the program. Therefore, we can theoretically estimate that an overhead of&#xd;
order O(log(i)) will be added to the data structure operations, where i is the number of&#xd;
data structure instances in the program. However, since the design for the secure data&#xd;
structures ties the MAC calculation and verification to the normal steps of the operations,&#xd;
the rest of the MAC related operations only add a constant overhead. The performance&#xd;
of our prototype has been evaluated using the provided performance tests in OpenCV,&#xd;
and our results show that the secure data structures introduce an overall overhead of 3.4%&#xd;
compared to the baseline. Furthermore, we present game-based proofs to prove the security&#xd;
of our designed data structures against data corruption attacks.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">SafeDS: Safe Data Structures for C++</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Master Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="discipline" lang="en">Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="grantor" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Master of Mathematics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="embargo" qualifier="terms" lang="en">0</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Asokan, N</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="contributor" qualifier="affiliation1" lang="en">Faculty of Mathematics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="city" lang="en">Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="country" lang="en">Canada</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="published" qualifier="province" lang="en">Ontario</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="typeOfResource" lang="en">Text</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
</dim:dim>
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