<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T20:52:05Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/4367" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/4367</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T17:21:10Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9865</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9888</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="43797fce-d873-4096-84e9-e645bffdbeb2" confidence="600">Shehan, Michael</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2009-04-30T19:28:16Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2009-04-30T19:28:16Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2009-04-30T19:28:16Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2009</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4367</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Theories of practical reasoning and rationality have been expounded at least as far back as the Greeks.  Beginning with several historical perspectives, I attempt to answer the descriptive and normative questions of practical reasoning and rationality.  I then turn to a popular modern attempt, expected utility theory.  I conclude that this approach cannot be sustained because of inherent inconsistencies and its inability to generate advice for a class of problems that other decision procedures can handle.  I conclude by offering support for a new model of practical reasoning, the practical argument model.  I explain the three dimensions of normative assessment for this model: logical, inferential and epistemic.  I then show how an expected utility decision-procedure is encompassed by the practical argument model and, therefore, subject to these three levels of assessment.  I conclude by offering some directions for future research.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">rationality</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">practical reasoning</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Practical Reasoning and Rationality</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Master Thesis</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Master of Arts</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
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