<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T13:36:47Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/4538" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/4538</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T17:00:24Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9865</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9868</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="ba85e931-17ae-466d-b53d-97a934efdf71" confidence="600">Berger, Leslie</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2009-08-07T19:26:19Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2009-08-07T19:26:19Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2009-08-07T19:26:19Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2009-07-10</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4538</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">The purpose of this study is to investigate how different incentive contracts that include forward-looking and contemporaneous goals motivate managers to make decisions consistent with the organization’s long-term objectives, in tasks of varying complexity.  Two research questions are addressed.  First, in a long-term horizon setting, how do incentive contracts based on various combinations of forward-looking and contemporaneous measures influence decisions?  Second, how does task complexity influence the expected effect of various incentive contracts on management decisions?  &#xd;
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I address my research questions using a multi-period experiment where I compare the effects of three different incentive structure types and two different levels of task complexity.  Results show that in a low complexity task, individuals perform better when only contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded in the incentive contract than when both forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded.  In a high complexity task, individuals perform better when both contemporaneous and forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded, but only when the contemporaneous goal attainment is weighted more heavily in the incentive contract.     &#xd;
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My research contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  First, this is the first study of which I am aware that compares the performance effects of long-term incentive contracts that reward forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment.  Second, this study is the first of which I am aware to experimentally test incentive contracts, for employees with a long-term horizon, that incorporate various weightings of forward-looking measures in the contract.  In addition, this study will be amongst the first to examine the impact of task complexity on incentive contract effectiveness.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">forward-looking goals</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">incentives</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">contemporaneous goals</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">long-term employment horizon</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">task complexity</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Accounting</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">How incentive contracts and task complexity influence and facilitate long-term performance</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Doctoral Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending" lang="en">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">School of Accountancy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="typeOfResource" lang="en">Text</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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