<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T09:36:24Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/5261" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/5261</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T16:50:48Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9924</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9934</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="87eeddbb-b12b-4b39-a95d-cf7985382fcc" confidence="600">Gornall, William</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2010-06-11T22:32:30Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2010-06-11T22:32:30Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2010-06-11T22:32:30Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2010</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/5261</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">This thesis models rational criminals and regulators with flawed incentives. In it we develop a rational model of crime and regulation that we use to show the SEC&amp;apos;s current incentive structure is ineffective at preventing fraud. Under our model, criminals balance the monetary rewards of &#xd;
larger frauds against an increased chance of &#xd;
being apprehended; and regulators design regulations to  minimize either the damage caused by  fraud or  some &#xd;
other metric. We show that under this model, the SEC&amp;apos;s focus on &amp;apos;stats&amp;apos; and &amp;apos;quick hits&amp;apos; leads to large frauds and a large social loss. We argue that regulators need to focus not just on successful prosecutions, but also on harm reduction and deterrence.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">Finance</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">Regulation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Quantitative Finance</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Financial Fraud: A Game of Cat and Mouse</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Master Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending" lang="en">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Dean of Mathematics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Master of Quantitative Finance</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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