<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T21:39:48Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6225" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6225</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T17:38:35Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9865</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9888</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="c16b5cfe-d6f6-4b5a-8733-7a00cc408446" confidence="600">Blouw, Peter</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2011-08-31T19:39:25Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2011-08-31T19:39:25Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2011-08-31T19:39:25Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2011</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6225</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Concepts are widely agreed to be the basic constituents of thought. Amongst philosophers and psychologists, however, the question of how concepts are structured has been a longstanding problem and a locus of disagreement. I draw on recent work describing how representational content is ascribed to populations of neurons to develop a novel solution to this problem. &#xd;
Because disputes over the structure of concepts often reflect divergent explanatory goals, I begin by arguing for a set of six criteria that a good theory ought to accommodate. These criteria address philosophical concerns related to content, reference, scope, publicity, and compositionality, and psychological concerns related to categorization phenomena and neural plausibility.&#xd;
Next, I evaluate a number of existing theoretical approaches in relation to these six criteria. I consider classical views that identify concepts with definitions, similarity-based views that identify concepts with prototypes or exemplars, theory-based views that identify concepts with explanatory schemas, and atomistic views that identify concepts with unstructured mental symbols that enter into law-like relations with their referents. I conclude that none of these accounts can satisfactorily accommodate all of the criteria. &#xd;
I then describe the theory of representational content that I employ to motivate a novel account of concept structure. I briefly defend this theory against competitors, and I describe how it can be scaled from the level of basic perceptual representations to the level of highly complex conceptual representations. On the basis of this description, I contend that concepts are structured dynamically through sets of transformations of single source representation, and that the content of a given concept specifies the set of potential transformations it can enter into. I conclude by demonstrating that the ability of this account to meet all of the criteria introduced beforehand. I consider objections to my views throughout.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">concepts</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">mental representation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">mental content</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">categorization</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">compositionality</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">semantic pointers</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">cognitive science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">A Dynamic Account of the Structure of Concepts</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Master Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="comment" qualifier="hidden" lang="en">Corrections to the title page and page numbering have been made.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending" lang="en">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Master of Arts</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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