<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T18:11:02Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6787" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6787</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T21:33:29Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9924</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9934</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="64cf1bb2-d6a5-4b8b-8e0e-4edd3dc9b162" confidence="600">Aoun, Bassam</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2012-06-14T19:15:02Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2012-06-14T19:15:02Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2012-06-14T19:15:02Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2012-06-01</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6787</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">Arbitrageurs play an important role in keeping market prices close to their fundamental&#xd;
values by providing market liquidity. Most arbitrageurs however use leverage. When&#xd;
funding conditions worsen they are forced to reduce their positions. The resulting selling&#xd;
pressure depresses market prices, and in certain situations, pushes arbitrage spreads to&#xd;
levels exceeding many standard deviations. This phenomenon drove many century old&#xd;
financial institutions into bankruptcy during the 2007−2009 financial crisis. In this thesis,&#xd;
we provide empirical evidence and demonstrate analytically the effects of funding liquidity&#xd;
on arbitrage. We further discuss the implications for risk management.&#xd;
To conduct our empirical studies, we construct a novel Funding Liquidity Stress Index&#xd;
(FLSI) using principal components analysis. Its constituents are measures representing&#xd;
various funding channels. We study the relationship between the FLSI index and three&#xd;
di↵erent arbitrage strategies that we reproduce with real and daily transactional data.&#xd;
We show that the FLSI index has a strong explanatory power for changes in arbitrage&#xd;
spreads, and is an important source of contagion between various arbitrage strategies. In&#xd;
addition, we perform “event studies” surrounding events of changing margin requirements&#xd;
on futures contracts. The “event studies” provide empirical evidence supporting important&#xd;
assumptions and predictions of various theoretical work on market micro-structure.&#xd;
Next, we explain the mechanism through which funding liquidity affects arbitrage&#xd;
spreads. To do so, we study the liquidity risk premium in a market micro-structure framework&#xd;
where market prices are determined by the supply and demand of securities. We&#xd;
extend the model developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen [BP09] to multiple periods&#xd;
and generalize their work by considering all market participants to be risk-averse. We&#xd;
further decompose the liquidity risk premium into two components: 1) a fundamental&#xd;
risk premium and 2) a systemic risk premium. The fundamental risk premium compensates&#xd;
market participants for providing liquidity in a security whose fundamental value is&#xd;
volatile, while the systemic risk premium compensates them for taking positions in a market&#xd;
that is vulnerable to funding liquidity. The first component is therefore related to the&#xd;
nature of the security while the second component is related to the fragility of the market&#xd;
micro-structure (such as leverage of market participants and margin setting mechanisms).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">Funding Liquidity</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">Arbitrage</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Actuarial Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Funding Liquidity and Limits to Arbitrage</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Doctoral Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="comment" qualifier="hidden" lang="en">No written permission is required.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending" lang="en">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">Statistics and Actuarial Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="typeOfResource" lang="en">Text</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
</dim:dim>
</metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>