<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-22T18:12:59Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6817" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6817</identifier><datestamp>2017-03-21T17:15:53Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10012_9924</setSpec><setSpec>com_10012_1</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_9930</setSpec><setSpec>col_10012_6</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" authority="a3127163-2b51-4900-86b0-7e4dec9b7399" confidence="600">Essex, Aleksander</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2012-07-05T13:16:05Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2012-07-05T13:16:05Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2012-07-05T13:16:05Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="submitted">2012</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6817</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en">In this dissertation we study the problem of making electronic voting trustworthy through the use of cryptographic end-to-end (E2E) audits. In particular, we present a series of novel proposals for cryptographic election verification with a focus on real-world practicality. We begin by outlining fundamental requirements of E2E election verification, important properties for a real-world settings, and provide a review of previous and concurrent related work. Our research results are then presented across three parts. &#xd;
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In the first part we examine how E2E election verification can be made more procedurally familiar to real-world voters and election administrators. We propose and implement an E2E add-on for conventional optical-scan based voting systems, and highlight our experiences running an election using this system in a United States municipality.&#xd;
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In the second part we examine how E2E election verification can be made more conceptually and procedurally simple for election verifiers/auditors. We present a non-cryptographic E2E system based on physical document security assumptions as an educational tool. We extend this system to a cryptographic setting to show how the procedures of cryptographic election verification can be completed with relatively tiny software code bases, or by using common-place programs such as a desktop spreadsheet. We then present an approach that allows verifiers to conduct cryptographic audits without having to plan for it prior to an election.&#xd;
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In the third part we examine how the methods in the first part can be extended to provide a level of privacy/distribution of trust similar to that of classical cryptographic voting protocols, while maintaining the (comparatively) intuitive optical-scan interface. To that end, we propose a novel paradigm for secure distributed document printing that allows optical-scan ballots to be printed in a way that still lets voters check their ballots have been counted, while keeping their voting preferences secret from election officials and everyone else.&#xd;
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Finally we outline how the results obtained in each of the three parts can be combined to create a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable voting system that simultaneously offers a conventional optical-scan ballot, ballot secrecy assured by a distribution of trust, and a simple, cryptographically austere set of audit procedures.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en">University of Waterloo</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">computer science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">security</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">applied cryptography</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en">trustworthy elections</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" qualifier="program" lang="en">Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en">Cryptographic End-to-end Verification for Real-world Elections</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Doctoral Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="comment" qualifier="hidden" lang="en">This thesis includes portions of published work. Publishers of that work do not require written permission for it to be published in this venue/context/manifestation.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="pending" lang="en">false</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" qualifier="department" lang="en">School of Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws-etd" element="degree" lang="en">Doctor of Philosophy</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="peerReviewStatus" lang="en">Unreviewed</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="uws" element="scholarLevel" lang="en">Graduate</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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